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Ominous or auspicious soccer 
Tensions between autochthons and settlers or immigrants have been a worrying 
phenomenon in many parts of the world, from Europe to Africa and beyond. In a 
striking but relatively unknown case in north-eastern Ghana, such tensions found 
a way out in unimaginable ethnic cleansing between autochthons and a dominant 
group of immigrants. Although the analysis of these hostilities contributes a lot to 
a better understanding of ethnic violence throughout the globe, this study specifi-
cally seeks to explore the possibilities of making peace between autochthons and 
immigrants. Let’s specify this focus with a case study.  
On 15 May 2005, I watched the Chamba Soccer Heroes play a friendly match 
against the Nanumba Nationals, the Bimbilla town team which successfully plays 
in Ghana’s second league. The Chamba team was made up of Konkomba players 
and that of Bimbilla town of Nanumba. The exceptionality of this match has to 
be understood against the background of three episodes of communal violence 
between members of the Konkomba and Nanumba ethnic groups in 1981, 1994 
and 1995 in the Nanumba districts (congruent with the Nanumba Traditional 
Area of Nanun), in the Northern Region of Ghana. Each lasted for only a few 
days, but left thousands of civilians dead. These were the most intense outbursts 
of violence in Ghana, an otherwise relatively peaceful country enjoying civil 
rule. A hotchpotch of relief-providing non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
brokered a successful peace accord between delegates of both groups in 1996.  
Visiting this soccer match was part of my study. The Chamba soccer team had 
arranged a large yam truck to convey around forty players and supporters (myself 
2 
 
included) to Bimbilla town (30 km to the east) for a nominal fee. In a cacophony 
of drumming, the truck left Chamba, a predominantly Konkomba town of some 
7000 inhabitants. The journey went through rolling hills on which farmers amidst 
abundant yam mounts cheeringly raised their hoes as the truck passed by. Half-
way to Bimbilla, we crossed Dakpam with its still ruined chiefly palace, its 
crumbling colonial office from which a Nanumba sniper used to kill Konkomba 
attackers and the abandoned well which holds a Nanumba mass grave. But the 
truck drove on and the drumming continued. After Dakpam, we crossed another 
three villages with separate Konkomba and Nanumba quarters before reaching 
the environs of Bimbilla, the district and traditional area capital with over 20,000 
inhabitants, where no Konkomba have permanently lived since the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1981.  
When the truck reached its destination, the Bimbilla Secondary School foot-
ball pitch, the Chamba supporters had become quiet. As the match started, 
Nanumba Nationals scored twice in three minutes, a lead they increased to a final 
score of seven goals to one. But the players shook hands and parted as if the 
match had ended in an insignificant draw. The Chamba boys walked to town to 
buy some snacks, and subsequently their truck left quietly in the night. The next 
morning – and the following days – the match was however the talk of the town 
in Chamba. By-passers repeatedly stopped at the house of my assistant – the 
Soccer Heroes’ striker – and teased him with the score, saying ‘you are just a 
bush team!’  
The point of this seemingly insignificant narrative is partly in what happened – 
Konkomba and Nanumba men voluntarily played a soccer match against each 
other – but especially in what did not happen. Matches in Nanun, as elsewhere in 
the world, seem to have the capacity to symbolise and canalise all sorts of social 
strife and are characterised by biting insults and nasty tackles. A few weeks after 
this match, for example, the Chamba team played a friendly match against a 
neighbouring Konkomba team, one which local police had to close after one of 
the teams started hurling stones at the other. Compared to this and all other intra-
ethnic matches I watched, that between Bimbilla and Chamba was surprisingly 
calm and devoid of any provocation. 
Because I encountered this calm not only in the soccer match, but many 
informants continuously describe their ‘peace’ as calm or coolness (Konkomba 
nsudoon; Nanumba sodoo) and not as unity (Konkomba kimòkbaan; Nanumba 
nangbaŋyini), I realised that it was probably impossible to understand Kon-
komba/Nanumba coexistence without putting such calm or excessive normality 
of their interactions central. This observation is important because the main 
broker of the 1996 peace agreement on the invitation of the NGO Consortium, 
suspected post-conflict calm. Hizkias Assefa, a devout Christian from Ethiopia, 
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was the director of the Kenyan Nairobi Peace Initiative and he has since medi-
ated in various peace processes around the continent. As one the most prominent 
scholars in peace studies, his work addressed several pertinent issues in this 
introduction. In his most influential publication Peace and Reconciliation as a 
Paradigm (1993), which formed the basis of the Ghanaian peace workshops, 
Assefa argued that the absence of violence is not the same as peace, because the 
people’s suppression of discussing conflict issues is born from their ‘misguided 
perception that by avoiding conflict, it will go away’ (Assefa 1996 [1993]: 43-
44). For Assefa, peace-building always required a transformative ‘reconciliation 
politics’ to construct ‘relationships full of energy and differences’ (op. cit.: 56-
57).  
However, the question is whether there has ever been an energetic Kon-
komba/Nanumba peace to fall back on. Peter Skalník, the anthropologist who has 
conducted decades of fieldwork in Nanun told me when I presented the above 
case to him, that such a voluntary match would have been unthinkable in the pre-
conflict era (Skalník, personal communication) & David Tait, an influential 
political anthropologist working among Konkomba in the 1950s, described the 
relationships between Konkomba and neighbouring ethnic groups as a permanent 
state of reserve (Tait 1953). From that perspective, the soccer match may have 
been auspicious rather than ominous. 
This book is about Konkomba/Nanumba peace and its manifestations. My line 
of argumentation will be that a conflict avoidance calm is eclipsed by a legalistic 
discourse which produces both authoritative statements and, in their shadow, 
silences about the key conflict issue in Nanun. This key issue, as I seek to un-
ravel, is the extent to which Konkomba as settlers are prepared to subordinate 
their citizenship and subject themselves to a Nanumba autochthonous power of 
decision about local leadership in Nanun. Rather than avoiding these issues, 
Konkomba and Nanumba seemed to save them for what they considered to be the 
right form and occasion, often a legal setting. Whereas the soccer match between 
the Nanumba townspeople and the Konkomba ‘from the bush’ had a strong 
symbolic value, players and supporters did not allude to this value during the 
match.  
The calm observed, then, was a deliberate silence for the sake of security and a 
future resolution of the conflict. I will demonstrate that the communal violence 
which haunted Nanun has had the same objectives of security and clarification. 
Making this point convincing requires a conceptualisation of both violence and 
peace and how they alternated in cycles of escalation and de-escalation in Nanun. 
To do so, I will focus on the case of a local leadership dispute in Chamba town 
between Konkomba and Nanumba from 1996 to 2007 and more specifically on 
the attempts to peacefully solve this dispute. This argument unfolds between the 
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1996 peace agreements and 2007 ‘renewed commitments’ to these agreements, 
following serious tensions in Chamba and Bimbilla. 
Before describing how this line of thought structures the rest of this book, this 
chapter embeds my research focus in the ethnographic field of Nanun and in 
relevant theoretical debates. This introduction consists of roughly three parts. 
After an introduction to the setting of this study and its scholarly niche, I con-
struct a theoretical framework, a cluster of related issues in political anthropol-
ogy, to inform my argument. The first theoretical section contextualises what 
may be called the content of the Konkomba/Nanumba contestations: The tension 
between citizen and subject positions in discourses of autochthony and ethnicity. 
From there, I study the forms in which this cluster of themes has been addressed, 
respectively in violence, peace-building and the current legalistic petitions. The 
third and final part of this chapter clarifies the structure of the rest of the book by 
using the 1996 peace agreements as a leitmotiv and makes a number of meth-
odological dilemmas, to which I return in the final conclusion, explicit.  
Konkomba/Nanumba violence and peace 
Why was there the need for a peace accord in the first place? In spite of its mani-
festations, the Konkomba/Nanumba violence is better not interpreted as age-old 
‘tribal’ hatred. It was not until the 1920s, during British colonialism, that Kon-
komba farmers from the Ghana/Togo borderlands settled in the fertile and 
sparsely populated Nanumba land hundred kilometres to the south. This was an 
unplanned family movement, but together they came in such great numbers that 
within decades, they outnumbered the autochthonous Nanumba perhaps two to 
one. This demography of Nanun has no equivalent in Ghana.  
It is crucial to note from the onset that land scarcity has never been a signifi-
cant issue in Nanun until very recently. With 144,278 inhabitants in an area of 
4178 km2, it had a population density half that of the national average by 2000 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2002). Rather, it was however not until the 1970s, 
against the backdrop of ethnic emancipation movements, that Konkomba and 
Nanumba leaders started blaming each other’s backwardness and claiming the 
development they felt entitled to. The resulting contestation between Nanumba, 
who have claimed certain political and economic privileges as the autochthons in 
Nanun, and Konkomba, who in spite of accepting their settler status demand 
equal citizenship, exemplifies what is known in political anthropology as the 
‘politics of belonging’ (see below). The Nanun case may contribute to a better 
understanding of these politics, not only because of its demographic make-up but 
also because of the huge outbursts of violence emanating from these and the bold 
attempt to peacefully resolve these tensions.  
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The Konkomba/Nanumba conflict has actually revolved around the same 
problem for three decades: Whether a form of local Konkomba self-determinacy 
in Nanun was a right or a revolt. The general Nanumba theory has supported the 
latter view, namely that such leadership flouts Nanumba authority as landowners 
and consequently, challenged the Nanumba title to land and the integrity of the 
Nanumba traditional area attached to this title. Many Konkomba, on the contrary, 
interpreted this Nanumba position as a sign that their livelihood in Nanun was a 
privilege rather than a citizenship right. Over time, this controversy fed mutual 
theories of exploitation: Nanumba found their hospitality taken for granted be-
cause Konkomba flourished on their lands without paying respect to their leader-
ship; Konkomba felt denigrated because they felt that they could live in Nanun 
only by the grace of oppressive Nanumba authorities. The 1996 peace agree-
ments aimed to stop both the mutual fear of being displaced from Nanun and the 
mutual sentiments of being exploited by stipulating that Konkomba and Na-
numba would positively coexist in Nanun as ‘brothers in development’ (see be-
low). 
As I show in greater detail in chapter two, three events in 1979 brought 
Konkomba and Nanumba in conflict. First, as Ghana returned to civil rule after 
almost a decade of military rule, a new constitution was passed which sought to 
integrate ‘traditional’ forms of administration into government. The ‘modern’ 
state delegated its sovereignty in terms of land tenure and settlement regulations 
to chieftaincy, as it was regulated by customary law (Ray 1996: 189). In Nanun, 
only Nanumba customary law, which had been drawn up a year earlier, was 
recognised, because only they were autochthonous, as an ethnic group repre-
sented by their chieftaincy. According to these regulations, settlers and their chil-
dren who were born and bred in Nanun and who had acquired full local citizen-
ship, were still strangers according to customary law and could be removed from 
Nanun if they displayed ‘bad character or contempt for authority’.  
Second, a few months after the constitution’s endorsement, the Nanumba 
paramount chief Bimbilla Naa won a decade-long court case between him and 
the paramount chief of Akyodé to the south about the entitlement to the area 
around Kpasa town, which was mostly inhabited by Konkomba. The Bimbilla 
Naa installed Nanumba chiefs in this area, but local Konkomba did not recognise 
the authority of these chiefs.  
Third, late in 1979, the Bimbilla branch of the recently established Konkomba 
Youth Association installed a headman to arbitrate Konkomba marital cases in 
town. In the 1960s and 1970s, as elsewhere in the country, both Konkomba and 
Nanumba Youth Associations tried to mobilize their ethnic groups for rural 
development. Rather than an age category, youth in Ghana implied a socio-
political denomination of literate modernizers aspiring to territorial or ethnic 
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‘unity for development’ by creating cohesive narratives, rituals and symbols and 
lobbying on the national and regional level claiming to speak on behalf of their 
entire ethnic groups (Lentz 1995: 395, 416; 1994: 461). The development agen-
das of these associations combined a pursuit of national or regional resources and 
an emancipation or modernization of their ethnic groups (see chapter two). 
The Nanumba Youth Association tried to overcome the outdated tribute regu-
lations of their mostly illiterate chiefs, while the Konkomba Youth Association 
focused on the feuds among, and general backwardness of, their target group. 
Konkomba youth were struggling to overcome the many disputes in arranged 
marriages which they thought retarded their ethnic unity. Realizing that they 
could not erase these marriage customs overnight, they at least claimed the right 
to arbitrate these cases themselves rather than Nanumba chiefs who were unfa-
miliar with Konkomba culture. The Bimbilla Naa regarded this a subversion of 
his sovereignty and gave the Konkomba arbitrator an ultimatum to stop his 
‘illegal’ activities. When the latter ignored this ultimatum, he was removed from 
Bimbilla.  
In 1981, as the Konkomba Youth Association went to High Court to defend 
the citizenship right of free settlement, Nanumba chiefs and the activists of the 
Nanumba Youth Association removed the Konkomba youth and their families 
from Bimbilla town. The next morning, Konkomba chased or killed the Na-
numba chiefs and all other Nanumba living in the Kpasa area.  
Violence neither broke out because Konkomba found Nanumba chiefs back-
ward and ‘feudal’, because most Nanumba agreed with them, nor because 
Nanumba considered Konkomba backward and warlike, because most Kon-
komba agreed with them. Rather, it was a mutual sense of being victimised by 
the others’ illegal action which led to violence. Konkomba considered their sub-
jection to Nanumba chiefs a violation of their citizenship rights, while Nanumba 
considered the Konkomba rejection of Nanumba authority a violation of their 
traditional rights as autochthons in Nanun. So while Konkomba/Nanumba coex-
istence has been shrouded in mutual sentiments of exploitation – Konkomba 
exhaust the land, while Nanumba are feudal – has just been a latent condition for 
victimhood about what they considered the illegal subordination of their autoch-
thony or citizen equality. As the President of Ghana stuck to this constitutional 
paradox, Konkomba and Nanumba took the law into their own hands in 1981. 
The way in which the internal Konkomba and Nanumba moral ethnicities were 
eclipsed by a newly found but seemingly age-old political tribalism shocked the 
nation.  
After several tense months with regular ambushing, Nanumba youth tried to 
restore Nanumba sovereignty over the Kpasa area, but their expedition resulted 
in mutual ethnic cleansing which claimed thousands of lives, especially of 
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Nanumba, until the national army stopped the fighting. President Limann person-
ally ‘reconciled’ Konkomba and Nanumba and installed a commission of inquiry 
to investigate the war. Half a year after the violence, however, the Limann ad-
ministration was toppled in a military coup and the military leader (Jerry 
Rawlings) blamed the Konkomba/Nanumba war on Limann’s waning regime and 
suspended the commission of inquiry.  
The case simmered silently in Nanun and produced mutual conspiracy theories 
about future ethnic cleansing. After the 1981 violence, Konkomba and Nanumba 
leaders strengthened their citizenship and autochthony claims, while rhetorically 
challenging each other’s claims: KOYA openly started to challenge Nanumba 
autochthony in Nanun, while Nanumba spokesmen challenged Konkomba citi-
zenship, especially after Ghana’s return to civil rule in 1992. After thirteen years, 
as Ghana had just returned to civil rule and reinstalled the constitution, a market 
riot over the purchase of a guinea fowl south of Bimbilla sparked off violence 
between Konkomba and Nanumba again. Within three days, Konkomba had 
driven Nanumba together in Bimbilla and its vicinity, while they controlled the 
rest of Nanun.  
Again, the army had to save Bimbilla but a state of emergency, ceasefire and 
commission of inquiry could not stop the violence. After a year of hostilities of 
growing intensity, communal violence started again when a prominent Kon-
komba ran into a Nanumba ambush early 1995. This event motivated relief-
providing NGOs to engage in an alternative peace process led by Hizkias Assefa, 
which soon eclipsed the government commission of inquiry and resulted in the 
peace agreement a year later.  
In a series of peace workshops focused on reconciliation, Konkomba and 
Nanumba delegates accepted to coexist in Nanun. According to the resulting 
peace accord, Nanumba were autochthons, while Konkomba were equal citizens; 
Nanumba would not use their autochthony privileges to denigrate Konkomba 
citizenship rights, while Konkomba would not subvert Nanumba autochthony 
with their citizenship majority. In other words, ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ politics 
would be disentangled (see below). 
Since 1996, there has been no Konkomba/Nanumba violence but although the 
issue of Konkomba leadership had been addressed in the peace agreement, a case 
of local Konkomba leadership in Chamba town threatened to escalate in 2002 
and 2006/early 2007. What is about this issue, which is actually embedded in a 
cluster of related issues, that it seems to have haunted Konkomba/Nanumba 
coexistence for nearly three decades? And how should we assess the 2002 and 
2006/2007 tensions; positively, because no violence occurred, or negatively, 
because apparently, this issue still has the potential to ignite ethnic tensions in 
Nanun? Answering these pressing questions requires a theoretical conceptualiza-
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tion of the issue of Konkomba leadership in the context of the constitutional 
paradox sketched above and the link between ethnicity and autochthony, but 
especially how this issue has been addressed violently and peacefully.  
Before turning to these theoretical themes, it has to be stressed that the 
Konkomba/Nanumba conflicts have been the largest of more than a dozen ethnic 
conflicts with growing intensity in the Northern Region of Ghana from the late 
1970s until the mid-1990s. The 1994 violence erupted amidst tensions in adja-
cent parts of northern Ghana and after the market riot, fighting spread over the 
entire eastern part of the Northern Region, an area the size of the Netherlands. 
The violence between Konkomba and Nanumba even seemed to dissolve in a 
wider confrontation in which Dagomba and Gonja allied with Nanumba to com-
bat Konkomba. However, in the subsequent peace processes, these occasional 
alliances were eclipsed by local peculiarities. So while I have benefited much 
from the available insightful comparative studies of these series of conflicts 
(Bogner 2000: 183; Brukum 2000: 131; Drucker Brown 1995; Jönnson 2007; Pul 
2003: 62), the focus of this study requires going beyond these accounts.  
The Konkomba/Nanumba peace was the last and most difficult to accomplish 
and with a reason. A brief overview of the other conflicts will show the differ-
ence with adjacent conflicts. British colonialism fixed a distinction between 
groups centralised around chieftaincy with a common history of conquering 
several ‘indigenous’ but segmented lineage societies, the latter who were to be 
integrated into the lower ranks of the formers’ chiefdoms (see chapter two; cf. 
Bogner 1996; Brukum 2000: 139; Drucker Brown 1995; Jönnson 2007: 25; 
Katanga 1994; Kirby 2002; Pul 2003: 57, 60). After Independence, the constitu-
tional re-confirmation of chieftaincy and its entitlement to land in Ghana’s Third 
Republic (1979-1981) and Fourth Republic (1992-), boosted the ethnic develop-
ment agenda of centralised groups (Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba) but thwarted 
that of a dozen so-called ‘minorities’, some of whom, especially Konkomba, 
were demographic majorities (Bogner 2000: 187; Brukum 2001; Drucker Brown 
1995: 51; Jönnson 2007: 9). Throughout the Northern Region, numerous ‘mi-
norities’ started to contest their subject position, using their first-comers argu-
ment. Realising the extent to which politico-administrative channels are pasted 
onto chieftaincy in Ghana, some of them also claimed autonomy in terms of 
chieftaincy. However, because the Government had delegated its sovereignty to 
the House of Chiefs which was monopolised by the existing chiefs, such requests 
were not successful and led to several violent confrontations.  
Scholars mentioned above have shown how several such local conflicts fed 
conspiracy theories about an imminent large-scale confrontation between ma-
jorities and minorities. So when Konkomba settler farmers became involved as 
allies to the Nawuri conflicts with Gonja in 1991 and 1992, and Konkomba youth 
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in 1993 claimed a ‘traditional area’ to be carved out of the Dagomba chiefdom’s 
east where they considered themselves indigenous, resentments simmering for a 
decade or so between Konkomba and Nanumba ignited early in 1994. The result 
was a full-fledged war between Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba and Konkomba.  
But whereas the escalation of the Konkomba/Nanumba tensions in 1994 has to 
be understood in the direct context of these series of conflicts, the peace process 
revealed profound local disjunctions. In the Gonja/Nawuri and Dagomba/- 
Konkomba conflicts, the so-called minorities claimed to be indigenous in eastern 
Gonja respectively eastern Dagomba and demanded autonomy. In the Kon-
komba/Nanumba case, however, Konkomba did not claim to be indigenous to the 
Nanumba area and hence did not claim autonomy but integration into Nanumba 
chieftaincy. This attempt was much bolder than in the Gonja/Konkomba case, 
where Konkomba settlers do not constitute a demographic majority.  
With my focus on Nanun, I follow in the footsteps of the political anthropolo-
gist Peter Skalník, who conducted fieldwork in Nanun from the late 1970s to the 
early 2000s. Although his prime research focus was on the political structure of 
Nanumba, the outbreak of violence in Nanun led him to focus on what he called 
the ‘troubled coexistence’ of Konkomba and Nanumba. My scope here is explic-
itly on the success of the peace accord between Konkomba and Nanumba in a 
historical perspective, but this focus requires discussing and at times critically 
reworking several themes in Skalník’s analysis.  
In the next sections I conceptualize four themes in Skalník’s analysis of Kon-
komba/Nanumba conflict and peace and place them in current anthropological 
debates. The first is the constitutional paradox that Konkomba and Nanumba are 
simultaneously Ghanaian citizens and subjects of chiefs and that Konkomba, as 
settlers by traditional definition, are degraded citizens. This tension was usually 
phrased in terms of ethnicity. The second theme concerns violence, or how and 
why Konkomba and Nanumba took the law into their own hands. According to 
Skalník, we have to look at the processes by which they internalised the colonial 
system of coercion which they put to play in the waning post-colony. The third 
theme is about ending the violence and solving the conflict; Skalník argued that 
the state misrecognised the modern dimension of apparently traditional issues 
and that it froze the conflict (Skalník 1983: 22; 1989: 161; 2003: 70-71), while 
the NGO Consortium successfully accomplished a sort of compromise. The last 
theme deals with the ways in which Konkomba and Nanumba themselves have 
tried to address their conflict issues in a non-violent way. Skalník described how 
both sides have tried to gather written evidence to back their claims (Skalník 
2002: 165).  
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Citizens, subjects and autochthony 
Skalník outlined that while British colonialism allowed free settlement through-
out the protectorate in which Nanun was located, it also applied indirect rule to 
glue each tribe to its traditional area. This colonial construction, by no means 
peculiar to northern Ghana (cf. Geschiere & Jackson 2006: 4), returned in the 
1979 constitution which confirmed equal Ghanaian citizenship for Konkomba, 
while they were also confronted with a de facto secondary position as the sub-
jects of Nanumba chiefs (Skalník 1983: 23; 1989: 164; 2002: 165; 2003: 72).  
In a wider perspective, Mamdani, in his influential work Citizen and Subject, 
argued that the ‘despotic’ colonial state in Africa deliberately opposed the 
modern urban civilian (citizen), possessing individual rights according to civil 
law, to the rural peasant, who was subject to ‘customary law’ and chiefs (1996: 
10, 23, 109). As he argued, customary law is not so much a set of positive rights 
but rather a straitjacket of naturalized customs (1996: 110; cf. Chanock 1998; 
Oomen 2005; Ubink 2007: 23-28). In the post-colony, this dichotomy continued 
to haunt African states, either in seesaw movements or in a paradoxical simulta-
neity (Mamdani 1996: 291; respectively 2001: 31; cf. Brempong 2003: 40). In 
Ghana, a certain seesaw mechanism from indirect rule (1931-1951), when 
Konkomba and Nanumba had no citizenship, to Nkrumah’s modernization 
(1951-1966), when Konkomba and Nanumba were no formal subjects of chiefs, 
resulted in the 1979 and post-1992 bifurcated law in which they were simultane-
ously citizens and subjects. 
Although this double position of citizen and subject applies to both Konkomba 
and Nanumba in Nanun, the salience of the Konkomba case is that as subjects of 
Nanumba chieftaincy, they have been considered strangers, whose residency was 
always a privilege instead a right. Although Konkomba are just one of many 
groups of settlers in Nanun (see chapter two), all other groups are marginal in 
terms of demography and they hardly contested Nanumba privileges.  
It is striking that this took such a rigid ethnic form, because both Konkomba 
and Nanumba generally acknowledged that their ethnicity is of recent vintage 
and largely emergent from their violent relationships (Skalník 1983: 25; 1987: 
308; cf. Barth 1969). In a useful theory transcending primordial and instrumen-
talist approaches of ethnicity, Lonsdale distinguished a fixed exterior component 
(‘political tribalism’) from a variable moral internal component (‘moral ethnic-
ity’). In the case of Mau Mau, a primordial facade of Kikuyu tribalism splintered 
behind the scene in moral struggles over what made a good Kikuyu (Lonsdale 
1992: 466; cf. Ranger 1993). I follow Lonsdale’s approach because it helps to 
explain the seemingly paradoxical realities in which Konkomba youth wanted 
Nanumba to keep away from their marital disputes so that they themselves could 
morally intervene in these traditions; or how Nanumba youth were struggling to 
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modernize their customary law but suddenly enforced these customs on Kon-
komba when they flouted this traditional rule. As we will see in the following 
chapters, Youth Associations in Nanun have been central in the oscillations be-
tween internal divisions and external aggressiveness. The emphasis on ‘tradi-
tional’ issues by modernizing youth actually led to the Ghanaian state consis-
tently misrecognizing the modernity of the Konkomba/Nanumba conflict (Skal-
ník 1989: 161).  
Consequently, Nanumba have often discursively exploited the marks of their 
autochthony, especially access to earth shrines, against Konkomba. As I show 
below, political anthropologists such as Meyer Fortes & David Tait described 
how Tallensi and Konkomba political autonomy was based on the performance 
of earth sacrifices. Several recent studies on Volta Basin societies of Northern 
Ghana and Burkina Faso have shown how marks of autochthony, especially 
access to earth shrines and settlement histories, can be strategically used to prove 
autochthony, even in spite of contestable entitlements and ongoing mobility 
(Hagberg 1998, 2006a,b; Hagberg & Tengan 2000; Kuba 2006; Lentz 2003, 
2006a,b,c; Lund 2003, 2006, 2008; Luning et al. 2005; Schlottner 1995, 2000). I 
follow this approach but also elaborate on it by investigating the relationship 
between such discourses and the actual performance of sacrifices in earth shrines 
(see chapter five).  
As Geschiere and his co-authors have shown, the exclusion of strangers by 
‘traditional’ criteria may enter, and erode, the realm of citizenship, through a 
‘politics of belonging’ in which autochthons fearing to be outvoted by settlers 
pursue an agenda that one can only vote or stand candidate where one really 
belongs (Bayart et al. 2001; Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Geschiere & Meyer 
1998; Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000; Geschiere & Jackson 2006). In an insightful 
publication, Geschiere & Meyer (1998) diagnosed how the 1990s upstream of 
political and economic liberalisation (endorsed by Bretton Woods organisations) 
paradoxically led to local mechanisms of exclusion based on autochthony. In 
chapter four I study whether these politics of belonging have challenged the 
peace of Nanun.  
Geschiere & Nyamnjoh argued that contrary to ethnicity, which requires at 
least a kind of cultural or linguistic basis, discourses of autochthony are ‘a trope 
without a substance of its own’, and therefore display a ‘paradoxical combination 
of staggering plasticity and celebration of seemingly self-evident “natural 
givens”’ (2000: 448; cf. Geschiere & Jackson 2006: 5). Precisely the elasticity of 
criteria of belonging exacerbates suspicion and may motivate violence to unmask 
the plots of strangers (Geschiere & Jackson 2006: 6; see next section).  
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Violence, sovereignty and security 
How to conceptualise the Nanun violence? That the above-mentioned cluster of 
themes generated tensions may not be surprising but the enormous outbreak of 
communal violence in which neighbours started to kill each other certainly 
shocked the nation. Like many analysts, I found that violence evades simple 
definition. While some analysts defined violence as ‘physical hurt’ (e.g. Riches 
1986), one may object that not all pain is violent (think of surgery, Spencer 1996) 
and that not all violence is physical (cf. Bourgois 2001). Part of the definition 
problem is that while violence may be a universal human capacity, its manifesta-
tions are contingent (Abbink 2000: xii; Robben & Nordstrom 1995: 3; Scheper-
Hughes & Bourgois 2003: 3; Whitehead 2004: 10).  
While several scholars understood violence as an assault on personhood (Das 
2006; Jackson 2002: 45; Scarry 1985; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2003: 1), 
such otherwise interesting analyses run the risk of dissolving violence into the 
wider concept of suffering. I have chosen therefore to narrow violence down to 
the Konkomba notion of kijaak and the Nanumba notion of tobu, both which 
were commonly used to describe the violence of 1981, 1994 and 1995, which 
imply intentional communal violent conflict and the need for ritual cleansing of 
the earth. These concepts exclude tension-exacerbating verbal ‘violence’ (LIK 
kininkpòkpòk; NAN zabili) and ‘structural violence’, which may be labelled as 
poverty (LIK igiin; NAN fara) or more specifically as exploitation (‘chopping’, 
LIK ji; NAN dibu).  
Why did the kijaak/tobu violence break out? This question resembles that of 
Appadurai (1998), namely, how ethnic enmity motivates individuals to kill their 
neighbours or friends. Appadurai explains ethnic violence as a technique of 
creating certainty in the face of the changing realities of globalisation which, 
along similar lines as argued by Geschiere & Meyer, engender profound notions 
of uncertainty.1 He argued that ethnic violence is a macabre technique of 
establishing certainty through cleansing (chasing or killing the enemy), but also a 
technique of ‘vivisection’, to investigate the victim’s otherness and ascertain 
blurry dichotomies of ethnic self and other (op. cit.: 912).  
In his 2001 When Victims Become Killers, Mamdani brilliantly showed how 
such techniques of ethnic violence are linked to notions of victimhood and justi-
fication of violence. While in an influential study, Riches interpreted violence as 
an arena of contested legitimacy between perpetrators, victims and witnesses 
                                                 
1  For the impact of globalisation, see Appadurai (1996), Comaroff & Comaroff (2003), Piot (1999) and 
Tsing (1993, 2005). 
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(Riches 1986: 8),2 Mamdani showed that the categories of perpetrators and vic-
tims are much more complicated. In Rwanda, both Hutu and Tutsi so-called 
perpetrators justified their violence by claiming to be victims of illegal suppres-
sion. This cycle of linking justice to violence could only be broken if both sides 
were prepared to consider themselves survivors rather than victims (Mamdani 
2001: 268; see chapter three). 
What is the role of the nation-state, the expected agency of legitimate vio-
lence, in such ethnic violence? Recent scholarship has described how especially 
in parts of Africa, state agencies may not only be incapable of maintaining the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, but also unwilling to do so because 
they benefit from disorder (Bayart, Ellis & Hibou 1999: 18; Chabal & Daloz 
1999). This blur of war and criminality and the oft-associated political economy 
of greed (cf. Collier 2003) has been dubbed ‘new wars’ by some scholars (Kaldor 
1999; Duffield 2001; cf. Cramer 2005; Richards 2005 for critiques). While such 
depictions may hold true for certain nations on the continent, the Nanun violence 
occurred during civil rule in Ghana. Here, it was not so much the criminalisation 
of the state, although people in Nanun suspected many state representatives of 
partiality, but rather a government deliberate inertia, caused by a dedication to 
the constitutional rule of law, which triggered violence. The concept of sover-
eignty helps to understand this. The Italian philosopher Agamben revived debates 
about sovereignty, mainly drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt & Walter 
Benjamin of the early 1920s, because Foucault’s theory of the dispersal of domi-
nation throughout society had failed to account for the legal-institutionalised 
exercise of power (Agamben 1998 [1995]: 11).3 
In his insightful study Performers of Sovereignty, Hansen (2006) showed how 
police in post-apartheid South Africa replaced its repressive control of townships 
and violent hunting down of ‘terrorists’ with a visible, predictable and account-
able law-preservers. However, confronted with a dramatic upsurge of crime, 
many citizens found that the mere presence of police patrols insufficiently 
providied them with a sense of security. To ensure their de facto security, entire 
neighbourhoods organised chartered private security agencies to arrest ‘crimi-
nals’ and beat them up before handing them over to the police. Such vigilantism 
breached the state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, but it was exe-
                                                 
2  Riches theory generated much debate: some scholars elaborated on the expressive features of 
violence (Abbink 2000: xii; Schröder & Schmidt 2001: 5) and others put question marks to the 
perpetrators’ instrumentality (Stewart & Strathern 2002: 7; Whitehead 2004: 58). 
3  Agamben recently applied Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty as the decision on the exception of law, 
coupled it with Foucault’s notion of ‘biopower’ as the ultimate sovereign decision over life and death 
and used it to interpret the Holocaust as the outlawing of Jews before mechanically exterminating 
them, and to draw parallels with the status of prisoners in Guantánamo Bay (Agamben 1998, 2005; 
cf. Das & Poole; Mbembe 2003). 
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cuted with impunity and as such a de facto sovereignty (cf. Hansen and Stepputat 
2006: 295).  
Hansen’s analysis leaned on Walter Benjamin’s argument in Critique of 
Violence (1921) that all law is established by means of law-making violence, 
after which it is canalised in predictable and procedural law-preserving violence 
until it becomes inert and is overthrown. A similar but more crystallised argu-
ment came from Benjamin’s contemporary Carl Schmitt, who famously opened 
his Political Theology (1921) with the statement that ‘[s]overeign is he who 
decides on the exception’ and ‘who is responsible for deciding whether the 
constitution can be suspended’ (1921: 7). Although sovereignty may be most 
visible during the suspension of civil rights by a dictatorship, Schmitt argued that 
constitutional routine also requires sovereign decisions.   
This is relevant for the Nanun case, in which both Konkomba and Nanumba 
expected the government to resolve the constitutional paradox mentioned above, 
i.e. to make an exception by privileging one set of rights to the other. When 
national and regional governments declared to abide by the law in 1981, 1994 
and 1995, civilians in Nanun created their own law and order to resolve the 
indecision of the constitutional sovereign in order to dismantle the insecurity 
which they suspected to breed in the other’s communities.  
Skalník has argued that such Konkomba/Nanumba ethnic violence was some-
thing completely new for both. He rejected a classic distinction in political 
anthropology between societies such as Konkomba and Nanumba, according to 
which the latter were capable of coercion while the former were not. This para-
digm has been paramount to political anthropology, a discipline which, according 
its godfather Radcliffe-Brown, in his famous preface to African Political Sys-
tems, had to study ‘the maintenance or establishment of social order’ rather than 
modern government (Radcliffe-Brown 1940: xiv).  
In African Political Systems, the editors Fortes & Evans-Pritchard sought to 
study ‘political habits and institutions’ empirically ‘on an abstract plane, where 
social processes are stripped of their cultural idiom and reduced to functional 
terms’ (1940: 3). On this abstract level, Fortes & Evans-Pritchard argued, all 
African societies were territorial and ritually stabilized political systems, but 
these fell in two categories due to variable ecological conditions and modes of 
livelihood (1940: 5-9). Social order in ‘Group A’ societies centred on kingship 
(with centralized authority, administrative machinery and judicial institutions) 
with significant territorial and demographic reach, while social order in egalitar-
ian and small-scale ‘Group B’ depended on kinship (‘segmentary lineage sys-
tems’).  
The editors accepted Radcliffe-Brown’s position that African political systems 
had moral-ritual rudimentary forms of law, such as mob justice, which were 
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halfway between war and Western law. Rituals, Fortes & Evans-Pritchard argued 
(1940: 19), retained social cohesion, but while rituals in heterogeneous Group A 
societies generated integration and subjection, rituals in Group B societies 
produced fusion but especially fission or autonomy. The most important distinc-
tion between these political systems, the authors argued, lay in the exercise of 
force, between a coercive ‘constituted judicial machinery’ in Group A societies 
and, in the absence of such sovereignty, ‘the right of self-help’ in Group B (op. 
cit.: 13-15).  
But whereas Group B societies lacked the provisional judiciary of Group A 
societies, all African political systems seemed to be based on what Hansen & 
Stepputat recently called ‘intrinsic sovereignty’ or a Durkheimian deep and 
implicit collective ethos which motivated everyday life and which produced 
social cohesion (Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 298-299). Such intrinsic sovereignty 
opposes to extrinsic sovereignty in the work of Schmitt discussed above, but also 
in the analyses of Skalník (see below). 
Konkomba became a classic example of Group B societies, through the 
ethnography of David Tait in the 1950s. Northern Ghana became a laboratory for 
political anthropologists, especially Meyer Fortes and later Jack Goody and 
David Tait, because it was here that the two dominant types of African social 
organization, state and stateless, were deemed to be living side by side (Piot 
1995: 2). In 1950, the Colonial Social Science Research Council funded two 
research projects for the two most anarchic societies of Northern Ghana, follow-
ing a research agenda for anthropologists published in 1947 by Raymond Firth in 
Africa. With indirect rule running to its end, the colonial administration in Accra 
became more interested to see how segmented societies retained social cohesion. 
Jack Goody was deployed to the Lobi and David Tait, an Accra (Legon) Univer-
sity College lecturer with fieldwork experience among Dagomba, to the Kon-
komba (Goody in Tait 1961: xiii-xiv).  
Although Firth had called for a practical study, Tait’s work showed structural-
functionalism at its peak. The paradigmatic underpinnings of Tait become espe-
cially clear in comparison to the work of his contemporary, the French adminis-
trator Froelich, who conducted fieldwork on Konkomba from 1940-1948 and 
published a monograph in 1954.4  
                                                 
4  Froelich’s comprehensive study held much about settlement histories, the colonial encounter, indus-
tries, adornment and belief systems. Lauding the ethnographic details of Froelich’s work, Tait, in a 
review, blamed Froelich for failing to analyse the political functions of these findings. However, 
close reading of Froelich’s work reveals that this was not an analytical shortcoming but a theoretical 
distinction. Accepting like Tait that Konkomba clans lived in earth shrine ‘districts’ (which he called 
‘parishes’), Froelich argued that these ritual bonds had no political reality (Froelich 1954: 106). Tait’s 
critique reflected a profound theoretical disjunction between British and French ethnographers in 
Africa, embodied in Radcliffe-Brown & Griaule, whereby the former emphasized the structural func-
tion of institutions in society and the latter focused more on systems of meaning (Griaule 1948; 
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Like Fortes before him, Tait started with a study of the clan system (1953), 
followed by the analysis of household structures (1956). Additionally, he studied 
the functions of ritual institutions for the various levels of social organization, 
which was made clear in the chapter in the 1958 volume Tribes without rulers, 
which he co-edited with John Middleton and which was published after his death 
(Middleton & Tait 1958).5  
Tait found more than a dozen Konkomba tribes glued together by territorial 
and linguistic proximity, face marks and ritual allegiances (1953: 220, 214). 
These numbers were not fixed: Fission and fusion were constants in the harsh 
ecological circumstances in swampy Kikpakpaan (1953: 222, 213). Due to these 
conditions, Konkomba major lineages seldom exceeded three minor lineages, 
except those clans living in the hills east and west of the river, where major 
lineages had more genealogical vicissitudes (1958: 177). Tait suspected similar 
scaling-up of Konkomba migrant communities.  
In Tait’s analysis, the ‘clan’ and its territorial ‘district’ were the largest 
Konkomba political units, although these concepts lacked a Konkomba transla-
tion (1958: 169; cf. 1953: 213). Clans were made up of major lineages (of five 
generations) which splintered in minor lineages (three generations) and house-
holds (1953: 213) and ‘each order of segmentation has its own ritual symbol’ 
(1958: 194).6 In the absence of law proper, Tait described the Konkomba clan as 
‘a morally conscious body’ based on ‘ritual and jural activities’ of an egalitarian 
gerontocracy of family elders (onekpel, better spelt uninkpel, pl. bininkpiib, in the 
dictionary of Langdon & Breeze 1981, which I will adhere to) (Tait 1953: 220; 
respectively 1958: 185-186, 188). Konkomba political clan autonomy was based 
on territorial earth rituals to local spirits in territorial ‘districts’: Descendents of 
the first settlers were eligible as earth priest (otindaa, better spelt utindaan) 
(1958: 172-173; 1953: 214).  
Konkomba were not capable of organizing on a supra-tribal level, so when 
Dagomba, with their centralized state structure, invaded the Konkomba territories 
in the seventeenth century, they picked off the Konkomba ‘clan by clan’ (1953: 
220). Because inter-tribal relationships were usually marked by a tense state of 
reserve, and intra-clan violence was tabooed (tensions were neutralised in joking 
                                                 
Radcliffe-Brown 1940b, 1949; cf. Piot 1999: 8). Froelich & Tait never developed such enmity: In a 
1962 review, Froelich praised Tait for his ‘anatomic dissection of society’ (1962: 176-177).  
5  In 1961, Jack Goody edited most of Tait’s work on Konkomba (except 1954a and 1955b) in one 
volume, The Konkomba of Northern Ghana. The book has three parts. Part one (‘The political 
system’) is an edited version of Tait’s unpublished dissertation (1952), the 1953b summary article in 
Africa, his chapter in Tribes without Rulers (1958) and 1953a. Part two and three are edited reprints 
from most of Tait’s articles (respectively 1956, 1954b, 1952b, 1953c, 1955a and 1954c): Apart from 
style editing, Goody substituted Land shrine with earth shrine and owner of the land with owner of 
the earth for scholarly consistency. 
6  Major lineages had dzambuna (spelt jabun) shrines, minor lineages had igi (better spelt nyiin) shrines 
and households had nnyok (medicine) (1958: 194; see chapter five). 
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relations or witchcraft accusations, Tait 1954c: 68), most Konkomba communal 
violence were inter-clan feuds. Such feuds could be ceremonially ended between 
ritually obliged clans (timantotiib).7  
Tait’s early death prevented him from elaborating on his visionary observation 
that the ‘Young Men’s association’ thwarted the segmentary lineage system and 
produced ‘equality of status as warrior and dancer’ (1953: 217; see chapter two). 
A second loose end was Tait’s expectation that Konkomba social organisation 
changed in the settler communities of Central Ghana. He thought that there, 
Konkomba lost their interest in earth shrines and hence their political autonomy 
(1958: 170-171; see chapter five). 
With Konkomba defined as a typical Group B or acephalous society, Da-
gomba and Nanumba were considered Group A societies, centralized around 
their chieftaincy. In recent years, two prominent anthropologists have tried to 
nuancee this dichotomy without ignoring its obvious value. Working on Da-
gomba/Konkomba relations, Jon Kirby (2002: 14) refuted the kingship/kinship 
dichotomy, arguing that ‘a broad range of organisational structures and institu-
tions supporting the idea of chieftaincy exists among the non-chiefly groups’, 
while ‘a similar range of traditional institutions associated with segmentary 
lineage systems, which are normally identified with non-chiefly people, exists as 
an integral part of state systems’. However, he condoned the dichotomy of vio-
lence, by arguing that while Dagomba (who are related to Nanumba) are typi-
cally coercive ‘hit people’, Konkomba are autonomy-seeking ‘run people’. 
Peter Skalník used the Nanumba case for an altogether more substantive 
critique of the African Political Systems paradigm. As seen above, Radcliffe-
Brown described political anthropology as the study ‘the maintenance or estab-
lishment of social order’. The work of David Tait in the 1950s was such a fasci-
nating analysis of Konkomba social cohesion, which was however silent about 
both the colonial context and his own fieldwork presence, in spite of his ‘deep 
but unsentimental affection’ for the Konkomba (Forde 1961: v). Contrary to Tait, 
who ignored the interaction between the political system of Konkomba and the 
modern colonial system, Skalník argued that the Group A and B societies of the 
1940s had already been so dramatically influenced by colonialism, that the real 
political dichotomy was one between the coercive Western state and authoritative 
pre-colonial African political systems, whether Konkomba or Nanumba (1983: 
11-12; 1987: 320; cf. 1986, 1989, 1996).  
As Spencer argued, political anthropologists such as Tait had an ‘impover-
ished’ understanding of politics as ‘the hard currency of anthropological com-
                                                 
7  In such ceremonies, the elders of feuding clans dug a hole on neutral ground to bury their arrows and 
sacrifice on them. These ceremonies were rare but bore the administrative hopes for a peaceful 
Konkomba land (Cardinall 1918: 50; see chapter five). 
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parison’ detached from culture, meaning and history (Spencer 1997: 13, 3). The 
first fieldwork experience of Peter Skalník among Nanumba in 1978 illustrates 
the collapse of this political anthropology. Hoping to gain insight in the political 
structure of the Nanumba ‘early state’, Skalník was instead confronted with the 
dramatic politicization of Nanumba chieftaincy in a post-colonial power vacuum. 
Faced with both the oversimplified representations of Group A and B societies in 
Tait’s generation and the internalization of such ethnographic representations for 
local claims, Skalník drastically abandoned his theoretical paradigm (Skalník 
1983: 25; see this chapter’s last section).  
This move exemplifies in one man’s career the shake-up of political anthro-
pology since Tait’s days. Within this time-lapse, anthropologists started to realize 
that ‘traditional’ political systems in Africa could not be studied in isolation from 
the colonial and post-colonial context but these had to be historicized by looking 
at power relationships, in which political anthropologists themselves were com-
plicit with the colonial enterprise and post-colonial powers. This critical anthro-
pology eventually culminated in the crisis of representation in the 1980s (Asad 
1973; Clifford & Marcus 1986; Fabian 1983; Said 1985 [1978]; Stocking 1991: 
314-324; Wolf 1982).  
Rather than showing how the potential of coercion set centralised Nanumba 
society apart from Konkomba, Skalník argued that Nanun was not a centralised 
state at all. When German troops attacked Nanun in 1896, Nanumba defended 
with no less than three separate armies. Nanun was ‘superficially stratified’; its 
leadership was based on consent and voluntary tribute and hence no coercion was 
required (1983: 16). Skalník argued that this authoritative and non-coercive 
system internalised the colonial and post-colonial rule politics and eventually 
replaced it with the chiefs’ exercise of sovereignty in 1981.  
Skalník however condoned the paradigmatic distinction between Konkomba 
territorial rituals and Nanumba integrative rituals. He described Nanumba society 
as constituting various social categories (e.g. chiefs, earth priests and elders), 
each of which had a role to play (1983, 1987, 1996). The crucial point in Skal-
ník’s analysis is however what he called a ‘politico-ritual pact’ between the 
conqueror founder Nmantambu and the autochthonous population of Nanun 
(1983: 16; 1987: 309). This myth, which comes in different versions, is repre-
sentative for settlement myths in chiefdoms all around the Volta Basin, from 
Nanun to Northern Burkina Faso. Chiefs in these places claim common descent 
from Gbewaa, a son or grandson of Tohazie (literally ‘red hunter’),8 who mi-
                                                 
8 In a thorough study based on several colonial ethnographies, Benzing explained Tohazie’s red colour 
and hunting in opposition to the indigenous ‘black’ farmers (Benzing 1971: 43; cf. Schlottner 1991: 
156). In some versions, Gbewaa was his grandson; in those versions, Tohazie wandered to Mali, 
where he married a local leader’s crippled daughter, who born him a son who conquered Gurma land 
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grated from Zamfara in the disintegrating Songhay empire of present Northern 
Nigeria, perhaps in the sixteenth century or earlier. He settled in Pusiga (in the 
north-eastern corner of Ghana) and founded a chieftaincy (naam) (Skalník 1978: 
470, 475; cf. Benzing 1971; Iliasu 1970: 95, 98; Kawada 1977; Oppong 1973: 
13; Staniland 1975: 3). The death of Gbewaa led to such competition among his 
descendents that they parted and founded the various chiefdoms. At least three 
sons of Gbewaa moved southwards, founding the Mamprugu, Dagbon and 
Nanun chiefdoms respectively. Although these three fraternal chiefdoms are 
autonomous, their paramount chiefs of Mamprugu, Dagbon and Nanun address 
each other as ‘my brother’ (Skalník 1987: 307; 1996: 113).  
Nmantambu was allegedly sent south by his elder brother who pointed with 
his hand in the direction for him to go; hence the name Nanun, derived from naa 
nuu (the chief’s hand) (Skalník 1979: 9; 1987: 307). He subjugated the small and 
dispersed Nawuri-speaking ‘autochthons’ and finally settled down in Dalaanyili 
(Skalník 1979: 11, 12). When Nmantambu’s son died, perhaps because he re-
volted against his father, Nmantambu asked the leader of Dalaanyili to bury his 
son (Skalník 1979: 13). After appointing his maternal nephew as his successor, 
from which the current chiefs descend, Nmantambu disappeared. In sum, ac-
cording to Skalník, the foundation of Nanun was based on the imposition of 
Nmantambu’s sovereignty onto the autochthons, but the latter continued to per-
form ritual duties which were crucial for the continuation of the naam and which 
‘counterbalanced’ the presumed spiritual forces of the chiefs (1983: 16; 1996: 
113). I elaborate on this interpretation in chapter five. 
Peace, reconciliation and depoliticization 
How to create non-violent security? This question lands us right us right at the 
centre of the problem of ‘transitional justice’ which dominates current peace 
studies and which roughly divides their scholarship. Adherents to the retributive 
justice approach hold that there can be no security, let alone peace, if perpetrators 
are at large (Borneman 2002; Cottingham 1979; Duvenage 1999; Widner 2001), 
while proponents of distributive justice, or more precisely restorative justice, 
believe that certainty and security cannot be imposed but only fostered in proc-
esses of reconciliation, forgiveness and healing (Abu Nimer et al. 2001; Amadi-
ume & An-Na’im 2000; Amstutz 2005; Bloomfield et al. 2003; Galtung 2001; 
Lederach 1997, 2005; Zehr 2002). The Nanun peace agreements emanated from 
the latter.  
This central dilemma of peace-building – a term with wide currency since UN 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for Peace – was fed by the 
                                                 
of south-eastern Burkina Faso, married an earth priest’s daughter, who born Gbewaa (cf. Benzing 
1971: 44-45). 
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violence in Rwanda and Yugoslavia and the fall of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. The first two events regenerated the field of international criminal justice 
which had been dormant since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The United 
Nations set up International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugosla-
via and the International Criminal Court in The Hague to prosecute the leaders of 
war. Probably the main complicating factor for retribution is the difficulty of 
defining perpetrators, which in many conflicts includes tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of civilians (Broch-Due 2005: 3; Hutchinson 1996; Yanacopulos & 
Hanlon 2006: 19; Kaldor 1999). In such contexts, promising criminal justice may 
unleash witch-hunts on presumed perpetrators, as happened in Rwanda following 
the establishment of village-level gacaca tribunals (Mamdani 2001a, 2001b: 44; 
Widner 2001: 67-68).  
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was 
installed in 1995 to deal with the atrocities under the Apartheid regime, is rather 
representative of ‘restorative justice’. The Commission’s mandate to trade am-
nesty for testimonies spared the country a potential civil war, but critics called 
the Commission’s ‘reconciliation’ a political compromise with culprits (Bonner 
& Nieftagodien 2002; Duvenage 1999: 14; Mamdani 2002). Despite this criti-
cism, the TRC became an example for similar commissions around the continent, 
including Ghana (Hayner 2001).9 
In Ghana, government reactions to the 1981, 1994 and 1995 violence did not 
focus on restorative justice but were constitutionally backed peace-keeping 
through predictable interventions; the declaration of a state of emergency, a 
military intervention and the inauguration of a commission of inquiry. Assefa’s 
mediation of the Konkomba/Nanumba conflict defied that of the government but 
it was no less saturated with the dilemma of transitional justice. Assefa acknowl-
edged that ‘reconciliation without addressing the injustice in the situation is 
indeed a mockery and belittling the suffering of the victim’, but he also feared 
that accusations and counteraccusations would hinder post-conflict coexistence 
(1999, respectively 2001: 182). He therefore emphasised the forging of unity and 
trust (see chapter three).  
Assefa called his brokerage ‘consultations on development’ and he considered 
peace and development to be intertwined. This approach has to be understood in 
the context of a then new development paradigm for Africa, following the end of 
the Cold War. A 1989 World Bank report blamed the insufficiency of economic 
                                                 
9  The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), which between 2002 and 2004 investigated the 
atrocities during Ghana’s military regimes, and recommended apologies and reparations to victims, 
excluded all episodes of Nanun violence, despite a petition of the Saboba paramount chief that 
Konkomba had been aggrieved by the 1978 Lands Commission (Ucha Bobor Borwan Kwadin IV to 
The Chairman, National Reconciliation Commission (10-01-2004) ‘Petition of the Konkomba of 
Northern Region’. 
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liberalisation (its focus since 1981) to counter the continent’s underdevelopment 
on a crisis of governance (The World Bank 2008). The report made it clear that 
many African governments were obstacles for development and hence these 
should adapt to ‘good governance’ standards, while development initiatives 
would by-pass the state apparatus and focus on the beneficiaries themselves. The 
insistence of Bretton Woods institutions on what Bayart (2000: 228) cynically 
called the ‘Holy Trinity of Reform’ (structural adjustment, democratisation and 
good governance) propelled a wave of democratisation through Sub Saharan 
Africa, including Ghana in 1992. Simultaneously, NGOs claiming to have a link 
with, or represent, the beneficiaries, massively stepped in the space left by state 
institutions to advocate community development (see chapter four). 
Assefa was not so much interested in governance as in empowering commu-
nities to develop themselves. He found modernisation ‘a constant source of 
disruption, conflict and disillusionment’ and therefore advocated an economic 
model which ‘integrates material development with social cohesion and psycho-
logical and spiritual growth’ (Assefa 1996: 65, 67). He was very interested in 
traditions, especially chieftaincy, which he found to be ‘still intact and powerful’ 
and ‘already accessible to citizens’ in Ghana (1996: 58-59; 2001: 182). This 
approach differed substantially from that of Lederach, another influential peace 
mediator and scholar who worked in Northern Ghana. Rather than looking back-
wards to authentic traditions, Lederach, and his adherent Kirby, stressed the need 
for a new peace culture (see chapters six and seven). 
Assefa argued that a handful of ethnic leaders abused chieftaincy for political 
and economic games, a process exacerbated by competitive multiparty democ-
racy (2001: 169; cf. 1996: 53-54). Assefa aimed at the purification and empow-
erment of both traditional rule, followed by ‘slowly infusing [traditions] with 
modern values of citizenship, participation, and equity’ (2001: 183; cf. Voor-
hoeve 2007: 20; see chapters four, five and six). Assefa’s approach was to recruit 
the unspoilt ‘voices of reason’ from the villages and to influence the elites 
through these empowered voices. However, he mistook Nanun customary law, 
which was the product of colonial and post-colonial political processes, for tradi-
tion. While Assefa and his team placed such traditions outside Ghana’s legal 
order, customary law was part and parcel of the national constitution, with a 
sovereignty delegated by the national modern government.   
In that sense, Assefa wanted to purify or depoliticize traditions. Assefa’s 
distinction between traditional forms of administration and modern politics is at 
odds with the wider anthropological definitions of politics discussed above. 
However, in a prominent contribution to counter the threat of a conceptual im-
passe in political anthropology, due to the dissolution of politics in the wider 
notion of power, Spencer called for more attention to what people themselves 
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understand by politics (Spencer 1997: 13). This proposition has been reproduced 
in a number of fascinating ways and it brought ‘modern’ government back in 
research focus (Spencer 2007; cf. De Boeck 2008; Ferme 1999; Mbembe 1992, 
1997; Pels 2004). I adhere to this approach because Konkomba and Nanumba 
notions of polatisi imply modern government but not traditional rule such as 
chieftaincy. However, in order to describe the interplay of politicization and 
depoliticization, especially in the context of earth rituals in chapter five, I will 
also resort to a wider anthropological definition of politics.  
In his famous study of depoliticization, The Anti-Politics Machine (1990), 
James Ferguson aptly showed that because they were depoliticized, technocratic 
development projects in Lesotho had unintentional political side-effects, such as 
bureaucratic expansion. In other words, depoliticization can disguise political 
influence. But while Ferguson described these influences as unintentional side-
effects of depoliticization, this study shows that tradition, which the NGO Con-
sortium regarded as apolitical, can disguise politics. Assefa and his team did not 
account for the fact that although chieftaincy is a very strong symbol of tradition 
and social cohesion in Ghana, this country has also been associated with count-
less chieftaincy disputes from time immemorial (Sakyi 2003: 135; see chapter 
six). When Assefa claimed that traditions in northern Ghana were still strong and 
intact, he overlooked the hand of the state, both colonial and post-colonial, in 
bolstering such traditions into a bundle of contradictions, and looked for an in-
trinsic sovereignty. 
Silence and legalistic discourses 
Although Assefa’s format for peace-building was highly successful in the 
Kumasi workshops, due to resources at his disposal but especially given his 
talent and charisma, the excessive calm in Nanun, of which the soccer match 
attests, challenges the outcome of his mediation. Assefa himself interpreted post-
conflict calm as pathological conflict avoidance. This is an important direction in 
trauma studies, especially since an influential work by Scarry in 1985, in which 
she called trauma a universal condition of suffering beyond cultural specificity 
such as speech (Daniel 1996: 143; Das 2007: 10, 59, 94; Hastrup 2003; Jackson 
2002; Malkki 1995: 107-108).10 Muteness after violence has been well described, 
often in pathological terms of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). There is a 
growing body of relevant scholarship on the cross-cultural analysis of such 
pathologies (e.g. Brown 2008; Wilson & So-kum Tang 2007), a discussion of 
which is beyond our current focus.  
                                                 
10  Another direction in the ethnography of trauma is the editing of experiences and memories, often 
described in terms of social amnesia (e.g. Borneman 2002; Buckley-Zistel 2006; Duvenage 1999) or 
conditioned by sentiments of shame (e.g. Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi 2007 [1963]). 
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These approaches would probably hold much value for understanding the 
behaviour and narratives of my interlocutors in Nanun. However, the oft-heard 
exclamation ‘I cannot speak’ rather hinted to a social incapacity to speak. Being 
silent, as Foucault (1990 [1976]) argued and feminist anthropology elaborated 
(Gal 1991; White 2000: 75; Willemse 2001), is not necessarily the same as being 
mute but it can be a communicative strategy in its own right. My interlocutors 
often spoke of ‘the lies on the streets’, ‘streets’ referring both to everyone and 
everywhere, and saw truth as something precious and protected by criteria of 
gender, age or profession and by occasion: Palaces, court rooms or press confer-
ences. As such, the calm soccer match was prompted by a silence: The disquali-
fication of the football pitch as the proper (i.e. secure) site and the teams as the 
proper actors for addressing issues at stake, which each team among themselves 
freely talked about, as proved by the jokes among Konkomba about the Chamba 
‘bush team’.  
In an important volume on the anthropology of human rights, Wilson & 
Mitchell (2003: 5) diagnosed that discourses of law and rights tend to ‘operate a 
particular regime of truth’ and thereby produce ‘silences as well as generating 
and authorizing certain types of speech’. They showed that specific topics are 
prone to a language of rights between silence and authoritative speech, shaping 
vocabularies, occasions, speakers and audiences (cf. Englund 2003; Hastrup 
2003: 319). The theory of Wilson & Mitchell is a suitable kick-off for thinking 
about the processes by which certain topics are anchored in legal formats and 
occasions for safe and constructive resolution. In other words, their theory invites 
for an emphasis on form rather than content of such topics. Geschiere and Jack-
son (2006) had made a similar point when they called discourses of autochthony 
a trope.  
The dominant form of authoritative ‘speech’ in the Konkomba/Nanumba case 
was, and is, that of texts, for it is widely held that ‘book no lie’. During my 
fieldwork, lunsi (tom-tom beaters or oral historians) had been silenced by the 
District Security Council’s ‘ban on drumming’ due to the ailing security situation 
in a lingering Bimbilla paramount chieftaincy succession dispute, but they also 
sidelined themselves in the absence of a Bimbilla paramount chief. These oral 
historians’ silence contained a strong critique of what they considered a politi-
cised succession dispute and of the ‘small boys’ in their families who sought the 
loopholes in the law to drum for the competing chiefs.  
While some Nanumba chiefs said that ‘[y]ou can’t learn the tradition from 
schoolbooks’, the very same (illiterate) chiefs also had petitions and letters writ-
ten. Among Konkomba, this generational tension has been overcome and elders 
massively acknowledged the relevance of education and literacy and some had 
their wisdom jotted down in a notebook for future generations. A study to Kon-
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komba/Nanumba conflicts and peace has to go beyond the reading of the content 
of these piles of paper written by Konkomba and Nanumba representatives, to-
wards an appreciation that the form and distribution of these texts have an im-
portant story to tell us (cf. Stoler 2002). 
We can find the ‘book no lie’ adage in Assefa’s descriptions of the peace 
workshops, for ‘[t]hose who came appeared with all sorts of documents and 
maps, government commission of inquiry reports, investigations and findings of 
British and German colonial authorities, legal briefs submitted to the PPNT, and 
so on’ (2001: 175). Skalník (2002: 165) observed that the period after 1981 was 
characterised by ‘the search for words and statistics, which would give credibility 
to the goals of each party in the conflict’ (see chapter three).  
Although the NGO peace process aimed to stop such petitioning and seek the 
dialogue in ‘voices of reason’, these activities do not seem to have ceased after 
the peace agreement and they fit Lentz’ description that throughout West Africa, 
representatives of both autochthones and migrants ‘arm’ themselves with written 
evidence, small papers in Francophone and court cases in Anglophone West 
Africa (Lentz 2006a: 27-29). Although written ethnic historiographies of intel-
lectuals differed from the oral histories of village elders, Lentz argued that 
‘parking’ one’s claims in court registers is a strategy similar to oral claims utter-
ances (Lentz 1994: 463, respectively 2006a: 28). The value of Lentz’ interpreta-
tion of ‘parking’ claims for the Nanun case, is that the casting of claims at spe-
cific occasions, or being heard, was often as important having a case solved. 
Why such (quasi-)legalism has taken hold of Konkomba/Nanumba relationships 
and how these processes, rather than the latent enmity in moral disapprovals, 
have contributed to the escalation of simmering tensions between them will be 
studied in detail in chapter six. Let’s focus on the agreements in more detail now 
and turn to the structure of this book. 
The peace agreements and book structure 
The peace agreements roughly fall apart in two sets of clauses. In order to study 
these, I have taken the liberty to change the sequence of the clauses. The first set 
of clauses (4, 9, 10, 12) deals with the Konkomba and Nanumba responsibility to 
build and keep their peace, from reconciliation according to their traditions to 
joint teams policing; decrying ethnic language and arms trafficking and stock-
piling, educating their communities about peaceful conduct and bringing war-
mongers to book. I study the effect of this responsibility in the Chamba dispute in 
chapter six. The second set of clauses contain the actual peace deal emanating 
from clause one (2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11). The vocabulary of these clauses testifies to 
this: Note below the use of words like ‘recognised’, ‘eligible’ and ‘due process’. 
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The profound ethnic level of agreement is surprising given the above stipulations 
about the abstinence from ‘ethnicizing’. 
The peace accord was a successful agreement that Konkomba accepted to be 
subjects of Nanumba traditional authorities and in return, Nanumba accepted to 
coexist with Konkomba. This agreement is significant because Konkomba had 
previously rejected the authority of Nanumba chiefs and even killed a number of 
them, while Nanumba repeatedly called for all Konkomba to leave Nanun. They 
agreed not only to coexist on these terms but also to abstain from accusations of 
exploitation, because they would be ‘brothers in development’. In return for 
accepting their subject position to Nanumba authorities, Nanumba opened the 
lowest level of their chieftaincy to Konkomba headmen so that a kind of integra-
tion became possible.  
The peace deal unfolds in the realm of Nanun tradition as it is supposedly 
represented in Nanun customary law and usage. Above, in our discussion of 
Mamdani’s Citizens and Subjects, we have seen the error in equating traditions 
with customary law. Customary law is the delegated sovereignty of the state and 
it is based on autochthony, because it is Nanumba customary law and not that of 
Konkomba. However, having confirmed the Nanumba privileges in terms of 
landownership, spiritual access to the land and paramount chieftaincy, Kon-
komba would be allowed to integrate into the lower levels of chieftaincy as 
headmen and be represented in the Nanumba Traditional Council which regulates 
land tenure. The main deal, and its goal, was summarised in clause one: 
‘Nanumbas, who are indigenous and sole owners of the land in Nanun, do recognise 
the Konkombas as an important non-Nanumba community and brothers in develop-
ment who seek the well-being of the district and whose status, duties and obligations 
are traditionally recognised and defined under Nanun customary law and usage’ 
(clause 1).11 
Four clauses explicitly addressed Nanumba rights, regarding the entitlement 
to, and the protection of, land. Two of them focused on land ownership and 
paramount chieftaincy: Clause five declared the Bimbilla Naa as the undisputed 
‘paramount chief and allodial owner of all land in Nanun’ and clause six guaran-
teed that paramount chieftaincy is ‘the preserve of eligible Nanumba’. Another 
two dealt with the protection of land: Clause seven entitled the Nanumba Tradi-
tional Council as the legitimate body to regulate land tenure and settlement pat-
terns ‘for purposes of preservation of the ecology for future generations’. Clause 
eight also dealt with the protection of land, but now with regard to its spiritual 
dimensions. It declared that ‘Customary pacification in respect of river gods, land 
                                                 
11  ‘Kumasi accord on peace and reconciliation between the various ethnic groups in the Northern region 
of Ghana’ (31-02-1996). 
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gods and grooves [sic] should only be performed by the recognised land and 
fetish priests or Tindanas of Nanun’. 
The status of Konkomba in Nanun had been recognised: They were entitled to 
equal ‘modern’ administrative and political representation and they were ac-
cepted as ‘brothers in development’. But the agreements went further than that 
and here we touch on the intriguing core of the peace deal. Clause eleven stipu-
lated that Konkomba and Nanumba would together find a ‘satisfactory’ solution 
for the status of Konkomba ‘self-styled chiefs’ while clause seven agreed to 
Konkomba representation in the Nanumba Traditional Council. The crucial deal 
for both was specified in clause two: 
‘Konkombas shall be allowed to freely choose their headmen to be blessed by the 
Bimbilla-Naa or his delegated divisional authority provided this will not conflict with 
the interest of the Bimbilla-Naa and/or the Princes of Nanun’ (clause 2). 
This clause will be central to this study, because it encapsulates the biggest 
challenge for today’s peace in Nanun: What if a freely chosen Konkomba chief is 
not acceptable to the Nanumba chiefs? Who has the power of decision in such a 
situation? This became very urgent in Chamba town, when the Konkomba 
community leader died in 1996 and the Nanumba chief asked the Konkomba 
community (which dominates Chamba) to choose a new leader to be officially 
installed as a headman or sub-chief. But as Konkomba chose their candidate, the 
Nanumba chief supported another, unpopular, Konkomba candidate. The case, 
which nearly escalated into violence in 2002, while I was in the field, became the 
litmus test for Nanun’s peace accord.  
Hundreds of Konkomba and Nanumba youth went to the streets, armed with 
sticks, machetes and guns. The anger of many local Konkomba that Nanumba 
wanted to impose a leader on them, and the local Nanumba sentiment that 
Konkomba undermined the authority of the chief, drew the attention of the 
Konkomba and Nanumba youth associations – the officious mouthpieces of the 
ethnic groups – and both wrote inflammatory memos, reminding each other of 
the second clause in the 1996 peace agreement. The tensions subsided over 2003 
but reignited when the Nanumba chief died in late 2006, again while I was in the 
field. Rumours quickly spread around Ghana that the Konkomba/Nanumba 
conflict was about to flare up again and the tensions resulted in a set of renewed 
commitments to the Kumasi Accord in 2007. 
Studying the Chamba dispute was like looking at Konkomba/Nanumba post-
1996 coexistence through a magnifying glass, as it brought almost all peace 
clauses, and apparently the insufficiencies of some of them, into play. The 
dispute provides an excellent case for studying the ways in which the consensual 
peace deal generated a stalemate in Chamba, oscillating between silence, threats 
of violence and processes legalistic petitions. 
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This book roughly falls apart in two halves: An analysis of the 1996 peace 
deal, as the chronological end of a Konkomba/Nanumba coexistence from its 
beginning in 1931 in chapters two and three, followed by an analysis of the 
resolution of tensions in the post-1996 period in chapters four, five and six, and 
ending up with conclusions in chapter seven.  
Chapter two studies the coexistence of Konkomba and Nanumba from its first 
record in 1931 until the eve of their first violent conflict in 1981. These were 
fifty years in which Nanun transformed from a remote place in a British mandate 
where nothing ever seemed to happen to Ghana’s hotbed of violence. It is a 
history of development, ethnic emancipation and overcoming backwardness by 
condoning some traditions and repressing others, from the point when a British 
administrator complained that the people he spoke to in Nanun were silent and 
hindered by taboos to the moment that ethnic youth associations claimed to speak 
on their ethnic groups’ behalf. In sum, chapter two studies the background to 
clause nine about not ethnicizing individual criminal behaviour: How and why 
did Konkomba and Nanumba come to consider themselves victims of the ethnic 
other’s violation of the law? As such, this chapter studies the theoretical debates 
raised above in the section on citizens, subjects and autochthony. 
Chapter three continues the chronology of Konkomba/Nanumba coexistence, 
from the first violence in 1981 to the signing of the peace accord in 1996, a his-
tory of escalation and de-escalation. This chapter tries to understand how and 
why communal violence erupted and how it stopped. It looks in particular at the 
relation between violence and silence in the context of clauses four and twelve on 
‘traditional’ reconciliation and security. As such, this chapter addresses the theo-
retical debates of violence, sovereignty and security and peace, reconciliation and 
security. 
Chapters four and five investigate the realm of traditional and modern devel-
opment and politics. Chapter four looks at the impact of ‘modern’ politics, both 
the legislature and executive, on Konkomba/Nanumba coexistence. Konkomba 
are an electoral majority and Nanun has experienced several key elections and 
decentralisations in the past years but these do not seem to have triggered the 
tensions which Assefa expected. This chapter therefore departs from clause three, 
which stipulated that political and administrative representation at decision-
making processes would be ‘by merit and following due process’. I start the 
chapter with an analysis of the demographic make-up of Chamba and western 
Nanun and how Konkomba became an electoral majority, followed by the analy-
sis of recent elections and administrative adjustments in this part of Nanun. This 
chapter deals with theories of politics and depoliticization outlined above. 
At a certain point in the Chamba dispute, one of the Konkomba candidates 
asked the Nanumba chief in town to let peace return by performing a sacrifice to 
28 
 
the local earth shrine. The chief refused to give such an order to the earth priest 
because he found the request a provocation. In chapter five, I study why the chief 
reacted in this manner and how earth sacrifices symbolise mutual Kon-
komba/Nanumba accusations of exploitation and destruction. I will seek to show 
that one of the most undisputed marks of authority, ritual sanctions of the earth 
cult, have in fact been at the basis of processes of escalation. Linking this com-
plicated topic to mutual stereotypes about destruction of the land, this chapter 
addresses clauses seven and eight on ecological protection and earth sacrifices 
respectively.  
Chapter six studies the Chamba dispute in detail from its beginning, two 
months after the signing of the Kumasi Accord in 1996, until its escalation in 
2002, followed by an analysis of another cycle of escalation and de-escalation 
between 2005 and 2007. Using clause two as a thread, the main question is why 
choosing a Konkomba headman is so problematic, and especially why finding a 
solution for the stalemate has been so difficult. Who has the sovereignty the 
resolve this case? As we will see, this question is crucial for Kon-
komba/Nanumba peace at large. Studying this case in the wider context of chief-
taincy disputes in Nanun, I arrive at an analysis which deals with most themes 
introduced in this chapter, particularly with the ways in which autochthony dis-
courses invoke requests for sovereign decisions and so produce an ominous calm 
and threats of violence. After a meticulous analysis of the Chamba case, we can 
draw conclusions in chapter seven about the success of the peace accord and 
whether the soccer match symbolised a fragile peace or a robust peace in Nanun.  
In and after the field: Presence and representation 
The obsession with texts and written evidence among the inhabitants of Nanun 
was epistemologically interesting but also methodologically challenging. Apart 
from the important ethnographic work of Skalník, mostly in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, not much ethnographic fieldwork has been conducted in Nanun. 
With the generous help of Jon Kirby and Peter Skalník, I was in the field three 
times, for a total of sixteen months between 2002 and 2007, in and around 
Chamba and Bimbilla (August 2002-January 2003; March-September 2005 and 
August 2006-January 2007). I spent some time in Kikpakpaan and several weeks 
in archives on a district level (Bimbilla), regional level (Tamale) and national 
level (Accra). Although I always worked with translators, I spent several months 
learning Likpakpaln to a working level, and to a much lesser extent also Nanunli.  
In the field, I got into processes which started before my fieldwork and con-
tinued afterwards, but within the given time frame I had the chance of observing 
several crucial events described in this book, including the Chamba events of 
2002 and 2006. Expecting my neutrality to be negated during such events, I was 
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surprised to find it actually imposed on me. I was worried that my interlocutors 
would try to ‘seduce’ me to consent (Robben 1995), interpret my encouraging 
‘silent’ and ‘uh-huh’ probes (Bernard 1995: 215, 217) as consent and that my 
pursuit of research neutrality was continuously subverted by my empathy to-
wards the people I worked with (Sluka & Robben 2007: 22-23; cf. Kleinman & 
Kleinman 1997; Das & Kleinman 2001; Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Scheper 
Hughes 1992). While this dilemma may seem to be a point of departure for 
contemplating ethical codes for ethnographic fieldwork, the tension between the 
pursuit of scientific objectivity and empathy towards the people in the field 
cannot be disentangled from the very basis of ethnographic methodology and 
often requires context-specific negotiations (Meskell & Pels 1999; Pels 1999; 
Pels & Salemink 1999: 35).  
But what if empathy and objectivity coalesce in the interlocutors’ expecta-
tions? People in the field came to know me as that man who wanted to learn the 
culture and history of Nanun and who, to that end, went round to listen from all 
sides and see for himself. I have been responsible for this image from day one 
but this fieldwork strategy was also in line with the role of ethnographic ‘evi-
dence’ in the local legalistic discourse. In 1994, the Nanumba Youth Association 
wrote that: 
‘As is widely known and confirmed by independent research (Prof. David Tait 1958, 
1961, Skalnik 1958, 1986, 1987, 1989) the Konkomba farmers started to settle in 
Nanung as refugees only from the 1940’s onwards after they had killed the Zagbli-
Lana [Dagomba Chief] and they were received well by the Nanumbas’.12 
In 1997, a Konkomba lawyer also referred to Tait, albeit in different tenor: 
‘Dr Tate [sic] in his book entitled the Konkomba of Northern Ghana paragraph 1 
page 12 says: The Konkomba settled in small communities that stretched over the 
whole of former Northern Togoland. He like Professor A.A. Boahen agree that the 
entire Oti basin, because of its fertility has been in full occupation of the Konkombas 
since the 15th century’.13 
Ferguson, in his research on the Zambian Copperbelt, found that erstwhile 
modernization theory had been internalized by the local people he encountered. 
Classic ethnography in the Copperbelt had moved from being a record to an 
ethnographic artefact because ‘theories originally conceived as external to the 
social reality they sought to account for have themselves become […] ethno-
graphic objects’ (Ferguson 1999: 15-16). Skalník recently reflected on the au-
thoritative position of ethnography and noted that the dichotomy between cen-
                                                 
12  Na Gbantohgu et al On behalf of Bimbilla-Na and Nanumba Youth Association (23-09-1994) ‘Re-
sponse to the ‘Konkomba Position paper of conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana with reference 
to Nanumba-Konkomba Conflicts Presented to the Permanent Negotiating Team, September 1994’. 
13  ‘Lawyer Jacob Jejeti on behalf of Konkomba Chiefs in Nkwanta District to The Permanent Peace 
Negotiation Team’ (06-01-1998). 
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tralised and acephalous tribes, ‘first offered by the colonial administrators and 
later corroborated by anthropologists – has been internalised by both African 
intellectuals and the general public’, in spite of the current unpopularity of this 
dichotomy in anthropology (Skalník 2003: 70).  
So when my interlocutors said ‘I can’t wait to read your book’, this flatter was 
eclipsed by tensions between the presence of the people I worked with and how 
to represent their case (Fabian 1990: 769). For me, it engendered doubts about 
my expertise (Ferguson 1999; cf. Clifford & Marcus 1986), fear for disappoint-
ment about my representation of the complexities I sought to describe (Das 2007: 
2; Robben & Nordstrom 1995: 15) and nervousness about what local leadership 
would use my findings for (Brettell 1993; Caplan 2003:23 ff.; Scheper Hughes 
(2000). While most people I worked with thought that my research would reveal 
‘the facts’, and coupled my witnessing to their testifying, my work was about 
dismantling such ontological aspirations and trying to represent the ways in 
which facts fractured. Eltringham’s work on the methodological and ethical 
challenges of representing the Rwandan genocide helped me with this approach. 
He proposed to give voice to confusion rather than a sanitised meta-narrative: 
‘Conflict is ultimately about disagreement. To properly understand conflict we must 
give voice to these disagreements and demonstrate how they are articulated. From 
such a perspective, disagreements about the nature and ‘truth’ of conflicts have less 
to do with the sanitised, objective and inevitable progression of ‘facts’, than they do 
with an informed engagement with the confused and confusing words of discursive 
strategies, partial ‘truths’ and conflicting subjectivities’ (Eltringham 2003: 109). 
How to represent confusion without being confused yourself? Like Ferguson 
in a Copperbelt in crisis, I found that my interlocutors’ messy answers inflicted 
confusion on me, resulting in ‘a situation where “the natives” as well as the 
ethnographer lack a good understanding of what is going on around them’ 
(Ferguson 1999: 19). Analyses of the events I witnessed should not be mistaken 
for testimonies. From these challenges emerged a casuistic approach, centred on 
the Chamba dispute. I reflect on this choice in chapter seven.  
  
 
 
 
 
2 
‘Ethnicizing individual criminal  
behaviour’ (1931-1981) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘We agree to refrain from the practice of ethnicizing individual crimi-
nal behaviour; that is, for blaming an entire ethnic group for the 
criminal conduct of an individual who is a member of that ethnic 
group’ (clause 9). 
Introduction 
The Chamba dispute briefly described in the previous chapter showed how 
quickly a local dispute about Konkomba village leadership escalated to an ethnic 
level. As I will show in chapter six, this dispute eclipsed internal Konkomba and 
Nanumba divisions about Konkomba leadership. In the words of Lonsdale (see 
chapter one), Konkomba and Nanumba internal moral ethnicities became 
eclipsed by an external political tribalism. To understand this potential, in spite 
of the peace agreement clauses eleven and which tackle the tensions around 
Konkomba leadership and prevent the habit of ‘ethnicizing’ individual cases, we 
have to historicize both the headmen topic and Konkomba/Nanumba ethnicity. In 
so doing, we will see how Konkomba and Nanumba ethnic emancipation inter-
sected with the privileges Nanumba claimed as autochthons in Nanun and the 
equal citizenship rights which Konkomba stood for, which culminated in the 
1981 violent conflict and which continues to challenge Konkomba/Nanumba 
coexistence to date. 
This chapter seeks to trace the lead-up to the first violent confrontations of 
Konkomba and Nanumba, roughly from the first record of their coexistence in 
1931 in a dull corner of a British mandated area, the peaceful conditions of which 
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attracted so many Konkomba farmers, to the explosion of violence which shook 
the independent nation of Ghana fifty years later. Although this historiography 
shows that Konkomba/Nanumba rarely lived together as a happy family, it also 
resists the argument that violent conflict was the inescapable result of this coex-
istence. It struck me that the lead-up to violence had been only years in the 
coming and not decades, as many Konkomba and Nanumba post-1981 represen-
tations of their pre-1981 coexistence suggested (see chapter three).  
Although the unrecorded settlement of Konkomba yam farmers in Nanun 
started on a small scale a decade earlier, 1931 certainly was a benchmark in the 
history of Konkomba/Nanumba relations. It was in this year that Nanun, for the 
first time, came under the explicit attention of the colonial administration through 
the research of colonial administrator Amherst into the customs of Nanun to 
benefit the implementation of indirect rule in 1933. In his ‘constitution’, Amherst 
fixed the Nanumba ‘Native Authority’ at the precise moment of what was argua-
bly the biggest change it was confronted with: The settlement of thousands of 
Konkomba farmers.  
Significant in Amherst’s intervention is also that he complained about the lack 
of local voices due the lack of educated natives and the taboos and ignorance of 
his interlocutors. Fifty years later, however, this alleged lack of voice had given 
way to the claims of educated Konkomba and Nanumba youth who were acting 
as self-proclaimed ethnic spokesmen with a moral authority. This chapter there-
fore not only focuses on the emergence of the conflict repertoires in Nanun but 
also on the local processes of gaining voice. While in 1931, ‘Konkomba’ and 
‘Nanumba’ were labels pasted onto loosely related peoples by outsiders such as 
Amherst, these ethnicities had become political realities by 1981.  
Studying the interplay of the registers of citizenship and customary law in 
Konkomba and Nanumba claims requires repeated referrals to national events as 
well as changes in the Konkomba ‘homeland’ of Kikpakpaan and the Dagomba 
district from which both Nanun and Kikpakpaan were most of the time adminis-
tered. Analysing the transformations which took place between 1931 and 1981 
also requires a meticulous description of several crucial events in and around 
Nanun in the preceding period between 1874 and 1931. Although such an exer-
cise may appear to be far-fetched, scrutinising these periods is relevant for under-
standing the historiographies of Konkomba and Nanumba and their subsequent 
claims. Many Konkomba and Nanumba I spoke to had a big interest in ‘German 
archives’ because they thought that the Germans found northern Ghana in its 
original state.  
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Early expeditions and the German period (1874-1914) 
In January 1890, Nanun came in direct contact with the colonial world as the 
German Hauptmann E. Kling travelled through Bimbilla.1 He conducted mete-
orological measurements and left. Six years later, in 1896, Nanun lost its sover-
eignty to Germany, after having been placed in a colonial ‘Neutral Zone’.  
Although Europeans had had trading posts on the Gold Coast since the late 
fifteenth century, they had no interest in moving inland until the nineteenth 
century. Trade centred on gold and especially slavery, through which Nanun was 
indirectly (via Asante and Gonja) linked to the coastal forts. After the abolition 
of slavery in the early nineteenth century, the British – who had come to domi-
nate the coastline – effectively colonised the Gold Coast, but they failed to incor-
porate the Asante chiefdom north of the Gold Coast until 1896. However, Asante 
was seriously weakened after a lost battle with the British in 1874 and this gave 
European explorers access to the ‘Ashanti hinterlands’, which had paid tribute to 
Asante since the mid-eighteenth century (e.g. Benzing 1971: 183).  
Colonial interests in Nanun were however very limited. Initial European expe-
ditions focused on the Gonja/Hausa market of Salaga, sixty kilometres west of 
Bimbilla and a former part of Nanun, until Gonja invasions in the seventeenth 
century (Benzing 1971: 139-140, Tamakloe 1931; Zech 1904: 118).2 According 
to Asante stories, Salaga was very rich and estimated to receive around 10,000 
traders a day (Olorumfemi 1984: 19). In order to avoid colonial confrontations, 
and particularly to outwit French expeditions from the Senegal coast, the British 
and Germans (who had colonised the Togo coast) demarcated a Neutral Zone in 
1887-8 around Salaga (Arhin 1974: xvi). Although off the main caravan route 
between Salaga and Yendi, Nanun became entirely located in this zone.3 
But the agreement notwithstanding, the German Kurt von Francois made 
several friendship treaties with chiefs in the Neutral Zone in 1888 (Arhin 1974: 
90; Ladouceur 1979: 39).4 In 1892, the British colonial government in Accra re-
sponded by sending the ‘native’ (Gold Coast) diplomat George Ekem Ferguson 
(1865-1897) upcountry to sign trade treaties with the ‘kings’ in the north (Arhin 
1974: xvii). After signing a treaty with the Dagomba ‘king’ in Yendi north of 
Nanun, Ferguson travelled to Bimbilla only because the area north of Yendi was 
unsafe. In the company of prominent chiefs and elders, Ferguson and Bimbilla 
                                                 
1  MFGS 1893: 249-250, Hauptmann E. Kling & Dr. R. Büttner ‘Ergebnisse der Forschungsreisen im 
Hinterlande von Togo 1890 bis 1892’. 
2  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/30/1 DC Eastern Dagomba (Gilbert) (1930) ‘A brief history of the Nanumba 
tribe’. 
3  MFGS 1888: 142-143, ‘Ubersichtskarte von dem Hinterlande des Deutschen Schutzgebietes Togo 
nach den Aufnahmen von C. von Francois’. 
4  MFGS 1888: 31 and MFGS 1888: 143-182, ‘Bericht des Hauptmann von Francois über seine Reise 
im Hinterlande des deutschen Schutzgebiets Togo’. 
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Naa Al Belsi signed a ‘friendship’ treaty on 26 August 1892 (Arhin 1974: 90). 
The Germans were annoyed when they heard that Ferguson had distributed 
British flags to the chiefs and sent Lieutenant R. Klose to Salaga in October 1894 
(Trierenberg 1914: 16; 23-25; Staniland 1975: 9).  
Klose however found that after a ravaging civil war, Salaga had virtually 
‘ceased to exist’ (Braimah & Goody 1967: 169; Klose 1992 [1899]). As a transi-
tion point where kola nuts from Asante were traded with cattle and slaves from 
the Sahel, the Ashanti hinterlands had no inherent wealth. Once cut off from 
Asante markets in 1874, this mercantile system collapsed, resulting in a politico-
mercantile vacuum, which also plunged Dagbon, Mamprugu and Nanun into 
chaos (Olurumfemi 1984: 20; cf. Arhin 1974: 90; Brukum 1999: 105; Cornevin 
1962: 57; Staniland 1975: 9). But although the Neutral Zone was fraught with 
colonial disappointment, the British, Germans and French unleashed a race for 
the Zone’s strategic geographic location. 
In November 1894, a Grosse Togo-Hinterlandexpedition led by Dr. Grüner 
started in Kete Krachi, just south of the Neutral Zone.5 Like Salaga, Kete Krachi 
had been loosely part of Nanun, probably until the Asante attacks on Nanun in 
the early nineteenth century (Zech 1904: 121). In 1881, the British delegate 
Lonsdale visited Kete Krachi to successfully encourage trade here to bypass the 
chaos of Asante and Salaga (Maier 1980: 39). Its growth resulted in such an 
influx of Grushi slaves from the Upper North of Ghana, to grow yams for 
consumption, that a British diplomat reckoned the Kete Krachi area in 1887 as 
‘the highest cultivated part of West Africa’ (op. cit.: 47). The unbridled growth 
of Kete Krachi had fuelled power struggles between a local chief priest and 
Hausa traders. The latter successfully rallied the support of Grüner, who executed 
the priest and opened a German station early 1895 (op. cit.: 40, 43).6 Kete 
Krachi’s yam economy – and especially its collapse in the 1920s – was an 
important factor for Konkomba migration to Nanun (see below). 
After opening the Kete Krachi station, the German expedition entered the 
Neutral Zone, to find Salaga waving the Union Jack. They rushed to the Da-
gomba capital Yendi where they successfully made a treaty with the Ya Na king 
in January 1895 and with the Chakosi chief at Sansanne Mango, northeast of the 
Neutral Zone (Trierenberg 1914: 78). Grüner returned to Kete Krachi via Bim-
billa, but showed no interest in making a treaty with the Bimbilla Naa.7 However, 
Nanun gained importance in the subsequent years, as it became apparent that the 
                                                 
5  MFGS 1898: 235-239, Sprigade P. ‘Begleitworte zu der Karte des nördlichen Theiles des Schutz-
gebietes Togo und seine Hinterländer’. 
6  DK 1896: 45. 
7  MFGS 1898: 235-239, Sprigade P. ‘Begleitworte zu der Karte des nördlichen Theiles des Schutz-
gebietes Togo und seine Hinterländer’. 
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Neutral Zone would be divided in a British western part and a German eastern 
part and Grüner hoped to divert the main caravan routes eastwards via Bimbilla.  
In 1896, while a German station was opened in Sansanne Mango, north of the 
Neutral Zone, the area between the Krachi and Mango stations was far from 
secure. First, there were rumours about a French expedition from the Dahomey 
coast heading for Mango (Trierenberg 1914: 16, 24). Second, the people living 
between the two stations, Konkomba and Dagomba, regularly attacked German 
messengers to sell them as slaves (Trierenberg 1914: 113). In order to secure (the 
route to) Mango, Dr. Grüner led an expedition of close to one hundred soldiers 
and almost triple that number of carriers from Krachi. The below chronology, 
which is adapted from Trierenberg (1914: 115-137), shows the imposition of a 
colonial sovereignty.  
On 27 November 1896, Grüner sent a message to the chief of the Nanumba 
town of Wulensi, asking for safe passage, but access was denied. According to 
Nanumba memories, the German request for passage confronted Nanumba with a 
dilemma. If they refused passage, the Germans would fight them but if they 
allowed German passage, Dagomba would feel betrayed and punish them; more-
over, who guaranteed that the Germans would not fight them after dealing with 
Dagomba? Nanumba chiefs and elders – so the story goes – had no option but to 
fight the Germans. The next day, the German expedition found Wulensi and 
Nakpayili deserted, but their messengers to Bimbilla were attacked on the way 
(Tamakloe 1931: 42). In the early morning of 30 November, the expedition 
reached Bimbilla which they also found deserted, but when they randomly shot 
into the thick grasses east of town, a battle with Nanumba hiding there started. In 
the afternoon a stronger army of some 1500 attacked from the north and the 
Germans killed more than hundred of them, after which they burnt down Bim-
billa. Bimbilla Naa Al Belsi escaped the Germans and fled to Chamba (Tamakloe 
1931: 42). The expedition members were in a hurry to reach Mango and decided 
to deal with the Nanumba later. 
On 4 December, the German expedition faced fierce resistance in the Da-
gomba village of Adibo just south of Yendi. An estimated 7000 warriors – in-
cluding many Konkomba – attacked the Germans from all sides. At least 430 
Dagomba, three German soldiers and a German police officer were killed before 
Yendi could be defeated. Grüner and his team rushed to Mango through the 
Konkomba land, but they took their time to burn every Konkomba village on the 
way. The team secured their Mango station a week later, a mere two weeks ahead 
of the French expedition. But while they were in Mango, the Dagomba Ya Na 
Andani gave the message that his troops were waiting to fight them, and the 
weakened German expedition escaped via the recently opened eastern station of 
Bassari, fighting through Konkomba roadblocks (Trierenberg 1914: 138, 143).  
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There are no indications that Nanun was the site of any further resistance to 
German colonialism but that was different for Konkomba and Dagomba. When 
Konkomba attacked German troops near Bassari, officer Von Massow launched a 
punitive expedition in which he systematically burnt all Konkomba villages and 
farms and seized their cattle in December 1897 and January 1898 (Trierenberg 
1914: 150, 154; Cornevin 1959: 698). Similar penal expeditions were organised 
in Kikpakpaan between 1898 and 1900 – killing one thousand Konkomba warri-
ors in the village of Iboubou alone (Froelich (1954: 4) – to make German control 
somewhat effective in the Konkomba area (Trierenberg 1914: 160-162; 191; see 
also Cornevin 1959: 699; Froelich 1954: 34; Tcham 1994).8  
In 1899, the British and Germans agreed on the Daka River as dividing line 
between their protectorates in the Samoa Treaty,9 but the death of the Dagomba 
‘king’ later that year led to various Dagomba families feuding for succession. 
The division of Dagbon in a British and German part complicated issues, and 
when Dagomba kingmakers installed the chief of Savelugu, in British territory, 
the Germans killed him and replaced him with the chief of Karaga (Ferguson & 
Wilks 1970: 345), after which they raised the German flag in Yendi early May 
1900 (Staniland 1975: 63).  
After 1900, the Germans continued to need a lot of coercion to control North-
ern Togo. They however had big plans for Northern Togo, where they had found 
local traditions of cotton-growing which could benefit German industries. Resi-
dents in Northern Togo had to offer twelve days of labour and unwilling Kon-
komba villages were subjected to a policy of ‘labour with hunger’ (Gehrts 1915: 
129; Tamakloe 1931: 59). Largely due to lack of (dedicated) labour, the cotton 
programme, which started around 1902, failed altogether and it was virtually 
non-existent ten years later.10  
But the German emphasis on labour had two main consequences for Kon-
komba and Nanumba. First, chiefs were charged to recruit labour: Nanumba 
chiefs had to recruit labour but when Bimbilla Naa Salifu’s efforts were unsatis-
factory, he was removed from the skin, banned to Krachi, and replaced by the 
former chief’s son Mahini. In Konkomba villages, headmen were installed to 
recruit labourers (Cornevin 1954; Froelich 1954: 22; Trierenberg 1914: 188). 
Second, in the pursuit of labour, infrastructural projects targeted densely popu-
lated areas. So while large parts of scarcely populated southern Nanun were 
declared a nature reserve in 1913,11 there were serious plans to extend the south-
                                                 
8  DK 1899: 313; DK 1901: 111; Gehrts (1915: 234). 
9  DK 1899: 803-805. 
10  DK 1902: 556; DK 1911: 232; DK 1912: 453. 
11  DK 1913: 844, ‘Bekanntmachung des Gouverneurs von Togo, betr. Einrichtung von Wildschonge-
bieten’ (26-07-1913). 
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ern railway between Lomé and Atakpamé to densely-populated Saboba.12 These 
plans coincided with a relaxation of German administration in Northern Togo 
and the access granted to missionaries in 1910 and an ethnographic film crew in 
1913, both of which gave accounts of admiration of Konkomba as noble savages, 
versus Dagomba as crumbling suppressors,13 evaluations which British and 
French administrators copied. 
Order and migration (1915-1931) 
When the First World War broke out, some of the first gunshots were heard in 
Northern Togo, where Germany had built the world’s largest wireless radio 
station. To deactivate this station, British troops from the Gold Coast and French 
troops from Dahomey successfully invaded Northern Togo in August 1914, 
capturing German administrators and missionaries as prisoners of war.14 The 
western part of Togo, including Nanun, Dagbon and western Kikpakpaan, was 
occupied by the British and the east by the French; a division formalised in 1917 
as League of Nations mandates and, with some adjustments, confirmed in 1929.  
The British encounter with the Asante hinterland had been fraught with disap-
pointment and consequent neglect. According to the Colonial Office in Accra, 
the so-called Northern Territories lagged fifty years behind the Gold Coast and 
Ashanti colonies (Staniland 1975: 55) and their only value was to facilitate the 
                                                 
12  DK 1914: 508. 
13  The German mission doctor Fisch travelled through Northern Togo in 1910 in search of suitable 
place for a Basel Mission station. Reaching Nanun in February, he was impressed by the chiefs’ 
palaces and the yam economy, but he was particularly touched by the Nanumba, whom he described 
as ‘friendly, trustworthy people … with open faces’ (Fisch 1911: 48, 51, my translation). Travelling 
on, Fisch found ‘fewer open, honest faces’ in Dagomba and of the Ya Na, he said that ‘not only has 
his empire fallen but he is a ruin himself too’ (op. cit.: 52, my translation). In the Konkomba area, he 
saw naked and drunk people, but ‘the courage, joy of living and zeal twinkled from their faces and 
their entire presence’ (op. cit.: 147). In the end, one Otto Schimming opened a Basler Mission station 
in the most accessible town of Yendi. Three years after Fisch, the German filmer Major Hans 
Schomburgk asked the 22-year-old Hamburg-based Meg Gehrts for the leading role in the drama 
movie The White Goddess of the Wangora (1914), with a script reminiscent of H. Rider Haggard’s 
King Solomon’s Mines (1989 [1885]). After shooting the film, they travelled upcountry to the 
Konkomba country. In a very readable travelogue on which I hope to elaborate elsewhere, Gehrts 
wrote that she was ‘greatly struck with their appearance. Tall, splendidly proportioned, and of fierce 
and warlike aspect, they carried themselves with a grace and dignity one could not help admiring’ 
(Gehrts 1915: 116). Gehrts’ romantic idea of Konkomba was however put to a test when Konkomba 
warriors were asked to talk, so that Schomburgk could record their facial expressions. The silent film 
(Im deutschen Sudan, 1914) shows these men talking and laughing plenty. When Gehrts asked the 
translator what these ‘unspoilt children of nature’ were saying, she got the reply that ‘most of the 
messages were of such a character that they would not bear being repeated’ (1915: 218). She argued 
that the only reason why they served under Dagomba, was because the latter had guns (1915: 214-
215). 
14  DK 1915: 27; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/497/n.n. ‘Annual Report of the Commandant Northern Territo-
ries Constabulary on the two platoons of that force in occupation in the British Mandated Territory of 
Togoland, for the Periods 1st April 1923 to 31st March 1924 and from 1st April 1924 to 30th Sep-
tember 1924’. 
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turbulent economic development of the Gold Coast and Ashanti colonies with 
labour. Missions had restricted access to the protectorate (Ladouceur 1979: 58; 
Bening 1990, 1999) and in 1922, the Northern Territories were declared public 
lands, in order not to protect the southern property market and to discourage any 
economic initiative which could compromise the north function as labour reserve 
(Brukum 1999: 121; Konings 1984: 7; Lund 2008: 26). Thousands of labourers 
from densely populated and infertile parts of the north were assigned to the 
plantations and mines in the south and although some Nanumba were enrolled 
very few Konkomba were, probably because Dagomba chiefs feared recruiting 
them.15 
The unification of Dagbon under the Union Jack in 1915 gave impetus to an 
administrative agenda of trying to undo the chaotic years of warfare, slave-
raiding and the colonial competition in the former Neutral Zone. This idea of a 
pre-colonial order and its possible reconstruction was the key to British colonial 
administration in Nanun and beyond (Lentz 1994; Pels & Salemink 1999: 25, 27; 
Ranger 1997 [1983]: 604), even if such an order was fictional, since this part of 
West Africa had been very unstable for centuries, due to slave-raiding and 
Asante imperialism (Benzing 1971: 36; Tamakloe 1931: 45).  
The first British step to restoration in Nanun – which ceased to be a nature 
reserve – was the 1915 reinstallation of Bimbilla Naa Salifu, who had been 
toppled by the Germans.16 Second, the British united Nanun, which had been 
divided over the two German administrative areas of Bassari and Krachi, under 
the latter in 1917.17 Third, in 1921, Governor Guggisberg envisaged the develop-
ment of three or four strong native states in the Northern Territories (Gonja, 
Dagbon and Mamprugu), which would usurp not only the non-centralised socie-
ties such as Konkomba but also the smaller centralised polities, like Nanun, 
eventually forcing them into one northern nation similar to the Asante Confeder-
acy (Lund 2008: 38; Staniland 1975: 58; Talton 2003a: 96). As a first move 
towards this, Nanun was transferred from Krachi to Yendi district in 1922, in 
spite of Nanumba objections because they feared to lose three villages to 
Dagomba which had been given to them during German rule.18 As a compromise, 
                                                 
15  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211/n.n. DPO (31-12-1915) ‘Annual Report on Yendi District 1915’; 
PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211/n.n. ‘Annual Report of the Yendi District 1916’; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/-
1/487/n.n. ‘Report on the Southern Province, Northern Territories for the Quarter Ending 30th 
September, 1921’; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/497/n.n. ‘Report on British Mandated Sphere of Togoland 
for the Year 1922’. 
16  PRAAD/A/ADM.67/5/2 ‘Yendi – Village Record Book vol. I (1919-1930)’. 
17  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/30 ‘Nanumba Native Administration (1930-31)’. A 1917 preliminary Franco-
British Togoland boundary provided that all Nanun was administered from Krachi, which was British 
(Bassari became French) (PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/497/n.n. ‘Report on British Mandated Sphere of 
Togoland for the Year 1922’). 
18  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/287/34 Dep CCNT DC Kratchi (29-12-1922); PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/287/20 
DPO Yendi to CCNT (06-01-1921); PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/287/21 DPO Yendi and DPO Kratchi to 
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Nanun’s chieftaincy would remain autonomous from that of Dagomba, but this 
could not prevent that Nanumba eventually lost all three villages to Dagbon: 
Tagnemo in 1923; Jagbuni in 1927 and Korli in 1935.19 
The British plans for Kikpakpaan were quite different. While the Germans had 
planned to construct a railway to densely populated Saboba and had installed 
village leaders for labour recruitment, the British interpreted such interventions 
as a flawing of Konkomba tribute to Dagomba. The preliminary 1917 French-
British Togoland boundary largely followed the Oti River which divided Kik-
pakpaan. Throughout the 1920s, Konkomba were subjected to British and French 
aspirations for having as few tribes as possible deprived by their borders, but this 
agenda was continuously subverted by the problem of tribal demarcation and 
tribes straddling their territories (cf. Nugent 1996: 39-41).20 A French interest in 
the physically strong Konkomba for their army and British considerations that 
Konkomba were Dagomba, and hence British, subjects, resulted in a status quo 
during the final border demarcation in 1929, thus leaving a good deal of admin-
istrative irritations between the British and French when it came to the Kon-
komba situation (see below).21 
In the British mandate, District Political Officer Poole suggested in 1916 that 
Konkomba required self-governance through a paramount chief but his assistant 
Cardinall advised Chief Commissioner Armitage that he ‘must use every en-
deavour to bring this wild but interesting tribe to recognise the authority of, and 
to become law-abiding subjects under, the Dagomba Chiefs’.22 The latter ap-
proach won, even though in reality, Dagomba control over Konkomba had been 
sporadic and most Dagomba chiefs were afraid of going to Konkomba villages.23 
                                                 
CCNT (18-01-1921); PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/487/n.n. ‘Report on the Southern Province, Northern 
Territories for the Quarter Ending 31st December, 1921’. 
19  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/287/22 DC Eastern Dagomba to CSP (07-06-1922); respectively PRAAD/-
A/ADM.56/1/300/n.n. CSP to CCNT (18-06-1925); PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/300/n.n. PCSP to 
ACCNT (16-07-1923) ‘Tagenemo Dispute’; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/300/n.n. ‘Settlement of the Da-
gomba-Nanumba Boundary Dispute’ (06-07-1935); PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/300/n.n. DC Dagomba to 
CCNT (23-07-1935); PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/300/n.n.CCNT to DC Dagomba (27-07-1935); 
PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/300/n.n. Ag DC Dagomba to Ag CCNT (14-10-1935) ‘Nanumba-Dagomba 
Boundary’; respectively  PRAAD/T/NRG8/1/3/123 CSP to CCNT (15-06-1927) ‘Boundary Dispute 
between the Chief of Miong (Dagomba) and the Chief of Bimbilla (Nanumba) over the Village of 
Jabuni’. 
20  PRAAD/T/NRG8/1/3 ‘Boundaries (1921-30)’; PRAAD/T/NRG8/1/8/103a Gold Coast Gazette (13-
01-1931) ‘Joint Report by the Two Committees Appointed for the Purpose of Delaminating the 
Frontier Separating the territories of Togoland placed respectively under the authority of the British 
and French mandates for Togoland (20-07-1922)’. 
21  PRAAD/T/NRG8/1/2 Krachi DPO to The Record Officer (03-04-1921);  
PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211/n.n. DPO ‘Diary for January 1918’. 
22  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211/n.n. DPO to CCNT (11-06-1916); respectively. 
PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211/n.n. Ag DPO to CCNT (23-10-1916); PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211 ‘Annual 
Report Yendi District (1916)’. 
23  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211 ‘Annual Report Yendi District (1916)’; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/204/n.n. 
DPO (25-01-1916) ‘Handing-Over Report’. 
40 
 
Although Dagomba probably never really exercised control over most Kon-
komba villages, they executed regular slave raids among Konkomba to fulfil 
tribute to Asante. Many Konkomba sought refuge in the swampy lands at the Oti 
River, where the horses of slave-raiding Dagomba could not reach, like other 
segmented societies (Goody 1971: 57; Piot 1999: 33). Although Poole and 
Cardinall disagreed on the administrative handling of Konkomba, they shared a 
fascination for them. In ethnographic work, Cardinall was fascinated by the ‘real’ 
Konkomba, who were not living under the Dagomba ‘yoke’ but hence were 
completely anarchical (1918: 46). Cardinall and Poole displayed a dislike of 
Dagomba as ‘lazy, effete, passive resisters of the worst description’ and an 
appreciation of Konkomba, similar to earlier civil German expeditions: 
‘[Konkomba] are industrious, merry and prolific. […] They are impetuous, seldom 
separated from their bows and arrows, and like the Irish always ready for a scrap. A 
brush between two villages is common and a few casualties on either side seem to 
worry them not at all. In my opinion this is a better trait than inertia and immovabil-
ity.’24 
But such loyalties did not interfere with a British self-imposed responsibility 
towards reproducing the pre-colonial social order which legitimated Konkomba 
subjection to Dagomba. 
Although continuous ‘Konkomba disturbances’ were regarded as ‘normal 
Konkomba fracas with no political significance’, because they were about 
‘faithless women and strong peto’ and not affecting colonial law and order,25 
such assessments systematically ignored the revolting realities of Konkomba 
sabotaging British telegraph wires, killing a soldier or a surveyor and his wife.26 
British penal measures were usually communal, especially crop and compound 
burning but these economically disruptive measures did not go well with the 
colonial government in Accra and reprimanded the northern administration for 
such measures in 1929. The Commissioner for the Southern Province (CSP) of 
the Northern Territories thereupon cautioned the Yendi District Commissioner 
that the Konkomba area was monitored by the League of Nations and that, al-
though ‘the Konkomba are unlike any other tribes in the Northern Territories’, 
                                                 
24  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/204/n.n. DPO (25-01-1916) ‘Handing-Over Report’. 
25  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211/n.n. DPO (31-12-1915) ‘Annual Report on Yendi District 1915’. Similar 
riots occurred for instance in Kutja, Sambul and Kanjoch in 1915 (PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/300/64 Ag 
CCNT to Ag CSP (07-01-1927)), Sambul in 1920 (PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/62 ‘Inquiry into Konkomba 
Riot’ (1934)) and PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/62/32 CCNT to CS (28-08-1934)); Tschegbani and Kuntuli in 
1927 (PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/300/45 Northern Terr. Constabulary to CCNT (31-01-1925)), Sambul in 
1920 (PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/62 ‘Inquiry into Konkomba Riot’ (1934)) and PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/62/32 
CCNT to CS (28-08-1934)). 
26  PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/211 ‘Annual Report Yendi District (1916)’; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/214 ‘Kutja 
Incident 1915-1917’; respectively PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21/19 DC Eastern Dagomba to CSP (21-01-
1929); see also PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21/8 CCNT to CS (03-01-1929); PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21/5 CSP 
to CCNT (02-01-1929); PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21/8 CCNT to CS (03-01-1929). 
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communal labour had proven a satisfactory punitive measure in other districts.27 
This proposal was quite different from that of District Commissioner Gilbert, 
who had written that ‘if they fight again they should be severely punished and 
moved from that area’. 28 
However, Konkomba hardly needed pushing, as since the 1920s, enabled by a 
colonial pax (Skalník 1983: 19), tens of thousands of them voluntarily left the 
conflicts and population pressure in Kikpakpaan. I found no evidence of British 
prevention nor of encouragement of this massive resettlement.29   
Early 20th century Kikpakpaan was ravaged by overpopulation, soil exhaustion 
(the land was ‘alternately a swamp and a dust bowl’, Hilton 1959: 27), a series of 
droughts, pests and locust plagues,30 and consequently family feuds. Initially, 
Konkomba headed for the highly cultivated Krachi area, where the British re-
lease of Grushi slaves after World War I had left a labour deficit (Hilton 1959), 
but many Konkomba who walked towards the south, carrying pots and pans on 
their head, found favourable virgin bush perfect for the cultivation of tubers 
(yams and cassava), on the way in ‘a great triangle of formerly unoccupied terri-
tory between Salaga, Bimbilla, and Krachi’, largely in Nanun (Tait 1961: 30; cf. 
Barker 1986: 175). Pioneering migrants walked back ‘home’ to show tokens of 
their abundant yam harvest, and many relatives followed them to Nanun, a trend 
which accelerated after the 1931 introduction of direct taxation. Although Bas-
sari, Chakosi and Kabré farmers and Fulani herdsmen were also attracted to the 
lands of Nanun, Konkomba were the largest group of settlers by far (see below). 
Indirect rule (1931-1951) 
The implementation of direct taxation to replace forced labour abolished in a 
1930 Geneva Convention (Brukum 1999: 113), was part of the 1931 introduction 
of indirect rule, integrating chieftaincy into the colonial administration and re-
naming the northern public ‘Native Lands’ (Konings 1984: 7; Lund 2008: 33-
34). Although the Gold Coast administration had wanted to introduce indirect 
rule, which had become the standard in other British colonies since the mid-
                                                 
27  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21/27 Ag CS to CCNT (14-06-1929), respectively PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21 CSP 
to DC Eastern Dagomba (26-09-1929); see also PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21 DC Eastern Dagomba to CSP 
(01-07-1929). 
28  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/21 DC Eastern Dagomba to CSP (01-07-1929). 
29  Administrators seldom noted the migration: PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/368/n.n. ‘Informal Diary of the 
District Commissioner Krachi for May 1926’; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/368/n.n. ‘Extracts of Official 
Informal Diaries of the Southern Province for Month of June, 1925’; PRAAD/T/NRG8/4/20/n.n. 
‘Krachi District Informal Diary for the Month of August, 1930’; PRAAD/T/NRG8/4/94/57 ‘Informal 
Diary – District Commissioner Dagomba, April 1945’. 
30  PRAAD/T/NRG8/4/94/76 ‘Informal Diary of District Commissioner, Dagomba, Yendi, for the 
Month of November, 1946’; PRAAD/A/ADM.56/1/368/n.n. ‘Extracts of Official Informal Diaries of 
the Southern Province for Month of June, 1925’. See also Weiss (2003). 
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1920s, this administrative change did not go smoothly in the Gold Coast and 
Ashanti nor in the Northern Territories. While in the former, educated ‘natives’ 
resisted the idea of delegating sovereignty to illiterate chiefs, it was rather the 
local administrators who resisted the introduction of indirect rule in the Northern 
Territories. The degradation of the north reflected on the administrators in the 
protectorate, most of whom were old hands with a military background and who 
argued that they already practiced indirect rule as far as possible and that the 
northerner chiefs would be incapable of fulfilling further administrative functions 
(Talton 2003a: 98; 2003b).  
But when Chief Commissioner Walker-Leigh retired in December 1928, this 
was a pretext for replacing almost the entire northern administration by personnel 
with a civil background. William Andrew Jones became the Chief Commissioner 
and he implemented indirect rule together with the new DC for Yendi (H.A. 
Blair) and the commissioner for the Southern Province of the NT (A.C. Duncan-
Johnstone). The latter found the Gold Coast type of indirect rule too complicated 
for the Northern Territories and he wrote his own guidebook based on Donald 
Cameron’s policies for mostly stateless societies in Tanganyika (Talton 2003a: 
114). Although indirect rule was a system of convenience and cutbacks (one-
third of the colonial employees lost their jobs during the economic world crisis; 
Rathbone 2000: 15; Staniland 1975: 105), it was primarily an ideology of cus-
tomary administration (Mamdani 1996; Rathbone 2000). 
Indirect rule required gathering ethnographic data on local customs in so-
called ‘constitutions’. A Dagomba constitution and its implementation in a 1931 
conference formally made Konkomba in Kikpakpaan subjects of Dagomba 
chiefs. Later that year, a similar Nanumba constitution was drawn up (see be-
low). Most ethnographies for this purpose were conducted by colonial officers, 
because the colonial administration in the Northern Territories had an aversion to 
academic anthropologists until the 1950s. The distinction between both forms of 
ethnography should not be wiped out but also not overestimated: colonial officers 
of that generation had had academic anthropological training in Accra, Cam-
bridge or Oxford (Goody 1995: 40; Lentz 1999: 123) and not only were their 
research methods (interviews with chiefs and elders) similar to those of anthro-
pologists, but they also shared an interest in social order (Lentz 1999: 138; cf. 
Pels & Salemink 1999).  
The administrative aversion to academia had its roots in a project of Gold 
Coast Government Anthropologist Rattray, who had been flown into Tamale in 
1929 with a lot of fuss to conduct a comprehensive ethnographic study of the 
Northern Territories (but not of the Togoland mandate). In his research report, 
which led to his 1932 Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland, he insulted local admin-
istrators by calling his work the protectorate’s first ethnography (Goody 1995: 
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207; Lentz 1999: 137).31 He criticised the administrative fixation on chiefs as 
village leaders, arguing that earth priests were more accountable leaders, and 
rejected the local applicability of the ‘tribe’ concept, which was central to British 
administration in spite of its obvious controversies (Lentz 1999: 122; 2006: 101; 
cf. Piot 1999: 132-134; Skalník 1996: 110).32 In the mid 1930s, Meyer Fortes 
was the first academic ethnographer to experience this administrative suspicion 
towards anthropology, even though his research on Tallensi (300 kilometres 
north of Nanun) was paid for by the Rockefeller-funded International African 
Institute (Goody 1995: 41; Stocking 1991: 53), and he always stressed the bene-
fits of his research to the colonial administration (Fortes 1945: xiii).  
It is in this context that we should understand the arrival of assisting commis-
sioner H.W. Amherst in Bimbilla on 6 September 1931, for three weeks of 
ethnographic fieldwork to write a Constitution on Nanumba customs to benefit 
the introduction of indirect rule.33 Amherst’s journey was the first colonial 
expedition entirely focused on Nanun, a small and scarcely populated far-away 
place which had seldom earned more attention than in side-notes. When Amherst 
asked his superiors for a fieldwork extension, they replied that no further enquiry 
was needed, because ‘[t]his little state must eventually be absorbed by Da-
gomba’.34  
Everything about his expedition testified of the limited interest of the colonial 
enterprise in Nanun: Amherst was accompanied by a translator from Yendi (the 
district capital) and not by a local assistant, he had no vehicle at his disposal and 
his expedition was scheduled during the peak of rainy season. However, Am-
herst’s zeal was striking: He succeeded in reaching all corners of Nanun during 
his fieldwork to ascertain its boundaries and crosscheck his Bimbilla data. Am-
herst told his interlocutors (mainly chiefs, elders and tom-tom beaters) that his 
research was to benefit a Conference similar to those held in Dagbon and Gonja 
                                                 
31  Rattray’s discovery of a linguist unity behind the apparent mosaic of tribal groupings, their 
dichotomy of autochthonous element (earth priests) conquered by Mole-Dagbani speakers, and the 
village-level distinction between chiefs and earth priests were by no means novel (cf. Zech 1904; 
Cardinall 1918, 1929: 407). Rattray’s innovation was the comparison of his material to that of 
Ashanti, Australia and North America, thereby using transplanting concepts such as ‘clan’ and 
‘totem’ to the Northern Territories (Lentz 1999: 137, 144; Lentz & Nugent 2000: 7-8). 
32  For example, sometimes Konkomba were a tribe, in other documents they were many tribes and yet 
in others, they were a subset of Dagomba (PRAAD/T/NRG8/1/3/n.n. CSP (02-07-1925) ‘Boundaries 
of the Mandated Area of Togoland’). Ferguson had classified the northern people as he found them, 
according to their various degrees of capacity for political negotiations: Muslim converts and traders 
(mostly Hausa); semi barbarous tribes with a form of organized government (e.g. Nanumba and 
Dagomba); and wild tribes (Konkomba), living in independent family communities (Goody 1971: 54; 
Lentz & Nugent 2000: 116, 119). However, the tribe concept became increasingly prescriptive (cf. 
Lentz 1994: 469), i.e. what they once were and should become in future as native states. By denying 
the historicity of the northern tribes, Rattray undermined the project of indirect rule. 
33  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/35 ‘Nanumba Kingdom (1931)’. 
34  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/30 ‘Nanumba Native Administration (1930-31), entries 14 and 1. 
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(1931b: 3), to which his informants were reportedly sympathetic. On his day of 
arrival, Bimbilla Naa Abdulai met Amherst in the Rest House with a cow.  
The next day, Amherst had a series of interviews, during which he found that 
‘my impressions at the end of yester day were largely wrong’ (1931a: 3). He 
feared that ‘if one kept on questioning them every day for a year one would still 
be inaccurate and full of half truths’ which he blamed on his informants: Win-
ning their trust was one thing but their subjection to taboos and ignorance were 
much harder to overcome (op. cit.: 4; 1, 3). The day’s disappointment was his 
interview with the imam, who was a Nanumba: ‘I had hoped that he would be a 
long-domicile Hausa […] and not so subject to the Taboos’ (1931a: 4). But if 
Amherst believed that he could keep on asking the same questions for a year and 
still have them half answered, this had probably as much to with his questions as 
with their answers. Considering that, as in other parts of Africa during colonial 
rule, local leadership also had its stakes in such ‘ethnographic occasions’ (Pels 
1996; Pels & Salemink 1999; cf. Bayart 1993: 20ff; 2000: 248), Amherst’s 
interlocutors were probably hardly ignorant or superstitious, but rather actors in 
an epistemological role-play in which they decided what information was best 
made clear, left ambiguous or concealed.  
The uncertainties about his data did not find their way into the lines of his 
fifty-page constitution. This report has eight sections, on area, boundaries and 
population and history, followed by sections on administration, judiciary, tribute, 
ethnography and agriculture. Nanun’s ‘traditional’ administration was suppos-
edly untouched by ‘modern conditions’ such as Islam and the German occupation 
(1931b: 12). It is very striking that this depiction was not only detached from 
Amherst’s encounter, but also silent about the massive settlement of Konkomba 
farmers.  
The only changes in Nanun, for Amherst, were those of internal evolution: 
Nanumba had ‘nearly, but not quite, emerged from the family-group stage’, divi-
sional chieftaincies existed only in ‘embryo form’ and open competition to 
chiefly titles, once common around the Volta Basin, was still prevalent (1931b: 
12, 13, 15). Amherst conceptualised Nanumba chieftaincy as a form of authori-
tative rule spread over five chiefly classes (royal chiefs, electors, elders, warriors 
and female chiefs), based on voluntary tribute rather than coercion. The judici-
ary, Amherst argued, was controlled by the Bimbilla Naa and his elders, and ritu-
ally sanctioned.35  
One and a half years later, on 11 February 1933, Yendi District Commissioner 
Cockey organised a Conference with Nanumba chiefs to implement indirect 
                                                 
35  Transgressors could for instance drink from the ‘fetish’ Malesogo of Kukuo village and promising 
not to repeat his or her behaviour, at the risk of being killed by Malesogo if this promise was broken 
(op. cit.: 29). 
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rule.36 At this Conference, Amherst’s descriptions of Nanumba organisation were 
made prescriptive in customary law. The Nanumba State Council (also the Judi-
cial Council) of the Bimbilla Naa and titles in the five classes of chiefs were 
fixed. The Native Judicial Court had jurisdiction in civil issues such as matrimo-
nial affairs, inheritance and land possession and was sovereign in criminal law 
violations, such as theft, crop destruction, arms possession and public fighting. 
The Conference appeared to have been silent on the Konkomba population. 
Konkomba settlers had no role in the Nanumba Native Authority, but they were 
subjected to its authority and jurisdiction.  
During indirect rule, which lasted until 1951, there were two key events which 
stimulated Konkomba migration to Nanun, fostered British administrative doubts 
about their Kikpakpaan policy (subjecting Konkomba to Dagomba), and which 
bore the seeds of Nanumba renouncing their reception of Konkomba. The first 
event was the 1936 French ‘pacification’ (demilitarisation followed by develop-
ment) of Konkomba to counter the Konkomba feuds which had plagued the 
French mandate since the introduction of civil rule in 1922 (Froelich 1954: 37-
39). Fearing that Konkomba would massively flee to British Togoland, the 
Governor of Dahomey and his delegates actively rallied British cooperation. The 
local British administration refused to close the border, sent back refugees, 
destroy all strophantus plants (from which poison for arrows was extracted) and 
prohibit hunting, as the French had requested, because all such measures had 
been unsuccessfully exerted by the British, who now preferred confidence 
building to coercion.37 
So the French pacification of the Konkomba area went ahead without British 
support in January and February 1936. Although the executive Lieutenant Massu 
called it ‘an extremely peaceful pastime’ (Lestrade 1994: 115), no less than 
300,000 arrows were confiscated and large numbers of French Konkomba fled to 
British Togoland (Cornevin 1959: 699; Tcham 1994).38 After the pacification, 
Konkomba were apparently rather successfully appeased by infrastructural, agri-
cultural and educational investments (Cornevin 1964: 699; Tcham 1994).  
The second critical event in Kikpakpaan was the September 1940 local 
Konkomba assassination of the Dagomba chief and twelve of his entourage in 
                                                 
36  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/59 ‘Native Tribunal (Nanumba Area) Order 1933’. 
37  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70 Sgd. Bourgine, Governor to The Governor of the Gold Coast (03-03-1935); 
PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/7 CCNT to DC Dagomba (26-03-1935); cf. PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/10b DC 
Dagomba to Commandant de Cercle de Sokodé; PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/13 CCNT to The Ag CS (26-
03-1935); see also PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/24b (Sgd) H.W.M. Hamford, I.G.P.: ‘Minute by the 
Inspector General of Police, dated 15th September 1935’; PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/24a Ag Governor 
to The Lieutenant-Governor of Dahomey (24-09-1935); see also PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70 DC 
Dagomba to CCNT (09-08-1935); PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/23 CCNT to CS (28-08-1935). 
38  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/49a (Sgd) M.L. Fraser C.O.P. ‘Konkomba Patrol’ (19-02-1936); see also 
PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/70/39 Ag DC Dagomba to CCNT (12-02-1936). 
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Segberi (see Talton 2003a, 2003b).39 A week earlier, veterinary assistant Binka 
had arrived in Segberi to inoculate cattle and the Segberi Naa delegated two men 
for his assistance. Binka found that some Konkomba cattle were not immunised 
and sent the owners with the chief’s delegates to the palace for making a report. 
These delegates were shot at a Konkomba compound, causing minor injuries. As 
the Yendi escort police arrived a few days later, they met a large troop of 
Konkomba, and they could not prevent the mentioned palace attack on 11 
September. As Dagomba warriors from surrounding villages arrived to punish 
the Konkomba communities (with British consent), they found all communities 
deserted. In the next two days, escort police arrested almost fifty fleeing Kon-
komba on the road to Bimbilla. By the end of the week, hundreds of men, women 
and children were held by the Yendi police, and 73 were officially arrested, while 
the main perpetrators were believed to have crossed over to French territory.40 
Although only one or two Konkomba clans were involved in the confronta-
tion, Chief Commissioner Jones applied the Peace and Preservation Act to 
communally ‘teach the Konkomba the lesson which they have to learn’. He 
found that ‘we must cease to treat the Konkomba as naughty, but amusing 
children’, because ‘[f]or twenty-five years they have been a festering sore on an 
otherwise healthy administrative body’.41 A very different voice, however, came 
from the director of Veterinary Services, which had carried out immunisation 
schemes in Konkomba communities for almost a decade without problems. The 
director rather blamed exploitative Dagomba for the Segberi rising and he ob-
served that Konkomba emigrants in Nanun and adjacent areas ‘appear to lose 
suddenly their vicious savagery’.42 
But it was the Chief Commissioner’s perspective which prevailed in a meeting 
with the Governor in Accra early October, at which they agreed on the opening 
of a staffed police station and fifty escort police at the central Konkomba village 
of Saboba, the prohibition and destruction of bows and arrows and the construc-
tion of a bridge over the river Tupe to make the area year-round accessible.43 
However, a year later, police patrols were reduced to normal strength and months 
later, the Northern Territories administration decided that neither financial nor 
                                                 
39  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/4 CCNT to CS (17-09-1940). 
40  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/6 Asst Superintendent, Gold Coast Police to CCNT (22-09-1940); PRAAD/-
T/NRG8/2/88/13 Superintendent Gold Coast Police/N.TS to CCNT (09-10-1940); PRAAD/T/-
NRG8/2/88/ Superintendent Gold Coast Police/N.TS to Ag CCNT (27-12-1940); PRAAD/T/-
NRG8/2/88/29a Superintendent Gold Coast Police/N.TS: ‘Konkomba riot-September 1940. Report of 
Konkomba Patrol up to 31.12.1940’ (31-12-1940). 
41  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/4 CCNT to CS (17-09-1940). 
42  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/51 Director Veterinary Services to Ag CCNT (18-03-1941); see also 
PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/1a F.K. Binka to The Director of Veterinary Services (16-09-1940); 
PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/49 DC Dagomba to Ag CCNT (25-04-1941). 
43  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88 CCNT to CS (02-11-1940). 
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human resources permitted the development of a subordinate Native Authority in 
the Konkomba area.44 
The rising attempts ‘to win back the confidence of Konkomba’ however 
resulted in the opening of a Konkomba administrative sub-district after all in 
February 1947, after the completion of a road to Saboba.45 In the opening cere-
mony, Acting Chief Commissioner Guthrie Hall challenged Konkomba to be 
responsible for settling their own disputes.46 He also inaugurated James Ander-
son as the sub-district officer. Anderson was charged to write a ‘Memorandum 
on Konkomba policy’ (1947),47 which rather than fixing their customs, pragmati-
cally gave several scenarios for future Konkomba administration. Rather than 
recommending the creation of a separate Konkomba council, Anderson proposed 
to choose the most stable option, the recognition of councils of elders subjected 
to Dagomba chiefs, because Konkomba were facing ‘the most severe trial in a 
people’s history’: Education (1947: 14).  
Anderson also called for a halt to Konkomba emigration because the area was 
getting depopulated: Between the 1920s and 1940s, perhaps up to three-quarters 
of the British Kikpakpaan population had left.48 ‘French’ Konkomba also mas-
sively settled in Nanun and adjacent areas, diverted from mountainous Central 
French Togoland and often fleeing the French ‘pacification’. Although Ander-
son’s proposal was copied by Hall, the Konkomba sub-district foreshadowed the 
abolition of indirect rule in the Gold Coast in 1951, after which Anderson’s 
report was rendered ‘irrelevant’.49 
Citizenship (1951-1979) 
Judging from administrative reports, nothing had happened in Nanun since the 
1933 Conference. In reality however, Nanun experienced one of its most dra-
matic demographic changes. Completion of a road between Bimbilla and Kumasi 
greatly enhanced the yam trade to the southern cities and triggered Konkomba to 
settle in Nanun. In spite of their inaccuracies,50 census materials are telling: Be-
                                                 
44  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/74 DC Dagomba to Ag CCNT (13-12-1941); PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/88/78 Ag 
CCNT to CS (09-02-1942). 
45  PRAAD/T/NRG8/4/94/54 ‘Informal Diary – District Commissioner Dagomba, February 1945’ 
46  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/97/5 DC Dagomba (n.d.); PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/47/2 ‘The Opening of the Saboba 
Sub-Station, 18th February, 1947’. 
47  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/97/9 Asst. DC James Anderson (02-07-1947) ‘Memorandum on Konkomba 
Policy’. 
48  From 40,000 to 12,000; PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/97/10 DC Dagomba to Colonial Secretary (19-06-1947). 
49  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/97/2 Senior DC Dagomba to CCNT (22-08-1951). 
50  Inaccuracy was due to counting constraints, sometimes ‘owing to the wildness of the people’ 
(PRAAD/A/ADM.5/2 ‘Census Report 1921’, p. 141), and due to tribal definition and demarcation. 
For example, while in the German 1907 census, 7791 Konkomba were counted in the Yendi district, 
the 1921 British census counted 6562 Konkomba as against 10,148 Chamba (PRAAD/A/-
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tween the 1931 and 1960 counts, Nanun experienced the colony’s highest annual 
growth percentages.51 While in the 1931 census, Nanun had an ethnically 
homogeneous population of 7927 (less than 2/km2), Konkomba had become 
Nanun’s ‘largest tribe’ with over 20,000 inhabitants thirty years later.  
Konkomba and Nanumba coexisted peacefully but their interactions were 
mostly economic and they did not intermarry. Many Nanumba despised Kon-
komba as bonkobŋò (bush animal) or nirbimaa (those people), while Konkomba 
found Nanumba arrogant. From the onset, Nanumba called these settlers 
‘Kpungpamba’ (Konkomba), while Konkomba usually called Nanumba ‘Bidag-
bam’ (Dagomba). In chapter four, I study this coexistence in detail. 
Nanun was however on the eve of perhaps even more drastic changes, due to 
circumstances which largely happened in the Gold Coast and Ashanti colonies. 
There, educated natives who had been systematically seconded to often inade-
quate chiefs, started to call for independence (Staniland 1975: 41, 105, 107; 
Rathbone 2000: 17). These external changes were internalised by a growing 
group of educated Nanumba youth.  
In 1947, Kwame Nkrumah returned from London to the Gold Coast to join the 
United Gold Coast Convention party founded by J.B. Danquah a year earlier, but 
the event of a British police shooting turning into an anti-colonial riot in Accra in 
1948 drove a wedge between them. While the moderate Danquah was on good 
terms with chiefs and with the British, Nkrumah radically opposed both. In 1949, 
Nkrumah established the socialist Convention People’s Party (CPP) and toured 
the colony – including the Northern Territories – to rally the support of the youth, 
such as the Asante Youth Association which had been established in 1947 
(Allman 1990). In the North, Nkrumah ignored the chiefs but instead rallied the 
support of the youth and women, through magasia (women leaders). Danquah 
responded with a similar itinerary, but calling on chiefs’ palaces, in the company 
of Alhassan Chambas, the first literate Nanumba, who after working in the 
Dagomba Native Authority became a journalist with the Ashanti Pioneer in 
Kumasi (Ladouceur 1979: 81; 88).  
The northern interest of Nkrumah and Danquah was the result of granting full 
citizenship to northerners. After the Accra riots, the Governor established two 
commissions to draw the colonial future of the Gold Coast. The two main 
                                                 
ADM.56/1/211/n.n. ‘Annual Report of the Yendi District 1916’). Chamba almost disappeared from 
later censuses. See also Kirby (1986) and Lentz (2006c: 84). 
51  NRG8/34/1 ‘Census 1931 Mandates Area (62/1930) (1931)’; Census Office (1964, 1972); Ghana 
Statistical Service (1989, 2002); While the national population growth rate between 1931 and 1970 
never exceeded three percent, the Nanun population grew significantly faster, with over 5 percent per 
annum between 1931 and 1948 (the highest in the colony), 7 percent per annum between 1948 and 
1960 and almost 4 percent per annum between 1960 and 1970. After 1970, overall population growth 
normalised in Nanun, with an overage annual growth of 2 percent (1970-1984) and almost 3 percent 
(1984-2000). 
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recommendations were the abolition of indirect rule and the unification of the 
Gold Coast, Ashanti and the Northern Territories under an African government, 
both which were enshrined in the 1950 Barnes Constitution and implemented on 
1 January 1951 (Bening 1999: 253; Rathbone 2000: 98). Nanun became a full 
part of Gold Coast, after Bimbilla Naa Natogmah had given his consent to a 
delegation from the United Nations, the successor of the League of Nations of 
which Togoland was still a mandate.52 In 1951, Nkrumah won the African 
Government elections and became Prime Minister. 
In Nanun, although the Native Authority was abolished, chiefs continued to be 
represented in the three newly established Local Councils of Bimbilla, Dakpam 
and Nakpaa. These were the three largest chieftaincies and the respective chiefs 
presided over these councils. These councils, which merged to one in 1956, 
accelerated local development. While it had taken until 1949 until the Nanumba 
Day School in Bimbilla was opened, schools mushroomed after 1951. Bimbilla 
got a small health centre and a number of dams were constructed (Skalník 1979: 
22). A few years later the Evangelical Presbyterian (Basel) Mission opened a 
station in Bimbilla and established a Teacher’s Training College on the outskirts 
of town.  
By that time, there were just a handful of Nanumba literates and probably no 
Konkomba literates in Nanun. However, the number of northern literates was 
increasing and some of them founded the Northern Youth Association in 1952, 
modelled after the Asante Youth Association (Ladouceur 1979: 113). I have 
found no evidence of Nanumba youth organisations in the 1950s but the North-
ern Youth Association set a precedent for local Dagomba and Konkomba youth 
groups.53 Although there were no Konkomba literates in Nanun yet, in Kikpak-
paan, Konkomba had had to fulfil village school enrolment quota for the school 
in Yendi in the 1940s. Initially, they sent orphans but Konkomba interest in 
schooling drastically increased over that decade, especially because recruited 
Konkomba native police, after being stationed in the south, saw the advantage of 
education for their children.54 The first Konkomba students graduated from 
Yendi Middle School years after its opening in 1948. During the ‘tribal meetings’ 
in Yendi school, Konkomba students discovered that their cultural-linguistic 
similarities outweighed their varying dialects and face marks (Talton 2003a: 161-
173; 2003c). 
                                                 
52  The chief’s declaration was verbal but transcribed by the team. ‘Petition from the Na of Bimbilla, 
Paramount Chief of the Nanumbas, His Sub-Chiefs and the People of Nanumba State concerning 
Togoland under British Administration’ (14-12-1949). 
53  PRAAD/T/NRG1/11/5/4 Secretary Yendi Youth Association to The Director of Social Welfare and 
Community Development (08-04-1957) ‘Yendi Youth Association’; PRAAD/T/NRG1/11/5/9 Secre-
tary Eastern Dagomba Students Union to Mr. G.U.L. Edwards, Government Agent (26-01-1959); 
PRAAD/T/NRG1/11/5/2 ‘Dagomba Youth Movement’ (n.d.). 
54  PRAAD/T/NRG8/3/167 ‘Annual Report Dagomba and Nanumba District 1949-50’, p. 15. 
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In 1951, some of these graduates were employed in the new Saboba Primary 
School, which had been opened with the help of the Assemblies of God mission 
(see below). The Konkomba teachers organised themselves in the Konkomba 
Improvement Association and were especially interested in the unification and 
development of Konkomba. They focused on girls, because sending a girl to 
school would counter the backward and feud-triggering marriage system of 
betrothal (Talton 2003a: 169-170; 173). The initiative collapsed when the teach-
ers were transferred to other parts of the colony in 1956, but was reactivated in 
the late 1970s (see below). 
The rise of emancipating youth was important in the context of the political 
developments in the Northern Territories. In 1953, one year ahead of the first 
elections of the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, the Northern Territories elec-
torate was granted equal rights to those in the south (Bening 1999: 253), obtain-
ing one quarter (26) of the Legislative Assembly seats (Ladouceur 1979: 113). 
The Gonja literate Braimah founded the Northern People’s Party (NPP) for the 
development of the north and the administration of the north by northerners 
(Ladouceur 1979: 113; 126). While CPP won almost three-quarters of the seats, 
NPP won half of the northern seats and became the largest opposition party 
(Ladouceur 1979: 129; Rathbone 2000: 28). Although NPP was reputed to be a 
party of chiefs, and the Mamprusi paramount chief was a devout supporter, CPP 
won in Dagbon and Nanun. In a serious chieftaincy dispute in Dagbon about the 
legitimacy of the paramount chief, Nkrumah initially wanted to replace the 
incumbent chief (Ya Na Abudulai III) with CPP supporter Andani, the chief of 
Mion village. However, as CPP spin doctors told Nkrumah that such intervention 
the removal of the incumbent would cost him a lot of votes in the North, 
Nkrumah tactically rallied the incumbent’s support, which probably influenced 
the political preferences of Bimbilla Naa Natogmah, who gave his support to 
CPP and their candidate, his literate ‘brother’ whose name was also Natogmah 
(Ladouceur 1979: 103, 119). 
Newcomer NPP was uneasy with its position as opposition leader and in the 
next years, newly established regional parties from elsewhere in Gold Coast 
sought the alliance of NPP. The first was the Ashanti-based National Liberation 
Movement (NLM) which aspired federalism or even separate Ashanti independ-
ence and the second was the Ewe-dominated Togoland Congress, which did not 
want to become part of an independent Ghana. NPP opposed both agendas and 
basically, the party opposed to Gold Coast’s nearing independence and the pros-
pect of being governed by Asante, and pointed at the British responsibility 
through their treaties (made by Ferguson) with the northern chiefs (Ladouceur 
1979: 157). NPP however concurred to Independence after the British Govern-
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ment released a special Development Scheme for the north (Ladouceur 1979: 
162).  
The last hurdle to Gold Coast’s Independence was the status of the Togoland 
mandate. In 1956 therefore, the United Nations held a referendum (‘plebiscite’) 
in which the Mandate population could vote for or against integration into inde-
pendent Ghana. CPP and NPP – who both had consolidated their seats in the 
Legislative Assembly in the 1956 elections – jointly campaigned for integration, 
while the Togoland Congress opposed integration. One of the leading Togoland 
Congress politicians was the Nanumba Alhassan Chambas, who had campaigned 
for Danquah in 1949, but who did not trust that the northern interest would be 
secured in an independent Ghana and argued that it would be better to be under 
the United Nations than under Asante. The results of the plebiscite were disap-
pointing for Chambas: Because Bimbilla Naa Natogmah was a CPP supporter, no 
less than 84.1 percent of the Nanun electorate voted for integration. Two-thirds 
of the Konkomba in Kikpakpaan – where Chambas had actively campaigned – 
also said ‘yes’ to Ghana, thereby definitively turning their backs to Konkomba in 
the French area.55 Although Cornevin (1959: 699) argued that this was due to the 
Konkomba indifference to wider political structures, the strategic border-crossing 
of Konkomba settlers rather indicated a profound consciousness of Gold Coast 
and Togoland nationalism.56 An Ewe majority opposed integration into Ghana 
but their vote was not enough to win the plebiscite (Nugent 1996). 
And so it happened that Nanun became part of independent Ghana on 6 March 
1957, with Kwame Nkrumah as prime minister (the British Queen remained the 
Head of State until 1960). In order to numb Ewe resistance and opposition from 
regional parties such as NPP, Nkrumah passed the Avoidance of Discrimination 
Bill in December 1957 to declare the entire opposition illegal (Ladouceur 1979: 
164). Between 1958 and 1960, almost all former opposition members (including 
Chambas) joined the CPP, causing the incorporation of the northern elite into 
national institutions and the penetration of local institutions by national agents 
and ideas. On the whole, northerners lost their voice and became further margin-
alised under Nkrumah’s rule (Ladouceur 1979: 181, 187). In 1958, the Northern 
Region replaced the Northern Territories but the Northern Regional Assembly 
was abolished a year later, for Nkrumah found it ‘a waste of money’ (Ladouceur 
1979: 167; Rathbone 2000: 130). The Northern Development Scheme also van-
ished (Ladouceur 1979: 167). In early 1958, Nanumba district was dissolved and 
Nanun became administered from Yendi again (Skalník 1979: 22).  
                                                 
55  PRAAD/T/NRG1/3/9 ‘Togoland Plebiscite Results (1956)’. 
56  On border-crossing, see Froelich 1954: 36; Lestrade 1994; for debates about borders as ‘theatres of 
opportunity’, see also (Lentz 2003), Nugent & Asiwaju (1996: 11) and Nugent (2002). 
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The status of chiefs was ambivalent under Nkrumah. According to Mamdani, 
Nkrumah reacted to indirect rule’s ‘decentralised despotism’ by rigidly stressing 
equal citizenship and denigrating traditional authorities (Mamdani 1996: 291) but 
the thesis that Nkrumah wanted to wipe out chieftaincy requires adjustment 
(Rathbone 2000: 22, 99). Although Nkrumah found chiefs repressive and out-
dated, he increasingly also manipulated chiefs to win the confidence of their 
subjects, and chiefs were not passive in this at all. In 1958, he therefore set up the 
Regional Houses of Chiefs (Rathbone 2000: 46). It was in this context that in 
1959, Bimbilla Naa Dasana succeeded Natogmah, who had died in 1957 (Skalník 
1979: 47). CPP also installed new chiefs where there had been none, such as in 
Nkwanta south of Nanun (see below).  
Although CPP made education and health care available to the masses – in 
Nanun alone, dozens of schools were opened in the early 1960s – the once flour-
ishing economy of the Gold Coast and Ashanti colonies suffered much from his 
socialistic policies. Moreover, especially after a 1964 ‘referendum’ had made 
Ghana a single-party state, many Ghanaians dreamt of a return to constitutional 
democracy and a liberation of chieftaincy. This silent opposition was a fertile 
ground for a coup against Nkrumah in 1966. A military National Liberation 
Council deposed several chiefs who had been installed by Nkrumah and organ-
ised elections in August 1969, which were won by the Progress Party of Kofi 
Busia, a close ally of Danquah. Busia became unpopular for his economic 
policies (he devaluated the cedi on the advice of the IMF) and his pro-Asante 
politics and in 1972, Busia was overthrown by the northerner General I.K. 
Acheampong, who in turn was overthrown by General F.W.K. Akuffo in 1978, 
who himself was ousted by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings on 4 June 1979. 
Rawlings put Acheampong and Akuffo before a firing squad and organised long-
awaited elections two weeks later. The Nkrumahist northerner Hilla Limann 
(People’s National Party) won the elections. Although it was during his admini-
stration that the first Konkomba/Nanumba violence erupted, events leading up to 
this started in the 1960s.  
Youth associations in Nanun 
In the early 1960s, as the number of Nanumba literates was increasing, Alhaji 
Abdulai M. Baba and some others founded the Nanumba Youth Association 
(NAYA). Youth activism in Nanun was not altogether new. The youth – who 
were and are usually married middle-age men, who are not yet elders – were and 
are usually called by the Hausa word amasachina, were an active group for 
dancing, organising communal labour and leading farm groups.  
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While Nanumba had been hostile to education in the 1930s,57 Bimbilla Naa 
Natogmah, who was the chief from 1945 to 1957, sent a significant number of 
young men, especially sons of chiefs, to schools in the 1950s. As a consequence, 
most young literates were related to chiefs, particularly to Natogmah’s Banyili 
lineage. These youth were however faced with Bimbilla Naa Dasana (1959-1981) 
from the Gbugmayili lineage, whose affinity with development and education 
was minimal. This situation placed the Nanumba Youth Association in an 
awkward position: Although of chiefly descent themselves, they also saw chief-
taincy as something backward. Nanumba youth evaluated some cultural practices 
as backward, but others as constitutive for their ethnicity, such as Simpa danc-
ing.58 However, several events increasingly tied the NAYA agenda up with chief-
taincy, and even with Bimbilla Naa Dasana. 
First, NAYA prioritised the re-establishment of Nanumba district as the 
engine of local development. After Nkrumah was ousted from office, the Na-
numba Traditional Council issued a petition to the Government stating that 
‘Nanumba are a different tribe from Dagombas and we live in a very viable area 
with a Paramount Chief capable of administering ourselves’ (Skalník 1979: 23). 
Although the Traditional Council wrote this petition, NAYA was actively in-
volved in this demand. Related to this request was the flaring up of the highly 
politicised Dagbon chieftaincy dispute, which culminated in the police shooting 
thirty rioters during the so-called ‘Yendi Massacre’ days after the inauguration of 
Busia (who was suspected to have a hand in the affairs) in September 1969. 
These events stimulated an Nanumba ethnic identity independent from Dagomba 
and they also resulted in the renewed codification of Nanumba chieftaincy suc-
cession regulations (see chapter six) (Skalník 1987: 307, 312-3).59  
A second circumstance which linked development to chieftaincy was the 
Kpasaland affair. As mentioned above, Nkrumah had installed a paramount chief 
for the Akyode people in the Nkwanta area. This chief, the Shiarewura, claimed 
Nanun south of the Mo river. This Kpasa area was a formerly uninhabited 
                                                 
57  PRAAD/T/NRG8/2/35 ‘Nanumba Kingdom (1931)’, p. 44. 
58  In the mid 1970s, Alhaji T.B. Damba, the son of a Bimbilla palace elder, founded the music group 
Amasachina (Hausa for youth). He performed in Bimbilla, Tamale and Accra but in Bimbilla he also 
organised entertainment shows for ‘traditional’ dances such as Bamaya and Takai, but especially 
Simpa. Much as Highlife musicians absorbed various rural music styles, dubbing them for instance 
dagomba, around 1930, brass bands playing European Quickstep and Foxtrot and Gold Coastal 
Highlife had reached the towns of the Northern Territories, particularly Tamale and Yendi. Local 
musicians combined these with local Dagomba and Hausa music styles to Simpa, the local name for 
the coastal town of Winneba town, one of the birthplaces of Highlife (Collins 1985: 33, 36). Simpa 
performances were youth events, and they grew in popularity as more young people were getting 
educated. Dagomba Simpa bands were often politically active, and so of them got heavily involved in 
the events leading up to the Yendi Massacre, leading to a temporal suspension of their performances 
(Collins 1985: 37).  
59  Nanumba Traditional Council (1969) ‘Nanumba Customary Regulations and Procedures’. 
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Nanumba hunting ground of around 1,500 square kilometres which had been 
administratively separated from Nanun since 1922. The area experienced a 
Konkomba population boom when a 1965 trunk road connecting Bimbilla and 
Accra cut through it.60 As Kpasaland gained economic importance, both Na-
numba and Akyode from the Nkwanta area claimed Kpasa.61 Konkomba, who 
were the area’s first-comers, initially supported Nanumba, but in late 1965, 
Shiarewura rallied the support of the Konkomba elder of Kpasa.62 In 1966, 
amidst regional administrative meetings, Bimbilla Naa Dasana took the Shiare-
wura to Tamale High Court,63 and the case continued to be in various courts until 
1979 (see below). In July 1974, General Acheampong’s restoration of Nanumba 
district (Skalník 1979: 23) greatly enhanced the Nanumba feeling of independ-
ence from Dagbon but it also made the Kpasa affair more tense.  
In sum, in the 1970s, Nanumba youth were the main actors in Nanun and their 
agenda for local development centred on a complex emancipation from Dagomba 
and simultaneously the definition of Nanun as Nanumba district. However, the 
biggest challenge to Nanumba emancipation came not from Dagomba or Akyode 
but, surprisingly, from groups of disparate settlers living inside Nanun: Kon-
komba. 
To understand this process, we have to briefly turn our attention to Saboba, 
which had become a prime mission station. Missionaries averted the chiefly 
groups which allegedly inclined to Islam and focused mainly on groups such as 
Konkomba. The Assemblies of God mission – which had been present in Saboba 
since the 1930s – had made many converts in Saboba and some communities 
west of town. In 1962, two Catholic priests from the recently established Yendi 
parish were part-time delegated to Saboba, where they built the St. Joseph’s 
Technical School (SABTECH) and one of them became the permanent parish 
priest in 1965. In the same year, Rev. Crast from the United States opened the 
Evangelical Presbyterian mission in Saboba and had a mission hospital con-
                                                 
60  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.4/97 District Organising Assistant (n.d.) ‘Short Report on the Kpassa Land 
Dispute’. 
61  Already early 1965, Krachi and Yendi DCs had consultations about the Kpasa affairs (PRAAD/-
T/NRG1/2/14/4-5 DC Kete Krachi to DC Bimbilla (20-03-1965) ‘Trespass on Shiare Lands by 
Bimbillahene’; PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/14/6 DC Bimbilla to DC Kete-Krachi (07-04-1965) ‘Trespass on 
Shiare Lands by Bimbilla-Na’. 
62  PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/14/1 Shiarewura to Konja Konkomba (13-12-1965) ‘Kpasah Situation’; 
PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/14/7 Secretary, Nanumba Traditional Council to The District Administrative 
Officer, Yendi (18-11-1966) ‘Meeting with Konja Konkomba’; PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/14/8 Bimbilla-
Na to The District Administrative Officer, Yendi (20-08-1966) ‘Land dispute between Bimbilla-Na 
and Shiarewura over Kpasah Village’; PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/14/9 Bimbilla-Na to The District Admi-
nistrative Officer, Yendi (20-08-1966) ‘The end of Bimbilla-Na’s land across River Oti’. 
63  PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/14/11 District Administrative Officer, Yendi to The Ag Regional Administrative 
Officer, Tamale (09-09-1966) ‘Dispute over Kpasah Village between Bimbilla-Na and Shiare-Wura’; 
PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/14/17 District Administrative Officer to The Bimbilla-Na (09-01-1967) ‘Land 
dispute between Bimbilla-Na and Shiarewura’. 
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structed. All three missions made many converts in Saboba and, for the Roman 
Catholic mission, the villages around Kikpakpaan.  
The impact of these facilities on Konkomba should not be underestimated. A 
crucial additional missionary activity however had an even larger impact: In 
1962, the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), a Christian organisation from 
the USA, set up the Ghana Institute of Language, Literacy and Bible Translation 
(GILLBT), and made the Konkomba Literacy Project in Saboba one of its first 
projects, resulting in a translated New Testament in Likpakpaln in 1977 and, 
after completing the translated Old Testament, in the first complete mother-
tongue Bible in northern Ghana in 1997. The Bible translation project did not 
only bring the Christian message much closer to many Konkomba, but it also 
standardised Likpakpaln in a 1981 dictionary based on the Saboba dialect (Steele 
& Langdon 1981), which greatly enhanced Konkomba ethnic consciousness be-
yond clan divisions (Kirby 1998; cf. Vail 1989).  
Back to Nanun, where until the 1970s, Konkomba, and for that matter 
Nanumba, were almost absent in local administrative files. But this changed with 
an emerging group of Konkomba literates in Bimbilla. With primary education 
compulsory and free of charge for all children under Ghana’s first president 
Nkrumah, there were many educated Konkomba in the 1970s, living in towns 
like Bimbilla. Realising that Konkomba were completely marginalised politi-
cally, administratively and economically in Ghana, despite large numbers and 
dominance in yam farming, they decided to found the Konkomba Youth Asso-
ciation (KOYA, Bikpakpaam aamòkbaan or Konkomba unity). The idea of 
KOYA emerged more or less simultaneously in Saboba and Tamale (and other 
places), but it was in the latter place that Kenneth Wujangi and Daniel Ngula 
brought many educated Konkomba (civil servants) together to officially form 
KOYA and to draw a constitution. KOYA was inaugurated in its headquarters in 
Saboba during Easter 1977, and Daniel Ngula was elected as the president (1977-
1981). With an interest in ‘promoting understanding and oneness among 
Konkombas both at home and abroad; promoting the advancement of both formal 
and informal education among Konkomba; participating and playing our role in 
national affairs; exploring avenues of reforming and up-dating some of Kon-
komba customs and practices according to the dictates of time’, KOYA focused 
on girl child education, like the Improvement Association in the 1950s.64 
The development agendas of both KOYA and NAYA centred on processes of 
labelling good and bad ‘traditions’, i.e. Nanumba kali and Konkomba nkaal. 
These concepts roughly meant ‘this is how we do things’ and hence had overlap-
                                                 
64  KOYA (1981) Memorandum Press Statement Submitted by the Konkomba Youth Association 
(KOYA) to His Excellency, the President, Dr. Hilla Limann of his visit to the Northern Region to 
settle the Nanumba/Konkomba Conflict on Saturday 11th July, 1981. 
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ping descriptive and normative components. Both Youth Associations distin-
guished good from bad traditions for their development: Nanumba youth focused 
on chiefs who were ambivalently the guardians of their traditional identity and 
backward old men; Konkomba youth focused on the marriage custom of infant 
girl betrothal which they found socially disruptive and backward, contrary to for 
example round-dances. Youth claimed from elders the authority to formalize and 
normalize kali/nkaal because they claimed to oversee the process of develop-
ment. Strikingly, not all backward traditions were age-old: The dramatic decline 
of Konkomba betrothal marriages led to a popularity of sister exchange mar-
riages, a then novelty which KOYA renounced as backward.  
The crucial point here is that although both Konkomba and Nanumba youth 
were critically looking at their ‘traditions’, they found that only they had the 
moral authority to scrap them. Although the marital system of Konkomba was 
under stress, Konkomba youth did not accept the arbitration of Nanumba chiefs 
in such cases. Similarly, although Nanumba youth challenged the tribute regula-
tions of chiefs, they did not accept Konkomba to flout these regulations. Lons-
dale’s theory of ethnicity as split up in a fixed external and a contested internal 
component helps to understand the paradox of kali/nkaal as both contested and 
politically enforced traditions. This duality, as we will see, triggered mutual 
conspiracy theories that traditions were used as political mechanisms of exclu-
sion.  
The lead-up to violence (1979-1981) 
KOYA’s most active branch was that of Bimbilla, led by Ali Kamshegu, a 
Likpakpaln interpreter at the Bimbilla court, and Batuul, a trader. In Bimbilla, 
several Konkomba had become successful yam traders and after the re-estab-
lishment of the Nanumba district, there emerged a small group of educated 
Konkomba in town, who interacted with a number of non-educated Konkomba 
opinion leaders, mostly farmers, around Nanun. Unexpectedly, chieftaincy also 
became the core issue of the Konkomba youth in Bimbilla. This situation has to 
be explained by a series of national and local changes in 1979. On the national 
level, Ghana returned to constitutional democracy after the military intervention 
of Rawlings. A year earlier, General Acheampong had anticipated such a transi-
tion, which would bring along a constitutional recognition of chieftaincy, espe-
cially in terms of land tenure. He therefore set up a commission to investigate the 
customary law of chieftaincy in Northern Ghana. The findings of the so-called 
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Alhassan committee (Alhassan being the Dagomba committee leader) were im-
plemented in the constitutional recognition of customary law.65  
KOYA criticised the composition of the committee, because all members were 
from the chiefly groups, and in vain refused to become subjects of Dagomba 
again. KOYA claimed a separate traditional area from Dagbon. This claim drew 
on a hitherto rather latent mutual acknowledgement of Dagomba and Konkomba 
that Gonja incursions in western Dagbon had led to the Dagomba relocation to 
the east, in what was then Konkomba land. The Alhassan Committee rejected the 
KOYA claim, privileging the Dagomba entitlement by right of conquest.  
The sense of displacement among Konkomba elites induced by this decision 
was aggravated by the Nanun section of the report. The recognised Nanumba 
‘customary law and usage’ distinguished indigenous Nanumba from settlers 
(such as Konkomba), an inequality at odds with equal Ghanaian citizenship 
which was endorsed in the same constitution. The findings of the Alhassan 
committee had been descriptive but they took a prescriptive form, as formalized 
customary law, in the Nanumba Traditional Council.  
The report stated that the ‘allodium’ to land was ‘vested’ in the paramount 
chief Bimbilla Naa through his divisional chiefs and sub-chiefs, who had earth 
priests to perform sacrifices for the fertility and appeasement of the land. ‘Citi-
zens’ had the right to use land for building if they inform the village chief but 
also the obligation to assist in the construction or maintenance of the palace. 
Citizens could use land for farming if they informed the village chief and pro-
vided they gave harvest tokens and labour to the chief. Citizens could pick from 
economic trees, except dawadawa trees, which were owned by the Bimbilla Naa 
and they could kill game on any land, provided they gave a hind leg (and for 
lions a skin and for elephants a tusk) to the Bimbilla Naa. All these regulations 
were extended to ‘strangers’ who have ‘no automatic right of use of lands in 
Nanumba’. But after being introduced to the chief by an elder and paying him 
kola nuts, a stranger may use the land ‘for as long as he continues to live in 
Nanumba and does not offend Nanumba customs or display ‘bad character or 
contempt for authority’. 
This regulation defined Konkomba settlement in Nanun as a privilege by the 
grace of their good behaviour, as assessed by Nanumba chiefs. While similar 
customs were formalised in Dagbon, it was only in Nanun that they became a 
social reality in the next few years. First, a dramatic event took place in 25 
September 1979, when the Stool Lands and Boundary Commission in Accra 
decided the Kpasa affair between Shiarewura and Bimbilla Naa Dasana in favour 
                                                 
65  ‘Report on the Committee on Ownership of Lands and Position of Tenants in the Northern and Upper 
Regions’ (1978). 
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of the latter.66 Directly after this verdict, Bimbilla Naa Dasana enskinned several 
chiefs in the area, who invented new chieftaincy titles and renamed their villages 
accordingly, much to the discontent of the local Konkomba communities.67 
In November 1979, a second event happened in Bimbilla. Here, KOYA had 
blamed Konkomba underdevelopment on their backwardness, especially on the 
traditional marriage system of betrothing baby girls. Facing the opposition of 
elders to eradicate betrothal, KOYA emphasized education, particularly of girls, 
to shape the context for social change. KOYA however realized that not only 
Konkomba but also Nanumba traditions hindered Konkomba emancipation. 
Unlike most other areas where Konkomba lived, Konkomba in Nanun were 
compelled to bring their cases to Nanumba chiefs, who acted as brokers for the 
magistrate. Both chiefs and magistrate were usually unfamiliar with Konkomba 
customs but most were also corrupt. Ali Kamshiegu – who was a translator at the 
magistrate’s court – witnessed this and in consultation with the other KOYA 
members in Bimbilla, he starting arbitrating Konkomba marital cases in late 
1979.  
Bimbilla Naa Dasana, who had maintained good personal relationships with 
Ali, was outraged when he heard about this and saw it as undermining his sover-
eignty. He asked the district and regional administration to stop the ‘secret tribu-
nals’ and remove Ali from the district,68 but when no administrative intervention 
came, the chief gave Ali an ultimatum to stop his arbitration. The ultimatum tran-
spired two weeks later in January 1980 and a group of Nanumba youth led by 
one Ponado (the local PNP chairman) went to Ali’s house, forced him and his 
eldest son Abukari to board a tractor and dumped them at Makayili village out-
side Bimbilla (Skalník 1983: 21). Only after Bimbilla Naa Dasana publicly 
condemned the tractor incident, Ali returned to Bimbilla and continued his arbi-
tration. The national KOYA executives, who were surprised by the heated 
Nanumba reaction, rallied behind Ali and sent a letter to all Konkomba commu-
nities in Nanun, telling them to choose their own leaders and refusing to pay 
tribute to Nanumba chiefs. While few Konkomba communities actually chose 
their own leaders, most stopped paying tribute to the local Nanumba chief and 
                                                 
66  Essiem, (SGD.) J.K. (25-09-1979) ‘In the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission Sitting at 
the Meeting Room 4 State House, Accra on Tuesday the 25th Day of September, 1979, Before Mr. 
J.K. Essiem, Deputy Commissioner; Enquiry No: 13/75, In the matter of boundary dispute between 
Nanumba (N.R.) and Shiare (V.R.)’; NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.4/97 District Organising Assistant (n.d.) 
‘Short Report on the Kpassa Land Dispute’. Shiarewura had appealed to the Sunyani High Court 
twice; he lost the first appeal and the second appeal was referred to the Stool Lands and Boundary 
Commission. 
67  PRAAD/T/NRG1/2/13/86 Bimbilla Naa Dasana Abdulai to The Registrar, Northern Region House of 
Chiefs (08-06-1972) ‘Petition Against the Local Government Report 1972 as Affects the Nanumba 
Local Council’. 
68  Sulemana, (Sgd) K.S. for MP Nanumba Constituency to The Regional Minister (23-11-1979) ‘Batu’s 
Secret Tribunals and Military Molestation’, Akapule (n.d., b). 
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numerous Konkomba also bypassed the Nanumba yam marketing network, by 
directly bringing their produce to Accra.  
Over 1980, this situation rendered Nanun so tense that the District Chief 
Executive (DCE) warned for violence in his February 1981 monthly report but 
after personally assessing the situation in Nanun, President Limann fired the 
DCE for creating panic (op. cit.: 21). Limann however gave ambivalent signals to 
Nanun: When Bimbilla Naa Dasana told him about the subversive activities of 
‘some aliens’ in Kpasaland, the President replied that ‘nobody is alien in Ghana’, 
but two weeks later, during the 6 March 1981 Independence celebrations, 
Limann decorated Bimbillla Naa Dasana with the Grand Medal (Skalník 1983: 
21-23). In this context, KOYA (under its new President Kenneth Wujangi) 
summoned Bimbilla Naa Dasana to Tamale High Court to defend the constitu-
tional right of free settlement for Ali. In spite of the Bimbilla Naa’s appeal to Ali 
to have the case withdrawn, the annual KOYA Easter Convention in Saboba 
endorsed the summon in the weekend of 19 April. Three days after Ali’s return to 
Bimbilla and his informing the Bimbilla chief about the KOYA endorsement, 
there was open violence in Bimbilla, Damanko and Kpasa, the intensity and scale 
of which surprised everyone in Nanun and throughout Ghana (cf. Fogelberg 
1982; Skalník 1983). 
Conclusion 
In this chronology, we have seen how during the British administration of Native 
Authorities, Nanun explicitly became a Nanumba traditional area, but one which 
was overrun by Konkomba settlers. This colonial paradox, assuming that each 
tribe had its territory while simultaneously encouraging the migration of tribes, is 
far from peculiar for Nanun (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 2000), but its scale and 
intensity is unprecedented in Ghana. Consequently, the British obsession with 
traditional order under indirect rule, which I discussed above, has always been 
fictional. Yet, the quest for the ‘original’ situation in Northern Ghana strikingly 
returned in the emancipation agendas of Youth Associations. Contrary to 1931, 
when officer Amherst found no local voices in Nanun, these Youth Associations 
raised their voices in the public realm.  
Their voices have to be understood in the context of the 1979 Constitution. 
Konkomba and Nanumba were subjects under chiefs, not citizens, between 1931 
and 1951 and citizens of the Gold Coast and later Ghana from 1951 onwards. 
Brief periods of civil rule in the 1960s aside, the 1979 Constitution marked 
another significant change in the status of Konkomba and Nanumba in Nanun; 
they were simultaneously citizens of Ghana and subjects of the Bimbilla Naa. 
The nation-state again delegated part of its sovereignty to what it considered 
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traditional rulers. However, as seen, such traditional rule had undergone signifi-
cant reconfigurations. 
Nanun had changed; Konkomba had become a demographic and economic 
majority and their educated youth considered the subject position of Konkomba 
to Nanumba chiefs a degradation. Konkomba youth were struggling to overcome 
the marital cases which disrupted many Konkomba communities and they 
demanded the moral authority from Nanumba chiefs to resolve them. As 
Konkomba installed their own leader to try such cases, Nanumba tried to impose 
customs on them, which Nanumba themselves were challenging internally. In 
reaction, the moral ethnicity of both Konkomba and Nanumba turned to political 
tribalism, running along the axis of rights as citizens and duties as subjects. 
Konkomba claimed moral freedom but Nanumba responded that this is not 
possible since they lived on Nanumba land. Nanumba expelled the Konkomba 
leader after which KOYA went to High Court to get free settlement right con-
firmed.  
As we have seen, 1979 was a year of legalization: Apart from the adoption of 
the Constitution, Bimbilla Naa won his court case into the Kpasa issue and 
Konkomba in Bimbilla set up their independent tribunals. Both sides considered 
their position justified by law and rallied for government support. But as Presi-
dent Limann gave ambiguous signals to both parties, the Bimbilla Naa eventually 
used his sovereignty to remove KOYA activists from Bimbilla. This act immedi-
ately became ethnic, ignited simmering stereotypes and generated a huge explo-
sion of violence. How it did so will be studied next. 
  
 
 
 
 
3 
Armed conflict and reconciliation  
(1981-1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘We decry the spiral of arms and ammunition build-up in the Northern 
Region and affirm our readiness and determination to stem their flow 
into the region’ (clause 12) 
‘We declare that we shall co-operate fully in bringing about and 
facilitating a complete reconciliation of our people in accordance 
with the tenets and practices of our traditions. We note in particular 
the restriction on the movement of our peoples in Nanun and all the 
other areas in the Region and agree that we shall implement appro-
priate measures as may be found efficacious to ease the problem’ 
(clause 4). 
Introduction 
This chapter studies the epoch of violence and non-violence in Nanun and how 
security and reconciliation interventions have, or have not, put an end to this 
enmity. As seen in the previous chapter, there had been a Konkomba/Nanumba 
conflict since 1979, one which turned extremely violent in April 1981. Kon-
komba/Nanumba coexistence was not very warm at that time and, as I described, 
both stereotyped and morally rejected the other. Nanumba often spoke of 
Konkomba as ‘bush people’, while the latter found Nanumba feudal. However, it 
was due to mutual accusations of degrading illegal actions, since the year of 
legalization in 1979, that violence erupted. So while Konkomba/ Nanumba 
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coexistence has been shrouded in mutual sentiments of exploitation – Konkomba 
exhaust the land, while Nanumba are feudal – have just been a latent condition 
for victimhood about what they considered the illegal subordination of their 
autochthony or citizen equality. The link between accusations of illegal action of 
the other and a violent reaction to counter such accusations, as introduced by 
referring to Appadurai (1998) and Mamdani (2001) in chapter one, will be 
scrutinized in this chapter. 
KOYA had set up an independent tribunal, and the Bimbilla Naa reacted by 
removing the Konkomba leader Ali from Bimbilla. Thereupon, KOYA went to 
High Court to defend the right of free settlement and the Bimbilla Naa removed 
the KOYA activists in Bimbilla, which involved the entire Konkomba commu-
nity. The next day, Konkomba chased away all Nanumba from south-eastern 
Nanun, where Konkomba had rejected Nanumba leadership. After the death of 
the old Bimbilla Naa, Nanumba youth activists launched an expedition to restore 
Nanumba sovereignty in the southeast and ethnic cleansing spread throughout all 
southern Nanun. Both sides countered the supposed constitutional paradox: 
Nanumba chiefs chased Konkomba from Bimbilla town, after which Konkomba 
rejected Nanumba authority in the Kpasa area. The violence was no de jure 
sovereignty because the state of Ghana holds the monopoly on the legitimate use 
of violence, but with the state response slow, it was an exercise of de facto sover-
eignty, as ‘the ability to kill, punish and discipline with impunity’ (Hansen & 
Stepputat 2006: 296). In chapter one, I argued with Skalník that the Nanun 
violence was a new experience for both Konkomba and Nanumba.  
When violence actually broke out, there were four crucial transformations. 
First, there was a massive process whereby individual Konkomba and Nanumba 
closed their ranks and fought each other as an collective ethnic enemy. Second, 
this violence was not just the breakdown of law and order in Ghana’s Third 
Republic but the installation of an alternative order of security based on ethnic 
cleansing. Third, after the violence, Youth Associations became not just the 
emancipators but also the main spokesmen of both ethnic groups and fourth, 
written claims became the main form in which they addressed the conflict issues.  
There was a significant difference between the 1981 and 1994 violence. While 
the 1981 violence started with the exercise of a seemingly traditional but in-
vented sovereignty, this war introduced something new: Nanumba victimhood. 
This was not just because Nanumba were defeated, but because Konkomba came 
together as warriors, something which Nanumba had never foreseen and there-
fore treated as a conspiracy. There was a strange situation of Konkomba victors 
who continued to feel exploited and Nanumba victims trying to recapture their 
sovereignty. Victimhood justified both positions and this was an tense situation 
which exploded in 1994 and 1995, until the NGO Consortium brokered a peace 
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agreement whereby Konkomba and Nanumba would not be the victims of each 
other but rather survivors in Mamdani’s vocabulary (see chapter one), or ‘broth-
ers in development’ in the peace accord terminology. 
This chapter studies the intermittent escalations and de-escalations of the 
Konkomba/Nanumba conflict between 1981 and 1996 and how various actors 
tried to create security without violence. This chapter offers the historical back-
ground to clauses twelve and four which respectively contain a pledge to abstain 
from picking up arms and to hold a traditional reconciliation between them. 
The 1981 violence 
On 23 April 1981, Bimbilla Naa Dasana’s son Mamadu, came to the house of Ali 
Kamshiegu and made words with the latter’s son Abukari over a Nanumba girl 
they allegedly both loved. As Abukari stabbed Mamadu with a knife, Mamadu 
fled, to return with Nanumba youth who were beating war drums and chanting 
war songs. Miraculously, Ali and other KOYA members who had gathered there 
escaped in various directions, while others sought refuge in the E.P. Training 
College on the northern outskirts of town. That night, at least seven people died 
in Bimbilla, including the personal secretary of the Bimbilla Naa and the son of 
the Konkomba community leader of Damanko.  
The following morning, youth and Nanumba kambonsi warriors, led by their 
leader from Jilo village, attacked Kabuliya, the nearest Konkomba community. 
Special groups of Nanumba autochthons are warriors, notably those in Jilo, 
Pusuga and Ganguyili communities which compete for the ‘chief warrior’ title 
Kambon Naa Kpema. The warrior organisation was copied from Asante military 
organisation during the period that Nanun was in the sphere in influence of 
Asante (1744-1874) (kamboŋa means ‘southerner’; cf. Benzing 1971: 185; Prost 
1980). 
Meanwhile, Konkomba in the Kpasa area attacked all local Nanumba, espe-
cially in Damanko where the Konkomba leader was informed about the death of 
his son in the nocturnal Bimbilla riots. Although police and military in Bimbilla 
were aware of the Damanko violence, they could not intervene without permis-
sion from far-away Ho, the capital of the Volta Region in which Damanko was 
located (Skalník 1983: 22). The Damanko violence was initially hushed up in the 
media, but later reports spoke of as many 600 casualties in Damanko, including 
four chiefs, and at least 1000 Nanumba fled to Accra.1 The next days, Nanumba 
attacked the Konkomba communities between Bimbilla and Damanko and 
cleansed the villages on the road between Bimbilla and Chamba.  
                                                 
1  WA (01-06-1981) ‘More on the Bimbilla fighting’; GT (30-04-1981) ‘Nanumba Youth Calls For 
Peace’. 
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These days of violence gave way to incidental ambushing throughout the 
subsequent two months, despite warnings from the Regional Minister, who 
visited Bimbilla and Chamba in May.2 The Kpasa issue utterly divided Nanumba 
leadership between belligerent youth leaders on the one hand and elders and ex-
politicians who opposed further violence on the other hand. Bimbilla Naa Dasana 
was under serious stress constraints and when both he and one of his prominent 
chiefs (Kpatihi Naa) died – some say under suicidal circumstances – on 31 May, 
the youth faction took the lead. On 19 June, just before a meeting between 
KOYA and NAYA mediated by the Regional Administration in Tamale, 
Nanumba warriors and youth crossed the Oti River east of Bimbilla, trying to get 
access to Kpasa. After chasing Konkomba from a handful of communities, they 
ran into a strong Konkomba counterattack and had to retreat. The simultaneous 
molestation of a Konkomba man at the Wulensi roadblock started a chain reac-
tion of violence: Konkomba from surrounding villages tried to attack Nanumba 
in Wulensi and vice versa.  
Most Nanumba in Chamba fled to Bimbilla overnight when they heard about 
the Wulensi situation. When Konkomba in Chamba saw wounded persons 
fleeing from the Wulensi area at daybreak, they organised under Biyenjin, the 
local KOYA member, and killed three Nanumba men who had stayed behind. 
The same day, Konkomba from Chamba burnt down Dakpam village, killing at 
least nine people, and after that they proceeded to Wulensi. They had to retreat 
due to heavy downpours. Early next morning they and Konkomba from sur-
rounding villages completely wiped out Wulensi, a town of 3000 inhabitants.3 
Over five hundred corpses were buried by security agencies who feared that 
hundreds of missing Nanumba were also killed in the bush. The ten policemen in 
Wulensi only managed to throw some smoke bombs to rescue the chief from his 
palace. Although Konkomba initially respected the police station as a sanctuary, 
they fired into the police station when a Nanumba man hiding there shot back at 
Konkomba.4 In the police station alone, more than hundred bodies were found. 
Konkomba casualties were usually taken home. The next day, Konkomba burnt 
nearby Nanumba settlements and surrounded Bimbilla, only to be stopped by a 
military enforcement from Tamale, causing many Konkomba to say that ‘the 
army saved Nanumba’. This ended the fighting, which never reached the north-
ern parts of Nanun.  
The violence was of a shocking intensity, involving thousands of people who 
had previously lived together in relative peace. My interlocutors remembered that 
‘something comes over you’. The violence was a communal affair: The dominant 
                                                 
2  DG (13-05-1981) ‘Live in Peace – Harruna’. 
3  DG (26-06-1981) ‘Wulensi – The Ghost Town’; WA (13-07-1981) ‘Violence in Bambilla’. 
4  WA (20-07-1981) Patti Waldmeir ‘Causes of fighting in Ghana’. 
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form of warfare was the surrounding of a village and burning it down, Kon-
komba being enticed by yelling women and the blowing of the announcement 
horn (ukpiin), Nanumba by beating dondo drums and gongong bells. In principle 
women and girls were spared, but fire and bullets shot from a distance were not 
gender-sensitive. Although no-one was forced to fight, only ‘cowards’ and boys 
stayed behind. Apart from fire, the main weapons used were single barrel guns 
(singal, LIK also kidabuk), previously used for hunting, cutlasses (machetes) and 
bow and arrows. The violence commoditised the use of fire weapons, which were 
hitherto sanctioned by age in Konkomba and descent in Nanumba society.  
The inter-bellum period 
Up to 1500 or 2000 people may have died in the violence; there were 15,000 
refugees in Bimbilla town and a further 50,000 refugees, mostly Nanumba, in 
Accra and Tamale.5 Government designated the Nanumba district a disaster area, 
banned the possession of arms and chartered the Ghana Air Forces to fly in food 
aid for the refugees in Bimbilla.6  
The conflict made headlines for weeks and even if few newspapers trickled 
down to Nanun, they shaped public debates and interventions. Media blamed the 
Northern Regional administration and President Limann for underestimating the 
conflict,7 which Government officials called a ‘clash’ but which some journalists 
called ‘civil war’, and which the Asante paramount chief Asantehene called ‘a 
threat to the nation’.8 The media seemed to be supportive of Konkomba as vic-
tims of feudal Nanumba, despite MP Marshall Adam saying in parliament that 
Konkomba were a ‘sociological problem’ for their violent inclinations.9  
                                                 
5  GT (25-07-1981) ‘The Konkomba-Nanumba War…The remote causes’; WA (20-07-1981) Patti 
Waldmeir ‘Causes of fighting in Ghana’; GT (30-04-1981) ‘Nanumba youth calls for peace’; DG 
(02-07-1981) ‘Konkomba-Nanumba Clash – 160 So Far Dead’. 
6  DG (08-07-1981) ‘Govt Bans Arms in 3 Districts’; GT (08-07-1981) ‘Nanumba area now disaster 
zone’; respectively DG (09-07-1981) ‘Flights suspended’; GT (08-08-1981) ‘Red Cross drugs for 
Nanumba area’. 
7  In a Daily Graphic editorial, President Limann was charged to ‘act now’ before violence would 
spread to adjacent areas, such as parts of Gonja and Dagbon (DG (16-06-1981) ‘Konkomba Youth 
Protest’; See also DG (18-06-1981) ‘Allegation is untrue’; DG (27-06-1981) ‘Kpandai – The Next 
‘Hot Spot’). 
8  DG (23-07-1981) ‘Lessons for all who love peace’; ‘Address by the Northern Regional Minister 
Alhaji Ibraiman Harruna at the Inauguration of the Nanumba Konkomba Clash Victims Rehabili-
tation Appeal Fund Committee at the Cultural Centre, Tamale on Saturday, 27th June 1981’ (27-06-
1981) (in: Akapule (n.d., b)); respectively DG (10-07-1981) ‘Otumfuo: Conflict is threat to nation’; 
DG (13-07-1981) ‘Be alive to your responsibilities’; DG (23-07-1981) ‘Lessons for all who love 
peace’. 
9  DG (18-09-1981) ‘Incident at Pito Bar Sparked-Off Fighting’; GT (25-07-1981) ‘The Konkomba-
Nanumba War … The remote causes’; respectively DG (02-07-1981) ‘Konkomba-Nanumba Clash – 
160 So Far Dead’; ‘Statement of the Nanumba-Konkomba Affair by M.A. Adam, Member of 
Parliament for Nanumba’ (06-07-1981). 
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On 11 July, three weeks after the Wulensi bloodbath, President Limann visited 
Bimbilla and he even spent the night there. After separately consulting Nanumba 
and Konkomba elders – both who were suspicious of Limann’s loyalties – he 
organised a reconciliation ceremony in Kpandai at which he was critical of 
chieftaincy. He said that outdated traditions would have to be scrapped,10 but he 
did not specify who would have the sovereignty to do this scrapping. With 
Bimbilla Naa Dasana dead and all local KOYA members fled, President Limann 
made Mamadu Dasana, who had become the Bimbilla regent, and Nana Nandi – 
an influential Konkomba chief in the Krachi area – shake hands.11  
Mamadu Dasana gave a speech in which he called the conflict ‘our price for 
accepting Konkombas as brothers and sisters’. He narrated that Konkomba 
settled in Nanun after the murder on the Dagomba chief of Zagbeli forty years 
earlier and that Nanumba received them well, because ‘settlement of strangers in 
one’s land is a sign of luck’. However, since 1979, KOYA executives rejected 
the authority of Nanumba chiefs without publicly presenting their grievances to 
them. He continued that ‘[a]ll Ghanaians will agree with me that every society 
has its customs and wherever one goes he has to observe the customs of the 
people he puts up with’ and he stipulated that Nanumba customs were non-
discriminatory.12 He argued that Konkomba were performing illegal arbitration 
and they wanted to secede from Nanun. They used false allegations to get their 
case across, but Nanumba were silent because ‘[h]e that is at fault talks much and 
we were quiet because we wanted them to reach the end of their lies’. He contin-
ued that ‘We regard this as a war on the Republic of Ghana and not Nanumbas. 
[…] Dogs and pigs feasted on human flesh in civilized Ghana.’  
National KOYA representatives also made reference to the laws of Ghana: 
Describing the ‘denial of basic human freedoms and rights’ to Konkomba.13 Ac-
cording to KOYA, Konkomba were not interested in secession from Ghana, nor 
in land or chieftaincy, but they only wanted an end to their customary exploita-
tion in Nanun, which had been bolstered by Nanumba influence in the regional 
administration and the army. KOYA blamed the Regional Minister, who was a 
Nanumba, for knocking the heads of Konkomba and Nanumba together, and they 
                                                 
10  DG (20-07-1981) ‘Scrap outmoded customs – Limann’; cf. WA (27-07-1981) ‘President Limann 
criticises chiefs’. 
11  DG (14-07-1981) ‘Konkombas, Nanumbas to smoke peace pipe’; WA (20-07-1981) ‘Nanumbas and 
Konkombas reconciled’. 
12  ‘Speech by Mahama Dasana, Regent of Bimbilla on the Occasion of the Visit of His Excellency Dr. 
Hilla Limann, President of the Republic of Ghana to Bimbilla on Sunday, 11th July, 1981’. 
13  KOYA (1981) ‘Memorandum Press Statement Submitted by the Konkomba Youth Association 
(KOYA) to His Excellency, the President, Dr. Hilla Limann of His Visit to the Northern Region to 
Settle the Nanumba/Konkomba Conflict on Saturday 11th July, 1981’. 
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said that Nanumba started the violence in Bimbilla. In sum, both KOYA and the 
Bimbilla regent blamed each other’s backwardness.14  
After the ceremony, President Limann passed through Chamba and saw fully 
armed Konkomba warriors.15 Many surrendered their weapons, and Limann 
brought the chief of Chamba (Naa Alhaji) with him to shake hands with the 
Konkomba leader Bijiba, after which a joint libation of sorghum beer (pito) was 
performed and Konkomba performed a round-dance. Most Nanumba from 
Chamba however stayed on in Bimbilla, mainly in the western quarter of Dang-
beyili, and only some returned home after the rainy season (see chapter four). 
Back in Accra, Limann sacked Northern Regional Minister Haruna and in-
stalled a Committee of Inquiry, chaired by Justice Lamptey. Two weeks after the 
reconciliation ceremony, regent Mamadu Dasana specified to three conditions of 
peace to the Committee: The return of cattle, stoppage of foodstuff destruction 
and free passage of peasants to their farms.16 
Although trade between Konkomba and Nanumba resumed within months 
after the violence, the social geography of Nanun had drastically changed. No 
Konkomba lived in Bimbilla and Wulensi anymore, Kpasa and Damanko were 
off bounds for Nanumba and Chamba emerged as the main Konkomba town of 
Nanun. Wulensi survivors gave their ruined houses to the bush and built a new 
town a few hundred metres away. The main outcome of the conflict was the 
overwhelming defeat of Nanumba, who were surprised by the joint strength of 
the allegedly disparate Konkomba communities. Nanumba lost Kpasa land and 
the authority of their chiefs and they realised that they were a minority in their 
own district.  
Another consequence of the 1981 conflict was that Konkomba bypassed the 
Nanumba yam middlemen. In 1981, the few yam-selling Konkomba in Accra 
were driven out of the Nanumba/Dagbamba dominated Timber Market in Accra, 
which by then was the country’s main yam market. Directly after the conflict, the 
Saboba MP, Nana Nandi (the chief in Krachi district) and several KOYA leaders 
acquired a portion of land for a Konkomba yam market (Bikpakpaannyon), 
which soon eclipsed the nearby Timber Market.  
As both sides awaited the results of the Commission of Inquiry, Flight Lieu-
tenant J.J. Rawlings ousted Limann on New Year’s Eve 1981 and in one of his 
first speeches on national radio, Rawlings blamed the waning Limann admini-
stration for the Konkomba/Nanumba conflict.17 He dismissed the Commission of 
                                                 
14  It is unclear whether there was a sacrifice at the reconciliation ceremony, but Konkomba elders from 
Chamba told me that a Bimbilla sacrifice was performed and that the President gave a cow to the 
chief imam. 
15  DG (14-07-1981) ‘Konkombas, Nanumbas to smoke peace pipe’. 
16  GT (24-07-1981) ‘Nanumba Regent’s 3 Conditions For Peace’. 
17  WA (11-01-1982) ‘Bringing the people into decision-making’. 
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Inquiry and removed the army from Nanun. Rawlings’ ‘revolution’ soon pushed 
the Konkomba/Nanumba conflict into national oblivion, leaving it to simmer 
locally. During these silent years, Konkomba did not perform any tribute to 
Nanumba chiefs and they continued to install their own leaders, while Nanumba 
youth increasingly got allied to the chiefs; since 1981, NAYA organised its 
annual meetings simultaneously with the most important Damba chieftaincy 
festival. 
Rawlings’ Qadaffi-like ‘revolution’ was initially not favourable to chiefs: 
Rawlings wanted to built his revolution on the masses and not on old men in 
palaces. In 1982, People’s Defence Committees (PDCs) had to replace the dis-
trict administrative apparatus, but the semi-literate ‘boys’ of the PDCs had little 
to no local authority in Nanun (Skalník 1992: 198). Although the PDCs were 
abolished after a few years, many ‘boys’ had learnt how to use a gun in the 
meantime. In 1983, Rawlings accepted a series of Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes from the International Monetary Fund, later joined by the World Bank 
and in 1984 he established a National Commission for Democracy, which ad-
vised a restoration of chieftaincy in the administrative system, which was imple-
mented in 1986 (Skalník 1992: 195). District administration was re-established in 
1988, but it was not until 1992 that Ghana returned to constitutional multiparty 
democracy. 
In Nanun, the youth associations attempted to resolve the silenced issues of 
the 1981 violence in late 1984 and early 1985. The main Nanumba youth condi-
tions for peace were that Konkomba considered themselves subjects of the 
Nanumba chiefs, which KOYA accepted, provided that Konkomba could choose 
their own local leadership and that such leaders be recognised by the Bimbilla 
Naa as Konkomba representatives. Moreover, KOYA asked for the Konkomba 
citizenship right to politically and administratively represent the district (Skalník 
1989: 165; 2002: 162-163).18 NAYA, after passing the Konkomba proposals on 
to the Nanumba Traditional Council, rejected these requests in August 1986 
(Skalník 1992: 202). 
Three years later, in June 1989, the District Secretary reported rumours of 
potential Konkomba/Nanumba violence in and around Juanayili over fishing 
rights.19 When KOYA made a tour through Nanun in June 1989, rumours came 
from all corners of Nanun that a new conflict was about to begin, but they found 
                                                 
18  Wujangi, Kenneth et al. (KOYA) to The Permanent Negotiation Team (September 1994) ‘Konkomba 
Position Paper on Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana – With Reference to Nanumba-
Konkomba Conflicts’. 
19  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.3/21 PNDC District Secretary to The PNDC Regional Secretary (14-06-1989) 
‘Report on Rumour of Revival of Nanumba Konkomba Conflict in Nanumba District’; NDA/-
DISEC/C/02/vol.3/29 PNDC District Secretary to The PNDC Regional Secretary (05-07-1989) 
‘Situation Report – Re: Konkomba Nanumba Conflict’. 
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no clues.20 In November 1989, Nanumba in Dipa village found the carcass of a 
black cow with arrows on it. Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II blamed Konkomba 
for spoiling the land, demanded sacrifices to pacify the land spirits and the 
banishment of the perpetrators.21 At the same time, there were rumours of a new 
Konkomba/Nanumba conflict, starting from Wulensi, Chamba or Kpasa.22 
KOYA and NAYA held a series of meetings in 1989 and 1990,23 and so did the 
joint District Security Councils of Nanumba and Nkwanta district. At one of 
these meetings, Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II recognised the Konkomba right to 
settle in Kpasaland.24 However, Nanumba continued to claim the area and in 
1991, Juali Naa installed one Nanumba Chicheli Naa as the Damanko chief, but 
this chief never settled in Damanko.25  
Stimuli from Gonja and Dagbon 
Although the 1994 violence started in Nanun, it spread over the entire eastern 
half of the Northern Region within two days. The Konkomba/Nanumba conflict 
of 1994 has to be understood in the context of events since 1991 in adjacent East 
Gonja and East Dagbon, where respectively Nawuri called for a separate district 
and Konkomba demanded a separate traditional council. 
The Gonja area is ethnically heterogeneous and when the Gonja Youth Asso-
ciation changed its name into Gonjaland Youth Association in 1991, many ethnic 
minorities interpreted this as a territorial claim, especially Nawuri who claimed 
autochthony to Kpandai town (Bogner 2000: 190-191). After a disputed plot 
allocation in this town between Nawuri residents and the town’s Gonja chief in 
April 1991, Gonja warriors chased all Nawuri from Kpandai but in June, Nawuri 
                                                 
20  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.3/42 Org. Secr. KOYA to The Regional PNDC Secretary (26-06-1989) 
‘Report on the Peace Talk Trip Made to Bimbilla District by ‘KOYA’ Three Man Delegation Headed 
by Anthony Adam Bukari 21st – 25th June 1989’. 
21  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.4/6 Bimbilla-Na Abarika Attah II to The PNDC District Secretary (15-01-
1990) ‘Request for the Banishment of Seven Families’. 
22  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/2 BNI/Bimbilla to BNI/N.R. (23-08-1988) ‘PNDC D/S Nanumba’; respectively 
NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.3/53 Zonal Org. Asst. Wulensi to The PNDC District Secretary (09-11-1989) 
‘Rumour about Konkomba/Nanumba Conflict’. 
23  NDA/E/11/vol.2/57 Secretary Nanumba Youth Association to KOYA President (11-01-1990) ‘Joint 
NYA-KOYA Executive Meeting on 13th January at Bimbilla’; NDA/E/11/vol.2/56 Secretary 
Nanumba Youth Association to The PNDC District Secretary (09-01-1990) ‘Joint NYA and KOYA 
Executives Meeting 13th January, 1990’; NDA/E/11/vol.2/49 Secretary Nanumba Youth Association 
to The PNDC District Secretary (15-12-1989) ‘Joint Meeting of KOYA Executives and NYA 
Executives’. 
24  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.3/1 ASPCL/Bimbilla to PNDC Dist. Secretary (30-02-1988) ‘Police Mes-
sage’; NDA/CONF/3/n.n. ‘Minutes of Joint D.I.S.E.C.S. of Nkwanta and Bimbilla Districts Held at 
Nkwanta on 20th-21st July, 1989’; NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.4/n.n. ‘Minutes of Joint DISEC Meeting 
between Nkwanta and Nanumba Districts of the Northern and Volta Regions from 22nd-24th Feb-
ruary, 1990’. 
25  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.4/n.n. Ag. PNDC Regional Secretary (Volta) to The PNDC Regional Secre-
tary, Northern Region (25-02-1991) ‘Re: Damanko Chieftaincy Affairs’. 
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retook the town. Konkomba, who were a demographic majority in the Kpandai 
vicinity, had stayed neutral until two Konkomba men were hit by Gonja fire 
(probably incidentally). In May 1992, Konkomba came in direct confrontation 
with Gonja, and this eventually eclipsed the Nawuri case. While Konkomba 
defeated Gonja in the area around Kpandai, they were forced to flee from West-
ern and Central Gonja.26  
Kpandai is only ten kilometres south of Nanun and especially Chamba, which 
had emerged as a Konkomba stronghold after 1981, received many refugees, 
while hundreds of Chamba residents took up arms to Gonja.27 Moreover, 
throughout 1992 and 1993, the Konkomba/Gonja violence fed conspiracy theo-
ries of an upcoming large conflict between chiefly and non-chiefly ethnic groups 
of the Northern Region. In Tamale, leaflets circulated warning for new Kon-
komba attacks on Kpandai and on the future Konkomba takeover of Bimbilla and 
Yendi (Bogner 1996: 169, ff; 2000: 191).28 
It was in this context, and only months after Ghana’s return to civil rule,  that 
in June 1993, KOYA sent a petition to the National House of Chiefs asking to 
upgrade the Saboba chief, who had been reluctantly installed by Dagomba in 
1989, to paramount status with a separate traditional area.29 Redirected by the 
House of Chiefs, KOYA sent a slightly adapted version to the Ya Na (Dagomba 
paramount chief) in October.30 The KOYA petitioners, claiming to represent all 
Konkomba and calling on the truth in the name of ‘Mother Ghana’, wrote that 
their ‘denied traditional Independence’ had ‘rendered Ghana’s Independence 
from the British in 1957 meaningless to them’. Their call for an independent 
paramount chieftaincy, could be misinterpreted by some, but it would only 
stimulate northern development. 
                                                 
26  The Government reacted to the 1991 violence by setting up a Committee of Inquiry, but its recom-
mendations, granting autonomy to Nawuri, were never implemented (Bogner 2000: 190; Schmid 
2001: 29). 
27  NDA/INT/13/21 Assemblyman Sabonjida to The District Chief Executive (25-05-1992) ‘A Report 
from Sabonjida’. 
28  One pamphlet, the authenticity of which must be seriously doubted, showed that Konkomba were 
involved in a separatist movement: ‘The National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland’ (06-
06-1989) (in: Akapule (n.d., b)). 
29  Uchabobor et al to The President, National House of Chiefs (29-06-1993) ‘Petition of Chief, Elders 
and the Youth of Konkomba Land to the National House of Chiefs for the Creation of Paramount 
Stool for Konkomba Land to be Known as ‘Ukpakpanbur’. On the 1989 installation, see Kotin, 
A.T.O. (Chief’s Secretary) to The President, Eastern Dagomba Traditional Council  (07-05-1989); 
Ya-Na Yakubu II to Bowan Kwadin (12-06-1989) ‘Notice of Nomination, Election and Installation 
of Chabob-Bor, Ubor Bowan Kwadin of Saboba – Your Letter Dated 7th May 1989’. 
30  Wujangi, Kenneth (KOYA) to The Ya-Na (19-10-1993) ‘Petition for the Creation of a Paramountcy 
Stool for Konkomba Land to be Known as ‘Ukpakpanbur’. 
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Three days later, the Dagomba paramount chief Ya Na firmly rejected the 
KOYA request.31 Calling Konkomba acephalous, nomadic and Togolese,32 he 
denied KOYA claims of indigeneity and demographic dominance in northern 
Ghana. He also renounced cultural-linguistic difference as a valid criterion for 
paramount chieftaincy and KOYA’s statement that Konkomba subjection to 
Dagomba chiefs was a colonial invention. The Ya Na made reference to David 
Tait to prove that Konkomba were ‘among the aucefuloss [sic] societies’.  
Even though KOYA petitioner Kenneth Wujangi gave safety assurances on a 
6 November press conference in Accra,33 many Dagomba, but also Gonja and 
Nanumba, feared a Konkomba revolt. Government representatives made several 
attempts in late 1993 to mediate in the conflict but these failed because all parties 
were suspicious of Rawlings: Konkomba saw the Government as the protector of 
the ‘majority’ groups, while the latter blamed Rawlings for personally setting 
Konkomba and other non-chiefly groups up against them.34 The best example of 
failed Government mediation was the 1 December speech of the Presidential 
Advisor on Chieftaincy Affairs in the Northern Region House of Chiefs, in which 
he warned the chiefs that Government would not allow individuals to use chief-
taincy for causing trouble, after which he was attacked by a Dagomba mob out-
side the building.35  
The 1994 violence 
On 19 October 1993, the Nanumba Traditional Council held an emergency 
meeting on the KOYA petition.36 Although KOYA did not ask paramount chief-
taincy from Nanumba, Nanun had been tense throughout 1993.37 In January, a 
                                                 
31  Dagomba Traditional Council to The President of the National House of Chiefs, through the Northern 
Regional House of Chiefs (22-10-1993). 
32  At that time anti-Togo sentiments were rife in Ghana. For years, Rawlings had maintained extremely 
poor relations with Eyadéma, but in January 1994, international relations between Ghana and Togo 
almost escalated when the Togolese army killed over 40 Ghanaians smugglers at the southern border 
(GT (11-01-1994) ‘Carnage at the Border’; GT (22-01-1994) ‘Obed: 40 Ghanaians Killed So Far By 
Togolese Forces’. 
33  Wujangi, Kenneth (06-11-1993) ‘Press Statement of the Konkomba Youth Association’. When The 
Ghanaian Chronicle warned for immanent bloodbath in the north in its 31 October edition, vans with 
speakers had to drive through Tamale to calm down the city (Bogner 2000: 192). 
34  Rumours circulated about a speech from Rawlings in Tamale in 1991, during which he was reported 
to have said that ‘No one came to the world with a piece of land’ (The Statesman (20-02-1994) 
‘Northern Region On Fire’). 
35  DG (28-06-1993) ‘Government is interested in stability of chieftaincy – Sarpong’; GT (02-12-1993) 
‘Chiefs Urged to Accept Changes’; DG (03-12-1993) ‘Sarpong calls for committee to study Chief-
taincy Problems in N.R.’. 
36  NDA/L/11/v.3/78 Registrar Nanumba Council to All Chiefs Nanumba Traditional Area (12-10-1993) 
‘Summons to an Emergency Meeting of Chiefs – Nanumba Traditional Area’. 
37  NDA/P/20/vol.4/16 (10-05-1994) District Admin. Officer ‘Quarterly Report for the 1st Quarter from 
1st January – 31st March 1994, of the Nanumba District Assembly’. 
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Nanumba schoolboy killed his Konkomba mate near Nakpayili, after which the 
father of the victim killed the Nanumba boy,38 triggering a joint KOYA/NAYA 
meeting to suppress tensions and to urge the public to treat this as a case of indi-
viduals.39 After a casino fight in Bimbilla market in which three Konkomba men 
from Chamba got seriously injured in August, the Regional Minister said the 
same in Chamba,40 but not much later, Konkomba arms smuggling was detected 
near Wulensi, feeding Nanumba suspicions that Konkomba were preparing to 
fight them.41 These tensions, it must be noted, eclipsed a serious Nanumba inter-
nal chieftaincy dispute, which had led to intra-Nanumba violence on several 
occasions between 1990 and 1993, resulting in a 1993 summer ‘full of tensions’, 
according to the local administration (see chapter six).  
A momentous event brought Konkomba/Nanumba tensions to a boiling point. 
On 25 January 1994, after police had arrested a Nanumba ammunitions smug-
gler, a Nanumba mob ransacked and burnt the Bimbilla police station, because 
according to them, police had turned a blind eye to massive Konkomba smug-
gling from the Konkomba Market in Accra.42 Many Konkomba were angry that 
none of the Nanumba rioters were arrested and they suspected the involvement of 
the Nanumba MP Mohammed Ibn Chambas.43  
After a week of tensions, a market riot was the last straw. On 1 February, a 
day after a Konkomba and Nanumba man had had a quarrel over the purchase of 
a rare and ritually important black guinea fowl at Nakpayili market (hence the 
conflict’s nickname ‘Guinea Fowl War’), the son of the Konkomba man killed 
the Nanumba and three of his relatives on their farm, after which local Nanumba 
attacked the Konkomba community, followed by a Konkomba counterattack 
(Skalník 2002: 148).  
News of the violence spread over Nanun and the next day violence broke out 
in all corners of Nanun, this time also including the north. Fighting first spread to 
the area between Bimbilla and Chamba on 2 February. In Chamba, the chief’s 
son from Bimbilla came on a motorbike to inform his father about the Nakpayili 
                                                 
38  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.4/120 The Ag. District Chief Executive to The Northern Regional Minister 
(28-01-1993) ‘Situation Report on the Murder of Two Boys at Sogon (near Nakpayili) 5 Miles from 
Bimbilla’. 
39  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.4/n.n. ‘Minutes of the Joint DISEC, Nanumba Youth Association and Kon-
komba Youth Association Meeting with the People of Nakpayili and Sogon on Murder Cases, Held 
on the 11th February, 1993’. 
40  NDA/P/20/vol.4/n.n. Ag. District Chief Executive ‘Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter – from 
July to September 1993: Nanumba District Assembly’. 
41  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.5/n.n. The Zonal Secretariat of CDR Wulensi to The Ag. District Chief Exe-
cutive (19-10-1993) ‘Situation Report’; respectively NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.5/n.n. The Zonal Secre-
tariat of CDR Lungni-Kpandai to The District Secretary (15-12-1993). 
42  DG (29-01-1994) ‘Situation in Bimbilla still tense’; DG (31-01-1994) ‘Bimbilla is calm’; GT (27-01-
1994) ‘Mob Attacks Securitymen, burns Bimbila police post’; GV (14 – 16-02-1994) ‘The Bimbilla 
clash: The untold story’; DG (11-02-1994) ‘Letter to Tamale’. 
43  DG (17-02-1994) ‘Chambas denies allegation’. 
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turmoil. All Nanumba gathered at the palace and they left Chamba at midnight to 
arrive at Dakpam early next morning. Only the chief’s elder (wulana) stayed 
behind in Chamba and he was killed together with two disabled persons.  
Similar to 1981, as Konkomba in Chamba saw wounded persons coming from 
the Nakpayili area the next morning, they organised and attacked Dakpam, a 
town swollen with Nanumba refugees. There was intense fighting until the late 
afternoon, when over twenty Nanumba had died, including the chief, and Na-
numba ran out of bullets. With few remaining bullets, Nanumba decided to try to 
break through the Konkomba siege to reach Bimbilla. Their escape was suc-
cessful but in the next village of Taali, Konkomba sniper fire killed dozens of 
Nanumba. The remaining refugees reached the villages of Kpalisorgu and 
Nabaayili, which had already been burnt by Nanumba from Bimbilla and which 
were littered with Konkomba corpses, until reaching Bimbilla.  
After burning down Kpalisorgu, Naabayili and a handful of other Konkomba 
communities, Nanumba youth and warriors could do little more than defend 
Bimbilla, Pusuga, Jilo and Kukuo, the only remaining Nanumba settlements. On 
4 February, Konkomba warriors sacked Wulensi and on 5 February they tried to 
attack Bimbilla. That day they killed Kpatihi Naa Ponado, one of the leading 
Nanumba warriors who however failed to respect the Bimbilla Naa due to the 
internal Nanumba chieftaincy crisis. Thousands of Konkomba warriors kept 
Bimbilla surrounded and attacked it daily for almost a week, usually at the west-
ern side.  
On 3 February, violence also spread to Yendi, Salaga and Tamale, which, 
contrary to Bimbilla, still had sizeable Konkomba communities.44 In Tamale, 
there was a systematic search for Konkomba.45 Over two thousand Konkomba 
fled to the military Kamina Barracks, but almost four hundred were killed in 
town or at roadblocks south of town.46 There was intense fighting in Dagbon and 
Gonja for weeks, but not in the Mamprusi area, where Mamprusi and Konkomba 
opinion leaders agreed to stay out of the conflict. Outside the Northern Region, 
the same happened with Konkomba and Nanumba in northern Brong Ahafo 
                                                 
44  DG (05-02-1994) ‘Tight Security Measures’; GBC (03-02-1994) ‘Fighting in Nanumba District’, (in: 
Akapule n.d., a)); GT (07-02-1994) ‘Konkomba Youth Appeal for Peace’; GT (11-02-1994) ‘3 More 
Killed in Krachi Dist’; GV (09 – 12-02-1994) ‘Kokomba, Nanumba clash … 8 houses burnt … 
bodies litter street’; This was despite a 28 January 1994 Uchabobor letter to the Ya Na stating that the 
Konkomba paramountcy would be beneficial to Ya Na’s administration (Uchabobor to The Ya-Na 
(28-01-1994) ‘Request for elevation in Status as Chief’). 
45  Pugansoa, Ben to Michael Butcher (10-02-1994) ‘Ethnic clashes between Konkombas and Da-
gomba/Nanumba in the Northern Region of Ghana’; The Mirror (19-02-1994) ‘Guinea fowls and 
their neighbours’; DG (11-02-1994) ‘Represent All Groups in N.R.’; Uhuru, no. 2 (1994) ‘War up 
North!’. 
46  DG (11-02-1994) ‘Carnage at Buipe Bridge’. 
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region.47 I hope to study this dedication to non-violence in future research. In the 
northern districts of the Volta Region, Konkomba attacked the small Nanumba 
community in Damanko,48 and there were isolated incidents in the Krachi area. 
These areas received many refugees and many of their inhabitants moved to the 
conflict zones to fight.  
Violence resembled that of 1981, but at a much larger scale. In a district with 
well over 100,000 inhabitants, virtually no-one was left untouched by this vio-
lence. Village attacks could last for hours but not for days, and they resulted in 
immediate cleansing. There was no systematic terror or rape. Within three days, 
all Nanumba were concentrated in Bimbilla and nearby Jilo, Kukuo and Pusuga 
villages, and save for a military intervention, their lot would have been very 
grim. In fact, while Nanumba military leaders may be correct when they ex-
plained their concentration in Bimbilla to me as a strategic choice, they were 
basically caught out in Bimbilla town.  
My interlocutors, mostly adorable people, had lived through, or participated 
in, acts of male toddlers being knocked to death on a stone, pregnant women 
killed and having their bellies cut open to molest the foetus, war leaders be-
headed and having their heads triumphantly carried through the streets, chiefs 
dragged out of their palaces onto the streets and cut to pieces with a machete, 
young men buried alive in a well, and families being burnt alive as the huts in 
which they were hiding were set ablaze. These realities are way beyond my 
imagination and my analytical comprehension, but the accounts of some of my 
interlocutors suggest that their violent behaviour was to counter profound uncer-
tainty, fear and mistrust by way of pre-emptive cleansing, to kill or be killed, as a 
technique for establishing safety (Appadurai 1998).  
Some people used AK47s, which were smuggled from surrounding countries 
or which were the heritage of Rawlings’ revolution in the early 1980s. Many 
Konkomba however still used bow and arrow, the poison (liluul) of which got a 
reputation throughout the country: Anecdotes circulated in Accra about Kon-
komba arrows which could knock on your door and kill you when you opened. 
Adam Mpanbe, a herbalist from Chamba, emerged as one of the most renowned 
Konkomba war leaders. Mpanbe got military training in the revolutionary com-
mittees during the Rawlings’ dictoratorship of the early 1980s and he fought in 
the 1992 conflict in East Gonja. He was the embodiment of the stories in national 
media of Konkomba ‘juju priests’.49 Mpanbe always prepared a concoction for 
                                                 
47  GT (17-02-1994) ‘Ejura area saved from disaster’; GT (21-02-1994) ‘Konkomba, Nanumba Chiefs 
Meet at Sene’. 
48  DG (12-02-1994) ‘Four women subjected to atrocities at Damanko’. 
49  GV (02 – 06-02-1994) ‘Rituals are performed as Kokombas, Dagombas Prepare for War’; GV (21 – 
23-02-1994) ‘Nanumba-Konkomba War. Juju overcomes power of guns’; GV (02 – 06-03-1994) 
‘Mystery behind one-einged guinea-fowl exposed’. 
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his warriors to drink in the morning and wore several smocks covered with 
talismans. Nanumba equally possessed all kinds of talismans (sabli, pl. saba), 
which they attached to their smocks. As in 1981, most casualties died from the 
gunfire of single barrel guns.  
Security and relief 
It took more than a week for national government to act on the violence. On 10 
February, cabinet declared a three-month state of emergency for all seven eastern 
districts in the Northern Region. This decision was taken after fierce debate in 
parliament, during which the Nanumba MP (Mohammed Ibn Chambas) called 
the Konkomba violence unconstitutional and his Saboba colleague (Moses 
Mabengba) was suspended after saying that ‘The Konkombas fight like the 
Israelis; if you kill one, you lose ten’.50 The state of emergency came along with 
a multibillion cedi Military Task Force (Gongong IV) in Bimbilla, Yendi, Salaga 
and Tamale, enabling President Rawlings to visit Nanun in the weekend of 
February 12 and 13.51 The declaration of the State of Emergency was presented 
as the ‘long arm of the law’: Faced by ‘anarchy’, including the looting and burn-
ing down of a police station in Bimbilla, ‘the government’ had to exercise ‘the 
powers invested into her by the constitution’ to ‘arrest the breakdown of law and 
order’.52 However, although the military expedition Gongong was presented as a 
law-preserving mission in Nanun, many Konkomba and Nanumba reflected on 
Gongong activities as illegal violence against Ghanaian citizens.  
The Military Task Force namely left a trail of destruction in the conflict zone. 
As a reprisal for the Konkomba ambushing and killing of three soldiers near 
Salaga,53 soldiers went round south-western Nanun, eastern Gonja and northern 
Krachi to burn every roadside Konkomba settlement.54 Chamba was severely 
affected because the army had announced that there would be a meeting in town. 
Many Konkomba had gathered in town, and dozens were killed by gunshot or 
fire. KOYA repeatedly objected to these military reprisals.55 In March, soldiers 
                                                 
50  DG (10-02-1994) ‘House addresses ethnic conflict’. 
51  Gongong is a codename; a gongong is an announcement bell; ‘Press Conference, Declaration of State 
of Emergency. Its Implications on Human Conduct During the Conflict Period (1994)’ (n.d.) (in: 
Akapule (n.d., b). 
52  ‘Press Conference, Declaration of State of Emergency. Its Implications on Human Conduct During 
the Conflict Period (1994)’ (n.d.) (in: Akapule (n.d., b); ‘Declaration of Principles by the Parties to 
the Peace Negotiations in the Northern Conflict’ (04-06-1994). 
53  DG (14-02-1994) ‘Carnage in the North’; GT (14-02-1994) ‘President Condemns the Genocide’. 
54  ‘Tamale Shooting Incident: Tuesday 1st March 1994’ (n.d.) (in: Akapule (n.d., b)); GV (21 – 23-02-
1994) ‘Nanumba-Konkomba War. Juju overcomes power of guns’; GV (23 – 27-02-1994) ‘Soldiers 
burn down Kokomba villages – Yam Sellers’; AI (28-02 – 06-03-1994) ‘Sweeping the dirt under the 
carpet’. 
55  Sukpen, Isaac et al (KOYA) to The Commander, Emergency Task Force (21-03-1994) ‘Be fair and 
just to Konkombas – Emergency Task Force’; Fulanba, Abdulai (2nd National Vice President 
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killed eight Nanumba civilians in Bimbilla, who showed suspicious behaviour 
but who were in fact performing a burial.56 Directly after that, soldiers gunned 
down six Nanumba warriors who had attacked a Konkomba community near 
Chamba.57 In reaction, Konkomba from Chamba launched a (failed) attack on 
Pusuga, the Nanumba military stronghold and seat of the warrior chief.  
Violence continued unabated until April in parts of Dagbon and Gonja.58 The 
northern conflict also extended to Accra, when on 1 March, a grenade exploded 
at the busy Konkomba market in downtown Accra, which had swollen with 
Konkomba refugees.59 Meanwhile there were continuous interceptions of 
ammunition in that market and at Accra and Bimbilla roadblocks.60  
Media extensively covered the conflict, in a variety of tones. While the 
Government newspapers Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times and the Ghana 
Broadcasting Cooperation (GBC) presented the news in a (presumed) factual 
manner, opposition newspapers ignored an appeal from the Deputy Minister of 
Information to the journalists to abstain from critical reports.61 Some journalists 
sympathised with the emancipating Konkomba,62 while other articles blamed 
Konkomba for the violence. In a fascinating 1994 magazine article, Justice 
Katanga quoted some men from the streets of southern Ghana on the northern 
violence, before debunking such stereotypes.63 An off-duty policeman told his 
friend that: ‘The North! Eh, let me tell you, that is not Ghana-oo! Dey be bush 
                                                 
KOYA) to Col. Osei Wusu, Minister of Interior (25-05-1994) ‘Military and police brutalities of 
Konkombas in the Krachi District of the Volta Region’; Ngula, Dan et al (KOYA) to The 
Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (n.d.) ‘Atrocities against the Konkombas 
and their allies by the Military and Peace Keeping Mission in the Northern Region and in the Kete-
Krachi and Nkwanta Districts in the Volta Region’; Uchabobor (05-11-1994) ‘The Activities of 
Military in Konkomba Areas outside Saboba District’. 
56  GV (11 – 13-04-1994) ‘8 Nanumbas, 6 Others Killed’. 
57  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.5/n.n. District Secretary to The Regional Minister (30-06-1994) ‘Compre-
hensive Report on the Nanumba/Konkomba War in the District from 1st February to 30th June, 
1994’. 
58  On 1 March in Tamale, where 12 Dagomba in a mob were killed by the army in front of a bank, 
inside of which some Konkomba were collecting their salaries (DG (03-03-1994) ‘9 Killed at 
Tamale’; GBC (01-03-1994) ‘Tamale: Conflict erupts again’, (in: Akapule (n.d., a)); GBC (04-03-
1994) ‘Govt. Delegation Press Release’, (in: Akapule (n.d., a)); DG (19-03-1994) ‘Research Com-
mittee on Conflicts of the National House of Chiefs’; DG (02-05-1994) ‘Fighting stops in East 
Gonja’. 
59  DG (02-03-1994) ‘3 Injured in Grenade Blast’. 
60  DG (05-03-1994) ‘Police seize arms at Konkomba market in Accra’; GT (05-03-1994) ‘Police 
uncover arms cache at Yam Market’; GT (09-03-1994) ‘Yam executive claim knowledge of arms’; 
GT (12-02-1994) ‘Police impound large consignment of arms’; GT (12-02-1994) ‘Others seized at 
Ashaiman barrier, 3 Answer in Court’; GT (18-02-1994) ‘Police seize 1,097 Cartridges, other ammu-
nition at Bimbilla’. 
61  GBC (16-03-1994) ‘Deputy Information Minister’ (in: Akapule (n.d., a)). 
62  AI (28-02 – 06-03-1994) ‘Sweeping the firt under the varpet’; AI (28-02 – 06-03-1994) ‘Views on 
the Conflict in the North’; Uhuru, no. 9 (1994) Justice Katanga ‘A new look at the Konkombas’. 
63  Uhuru: 9 (1994) Katanga, Justice, ‘A New Look at the Konkombas – Stereotypes…and the road to 
reconciliation in Northern Ghana’. 
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people! Especially the Konkomba. Dey be foolish proper!’ Katanga overheard a 
lorry driver saying: ‘Ei! Dey be bad oo! Dos Konkombas! Dey ha bad juju!’ Juju, 
it may be noted, is a common national denomination for magic. And his ‘mate’ 
added that ‘they have horns and tails like devils’. Konkomba were perceived in 
the south as more backward than the other northerners, but, as the statement of 
the off-duty policeman showed, the other northerners were hardly better. Con-
sider this quote from a government officer whom Katanga heard saying: ‘These 
people, the Cucumbers and Nanumbers and what and what…They are always 
making trouble! They ought to just finish them all, one time!’64  
These stigmas had a huge impact on media coverage, peace mediation and on 
the self-identification of Konkomba and Nanumba in the north and particularly in 
the south. All northerners tried to gain the support of media and academia, but 
the general Ghanaian public was hardly interested in distinguishing one northern 
group from the other (Skalník 2003: 72; cf. Drucker-Brown 1995: 37; Pul 2003: 
72-77).65 
Most journalists were critical of the Rawlings administration.66 The Statesman 
published a front page article titled ‘Shouldn’t these men resign?’, showing the 
pictures of Rawlings, the Regional Minister and high military staff.67 Although 
some journalists tried to deny the seriousness of the conflict by pointing at the 
guinea fowl incident or by distancing it from Accra as ‘the Northern conflict’, the 
BBC interpreted the violence in the context of democratisation and saw it to have 
a huge impact on Ghana as a whole.68 As in 1981, very few media reports 
reached Nanun, but the resulting national public debate greatly influenced the 
subsequent peace processes.  
The estimated number of casualties in the entire conflict zone ranged from 
1,000 to 15,000, but the 2006 GHANEP estimate of 2,400 appears realistic.69 In 
                                                 
64  Uhuru: 9 (1994) Katanga, Justice, ‘A New Look at the Konkombas – Stereotypes … and the road to 
reconciliation in Northern Ghana’. 
65  Uhuru (1994, no. 9) Katanga, Justice, ‘A New Look at the Konkombas – Stereotypes … and the road 
to reconciliation in Northern Ghana’. Scholarship in Ghana was also divided; some found the major-
ity groups such as Nanumba feudal (Brukum 2001; Katanga 1994), while other found Konkomba 
benevolent (Boaten 1999; Mahama 2003; Martinson 1995). 
66  GV (23 – 27-02-1994) ‘Kokomba War Plan Found’; WA (04-10-04-1994) Alfred Owusu Frimpong 
‘The Konkomba Factor’. 
67  GV (14 – 16-02-1994) ‘Rawlings Provoked Nanumba, Kokomba War – NDC Chairman’; See also 
GV (16 – 20-02-1994) ‘Rawlings Told Northern in 1991…Take up guns if you are cheated … and 
today there is war’; respectively The Statesman (06-03-1994) ‘Shouldn't These Men Resign?’; A 
similar message came from West Africa (WA (28-02 – 06-03-1994) ‘Fatal miscalculation’. 
68  BBC Focus on Africa, 13 (1994) Baxter, Joan ‘Coming of age’; cf. Africa Report (May/June 1994) 
Ruby Ofori ‘Rawlings’ biggest challenge’; An Ashanti independent editorial similarly put it that ‘We 
are pretenders, we have more problems than we think we have’ (AI (06-03 – 13-03-1994) ‘Our Point 
of View’). 
69  ‘Recommended Joint Proposal of the GoG/Inter NGO Consortium for Relief and Rehabilitation 
Assistance in Northern Ghana’ (undated). 
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total, 152,600 refugees were registered but the actual number of displaced people 
was probably much higher (Van der Linde & Naylor 1999: 28, 32), also because 
many Konkomba fled to Togo.70 According to NAYA, 863 Nanumba were bur-
ied, including seven chiefs.71 Figures for Konkomba casualties are lacking alto-
gether, because, if possible, Konkomba carried their dead home and instantly 
buried them. At least 442 villages were destroyed by fire, of which 56 in Nanun.  
By March 1994, there were 57,000 so-called internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in Nanun,72 quadrupling the population of Bimbilla town and overcrowd-
ing Kukuo and Wulensi too. Because there were no camps, refugees usually 
stayed with relatives in overcrowded rooms. Chamba had at least 8,000 Kon-
komba refugees, especially after the Commander of the Task Force in March 
ordered all wandering Konkomba in Nanun to concentrate at Chamba or Makay-
ili to await disarmament. Those failing to do so ran the risk of being shot.73 In all 
mentioned places, there were severe problems with sanitation, malnutrition and 
epidemics of guinea worm disease, dysentery, meningitis, yellow fever and 
cholera.74 Many Bimbilla refugees felt cheated, insulted and accused of witch-
craft, causing thousands of them to leave Nanun altogether and start anew in 
Tamale and especially Accra. Sadly, the safety of Bimbilla was destroyed by 
intra-ethnic, mostly intra-family, tensions and accusations, often triggered by 
poverty and jealousy over relief aid (Kirby 2006: 18).  
Two weeks after the start of the military intervention, the Government of 
Ghana, domestic and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
and the United Nations made an assessment tour in the conflict zone.75 The 
assessment kicked off a mishmash of relief efforts, often distributed by NGOs 
                                                 
70  DG (19-02-1994) ‘5000 Refugees Flee to Togo’. 
71  ‘Joint Memorandum of the Nanumba Traditional Council and the Nanumba Youth Association to the 
Negotiation Team on the Ethnic Conflict in the Northern Region’ (June 1994). 
72  Department of Social Welfare – Northern Region (undated) ‘Report on the State of Displaced 
Persons’; in June there were 62,000 (NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.5/n.n. District Secretary to The Regional 
Minister (30-06-1994) ‘Comprehensive Report on the Nanumba/Konkomba War in the District from 
1st February to 30th June, 1994’; WA (21-27-03-1994) ‘Soldiers buried’. 
73  Konkomba in East Gonja should concentrate at Loloto, those in Kikpakpaan in Saboba and Wapuli 
(‘Press Statement by the Task Force Mission Commander (1994) (n.d.) (in: Akapule (n.d., b)). 
74  Dekker, Rein (Inter NGO Consortium) (29-03-1995) ‘Assessment of the Situation in Bimbilla 
District’; Inter-NGO Consortium (ActionAid Ghana) (25-02-1996) ‘Report on Seed Procurement and 
Dispatch to Conflict Area for Distribution to IDPs’; Dr. C. Owusu-Agyeman (Reg. Health Admin.) to 
The Minister of Health (17-04-1994) ‘Report on Health Service Delivery in Northern Region from 
February 2nd-April 15th’; Jangira, Lindiwe Chaza (Emergency Consultant Unicef) to Ken Williams 
(Unicef Representative) (26-07-1994) ‘Comments/Recommendations on the Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Programme for Internally Displaced in the Northern Conflict’; GBC (23-03-1994) 
‘Military Task Force Briefs the Press’ (in: Akapule (n.d., a). 
75  ‘Recommended Joint Proposal of the GoG/Inter NGO Consortium for Relief and Rehabilitation 
Assistance in Northern Ghana’ (undated). 
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who stood for bilateral and multilateral donors.76 Médécins Sans Frontières, Red 
Cross, Assemblies of God Relief and Development Services (AGREDS), Catho-
lic Relief Services (CRS) and Oxfam were the main distributors, while World 
Vision coordinated the relief aid from Tamale. To streamline the relief pro-
gramme, most involved NGOs joined the umbrella of the so-called Inter-NGO 
Consortium.77 
The challenges for providing humanitarian relief in a conflict zone the size of 
the Netherlands were immense. It took the relief agencies more than two weeks 
to provide potable water in Bimbilla and even longer to bring in food and non-
food items (blankets, clothes and candles). There was shortage of vehicles due to 
miscommunication and competition between NGOs (Van der Linde, p.c.). 
Registration of refugees was another constraint for providing relief, due to the 
mentioned infrastructural constraints but also because of unclear definitions: In 
Bimbilla, there was no refugee camp, making it difficult to tell who was dis-
placed. Arguably the biggest challenge for registration was to take away the 
widespread fear to give out one’s identity.78 Although the Consortium of NGOs 
worked in so-called ‘joint neutral teams’, it was sometimes difficult to win the 
confidence of people in need, either due to their perceived affinity with project 
communities or because of their Christian foundation (Pul 2003: 77). While 
Konkomba in majority inclined to Christianity, Nanumba and related groups 
were predominantly Muslims. However, this religious division was – and still is 
– hardly any issue in Nanun.  
Petitioning and new violence 
Although the Government of Ghana contributed to relief aid, its main task was to 
provide security. On 12 April 1994, the Minister for Interior formed the Perma-
nent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT), chaired by the paramount chief of the 
Efutuakwa Traditional Area (in Ashanti Region) and member of the Council of 
                                                 
76  Relief programmes included a ten month food assistance package from the World Food Programme 
(WFP), a Ministry of Food and Agriculture package for agricultural reconstruction, low-rent loans 
from the Agricultural Development Bank and the deployment of doctors funded by Ministry of 
Health; DG (16-02-1994) ‘Govt Registers Refugees from Ethnic Conflict’; GT (16-02-1994) ‘35 
Doctors, Others to Go to the War Zone’. 
77  ‘Draft Northern NGO Consortium Working Principles and Guidelines’ (n.d.); UNICEF, WFP, UK 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the British and Canadian High Commissions and later 
also United National Development Programme (UNDP) and USAID were the main bilateral and 
multilateral donors. Prominent local NGOs were Amaschina, AGREDS, Ti Yum Taaba Development 
Association (TIDA), Business Advisory Development and Consultancy Centre (BADECC), Catholic 
Secretariat, Council of Churches, Gubkatimali and Penorudas. Internal NGOs included Action Aid, 
Action on Disability and Development (ADD), CRS, Lifeline Denmark, Oxfam UK and Ireland and 
World Vision (Van der Linde & Naylor 1999: 30). In Nanun, most relief aid was distributed by 
Amaschina, AGREDS and TIDA. 
78  Kuyipwa, Andrew (Inter NGO Co-ordinator) (undated) ‘Report on the Monitoring Exercise in Na-
numba District’. 
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State. The other members were paramount chiefs, MPs and representatives from 
the President’s Office. PPNT’s objective was a ceasefire followed by peace 
negotiations against the backdrop of the 1992 Constitution.  
The ceasefire, signed in two separate meetings on 9 June, has seven agree-
ments between the by representatives from seven ethnic groups. The agreements 
banned the use of physical and verbal violence and imposed a commitment to 
abide by the law. After the signing of the ceasefire, the various delegations took 
the message of ceasefire home. KOYA toured the main Konkomba communities, 
including Chamba and preached the ceasefire as a peace accord.79 In the mean-
time, the state of emergency which had been extended thrice was finally lifted on 
10 August 1994. 
After the ceasefire, PPNT asked all parties to write ‘position papers’. Only the 
Konkomba and Nanumba papers are studied here. The petitions were addressed 
to PPNT but copies were sent to respectively the Konkomba and Nanumba 
delegations. The invitation to write position papers exacerbated the legalistic 
petitioning which, as I argued in chapter one, produced societal silence because 
laymen stood behind the authoritative statements of especially Youth Associa-
tions. 
The first Nanumba petition, signed by Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II, was 
written late June.80 It gives a chronology from 1938 [sic, 1940], when according 
to the paper the first Konkomba settled in Nanun after killing the Segberi Naa in 
Dagbon. Despite warnings from the Ya Naa about the bellicose Konkomba, then 
Bimbilla Naa Abudulai received the Konkomba, provided they respected the 
Nanumba customs and rituals. This they did until 1981, when Konkomba started 
to install their own chiefs, ‘perform sacrifices to Nanumba gods and violate 
sacred grounds, ponds and hunting territories’. Bimbilla Naa blamed KOYA for 
all this, stating that since its foundation KOYA has planned ‘to eject the Na-
numba from their legitimate land’, which they successfully did in Damanko and 
Kpasa. He said that the Konkomba ‘bellicosity is totally unwarranted and out of 
tune with proper conduct in lawful, constitutional and civilized society’. And 
moreover, the ‘truth is that the Nanumbas have been taken for a ride due to their 
excessive hospitality’. Naa Abarika’s ‘final and not negotiable’ solution is that 
all Konkomba leave Nanun, as ‘they have forfeited and exhausted any privileges 
they may have been accorded by the Nanumbas’. Konkomba must be regrouped 
                                                 
79  ‘Declaration of Principles by the Parties to the Peace Negotiations in the Northern Conflict’ (04-06-
1994); ‘A Comprehensive Report Presented to the Negotiating Team on the Ethnic Conflict in the 
Northern Region on the Declaration of Principles Peace Negotiation by First Vice President of 
Konkomba Youth Association (Mr. Isaac B. Sukpen) on KOYA’s Involvement in the Peace Accord 
Exercise from 15th-24th June, 1994’ (n.d.). 
80  ‘Joint Memorandum of the Nanumba Traditional Council and the Nanumba Youth Association to the 
Negotiation Team on the Ethnic Conflict in the Northern Region’ (June 1994). 
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in the Saboba area and ‘be subjected to intense education so that they can 
abandon their violent propensities’. Attached to the petition was a set of regula-
tions derived from the Alhassan Committee report, which were referred to as 
‘terms of settlement’. 
The first Konkomba position paper was written on 5 July by Kenneth Wujangi 
(KOYA President).81 This lengthy document (14 pages) dealt not only with 
Konkomba/Nanumba relations. According to the petition, the conflict started 
because Konkomba have been subject to ridicule and exploitation and it could 
have been prevented if national and regional politicians had been fair to them. 
After narrating the conflict histories in the various districts, the last part of the 
paper focuses on the root causes of the conflict, notably the colonially invented 
opposition between the ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ tribes in northern Ghana, and 
the majority’s monopolisation of ‘political, economical and traditional’ resources 
in the Northern Region. The main solutions offered are that all ethnic groups in 
the Northern Region should have separate chieftaincies and political representa-
tion should be open to qualified people irrespective of their ethnic background. 
In September, KOYA under Wujangi prepared a position paper specifically 
addressing the Konkomba/Nanumba situation.82 The petitioners put the Kon-
komba/Nanumba conflicts in a chronology of conflicts in the Northern Region 
between 1979 and 1994, so as to demonstrate an ‘unholy alliance’ of the ruling 
class of Dagbamba, Gonja and Nanumba against the ‘so-called chiefless and 
minority groups’. The paper then claims that in the 16th century, Nanumba 
founded their chiefdom ‘in the heart of Konkomba land’. This statement was 
motivated by the widespread Konkomba idea that originally, they were not only 
indigenous to Dagbon but to the entire Oti Basin also including Nanun and 
eastern Gonja.  
It is likely that the KOYA petitioners were influenced by Ali Kamshegu (the 
1981 headman), who in the hearings of the Lamptey Commission which investi-
gated into the 1981 conflict, had built a Konkomba first-comer narrative in 
Nanun around the toponymy of Waapu, a small lake west of Bimbilla which was 
dammed in colonial times. Kamshegu stated that when Nmantambu conquered 
Nanun he met a female Konkomba potter called Waapu.83 This name, several 
KOYA members spelt out to me, was derived from Likpakpaln liwaal aapuu (the 
shrine’s wife) who by digging the clay for pottery created the lake. Nanumba 
                                                 
81  KOYA (July 1994) ‘Konkomba Position Paper, July 1994 to the Permanent Negotiation Team into 
Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana’. 
82  Wujangi, Kenneth et al. (KOYA) to The Permanent Negotiation Team (September 1994) ‘Konkomba 
Position Paper on Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana – With Reference to Nanumba-
Konkomba Conflicts’. 
83  ‘Statement of J.Y. Ali Kamshegu on Settlement of Dagombas on Konkomba Lands and Some of the 
Taboos of Nanumba District to the Lamptey Committee into Konkomba/Nanumba Conflict’ (1981). 
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have always firmly rejected this history by claiming that Waapu means a collec-
tion of water, from the old Nanunli word waa (water; currently: Kom) and puya 
(collected) .84 
The petitioners’ first-comer claim to Nanun implied that ‘being the aborigines, 
cannot the Konkombas demand any rights and privileges from the colonially 
prompted Nanumba regime imposed on them with the aid of the British.’ Not 
only were Konkomba the ‘aborigines’ of Nanun, they also were its demographic 
and economic backbone as ‘the leading producer of all food crops in the district’.  
Wujangi called for the implementation of the 1985 negotiations, the failure for 
which he blamed on NAYA, to ensure ‘a speedy integration of the Konkomba 
interest built around the Bimbilla-Na’: 
‘The Konkombas have always recognised the Bimbilla-Na as Paramount Chief from 
time immemorial, but no Nanumba Chief has made any definite attempt to integrate 
the Konkombas politically and traditionally into the Nanumba society. […] We are 
aware it is not easy to integrate two peoples with different cultures into one society, 
but the time has now come for both the Nanumba and the Konkomba to make a bold 
attempt towards a peaceful co-existence providing a strong unity in diversity.’ 
This KOYA position clearly showed the differences between the Konkomba 
case in Nanun and in Dagbon. Nanumba representatives were however red hot 
after reading this KOYA petition. My copy of the document contains comments 
written in the margins by a NAYA executive. His jottings vary from ‘Show 
evidence’ (Konkomba aboriginality) to ‘Big lie’ (Nanumba are blamed for the 
failed 1985 negotiations). Yet another jotting states ‘If aborigines, why accept 
Bimbilla-Na overlordship?’ In the petitioners’ claim for political and administra-
tive representation for Konkomba who prove to be dedicated sons of the district, 
the word ‘dedicated’ is underlined. 
The KOYA petition was countered in September by another NTC/NAYA 
memo.85 In this petition, NAYA rejected KOYA as negotiation partners, because 
since ‘[n]one of them is in Nanung and we have reason to believe that they do 
not represent the Konkombas in Nanung.’ The petition rejected the KOYA claim 
of aboriginality in Nanun, which was considered an agenda to seize the lands of 
Nanun. According to the petitioners, different populations in Nanun had ‘welded 
                                                 
84  Muslim Gonja chronicles from the late 19th or early 20th century suggest that when Jakpa – the 
founder of Gonja – crossed the Daka River to conquer ‘the country of Nanunba and Kunkunba’ 
(Quoted in Wilks et al. 1986: 163). Zech (1904: 116) had it that Konkomba used to live in places of 
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theme.  
85  Na Gbantohgu et al On behalf of Bimbilla-Na and Nanumba Youth Association (23-09-1994) 
‘Response to the ‘Konkomba Position Paper of Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana with 
Reference to Nanumba-Konkomba Conflicts Presented to the Permanent Negotiating Team, Sep-
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together at various stages into the Nanumba’; including the original population 
(‘the Foundation stock of Tendana’), ‘the stock of Mantambu (Founder of 
Nanumba state)’ and, among others, groups of Gonja, Hausa and Asante: 
‘Those who were in Nanung before Mantambu – a Guan speaking people from 
several villages in present day Nanung have a strategic role in the rituals, funerals 
and selection of chiefs in Nanung including the Bimbilla-Na. […] No Konkomba has 
ever had the privilege and duty of performing any customary role in Nanung.’ 
This is because: 
‘As is widely known and confirmed by independent research (Prof. David Tait 1958, 
1961, Skalnik 1958, 1986, 1987, 1989) the Konkomba farmers started to settle in 
Nanung as refugees only from the 1940’s onwards after they had killed the Zagbli-
Lana [Dagomba Chief] and they were received well by the Nanumbas.’ 
The petitioners interpreted this Konkomba settlement as a deliberate and 
illegal attempt to seize the lands of Nanun. On the allegation that Nanumba failed 
to integrate Konkomba into their chieftaincy, the petitioners argued that Kanjoo 
Naa was installed as the Konkomba leader for Nanun and that political participa-
tion and distribution of development projects in Nanun is non-discriminatory. In 
its conclusion, the petition repeated the earlier statement that Konkomba should 
leave Nanun.  
On 9 January 1995, the Bimbilla Naa wrote yet another petition, softening his 
demand that not all Konkomba but only ‘360 warlords’ should leave Nanun, but 
he maintained his refusal to allow Konkomba political representation in Nanun.86 
This petition made KOYA so angry that they refused to attend to a PPNT 
mediated meeting with NAYA on 28 January (Skalník 2002: 164). In their 
absence, PPNT endorsed a set of conditions from the Bimbilla Naa to KOYA, 
including a safety assurance and a public apology to the Bimbilla Naa.87 These 
conditions were unacceptable to KOYA, and two PPNT meetings with NAYA 
and KOYA in late February could not ease the build-up of tensions in Nanun.88 
Despite ceasefire, there were dozens of fatal ambushes of farmers and traders 
in Nanun, after the rainy season and particularly in February and March 1995, a 
period typified by a local administrator as full of ‘panic, fear and chaos’.89 
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Travelling was possible because of a status quo: Nanumba could travel through 
Chamba so long as Konkomba could travel through Bimbilla. The majority of 
Konkomba however took bush-paths to Damanko and entered lorries there. On 
12 March the son of the Konkomba headman from Nabaayili cycled to Damanko 
market to buy bicycle parts, but he got ambushed and killed on a bush-path near 
Nakpayili.90 This sparked off open ethnic violence in Nanun.  
That very afternoon, Konkomba from surrounding villages attacked the few 
Nanumba in Nakpayili. Nanumba residents tried to flee to the nearby village of 
Binda. When news reached Bimbilla, Nanumba youth and warriors attacked 
Nabaayili west of town. The next day, intense fighting took place in and around 
Pusuga, the Nanumba warrior stronghold which Nanumba warriors had dubbed 
‘Dobeyili’ (the village of men) and which for most Konkomba symbolised 
Nanumba arrogance. In the morning, Konkomba attacked and burnt Demonayili, 
a village close to Pusuga and around 4 pm, they burnt down Pusuga and two 
hamlets west of town, while Nanumba attacked an adjacent Konkomba commu-
nity. The same day, Konkomba also launched failed attacks on Bimbilla, Wulensi 
and Kukuo but the next day, Konkomba burnt down all three remaining Na-
numba settlements south of Bimbilla, after which cleansing was completed and 
violence stopped. The violence left over hundred people dead, most of whom in 
Pusuga, and Nanun was put under curfew again for months.91 The military com-
mander in Bimbilla held Konkomba responsible for the violence, and local police 
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NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.5/n.n. Ag. District Chief Executive to The Regional Minister (07-03-1995) 
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90  Dekker, Rein (Inter NGO Consortium) (29-03-1995) ‘Assessment of the Situation in Bimbilla 
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in Bimbilla admitted having used violence against Konkomba.92 Despite inciden-
tal ambushing, calm was restored in Nanun over April.93 
PPNT also said it was ‘shocked’ by the violence,94 but the Team’s incapacity 
had become already obvious to the warring parties, the general public in Ghana, 
the Inter-NGO Consortium and probably also to itself. As a Government com-
mission, PPNT was associated with state inertia (Kaye 2007), from the late 
declaration of a State of Emergency to military atrocities against citizens. By 
unconditionally accepting the youth associations as negotiation partners, PPNT 
got trapped in their conditions. Despite KOYA objections, it agreed to treat the 
Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba youth associations as one block, resulting in a 
reactionary Konkomba, Bassari, Nawuri and Nchumuru coalition.95 The coali-
tions never interacted with each other, but instead PPNT asked the youth leaders 
to write petitions, which were used primarily for repeating pre-war rhetoric. 
Many Konkomba, Nanumba and Ghanaians at large doubted not only the vigour 
but also the impartiality of the Government and President Rawlings, even though 
the latter had declared during the sober 6 March Independence celebrations in 
1994 in Accra that ‘government has never, and will not discriminate against any 
region or ethnic group’, a statement which he repeated in a 2007 interview with 
me.96  
The Kumasi peace process 
Although the Consortium’s activism was primarily a ‘consultation on develop-
ment’ (Assefa 2001: 170), it was prepared to play a facilitating and mediating, 
but not an arbitrating, role in any peace initiative. Directly after the March 1995 
violence, the Consortium toured the conflict areas and formed the Peace Aware-
ness Committee made up of representatives from the warring parties and charged 
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al (23-02-1994) ‘Konkomba Youth Association – Press Release’. 
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them with the organisation of a peace workshop in Kumasi.97 The workshop of 
16-18 May 1995 was the first of six ‘Kumasi workshops’, which culminated in 
the signing of the Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation Between The 
Various Ethnic Groups In Northern Region of Ghana ten months later.98 Al-
though the Government of Ghana gave the Consortium the liberty to act, it never 
officially recognised the accord.  
Assefa rejected the PPNT approach: He bypassed the youth leaders as repre-
sentatives of ethnic blocks, insisted that Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba were 
treated as separate delegations and replaced the petitioning habit with open 
dialogue. Leadership was one threat to the unity which Assefa wanted to build in 
his workshops; religion was another. First, Assefa blamed leaders for inculcating 
cultures of fear (2001: 179). He therefore looked for consensus among ‘voices of 
reason’ or ‘bridge-builders’, whom he selected as his workshop participants 
(2001: 168-169).99 He wanted to ‘start with a manageable number of actors and 
issues and then gradually expand outward to reach the whole community in order 
to address the multiplicity of issues in the conflict in a multidimensional and 
holistic manner’ (2001: 179).  
Second, Assefa adhered to a kind of perennialism: While he found religion an 
instrument of division, spirituality exposed the essence of all religions and has 
the capacity to produce ‘healthy societies’ (2001: 185), through the voluntary and 
unconditional remorse and seeking forgiveness in the face of God, oneself, one’s 
neighbours and nature (1996: 46). Hoping to stop the accusations and counterac-
cusations of the ethnic delegations, he explained peace as the responsibility of 
each and every individual participant. In so doing, Assefa hoped to draw 
attention away from the ethnicity which divided the participants, to the belief in 
God which united them.100 This tactic had all chances to fail, because the ethnic 
divisions of the participants overlapped with religious differences: Dagomba, 
Gonja and Nanumba incline to Islam and Konkomba to Christianity. Moreover, if 
there was one factor which compromised the neutrality of the NPI and most 
NGOs in the Consortium, it was their Christian background. However, Assefa 
sensed well that many northern Ghanaians take pride in stating that Christians 
and Muslims worship the same God (cf. Kirby 2002). A Muslim workshop 
participant told Assefa: ‘You may not know it, but you are deeply Muslim’ 
(Assefa 2001: 185).  
                                                 
97  ‘Nairobi Peace Initiative, Inter-NGO Consortium, Search for Peace in the Northern Region of Ghana. 
Update Report and Six Months Programme Proposal’ (n.d.). 
98  ‘Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation between the Various Ethnic Groups in the Northern 
Region of Ghana’. 
99  ‘Nairobi Peace Initiative, Inter-NGO Consortium, Search for Peace in the Northern Region of Ghana. 
Update Report and Six Months Programme Proposal’ (n.d.). 
100  ‘Nairobi Peace Initiative, Inter-NGO Consortium, Search for Peace in the Northern Region of Ghana. 
Update Report and Six Months Programme Proposal’ (n.d.). 
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Kumasi I was the first occasion since the outbreak of the war at which 
Konkomba and Nanumba representatives met. Although many participants knew 
each well personally, it took Assefa more than a day to let them have breakfast 
together. Assefa told the participants that the Consortium wanted to empower the 
participants to become peacemakers, but he also asked the participants what they 
expected from the Consortium. Assefa promised to listen to the request for peace 
education and the involvement of chiefs and leaders in the process but he refused 
to assist the PPNT. The participants recruited representatives for the second 
workshop (26-29 June), around forty of them, including chiefs, MPs and youth 
association representatives, who according to Assefa were ‘more difficult to 
handle’ (Assefa 2001: 172, 173).  
Although their distribution of relief aid ended in December 1995, the Consor-
tium became ever more engaged in the peace process. In August 1995, Alhaji 
Alhassan Chambas, a Nanumba political heavyweight, spoke of ‘the miracles of 
Prof. Assefa’.101 Obviously, Assefa was not just authorising (or empowering) 
workshop participants but he became an authority himself! Workshop partici-
pants organised several peace gatherings as daily life started to normalise. In 
July, the Regional Minister visited Bincheratanga town north of Bimbilla, in the 
presence of both KOYA and NAYA.102 Both associations declared to peacefully 
handle the many resettlement disputes (Assefa 2001: 174-175; Van der Linde & 
Naylor 1999: 52). From 16-23 October, an extensive Peace Education Campaign 
started in Nanumba district, followed by similar campaigns in the other conflict 
districts.103 
The third Kumasi workshop (16-19 December 1995) drew in national youth 
leaders and chiefs as participants, to discuss the causes of and solutions for the 
violence. Both Konkomba and Nanumba delegates saw the need for peace 
education and the establishment of a multi-ethnic Northern Youth Association, 
but they also wanted PPNT support for the Consortium. Nanumba delegates 
wanted security assurances from Konkomba, because they feared the Konkomba 
                                                 
101  Jesiwuni, Issahaku (BADECC) (August 1995) ‘Report on the Inter NGO Consortium/NPI Peace 
Education Committee in Yendi on the 5th of August, 1995’. 
102  NDA/DISEC/C/02/vol.5/n.n. District Co-Ordinating Director to The Regional Minister (26-07-1995) 
‘Report on the Visit of the Regional Minister and Regional Security Council Members to 
Bincheratanga – Nanumba District on 18/7/95’; NDA/E/11/vol.2/n.n. Konkomba Delegation on Inter 
NGO Consortium and NPI Peace Moves to The Executive Director – BADECC (07-08-1995) 
‘Application for means of transport to reach out to Konkombas and Nanumbas in Nanumba District 
in concert with Nanumba Youth Association from 11th to 13th August, 1995’; NDA/E/11/vol.2/108 
President Konkomba Youth Association to The Chairman, Permanent Negotiation Team (01-05-
1995) ‘Passionate appeal for effective means of transport to reach out to Konkombas in Yendi, 
Gusheigu/Karaga, Zabzugu/Tatale, Nanumba and East Gonja Districts to Enhance Public Education 
for Absolute Peace to Return to the Conflict Area in the Northern Region’. 
103  ‘Nairobi Peace Initiative, Inter-NGO Consortium, Search for peace in the Northern Region of Ghana. 
Update Report and Six Months Programme Proposal’ (n.d.). 
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installation of chiefs without Nanumba consent and their suspected intention to 
forcefully take over the lands of Nanun. Konkomba delegates pointed at the 
denial of self-rule and imposition of leadership on them by ‘majority groups’. 
Assefa made the Konkomba delegates to assure Nanumba that they were not 
after the land of Nanun and pressed the Nanumba team to consider granting 
Konkomba chieftaincy titles in Nanun (Van der Linde & Naylor 1999: 40).  
In order to move from this rough deal to a draft peace accord, Assefa invited 
the PPNT representatives from each ethnic group to Kumasi IV (26-29 February 
1996). The representatives of the parties were then sent home to present the draft 
accord to opinion leaders and report back to Kumasi in a month. At the fifth 
workshop (27-30 March 1996), the delegates returned to Kumasi with generally 
much communal support but also with a number of issues which required exten-
sive renegotiation: Notably, Nanumba wanted to subject Konkomba to yam 
harvest tribute regulations. Through Assefa’s mediation, this issue was aban-
doned and on the last day of the workshop, Konkomba and Nanumba delega-
tions, and delegations of the five other ethnic groups, signed the accord (Assefa 
2001: 177).  
Reconciliation 
By the time the accord was signed, Nanun was slowly getting back on its feet. 
The economy of Nanun was in shatters, but with free movement of its citizens 
guaranteed, yam cultivation recovered and markets reopened. NGOs (notably the 
Catholic Relief Services and Assemblies of God Relief and Development Ser-
vices) had a significant role in reconstruction. However, directly after the peace 
accord, many NGOs turned their backs on Nanun and centred their activities in 
the regional capital Tamale where some of them unleashed a competition for 
Assefa’s heritage. When an Oxfam team assessed the situation in the former 
conflict zone in September 1996, they saw development projects in disrepair 
(Van der Linde & Naylor 1999: 63).  
Government control came about only piecemeal, leaning much on security 
forces. A large military/police contingent of Operation Gongong IV has stayed in 
Nanun up to date, still protecting a ban on the use of firearms.104 The Nanumba 
District Assembly (DA) gradually started to gain control over its citizens, again 
or at last. With the assistance of the military presence, the DA forced thousands 
of internally displaced Nanumba to return to their villages, but revenue collection 
                                                 
104  NDA/L/11/v.3/208 Registrar Nanumba Traditional Council to The Sector Commander (04-06-2001) 
‘Permit to Use Fire Arms’; NDA/L/11/v.3/207 Registrar Nanumba Traditional Council to The Divi-
sional Commander (04-06-2001) ‘Application for Police Assistance’. 
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did not recommence until late 1997. Dozens of destroyed schools and clinics had 
not yet opened as late as 1996.105  
In September 1996, President Rawlings and the PPNT ‘reconciled’ Konkomba 
and Nanumba in a Bimbilla school park, the last but according to KOYA the 
most important of three ceremonies.106 Compared to similar ceremonies in Yendi 
(December 1994) and Salaga (May 1996), there was little media attention to the 
Bimbilla reconciliation. In Nanun, I found a complete silence about the ceremony 
too, and my interlocutors said ‘it was just politics’ or ‘I was not there’. Several 
NGO executives who attended to the ceremony also reflected on it as ‘not from 
the heart’ or ‘a political rally’.  
In this ceremony, the issue of divergent reconciliation rites was solved in a 
construction in which the Bimbilla earth priest (Jahanfo Sirikpamo) with the 
assistance from a Konkomba elder, poured libation for peace, after which they 
sacrificed a white cock and white ram on behalf of Nanumba and a red cock and 
brown goat on behalf of Konkomba, to ask the earth for forgiveness.107 After 
that, Konkomba and Nanumba women planted a peace tree in the Bimbilla 
market (which died during dry season because no-one watered it). Rawlings 
spoke about development in Ghana, which KOYA and NAYA Presidents re-
peated. KOYA President Isaac Sukpen said that: ‘It’s sad to recall events which 
started in 1981 and quickly tore apart a once happy family of farmers and 
fishermen in a fertile and highly productive District.’ But he continued that 
‘nothing can stop us from marching in peace as one people to help the District 
recapture its position as the leading food producers and the most peaceful in the 
country’.108 This speech marked the beginning of a peace in which Konkomba 
and Nanumba spokesman would emphasise technocratic development.  
                                                 
105  GT (02-04-1996) ‘GES Demands Report on Closed Nanumba Schools’; GT (01-04-1996) ‘Nanumba 
Schools Hit by Shortage of Teachers’; GT (20-09-1997) ‘Nanumba, Konkomba Chiefs Enforce Peace 
Process’. 
106  Both these reconciliation ceremonies were tense due to disagreements over sacrificial requirements. 
Both ‘traditional’ reconciliations were marked by a mishmash of Christian, Muslim and ‘traditional’ 
performances and what came close to a political rally. GBC (20-12-1994) ‘Dagombas/Konkombas 
Peace’ (in: Akapule (n.d., a)); DG (22/12/1994) ‘Dagombas, Konkombas Resolve Dispute’; Ngula, 
Dan K. & Kenneth Wujangi to The Chairman, Permanent Negotiation Team on Conflict in the 
Northern Region (15-02-1995) ‘Dagomba/Konkomba Reconciliation Ceremony at Yendi on 20th 
December 1994’; Kissmal, Ibrahim Hussein (18-05-1996) ‘Peace and Reconciliation Ceremony in 
Salaga, May 18th 1996’; ‘Address by Konkomba Chiefs and People in the East Gonja District on the 
Occasion of the Reconciliation Ceremony Between Konkomba and Gonjas at Salaga on 18th May, 
1996’. An earlier reconciliation between Gonja and Konkomba was cancelled because Konkomba 
delegates failed to show up, for which they later apologised to Rawlings: GT (16-09-1995) ‘President 
on Peace Mission to the North’; respectively GT (30-09-1995) ‘Konkomba Chiefs, Elders Apologise 
to President’. 
107  GT (16-10-1996) ‘Nanumba, Konkomba Seal Peace Process’. 
108  Sukpen, Isaac B. (KOYA) ‘Address by Konkomba Chiefs and People in the Nanumba District on the 
Occasion of the Reconciliation Ceremony between Konkombas and Nanumbas at Bimbilla on 21st 
September, 1996’. 
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Why was this ceremony not ‘from the heart’? Everybody knew that one cannot 
sacrifice to earth spirits in a school park, and that there is no central sacrifice to 
the land spirits of Nanun. The reconciliation ceremony was considered to be 
politicized; the speeches of authorities were mistrusted because they, the chair-
man of the PPNT, Rawlings, the KOYA and NAYA representatives were under 
suspicion. Finally the ceremony was considered both redundant, since there was 
already a peace accord and many refugees had resettled, and insufficient, because 
there were dozens of local reconciliations in the villages to be made (see chapter 
five).  
Rawlings’ reconciliation was a way to regain a sovereignty in Nanun, which 
the routine law-preserving interventions of the Permanent Peace Negotiation 
Team and the Operation Gongong had failed to restore. Konkomba/Nanumba 
violence was a de facto sovereignty: Thousands of citizens took the law into their 
own hands and killed their neighbours with impunity. The NGO Consortium, in 
its mediated Kumasi Accord, made no single reference to law and order through 
security forces or arbitration and retribution, but rather a security emerging from 
consensus, which was locally received as a ‘pledge’. Rawlings’ administration 
could neither prevent nor end the violence in Northern Ghana. Konkomba and 
Nanumba generally interpreted Rawlings’ reconciliation as an attempt to save his 
own face, not surprisingly three months ahead of the general elections, and not as 
a sincere move to broker peace. His NDC suffered massive electoral defeat in the 
Nanun constituencies (see the next chapter). 
Conclusion 
This chapter studied the cycles of violence and peace in Nanun between 1981 
and 1996 from the angle of the peace clauses on reconciliation and security. In 
this chapter, we have seen how the cluster of related issues, which drove a wedge 
between Konkomba and Nanumba, first among themselves and then between 
each other, exploded into communal violence. These issues concerned the para-
dox between rights and obligations as citizens and subjects in Nanun, a paradox 
underscored by claims of equal citizenship and majority versus claims of 
autochthony. Although these claims drew on ethnicity, the next two chapters will 
show that both sets of argumentations tend to dissolve intra-ethnically. We have 
however seen how the contents of the conflict, a cluster of issues, has been more 
or less the same while they have been addressed in various forms, ranging from 
petitioning, to verbal expressions (or insulting), violence (the kijaak/tobu type 
described in chapter one) and dialogue during the Kumasi workshops. I empha-
sise this distinction between content and form in order to show how a conflict 
can be alternately politicised and depoliticised. In chapter six I will study why 
petitioning has returned as a dominant form of addressing these issues after 1996.   
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But let’s first look again the outbreak of violence in 1981, which started as the 
Bimbilla Naa exercised what he considered his sovereignty, namely the violent 
displacement of Konkomba from Bimbilla by his warriors. This act of coercion 
had no precedent in Nanun and although it seemed to be a ‘traditional’ measure, 
it was in fact a new phenomenon. And so was its result; massive ethnic cleansing 
throughout Nanun by both Konkomba and Nanumba. The subsequent violence 
and non-violence in Nanun have to be interpreted bearing this experience in 
mind. 
The outcome of the 1981 violence, namely, was a mutual sense of victimhood 
and insecurity, because the other was allegedly plotting against them. The return 
to multiparty democracy in 1992 triggered conflicts in surrounding parts of the 
Northern Region of Ghana and resulted in a widespread rumour that Konkomba 
were to chase all chiefly groups, vice versa. Tensions quickly mounted in Nanun 
and this time, there were no official warnings. While underlying the 1981 
violence was a Konkomba demand for independent tribunals and a Nanumba 
response of imposing more customs on them, the 1994 violence broke out in a 
widespread mutual sentiment that their coexistence in Nanun had become impos-
sible.  
Contrary to 1981, when state intervention was just late and insufficient, in 
1994 and 1995, both sides actually challenged the neutrality of the state. First, a 
Nanumba mob attacked the police station in Bimbilla and Konkomba killed 
Nanumba farmers in Nakpayili. This kicked off another round of violence. The 
situation was different from 1981, because it was individual criminal behaviour 
which escalated. This exercise of certainty became popularised: While the 1981 
violence started as a penal exercise on the instigation of the Nanumba paramount 
chief, the 1994 and 1995 outbursts of violence started respectively with a riot and 
an ambush in Nanun’s periphery.  
The government argued that it had to restore law and order but it was actually 
fighting a war which it rather concealed. Along the way, as suspicions mounted 
about the security agencies backing the enemy, their violence became directed at 
the police (a Nanumba mob attacked the Bimbilla police station in 1994) or the 
army (Konkomba guerrillas ambushed soldiers near Chamba in 1994). The 
violence in Nanun was much more than a breakdown of law and order in a 
remote part of the country; Konkomba and Nanumba warriors took law into their 
own hands to create their own security. Behind the façade of keeping the peace 
and maintaining law and order, therefore, the national army had to win back its 
sovereignty in Nanun.  
The challenge of the NGO Consortium was how to accomplish clarification 
and security without violence and without arbitration, which they though engen-
dered accusations and counteraccusations. The Permanent Peace Negotiation 
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Team, as argued, was seriously handicapped not only by its allegiance to the state 
but especially by the state’s delegated sovereignty in terms of chieftaincy which 
was the core of the conflict. The Team however investigated the legality of tradi-
tional and modern interventions without studying the paradox in the Constitution.  
In Mamdani’s terms, the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team premised that 
there were collective victims and perpetrators, while the Consortium’s ideology 
was that in a way, everyone in Nanun was a victim and a perpetrator, but espe-
cially a survivor. Above, I have analysed the processes of forgiveness and 
healing during the Kumasi peace workshops. It was striking that the initial 
delegates were not the conventional ethnic spokesmen, mostly from the Youth 
Associations, but ‘voices of reason’ with their feet in unspoilt traditions. 
Contrary to the peace initiatives by the representatives of the Government of 
Ghana, which found security enshrined in the rule of law, the NGO Consortium, 
more precisely Assefa, thought that only a spirit of forgiveness and trust could 
lead to a real security anchored in tradition. However, this tradition was a repre-
sentation of the past, both legalised (customary law) and modernised (by the 
Youth).  
Another crucial point for the rest of this book is that the peace process focused 
on forgiveness, healing and especially confidence in the other. In that spirit, 
traditions could glue Konkomba and Nanumba together. This approach implied a 
suspension of mutual prejudices. However, it remains to be seen, in the next 
chapters, whether prejudices and stereotypes are that disruptive for Nanun’s 
peace. While Konkomba/Nanumba coexistence has been, and continues to be, 
shrouded in morality, mutual sentiments of exploitation – Konkomba exhaust the 
land, while Nanumba are feudal – have just been a latent condition for victim-
hood about what they considered the illegal subordination of their autochthony or 
citizen equality. As I hope to show in chapter six, Konkomba and Nanumba 
mocking each other’s character is insufficient for the explosion of violence, but 
feelings that their rights and entitlements are violated are not.  
In chapter one, I introduced the distinction between calm and unity, which 
both Konkomba and Nanumba draw. I found that calm or reserve is a very 
‘traditional’ way of solving problems, but it is eclipsed by a sense of postpone-
ment, awaiting a verdict. But in the process of waiting, there is a lot of peace in 
playing soccer, playing draft, drinking beer, dancing or watching cinema. As 
Skalník observed (personal communication), the current coexistence between 
Konkomba and Nanumba is far more dynamic than that before 1981. Perhaps this 
is the ad hoc realm of reconciliation. Leaving this issue for chapter six, we now 
turn to the security in ‘traditional’ earth sacrifices in the context of rights and 
prejudices in chapter five, but first the security in political competition in the 
next chapter.  
  
 
 
 
 
4 
Political and administrative  
decision-making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Representation at administrative and political decision-making proc-
esses shall be by merit and following due process’ (clause 3). 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I study the ballot box as the locus for Konkomba majority in 
Nanun, in the context of decentralization. As I showed in chapter one, Geschiere 
& Meyer (1998) described how elections may ignite tensions between autoch-
thons and settlers, especially if the latter are electorally dominant. How does this 
work out in Nanun, where Konkomba constitute an electoral majority? In their 
September 1994 petition to the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team, KOYA 
executives complained that Nanumba had tried to prevent Konkomba from 
casting their votes in the 1992 elections.1 And just before the May 1994 local 
District Assembly elections, which had been postponed due to the violence, 
Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II and the Nanumba Youth Association petitioned 
the National Electoral Commission to ask for the exclusion of Konkomba candi-
                                                 
1  Wujangi, Kenneth et al. (KOYA) to The Permanent Negotiation Team (September 1994) ‘Konkomba 
Position Paper on Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana – With Reference to Nanumba-
Konkomba Conflicts’. 
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dates and electorate; Konkomba should cast their vote in ‘Saboba’.2 The Elec-
toral Commission refused this request and since then, there seem to have been 
only sporadic cases of Nanumba questioning the voting right of Konkomba.  
This was the context for clause three, which deals with the ‘modern’ coexis-
tence of Konkomba and Nanumba. As outlined in chapter one, Assefa sought a 
Konkomba/Nanumba peace in tradition, because he found modern politics not 
only alien to consensual traditional African forms of governance but also disrup-
tive. This chapter however shows that political competition is not as dangerous 
for a tense society like Nanun as Assefa assumed and others suspected for a place 
where settlers are an electoral majority (Geschiere & Meyer 1998; Mamdani 
2001). Certainly, elections in Nanun have been very ethnic in character: In 
chapter three, we saw how the 1994-1995 violence trickled down to the 1996 
general elections. While president Rawlings won the presidential polls in Nanun, 
both incumbent MPs from Rawlings’ National Democratic Congress lost their 
seats to opposition parties. However, that elections were ethnic does not mean 
that they jeopardized the peace of Nanun. 
Looking at the clause in more detail, we read that political and administrative 
representation ‘shall be by merit and following due process’. While a meritoc-
racy is not the same as equal citizenship, this clause does imply that representa-
tion would be on the basis of personal qualification rather than on factors such as 
ethnicity, and that such representation would be according to the law (‘due 
process’). The prescriptive tone in the clause is actually surprising, because the 
agreement is not just redundant (because it was secured in the constitution) but 
also unfeasible (the electorate has the right to vote ethnically). The tenor of the 
clause was however that Nanumba would not use their autochthony to prevent 
Konkomba from taking up modern political and administrative positions in 
Nanun.  
Although the peace clause addressed ‘political and administrative decision-
making’, emphasis during the peace workshops lay on the legislature and the 
right to vote. However, I will show how in post-1996 Nanun, the executive 
power of government has generated much more tensions between Konkomba and 
Nanumba than the legislature has, for two reasons. First, the executive was 
considered to be more politically neutral than the legislature. I will seek to show 
that the suppression of political competition in the executive has been more 
prone to tensions than the open legislative political competition. This analysis 
invokes Ferguson’s theory of depoliticization in The Anti-Politics Machine 
(1994), as introduced in chapter one. Although Ferguson concluded that the ‘anti-
                                                 
2  NDA/E/11/vol.2/101 Bimbilla-Na Abarika Attah II to The Chairman, National Electoral Commission 
(01-05-1994) ‘Petition on Postponed District Level Elections in the Northern Region – Nanumba 
District’. 
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politics machine’ – the political impact of seemingly technocratic interventions – 
was an unintentional side-effect of development projects in Lesotho, the Nanun 
material suggests that apolitical administrative interventions may be a deliberate 
cloak for political control, thereby resulting in a fertile ground for conspiracy 
theories.  
And second, while both the peace brokers and many peace workshop partici-
pants thought that ‘decision-making processes’ happened in the national capital, 
hence for example the Youth Associations’ presence in Accra, there has been a 
significant transfer of ‘decision-making processes’ or sovereignty from the 
national capital to the local government District Assemblies as part of decentrali-
zation politics. This devolution sidelined both the MPs (see below) and the Youth 
Associations (see chapter six). In 2003, Nanumba district was divided in nine 
sub-districts; in 2004, Nanumba district itself was divided in Nanumba North 
(Bimbilla) and Nanumba South (Wulensi) district and in 2005, a poverty pro-
gramme was drawn up for districts and sub-districts. In the Chamba dispute we 
will see the decision power of the District Chief Executive. So while Assefa 
wanted to look beyond the state, the state has become stronger in terms of secu-
rity and development.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. For a better contextualisation of the 
topics of this chapter, I have chosen to present the sociography of Chamba town 
here. This town’s make-up backs the argument here but it also serves as an intro-
duction for the cases from this town in the next two chapters. After that, I study 
the electoral history of Nanun since 1996 to show that political competition has 
not jeopardized the peace in Nanun. Rather, I try to understand the tensions 
generated by the so-called politically neutral decentralization politics and poverty 
reduction programmes. I will use the case of decentralization in Chamba and two 
cases about the installation of District Chief Executives in Nanun to inform this 
inquiry, and end with a brief conclusion of the main findings.  
Introducing Chamba 
This chapter draws heavily on the ethnographic material from Chamba, because 
the people in this Konkomba-dominated town in south-western Nanun have 
played a crucial role in elections while often being marginalised in administrative 
reforms. Since 1996, all parliamentary elections in the Bimbilla constituency, 
which comprises the larger part of Nanun, have been decided by Konkomba 
voters in and around Chamba town, who constitute more than a quarter of the 
constituency electorate.  
Between late 2003 and the spring of 2004, two main decentralization inter-
ventions happened in Nanun: First the sub-division of Nanumba District in nine 
area councils by November, which was followed by the separation of the District 
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itself in two halves: Nanumba North and South Districts. These were significant 
efforts to bridge the distance between ‘the government’ and ‘the people’ but as I 
came to Chamba town another year later, early 2005, this large Konkomba-
dominated town was still shrouded in disappointment over the decentralization 
policies. While some Konkomba had hoped for a district demarcation around 
Chamba rather than around the Nanumba town of Wulensi, most of them saw 
this division coming: The Nanumba North/South demarcation overlapped with 
the Bimbilla/Wulensi constituency boundaries. Rather, the real disappointment in 
Chamba was that, in spite of being the third-largest town in Nanun and the 
obvious hub in the south-western part of it, Chamba did not become the capital of 
any of the nine sub-districts. Instead, the ruined Nanumba chieftaincy centre of 
Dakpam ten kilometres to the east became the local area council capital and the 
old and crumbling colonial building – symbolically loaded because a notorious 
Nanumba sniper hid in this office during the 1994 violence – was repainted to 
house the administration.  
Before elaborating on the parliamentary elections and the decentralization, 
let’s look at Chamba in more detail and especially how Konkomba became such 
a majority in this town. This section has a more descriptive sociographic charac-
ter, which sketches Chamba also for the case studies I present in chapter five and 
six. I have chosen to centralise this material here, rather than in bits and pieces in 
the subsequent chapters. This section might therefore be used as a reference.  
Chamba on an average morning: The latest Abu Sadic hit in Dagbanli (of 
which the Nanumba tongue Nanunli is a dialect) sounds from one of the bars. My 
Konkomba assistant rhythmically drums on his thighs, smiles and says: ‘They are 
crazy, but they do know how to sing!’ Meanwhile, Konkomba men in airy 
Nanumba-tailored kaftans walk their way to buy breakfast from the Nanumba 
women opposite the mosque, because ‘their porridge tastes so much better’. A 
glimpse in the other direction: A Nanumba man with stomach pain heads to the 
house a Konkomba healer, while the Nanumba earth priest Fuseini sneaks into a 
Konkomba bar to enjoy a calabash of sorghum beer. Despite this apparent 
normalcy, nowhere is the tension between a Nanumba minority of first-comers 
and a Konkomba majority of settlers more tangible than in Chamba.  
This town is one of the most important Nanumba chieftaincy centres, as 
second-highest post (after Dakpam) in the hierarchical ‘house of the bangle’ 
(Banyili) chieftaincy lineage, which alternates with the ‘house of the lion’ 
(Gbugmayili) for the Bimbilla paramount chieftaincy. In spite of this chieftaincy, 
Konkomba currently make up more than 95 percent of the town’s population of 
7,000. Chamba is the third-largest town in Nanun, after Bimbilla and Wulensi, 
both towns where few to no Konkomba permanently live.  
97 
 
It is however not the overwhelming demographic dominance of Konkomba, 
but the consistent return of Nanumba after each episode of violent displacement, 
which makes Chamba such an intricate setting. Contrary to other Nanumba 
villages in south-western Nanun, which have been abandoned and whose chiefs 
reside in Bimbilla, the exile of a chief as important as the Chamba Naa would be 
unthinkable for Nanumba.  
Chamba exemplifies the realities of ethnic cleansing in Nanun’s demography. 
Because so many Nanumba villages have been permanently deserted since the 
1994 and 1995 violence, most Nanumba live within a circle some 10 kilometres 
in all directions around Bimbilla and in Wulensi and its environs. Few to no 
Konkomba live in or around these towns. As of 2006, the only Konkomba 
permanently living in Bimbilla were a medical assistant, a waitress and some 
teachers (not counting hundreds of students in Bimbilla’s schools and teachers 
training college). Konkomba dominate everything outside the Bimbilla and 
Wulensi areas and they are de facto autonomous in large parts of it. Although 
many Nanumba continue to call Konkomba bush people, and indeed, any branch 
from the main road in Nanun takes you on a small path to farms with Konkomba 
homesteads scattered all over, there had been a significant relocation of Kon-
komba to the roadside facilities (notably schools, boreholes and markets) since 
the 1980s, resulting in elongated Konkomba conglomerates of which Chamba is 
the largest example.  
In sum, the fault line between a Konkomba-dominated and a Nanumba-domi-
nated Nanun runs right through Chamba and hence, this town’s make up is a 
kaleidoscope for their coexistence at large. Hardly surprising, the first serious test 
of the 1996 peace accord happened in Chamba in August 2002, when the 
Nanumba chief (naa) of Chamba town used his position as ‘the traditional ruler 
and custodian of the land in the area’3 to install one Konkomba man as a sub-
chief for the Konkomba communities in town, while the overwhelming majority 
of the Konkomba supported the son of the previous headman as their leader. That 
this local conflict so quickly brought ethnic enmity into play testifies to the 
symbolic position of this town (see chapter six). However, studying the political 
and administrative developments in Nanun also requires looking at Chamba.  
Although both the Konkomba and Nanumba populations in town fragment in 
various kinship based quarters, the consider their coexistence prominently ethnic. 
As of 2005, the Nanumba community in Chamba had just over one hundred 
inhabitants in sixteen houses over seven quarters encircling the mosque. Most 
Nanumba in town were Muslims, while only a dozen individual Konkomba 
practised Islam, and no Nanumba had converted to Christianity, which many 
                                                 
3  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/22 Chamba-Naa Salifu Alhassan to The Regional Minister (15-10-2002) ‘Chamba 
Konkonba Community Situational Report (31st August) – A Rejoinder’. 
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Konkomba practice. The word yili denotes both individual compounds and 
lineage quarters. While most compounds were inhabited by families made up of 
relatives maximally three times removed (dogim), these persons belonged to 
seven wider patrilineal lineages (dan); of the incumbent chief Salifu Alhassan, of 
the late chiefs Alhaji and Yakubu, of the earth priest Fuseini and of three butcher 
families.  
Konkomba in Chamba also live together in kin-based quarters which usually 
bear the name of the ‘clan’ living there. For example, Kanjooktiib, the ‘Kanjook 
people’ from that Kikpakpaan village, live in a quarter commonly known as 
Kanjooktiibdo, the suffix do implicating place. Konkomba and Nanumba alike in 
Chamba tend to recognise sixteen Konkomba clan quarters (see chapter six), but 
due to blurry clan definitions, some ‘clans’ share a quarter, while other clans 
spread over various separate quarters.  
The Kanjooktiib section had more than fifty houses in 2005, which were 
however distributed over six mostly endogamous and ritually autonomous sub-
quarters. The oldest of these quarters is that of Bijoliib, which dates to 1965 and 
which had fifteen compounds in 2005. The 183 inhabitants claimed descent from 
an apical forefather called Dana, but they were loosely divided between the 
offspring of Bayuul and Ŋmamo.4 In 2005, the eldest man (uninkpel) was the last 
living son of Bayuul, and he performed rituals on behalf of all Bijoliib as well as 
sacrifices to the Kanjook earth shrine on behalf of the wider Kanjooktiib 
community in town. The enormous population growth of Chamba has exhausted 
space in the Kanjooktiib and most other quarters, so that new houses are usually 
built on the fringes of town. 
Comparing my survey material from the entire Nanumba community to that of 
the Bijoliib, it struck me that the latter are much more sedentary than Nanumba, 
especially youth. Virtually all Nanumba women married outside Chamba, mostly 
in Bimbilla and Accra, while almost half of the Bijoliib women married a man in 
town and most who did not married in adjacent villages. Perhaps more strikingly, 
more than half of the Nanumba young men had permanently left Chamba, again 
for Bimbilla or Accra, while no single Bijoliib man had permanently left 
Chamba. I found that while most young Nanumba were busy getting out of 
Chamba and no Nanumba settled in Chamba, most Konkomba were planning to 
stay in town and each year, hundreds of Konkomba from adjacent villages settle 
in Chamba, which they call, using English, ‘the city’.  
In 2006, I counted no less than sixty new houses under construction on the 
outskirts of town alone, the majority of which were built by settlers from adja-
                                                 
4  Ŋmamo fled Kanjook during the 1936 French ‘pacification’ which killed some of his family mem-
bers, and he settled in a village near Wulensi. Bayuul’s five sons joined him after their father’s death. 
When Ŋmamo died in 1965, his and Bayuul’s sons moved to Chamba, to flee a lingering family 
quarrel.  
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cent villages. While most Konkomba initially came to Nanun for its availability 
of farmland and water, recent settlers in Chamba told me that they accepted the 
chronic water and farmland shortages in this town, only to profit from its schools, 
market and electricity. Many of them kept their farms in the villages they left or 
started a farm in the southern part of a forest reserve fifteen kilometres north of 
town, which was recently opened for agriculture. Consequently, most Konkomba 
farmers in Chamba sleep on their farms throughout the week to come home only 
for the Friday market.  
The settlement by Konkomba started in the 1950s, but none of the descendents 
of the Nanumba who received them were found to be living in Chamba. Conse-
quently, none of the Konkomba or Nanumba living in Chamba knew much about 
the more remote history of this town. The historiography of most Konkomba 
reaches back to the settlement of one Fiindi; Nanumba with longest residency in 
Chamba are the descendents of a chief who came to Chamba in the late 1960s 
and these descendents turned out to hold little knowledge of, or interest in, the 
period before that. However, from various sources, mostly outside Chamba, I 
have been able to sketch its older history.  
The issue of principal interest in such a historiography must be that when the 
first Konkomba started to settle in Chamba, this place was little more than a 
hamlet which had emerged three or four decades earlier and which was even 
uninhabited for some years. Some Nanumba elders living elsewhere in Nanun, 
mostly in Bimbilla, had partial narratives of Chamba’s history. One version goes 
that Dawuni, one half of a twin, left his brother Danaa just west of Bimbilla to 
hunt for elephants. This was after the foundation of Nanun by Nmantambu. 
Dawuni allegedly entered a large forest (cha mba may mean ‘go in’) and settled 
there. When Dawuni died, he hung his powers in a tree, which became a shrine. 
At a later stage, one Bimbilla Naa installed one of his sons as the chief of 
Chamba (Chamba Naa) to rule Dawuni’s offspring of earth priests. After an 
unascertained number of Chamba chiefs, Sulemani – the son of Bimbilla Naa 
Abarika I – was installed as the chief of Chamba. It was during the reign of 
Sulemani – he died in 1924 – that the villagers of Chamba resettled to the town’s 
present location. 
There may have been various reasons for resettlement, such as lack of water or 
relocation to a colonial-built path to Salaga, but several accounts of my inter-
locutors referred to one hunter Attah Shiariga from Bimbilla who killed an 
antelope at the present Chamba site of which he gave a hind leg to Sulemani. 
When Attah told the chief about the favourable conditions at New Chamba, Naa 
Sulemani decided to relocate to this new site and he made Attah Shiariga the 
earth priest. The present earth priest of Chamba claims descent from him. As 
Sulemani left, Old Chamba was deserted altogether, but the offspring of Dawuni 
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did not settle in new Chamba. Instead, they got dispersed over villages in south-
western Nanun, such as Dakpam, Taali and Wulensi. 
In a 1927 local British census, there was no mention of ‘old’ or ‘new’, but 
Chamba was located on the ‘road’ and it had only seven compounds.5 Chamba’s 
population did not grow for decades. After the death of Sulemani in the late 
1920s, two successive chiefs (Iddrisa and Natogmah) of Tuu village were 
promoted to Chamba. When the earth priest died in the early 1940s and Naa 
Natogmah was promoted to the Dakpam chieftaincy in 1943 (and to become the 
Bimbilla Naa not much later), no-one lived in Chamba for some months, until 
Issah became the new chief. Issah was a son of Sulemani and therefore no 
stranger to Chamba, but he lived in Nabaayili (near Bimbilla) and was a cattle 
trader, plying between Nanun and Kumasi. As he became the chief, Chamba 
grew to four compounds: The palace, the houses of the wulana (chief’s elder) 
and his brother, and that of the new earth priest. During the incumbency of Naa 
Issah (1943-1967), Chamba was however to experience a huge population 
growth, mainly of Konkomba.  
While since the late 1920s, Konkomba farmers had settled in increasing 
numbers in scattered hamlets off the main north-south route of Nanun, especially 
around the swampy areas near Wulensi, south-western Nanun was covered in 
dense forests and almost uninhabited until completion of the Bimbilla-Salaga 
road in 1956.6 A number of villages however emerged along streams between 
Dakpam and Wulensi in the 1940s. In one of those villages lived Fiindi, a 
middle-aged man born near Saboba, who had accompanied his father on his quest 
for greener pastures. While living there, Fiindi became friends with the cattle 
trader Issah. When Issah became the chief of Chamba in 1943, he invited Fiindi 
to join him there. Fiindi accepted the invitation but awaited the death of his 
father, which took another decade, and came to Chamba in 1953 with his wives, 
children and brothers.  
Chamba Naa Issah called Fiindi his Konkomba elder (Kpungkpaam kpema), 
but subsequent Konkomba settlers would come to know him as Bikpakpaan 
aatindaan (Konkomba earth priest). Fiindi usually mediated between new settlers 
and the Nanumba chief and earth priest, who had to be offered respectively only 
a small amount of kola nuts (a metaphor for money) and a fowl (or money), and 
he also recruited Konkomba farm labour for the chief. It is significant to note the 
authority of Fiindi as Konkomba first-comer, among both Konkomba and Na-
                                                 
5  PRAAD/A/ADM.67/5/2 ‘Yendi – Village Record Book vol. I’ (1919-1930). 
6  PRAAD/T/NRG1/13/5/166 ‘Agenda for the 34th Meeting of Finance and Staff Committee to be Held 
on 7th January, ’56 at the Council Hall Bimbilla’. Prior to completion, there was a smaller path to 
Salaga.  
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numba. In this capacity, Fiindi, and later his eldest son, would play decisive roles 
in the Chamba chieftaincy dispute (see chapter six).  
Completion of the road mentioned above diverted some traders between 
Saboba and Kumasi from the Bimbilla-Kete Krachi to the Bimbilla-Salaga road. 
One of them, Magati from Kujoon north-west of Saboba, traded livestock and 
dogs to Kumasi, and was impressed by the abundance of land and hunting areas 
in Chamba. He and two of his brothers, settled in Chamba as farmers and 
hunters, and as the second Konkomba family. Within a year, family members 
joined them, first from Kujoon and later from other parts of Nanun.  
Magati was one of many Konkomba settling in south-western Nanun. Usually 
called Kumbu after the river between Dakpam and Chamba, the population in 
this area of around 800 square kilometres increased from 2000 in 1960 to almost 
22,000 in the 2000 census, while the number of villages counted more than 
tripled. Although census results have to be taken with a substantial pinch of salt, 
interval results suggest that the Kumbu population grew with almost 10 percent 
per annum  between 1960 and 1970, 6 percent between 1970 and 1984 and 4 
percent between 1984 and 2000.7 This population growth was almost entirely due 
to Konkomba settlement in the area.  
The growth pattern of Chamba differs significantly from this trend. While in 
the 1960s, Chamba grew at a lower pace than elsewhere in the Kumbu area, 
probably because of the departure of the relatives of the late Naa Issah, 
Chamba’s population quadrupled to over 1700 in 1984 at a staggering ten percent 
on average per annum growth rate. Between 1984 and 2000, the town’s popula-
tion tripled to 5200 inhabitants at an average seven percent per annum growth 
rate,8 mirroring the population decreases n some surrounding villages. In terms of 
population growth, Chamba has no equivalent in the Kumbu area or in Nanun at 
large. What was so special about Chamba in the 1970-1984 census interval 
period? Five factors stand out.  
First, in the late 1960s, the construction of a small dam east of Chamba, which 
was selected because the physical make-up of this spot made it the cheapest place 
in south-western Nanun to build a dam, triggered the settlement of dozens of 
small families. Most of them came from nearby waterlogged areas and found in 
Chamba a combination of fertile land and reliable access to water without being 
cut off from the outside world. Over the 1970s, these fifteen main Konkomba 
quarters drastically grew in size as relatives joined them, due to the following 
reasons. 
                                                 
7  The 1970 census gave an overall population of 5276 in 18 villages, and in 1984, 39 villages together 
had 12378 inhabitants (Census Office 1964, 1972; Ghana Statistical Service 1989, 2002). 
8  The 2000 census gave Chamba a population of 5200 inhabitants, a quarter of which were detracted in 
the official figures because they resided outside Chamba most of the time (mostly in farm huts in 
Sofeya). 
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The second factor was the emergence of a market in Chamba. Naa Alhaji, who 
became the chief in 1967, was a Muslim, and he invited an imam from Yendi to 
start Muslim prayers in town. Although Hausa Muslims had been present at the 
palaces of the highest Nanumba chiefs since the early nineteenth century 
(Levtzion & Pouwel 2000: 100), very few Nanumba commoners had converted 
to Islam in Nanun until the 1970s, while widespread conversion did not com-
mence until the 1990s. In Chamba, the small Nanumba community largely 
converted to Islam in the 1970s, but none of the Konkomba did. However, 
Konkomba in town adopted the Friday holiday. When the wives of Fiindi and 
Magati, the early Konkomba settlers, began selling beer under a tree on Fridays, 
they started an ad hoc ‘market’ of Chamba. This market was no part of Nanun’s 
six-day market cycle, which included Dakpam and Bimbilla as closest markets, 
but it soon became an important yam market and it attracted settlers. 
Third, in the 1970s, witchcraft accusations ravaged many Konkomba commu-
nities in Nanun, causing many individuals to flee to ‘town’, which was usually 
Chamba (see the next chapter). In Bondaando village, five kilometres south of 
Chamba, more than half of the population, who were all related to each other, 
fled to Chamba or beyond.  
Fourth, in 1976, the German priest Joseph Renner opened a Roman Catholic 
mission in Chamba. Although there had been Evangelical Presbyterian and 
Roman Catholic missions in Bimbilla since the late 1950s, their congregations 
consisted mainly of southerners. The German Fr. Joseph Renner had a budget for 
opening a new parish in north-eastern Ghana but local response was lukewarm in 
several larger Nanumba towns. As the story goes, Renner met one Jaglen Jagen 
from the Saambuultiib clan in Chamba, who initially wanted to purchase an anti-
witchcraft shrine, until his elder brother (who had heard about the Roman Catho-
lic Church in Saambuli near Saboba) told him to look for a missionary instead. 
Jaglen contacted Father Joseph, who was based in Bimbilla, and invited him to 
Chamba.  
Within weeks, a dozen young Saambuultiib attended ‘mass’ in Jaglen’s house. 
In 1976, Father Joseph got permission from Naa Alhaji to build his mission 
(Father’s place, Fadado) on a large plot north-west of the village in a dense 
forest which the inhabitants of Chamba feared. Many Konkomba considered the 
cutting down of this forest as an act of bravery or even magic. Most Konkomba 
were however particularly enchanted by the Catholic clinic, which Father Joseph 
opened with the aid of German and Dutch nurses in 1978, the opening of a 
school and the distribution of foodstuffs and medicine in town.  
Conflict was the fifth factor. While the combination of abundant and fertile 
land, reliable water access, trade and a market and a Catholic mission interested 
in the health and education of the community made Chamba an attractive town 
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for Konkomba, the outbreak of the 1981 conflict made Chamba the town it is 
today. When violence broke out in June 1981 in Wulensi, the small Nanumba 
community in Chamba fled to Bimbilla. There was no fighting in town but as 
some Konkomba fled to their farms, many others went to battle elsewhere in 
Nanun. Chamba also became a refugee centre for Konkomba from the Wulensi 
and Bimbilla areas, partly due to the relief efforts of Fr. Joseph, and many 
refugees stayed in Chamba, making it, like Kpasa, one of the most important 
Konkomba towns in Ghana after Saboba. This instigated the increase of Chamba 
market to the largest yam market in Nanun; Konkomba farmers massively 
refused to sell their yams to Nanumba middlemen, so that the nearby Nanumba-
dominated market of Dakpam, which was burnt to ashes, ceased to exist.  
Only a handful of Nanumba ever returned to Chamba, but the chief was not 
among them and he died in exile in Bimbilla in 1983. Naa Alhaji had not been on 
very bad terms with Konkomba but it was during his rule that Nanumba leader-
ship in Chamba became somewhat artificial. While all Konkomba had come to 
meet Naa Issah as the chief of Chamba, they could not help interpreting the 
installation of Naa Alhaji, who was a complete stranger to Chamba, as an impo-
sition. Although there are no indications of tensions in Chamba up to the late 
1970s, the son of Naa Alhaji told me that his father feared the Konkomba and 
that he tried to refuse the settlement of Kanjooktiib and other ‘French’ Kon-
komba, whom he feared in particular. Biyenjin, the local KOYA activist, was 
among them and this certainly engendered mistrust between them.  
From 1981 until 1985, there was nothing much of a Nanumba community in 
Chamba. The installation of Tuu Naa Yakubu as the chief of Chamba in 1985 led 
to a growth of the Nanumba community, with the significant inflow of butchers. 
Because one of the wives of Naa Yakubu came from a family of butchers 
(nakohanima), inheritance of which is usually maternal, some sons of the chief 
started butcher shops in Chamba and they stayed in town when the chief died in 
1990 (to be succeeded by Natogmah Attah). The butchers continued to play a 
dominant role in Chamba, as a case in chapter six will show.  
But let’s put things in perspective: The humble growth of the Nanumba 
community was eclipsed by a refugee stream of hundreds of Konkomba from the 
1992 Gonja/Konkomba conflict, many of who stayed in Chamba. When the 1994 
violence broke out, the situation in Chamba resembled that of 1981: All Na-
numba fled to Bimbilla, while over the next days, Konkomba warriors made 
Chamba their centre. As described in chapter three, the army responded to a 
Konkomba ambushing of soldiers by burning dozens of Konkomba roadside 
villages in Nanun and eastern Gonja, including Chamba. Because the military 
had announced a meeting in town, Chamba was packed and consequently, dozens 
of civilians lost their lives during this penal expedition. After that, the army 
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instructed all wandering Konkomba in this part of Nanun to gather in Chamba for 
disarmament and relief aid, but both failed.  
It took Nanumba almost three years to return to Chamba. The first man to 
return, in November 1996, was the local chief butcher. Most other butchers also 
returned in 1996 and so did some of the relatives of former chiefs, but in each 
family numerous individuals stayed in Bimbilla or left for Tamale or Accra. As 
the first returnee arrived under military escort, soldiers brought him to the home-
stead of Nyilyar, the son of the Konkomba headman who had died earlier that 
year, and forced him to receive the Nanumba. Narratives from both sides how-
ever suggest that this meeting was quite hospitable and that Nyilyar offered his 
help in the reconstruction of Nanumba houses and in the provision of yam seed-
lings. Nanumba reception was however highly dependent on individual goodwill. 
Soldiers checked on Chamba on a regular (usually weekly) basis, just like they 
did in other mixed communities, but I have not heard of any tensions. There was 
no welcome ceremony, nor any reconciliation. However, as returnees told me, 
Konkomba funerals were occasions for joint entertainment. This memory of the 
joint celebration of Konkomba funerals is striking because it illustrates that 
contrary to what Geschiere and Nyamnjoh found for Cameroon (2000), funerals 
in Nanun are not at all enmeshed in claims of belonging (see the next chapter). 
The incumbent Naa Natogmah and his family stayed in Bimbilla to await his 
1998 succession to the skin of Dakpam (whose chief had died in the violence). 
Again, as after the 1981 violence, Chamba was without a chief for four years, 
until the chief of Lungni, Salifu Alhassan, was promoted to Chamba and, under 
military escort, introduced to Nyilyar, the acting son of the Konkomba headman, 
who had died in 1996. This is where the Chamba dispute started (see chapter 
six). The earth priest Fuseini arrived even later. He was born in Wulensi and had 
never lived in Chamba until he was called to office in 2000, when his predeces-
sor had died in exile in Bimbilla. However, this is also the context for our next 
discussions of parliamentary elections and local administration. 
Electoral majority and maturity 
As I argued, all recent parliamentary elections in the Bimbilla constituency have 
been decided by Konkomba voters in and around Chamba town, who constitute 
more than a quarter of the constituency electorate. Only the 2004 polls were 
decided in the Nanumba town of Bimbilla (one-third of the electorate), for rea-
sons I study below. In each of the elections, except those of 2004, the winning 
candidate obtained more than two-thirds of the Chamba votes.  
Strikingly however, as we will see, party allegiance was no significant factor. 
Quite on the contrary: The Chamba electorate massively voted for the People’s 
National Convention (PNC) in 1996, for the National Democratic Congress 
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(NDC) in 2000 and for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2002 (see table one)! 
This was not only at odds with the results of the Bimbilla electorate which was 
usually split over NDC and NPP with a slight preference for the first, but also 
with the results of the presidential elections which were held simultaneously with 
the parliamentary elections (see table two). As I will show, Konkomba massively 
voted for Konkomba candidates in 1996 and 2002 (and 2008) and for a Nanumba 
candidate in the 2000 polls in which no Konkomba contested. The 2004 elections 
stood out because the incumbent MP (a Konkomba from Chamba) was very 
unpopular among both Konkomba and Nanumba; while Konkomba in and 
around Chamba stood divided about their support for ‘their’ MP, the Bimbilla 
electorate massively outvoted this MP, while simultaneously giving a majority 
vote to his NPP party in the presidential elections. 
Considering the weight of the Chamba votes, it struck me that Nanumba did 
not feel victimized by the Konkomba voting patterns. Rather, the general Na-
numba interpretation I encountered was that Konkomba were immature voters, as 
shown by their shifting allegiances. Nanumba thought of themselves as a mature 
electorate, voting for party programmes rather than for individual candidates. 
Certainly, the ballot box had a symbolic value, although not so much as the locus 
for demonstrating Konkomba majority as citizens, but rather as the locus of 
Konkomba political immaturity. Most Nanumba interpreted the Konkomba vot-
ing results as immature ethnic voting rather than a demonstration of Konkomba 
majority. If they wanted to, several Nanumba told me, they could vote along 
ethnic lines too and show their electoral force. However, as they told me, 
Nanumba were experienced enough to dismantle politics as a game of promises 
and deceit.  
Many Konkomba actually ascribed to such interpretations, by turning it 
around: They often interpreted Nanumba political divisions as a sign of politi-
cised internal contestations, especially that of the Bimbilla chieftaincy dispute 
(see chapter six). Many Konkomba in Nanun were much busier working on their 
reputation as good citizens than with trying to get to vote in the first place. 
Certainly, in the post-1996 period, voter registration and access to polling sta-
tions continued to simmer among some Konkomba. The Electoral Commissioner, 
himself a southerner, accepted that at least ten percent of the eligible electorate in 
Nanun have not been registered, mostly Konkomba ‘in the bush’. Although 
judging from my data, this theory of an unregistered reservoir of Konkomba 
voters is exaggerated, it is significant that while some Konkomba interlocutors 
suspected that registration teams, many of whom include Nanumba, systemati-
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cally ignore eligible Konkomba voters, many others agreed with the general 
Nanumba argument that such Konkomba are not interested in politics.9  
In sum, Nanumba fears of being outvoted by Konkomba settlers were eclipsed 
by paternalistic judgments that Konkomba were naïve voters; Konkomba accu-
sations that Nanumba were using their autochthony to subvert Konkomba elec-
toral majority were drowned in a general assessment that Nanumba were more 
politically skilled. Both the general Konkomba and Nanumba perspectives drew 
on a definition of politics as a specific realm imbued with competition, promises 
and deceit, and second on a moral assessment of each others’ mastery of such 
political skills. These assessments did not produce mutual feelings of illegal 
actions of the other or of violated rights and victimhood. This was quite different 
from competition in depoliticized realms, such as local administration (see 
below) or chieftaincy (see chapter six). A crucial additional factor is that due to 
decentralization, parliamentary representation has considerably lost importance 
in Nanun; many crucial development and security decisions are no longer made 
in Accra but in Bimbilla or Wulensi (see below). But let’s first look at an analy-
sis of the recent electoral history of Nanun.  
As typical northern constituencies, the initial loyalties of most Konkomba and 
Nanumba in Bimbilla and Wulensi lay with Rawlings’ populistic NDC. But 
while NDC won all presidential polls in Nanun, albeit with an increasingly 
smaller margin with NPP (which eventually won the 2008 polls), NDC won only 
two of the parliamentary elections in Bimbilla and one in Wulensi (see table 
three). There has therefore been a significant trend of what is called ‘shirt and 
trousers’ voting in Ghana: Voting for different parties simultaneously in the 
presidential and parliamentary polls. Another phenomenon in Ghanaian politics, 
the ‘pull him down syndrome’ applies here: No MP or party has won two con-
secutive terms, except in the Wulensi 2004 elections, where the incumbent MP 
had been in office for only a year due to mid-term by-elections. This suggests 
that the actual ideological differences between NPP and NDC are limited but that 
a dichotomy between these parties can be pasted onto all sorts of local struggles 
in the north (Kelly & Bening 2007; cf. Nugent 2001; Van Walraven 2002).  
                                                 
9  I have not heard speculations about the deliberate rejection of ballots. The percentage of refused 
ballots (an astronomic eleven percent in 1996 and still six percent in 2004) in the different polling 
stations of Nanun did not indicate ethnic exclusion strategies. I have not ascertained whether some 
people deliberately cast a foul vote, nor have I found evidence of deliberate rejection of ballots in 
specific polling stations. Moreover, I have not found significant differences in voters’ turn-outs. In 
the elections since 1992, turn-out has seldom exceeded 65 percent, even in key bye-elections which 
drew nation-wide attention. As I found out during the local government elections in 2006, some 
people forgot to vote, while others were sick or had travelled. Yet others were not interested in cast-
ing a vote, some because they were disappointed in ‘politics’, others because they did not want to 
walk all the way to the polling station. In several polling stations, I witnessed voters who had left 
their ID-card at home and had to walk back for hours to go get it (few of them actually returned). 
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Because the opposition boycotted the 1992 parliamentary elections after 
accusing Rawlings’ NDC of rigging the presidential results earlier that year, the 
Fourth Republican parliamentary history in Nanun’s two constituencies Bimbilla 
and Wulensi actually started in December 1996, almost nine months after the 
signing of the Kumasi Accord. Electoral resentment over the 1994-1995 conflict 
became tangible in the elections: Both MPs, Mohammed ibn Chambas in Bim-
billa and Amidu Seidu in Wulensi, who were both Nanumba, suffered defeat, 
while Rawlings’ defeat was smaller in the presidential polls which were held 
simultaneously.  
 
 
Table 1 Parliamentary election results Bimbilla constituency10 
 NDC NPP PNC 
 All Bimbilla Chamba All Bimbilla Chamba All Bimbilla Chamba 
1992 - - - - - - - - - 
1996 23.5 36.4 19.2 30.7 61.1 9.3 45.6 0.5 70.5 
2000 61.3 54.4 74.0 30.0 41.7 10.8 0.9 0.2 1.8 
2002 36.9 53.8 25.2 58.3 41.8 67.1 2.4 0.4 6.2 
2004 51.9 84.4 29.5 41.9 11.7 58.2 4.1 0.3 10.2 
 
 
Table 2 Parliamentary and presidential election results Bimbilla constituency11 
 NDC NPP PNC 
1992 - 59.8 - 8.2 - 24.5 
1996 23.5 47.6 30.7 31.7 45.6 20.7 
2000  61.3 57.9 30.0 33.4 0.9 0.7 
(run-off) (63.3)   (36.7)  
2004 51.9 48.1 41.9 47.6 4.1 3.2 
 
 
Two opposition parties were waiting with open arms: PNC had two Kon-
komba candidates in Nanun and NPP had two Nanumba candidates! In Bimbilla, 
where Konkomba are an electoral majority, PNC (George Mpanbe) won, while in 
Wulensi, NPP (Sheini Iddi) beat PNC (Thomas Ogajah) with a one percent 
margin. NDC came in third in both constituencies. The ethnic voting patterns 
                                                 
10  Electoral Commission of Ghana [henceforth ECG] (1992) ‘1992 Parliamentary Elections – Un-
opposed Candidates’; ECG (1996) ‘Provisional Polling Station Results – Parliamentary, Bimbilla’; 
ECG (2000) ‘Declaration of Results for the Office of Member of Parliament from Bimbilla 
Constituency’; ECG (2002) ‘Bimbilla Constituency Bye-Election N/R/ 14 March 2002’; ECG (2004) 
‘Results of Bimbilla Constituency 2004-Elections, Parliamentary’. 
11  ECG (1992) Results Presidential Elections, Northern Region’; ECG (1996) ‘1996 Presidential 
Results Data Sheet, Northern Region’; ECG (2000) ‘2000 Presidential Results Data Sheet, Northern 
Region’; ECG (2000) ‘Presidential Run-Off Results Data Sheet: Provisional Figures Released on 
30th December 2000’; ECG (2000) ‘2000 Presidential Results Data Sheet, Northern Region’; ECG 
(2004) ‘Results of Bimbilla Constituency 2004-Elections, Presidential’. 
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become clear if we compare the results from Bimbilla town (30 percent of the 
electorate, almost exclusively Nanumba) with those of greater Chamba (25 
percent of the electorate, almost exclusively Konkomba).12 This breakdown 
shows that the winning party PNC had an absolute majority in Chamba but won 
only 0.5 percent of the Bimbilla electorate! Similarly, NPP got over 60 percent of 
the Bimbilla electorate and less than ten percent in Kumbu (see table one). 
 
 
Table 3 Parliamentary and presidential election results Wulensi constituency13 
 NDC NPP PNC 
1992 - 75.2 - 11.2 - 8.6 
1996 25.0 53.3 35.7 31.7 34.7 9.5 
2000  54.4 56.5 39.3 37.7 - 0.6 
(run-off)  (57.5)  (42.5)  
2004 43.7 49.0 46.4 48.2 3.9 1.9 
 
 
NDC contemplated this defeat and found a solution in coupling the Bimbilla 
and Wulensi elections. Nominating again the senior Nanumba politician 
Mohammed ibn Chambas in Bimbilla, the party submitted a young Konkomba 
(Samuel Nyimakan) in Wulensi. The party cleverly drew the support of PNC and 
consequently the Konkomba electorate, the latter which which shied the NPP 
anti-Konkomba rhetoric. With this approach, more than half of the Nanumba 
voters in Bimbilla constituency returned to NDC, but in Wulensi, most Nanumba 
did not vote for the Konkomba candidate and continued to support NPP.  
This politics was quite coincidentally put to a test in two separate by-elections, 
first in Bimbilla in 2002 and then in Wulensi in 2003. In 2002, the Bimbilla seat 
became vacant because MP Chambas – who had been a senior Minister of State 
in Rawlings’ 1996-2000 administration – accepted the prestigious position of 
General Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in Abuja, Nigeria. By-elections usually draw national attention but 
the March 2002 Bimbilla by-elections had even more impact because of its 
importance for the incumbent NPP administration. Not only was this by-election 
the first popularity poll for Kufuor’s administration, but with exactly half of the 
parliamentary seats won in 2000, winning the Bimbilla seat would give NPP a 
majority in parliament.  
                                                 
12  I decided to take as a unit the entire Kumbu Area for higher statistical reliability; the differences 
between Chamba town, greater Chamba and surrounding villages are not significant.  
13  Presidential: see above; Parliamentary: ECG (1992) ‘Elected Parliamentarians – 1992 elections’; 
ECG (1996) ‘Provisional Polling Station Results – Parliamentary, Wulensi; ECG (1996) ‘Parlia-
mentary Results-1996’; ECG (2000) Parliamentary Results – Election 2000’; ECG (2003) ‘Election 
Results – Wulensi Constituency Bye-Election’; ECG (2004) ‘Parliamentary Election Results’. 
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NPP surprisingly renounced its anti-Konkomba rhetoric and submitted a 
Konkomba candidate, Dominic Nitiwul. Born in 1976 in Gungunpa near 
Chamba, Nitiwul was a Winneba (near Accra) University student. NDC contin-
ued its strategy of equal Konkomba/Nanumba candidacy in Nanun and nomi-
nated Mohammed ibn Abass, a Nanumba born in 1964 in a middleclass Bimbilla 
family, and who worked as a Bimbilla E.P. Teachers Training College lecturer 
and as the Nanumba Youth Association secretary. Konkomba were generally 
enthusiastic about the youthful Nitiwul, despite the strange NPP twist from anti- 
to pro-Konkomba rhetoric. Many Nanumba were confused about the NPP loyalty 
shift but many voted for Nitiwul (over forty percent in Bimbilla), because they 
did not want to fail the new NPP Government, which had supported ‘their’ 
Chambas in his ECOWAS application. Nitiwul won the elections with 58 percent 
to become Ghana’s youngest MP in history.  
In 2003, the Wulensi seat also became vacant. On 15 January 2003, the 
Supreme Court in Accra disqualified Samuel Nyimakan as MP.14 One Fuseini 
Zakaria, a Nanumba from the constituency, had summoned Nyimakan because 
he did not reside or originate in the constituency, as Article 94,1b of the 1992 
Constitution required. Zakaria argued that Nyimakan was born in Saboba, 
schooled in Tamale, and employed in Chamba. Nyimakan defended that he was 
born in a village near Wulensi.15 The case drew much attention, because dis-
qualifications of MPs for reasons other than corruption were rare in Ghana and, 
as journalists remembered Wulensi as one of the hardest-hit towns in the 1981 
and 1994 conflicts, media and the general public interpreted the Nyimakan af-
fairs as an ethnic clash between Konkomba and Nanumba.16 In reality, and this is 
important to emphasise, most Konkomba approved of Nyimakan’s disqualifi-
cation and very few interpreted the disqualification in ethnic terms or as politics 
of belonging.  
While NDC nominated another Konkomba candidate, it was the Nanumba 
candidate for NPP (Wumbei Kofi Karim) who won with a small margin. This 
was partly due to Nitiwul who campaigned for Karim, but also due to the inaugu-
ration of Charles Bintin, the Konkomba DCE for Saboba, as Deputy Northern 
Regional Minister. 
The NPP victory in the Bimbilla and Wulensi by-elections triggered an elec-
toral breakthrough of this party in the north. In the 2004 general elections, NPP 
more than doubled its Northern Region seats, including that of Saboba, the 
Konkomba ‘homeland’ and a typical NDC constituency. There, the NPP candi-
                                                 
14  GW (03-05-2002) ‘Aggrieved MP Files Writ At Supreme Court’; GW (16-01-2003) ‘Disqualified 
MP Asks For Supreme Court Review’; GW (24-01-2003) ‘Are Wulensi’s Troubles Troubling the 
Superior Court?’ 
15  GW (16-01-2003) ‘Supreme Court disqualifies Wulensi MP’. 
16  GW (24-01-2003) ‘Are Wulensi’s Troubles Troubling the Superior Court?’ 
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date Charles Bintin was the District Chief Executive until he was promoted to 
Deputy Northern Regional Minister. The electoral promise that Bintin would be a 
cabinet minister made NPP win the Saboba polls and indeed, after the elections, 
Bintin became the first Konkomba cabinet minister ever (for Local Government 
and Rural Development). A Konkomba NPP candidate also won the Konkomba-
dominated Kpasa constituency (which was central in the 1981 conflict, see 
chapter three), and this MP (Joseph Nayaan) was made the Deputy Volta Re-
gional Minister. The victory of both Konkomba MPs is important for under-
standing the subsequent connection between NPP and Konkomba.  
In Nanun, however, NPP had a hard time defending the successes of the by-
elections. In Wulensi, NPP came very close to losing their seat, despite a set of 
very favourable conditions for the party. The moderate Karim had been the MP 
for little more than one year and earned the goodwill of many voters. Far more 
importantly though, the NPP administration had made itself popular in Wulensi 
with the creation of Nanumba South district. It was a truism in the NPP campaign 
that if you voted for NPP you got the popular Konkomba Thomas Ogajah for free 
as the new Wulensi DCE (see below).  
In 2004, NPP copied NDC’s one Konkomba/one Nanumba strategy, but in-
versed it by nominating the incumbent Konkomba Nitiwul in Bimbilla and the 
Nanumba Karim in Wulensi. Their main opponents were the Nanumba Abass 
and another young Konkomba candidate. But neither the NDC nor the NPP 
strategy worked: Nanumba voted massively for NPP in Wulensi and for NDC in 
Bimbilla, outvoting Konkomba in both constituencies. In Bimbilla constituency, 
NPP suffered defeat as the incumbent Dominic Nitiwul (NPP) and opposing 
Mohammed ibn Abass (NDC) contested the parliamentary seat again. This time, 
Abass won with a ten percent margin. The Nanumba electorate had been divided 
over NDC/NPP support in the previous elections and many Nanumba had voted 
for Nitiwul in the 2002 by-election, but in 2004, NPP was completely marginal-
ised in the parliamentary polls in Nanumba areas. In Bimbilla town, Nitiwul got 
only a fraction of the votes, even though NPP came very close to winning the 
simultaneous presidential poll. Although Nitiwul won most Konkomba domi-
nated polling stations, both Abass and a Konkomba candidate for PNC got a lot 
of votes in the Konkomba communities. Both in Konkomba and in Nanumba 
communities I heard of complaints about Nitiwul’s young age and his failing 
respect for chiefs and elders. 
After his defeat, Nitiwul decided to leave the country and he won a MBA 
scholarship in the UK. On 21 August 2005, just before leaving for the UK, 
Nitiwul organised a meeting in Saboba with Charles Bintin (Saboba MP and 
State Minister), Joseph Nayaan (Kpasa MP and Deputy Volta Regional Minister) 
and a number of Konkomba District Assembly members from Nanun. The take 
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home message of the meeting was that Konkomba should vote for NPP, because 
NPP was ‘kind to Konkomba’. Three days later, Nitiwul repeated his message to 
party members in the NPP party hall in Bimbilla. There he told me that ‘politics 
in the Nanumba area will be tribal for some time’ and that Konkomba, as the 
electoral majority, would win this game. News of the Saboba meeting had 
reached MP Abass in Accra, who came down to Bimbilla the same day to inform 
his party members that NDC would never play the ethnic card. He told me cate-
gorically that Nanumba do not vote along ethnic lines. 
At my departure from the field in early 2007, there was the foresight of an 
ethnic 2008 parliamentary poll in Bimbilla constituency, but glimpsing beyond 
2007, we see how Nitiwul won the 2008 elections with significant Nanumba 
support. Abass had spent four years in parliament with variable success, espe-
cially because he belonged to the opposition. His charisma and young age made 
him popular among youth and elders. Through his former position as a Training 
College teacher he has the general goodwill of primary school teachers, who are 
often key opinion leaders in small villages. In Bimbilla town, Abass could draw 
on his family background to win the support of many elders. In reality, however, 
his pursuit of neutrality has made Abass rather invisible, whereas Nitiwul re-
turned to Ghana late 2007 with a promise of more experience.  
In Wulensi constituency, incumbent MP Karim retired and he was replaced by 
the District Chief Executive Thomas Ogajah, who believed he would become 
Deputy Northern Regional Minister if he won the elections. In sum, NPP had a 
Konkomba candidate in both Bimbilla and Wulensi and although the latter 
constituency had usually voted for NPP, things turned out differently in 2008. 
The Konkomba electorate got divided over NDC and NPP, while most Nanumba 
voted for former MP and DCE Sheini Iddi, who contested as an independent 
candidate and won.  
The above chronology shows how competitive and ethnic parliamentary 
politics in Nanun have been, but also that they were not violent. Riots during the 
crucial by-elections were started by so-called ‘macho men’, or pressure groups 
from Tamale and Accra, while at the same time the turn-out percentages were 
comparatively low. Moreover, whereas many Ghanaians feared an outburst of 
ethnic violence during the Wulensi by-elections, Konkomba massively agreed 
with the disqualification of ‘their’ MP. 
If one thing stands out in the recent electoral history of Nanun, it is the fact 
that no MP has served two consecutive terms, except the Wulensi MP who was 
elected in a 2003 bye-election and won the general elections one year later. It 
seems that MPs can only fail. They find themselves trapped in the expectations 
of the electorate. If they speak the language of the streets, people say ‘it is just 
words’, but if they stay away from the constituency, they find them arrogant. 
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Overtly speaking about for instance the chieftaincy disputes in Nanun makes an 
MP vulnerable to accusations for choosing sides but avoiding such topics results 
in accusations that either the MP does not know what is going on or that he has a 
hidden agenda.  
It was a truism among many of my interlocutors, both Konkomba and 
Nanumba, that politicians cannot be trusted, and that they use all means to buy 
votes with the distribution of ‘kola’, drinking money, t-shirts, sewing machines 
or bicycles. Assefa was right here, but are voters aggrieved by this? I do not think 
so: MPs were usually addressed as ‘Honourable’, with an ambiguous undertone 
of both respect and sarcasm. Voters may promise to support a candidate and even 
wear a t-shirt with his face on it, but once in the booth, he or she may vote for 
another candidate. While politicians try to ‘buy’ their support, most voters do not 
mind accepting such gifts or benefiting from being a ‘friend’ or ‘brother’ of a 
candidate.  
There are three additional reasons why MPs in Nanun seem to have lost their 
authority. First, with the senior politician Mohammed ibn Chambas as their MP 
from 1992-1996, citizens of the Bimbilla constituency were used to high expec-
tations. But Chambas was unique; none of the other MPs, whether in Bimbilla or 
Wulensi, became minister and being an MP was usually their first political 
function. Second, MPs were not regarded as part of ‘the government’. This was 
because the electorate in Nanun was mostly unlucky enough to vote for an MP 
from a party which lost the presidential elections. This was felt both in Parlia-
ment and in the district, because although District Chief Executives have to be 
politically neutral, they are appointed by the president and are therefore on his 
side. The 2006/2007 tensions in Nanun, which I study in chapter six, were partly 
eclipsed by a fight between the Bimbilla DCE and MP, because the latter felt 
excluded from key meetings.  
Third, while MPs were ‘our man in Accra’, Ghana is a country where under 
decentralization, the government is coming to people’s doorsteps. MPs usually 
arrived late when there was a local problem (even with a 4x4 vehicle, it takes a 
day to reach Bimbilla or Wulensi), while District Chief Executives were regu-
larly to be found in Accra. They obtained significant local power of decision in 
terms of development and security. MPs were increasingly sandwiched between 
the constituents’ expectations that he should in Accra and that he should be at 
home.  
In sum, while many people in Nanun may not positively evaluate political 
representation, their attitude is not one of disappointment because in general, 
they do not accept the promises of politicians. So behind the divisions and 
tensions of elections, there may be much less contested reality (Ferme 1999; cf. 
Karlström 2006; Pels 2007). Hence, elections in Nanun can be competitive but, 
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in my view, they do not produce victimhood. This is quite different for adminis-
trative representation. On a final note, before turning the executive, the relative 
innocence of political competition in Nanun may not be comparable to other 
parts of northern Ghana which have lived through extremely violent elections. 
Decentralization and the exclusion of Chamba 
In mid-2004, the Nanumba District was cut in half: Nanumba North and South 
districts, with capitals in Bimbilla and Wulensi. The new executive in Wulensi 
became effective a year later, with the installation of a Nanumba South District 
Chief Executive, who was a Konkomba (see below) and with the local govern-
ment elections another year later in September 2006. But let’s first look at the 
local government structure in more detail. 
The local administrative make-up is divided in the executive and the legisla-
ture. The first comprises around a dozen officers and the District Chief Execu-
tive. The second, the District Assembly, is made up of elected members repre-
senting electoral areas (two-thirds) and national government appointed members 
(one-third). These members elect a presiding member, by majority vote, among 
themselves for a four-year term. In Nanun, the District Assembly sits once or 
twice a year as a kind of local Parliament. So-called ‘Assemblymen’ (most of 
them are men indeed) may however individually mediate between the communi-
ties they represent and the district executives. While the district officers are 
government appointed and few were Nanumba and none Konkomba, District 
Chief Executives are nominated for a four-year term but require the endorsement 
of District Assembly majority, in a ‘confirmation’ ceremony usually held a few 
months after the presidential elections (see below).  
In the Nanumba North District Assembly, in which Bimbilla and Chamba are 
located, a majority of the elected members were Konkomba, while in Nanumba 
South District (Wulensi), Nanumba elected members were in a slight majority 
(see below). However, I heard widespread Konkomba complaints in and around 
Chamba that the demarcation of electoral areas in terms of the electorate/-
representative ratio had a Nanumba bias. Such complaints were fed by the 
selection of so-called ‘appointees’, most of whom were Nanumba, including 
women and dignitaries, members of other ethnic groups than Konkomba, and 
public figures such as the Bimbilla Catholic parish priest. Few appointed mem-
bers however were Konkomba. In sum, many Konkomba I spoke to felt disad-
vantaged in the local government structure and especially economically margin-
alised.  
This is salient in Chamba town, where Nanumba constitute only two percent 
of the population but where the chief, who has no formal role in local govern-
ment, has managed to maintain closer ties with the district executives than the 
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Konkomba assembly member (see chapter six). In Chamba town, the Assembly 
member has always been a Konkomba since the 1988 local government elec-
tions. Anyone who is not a member of a political party, has no criminal record 
and who succeeds in collecting enough supporting thumbprints can register as a 
candidate with the District Assembly. No Nanumba has bothered to do so in 
Chamba for ages, because he or she would not stand a chance in this Konkomba-
dominated town.  
However, the main disappointment for many Konkomba was the 2003 selec-
tion of Dakpam and not Chamba as the newly established sub-district centre in 
south-western Nanun. As the yam truck full of supporters of the Chamba Soccer 
Heroes drove to the Bimbilla football pitch, they passed through Dakpam (see 
chapter one). Dakpam is easily the most ghostly and schizophrenic village in 
Nanun, especially by comparison to lively Chamba. Until 1981, Dakpam was 
really a town; it had over one thousand inhabitants, mostly Nanumba, a prosper-
ing market and several shops. As the highest chieftaincy in the Banyili lineage 
which alternates with Gbugmayili lineage for the Bimbilla paramountcy, this 
place was humbly boosted by British Native Authority. Dakpam however suf-
fered enormously from the 1981 and 1994 violence: It was burnt to ashes twice 
and to date, ruined houses outnumber the rebuilt houses. No place in Nanun 
symbolises the Nanumba defeat better than Dakpam does.  
Yet it was here that on 6 November 2003, representatives of the National 
Electoral Commission and the Nanumba District Assembly inaugurated the so-
called Kumbu Area Council to cover south-western Nanun including Chamba. 
The establishment of Kumbu Area Council was part of the implementation of the 
1993 Act 462 for administrative decentralization in Ghana.17 Its realization ten 
years later was possible with funding from the NGO Action Aid. This interven-
tion is characteristic of a changing development paradigm (see below). Kumbu is 
the name of the earth spirit which is believed to exercise control over this part of 
Nanun (see next chapter). All eight other sub-districts also bear the names of 
local Nanumba heroes or earth spirits: The Bimbilla area, for instance, is called 
Gmantambu, after the mythological founder of Nanun. These names had been 
proposed by the Nanumba District executive.  
At the inauguration ceremony, local executives said that the creation of local 
areas was to foster development by ‘bringing development to the doorsteps of the 
people.18 A pressing question in the Kumbu area was however, whose doorsteps 
were actually implicated. Although Chamba was the third-largest town in the 
                                                 
17  NDA/L/67/14 Secretary (2004) The New Local Government Concept. Kumbo Area Council’. 
18  NDA/L/67/14 Secretary (2004) The New Local Government Concept. Kumbo Area Council’; see 
also NDA/L/67/10 N.I. Salifu (2003) ‘Report on the Inauguration of Kumbo Area Council on 
Thursday, 6th November 2003 at Dakpam’. 
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Nanumba district (after Bimbilla and Wulensi) and the undisputed infrastructural 
and commercial hub in south-western Nanun, it was rather Dakpam which was 
selected as the capital of Kumbu Area. Many Konkomba from Chamba were 
greatly disappointed in this choice and although virtually all elected District 
Assembly members in this area were Konkomba, they still felt excluded from 
development.  
This is because decentralization policies, which were aimed towards good 
governance, increasingly intersected with a global development paradigm based 
on the Millennium Development Goals, which not only gave new impetus to 
technocratic development interventions (drilling boreholes, building schools et 
cetera) but also, as Ferguson (1994) described for technocratic development 
interventions in Lesotho in the 1970s, gave new vigour to the state.  
Although I have never seen the Area Council building opened, the Kumbu 
Council was to receive $500,000 for the 2006-2009 period for the improvement 
of food production, school enrolment, health education campaigns, drilling of 
boreholes and constructing latrines and especially, as a precondition, the estab-
lishment of an effective administration of the Area Council.19 To get this pro-
gramme, which was aimed at meeting the Millennium Development Goals, 
across, the financiers of the District Assembly ranged from Ministries backed by 
the World Bank, bilateral and multilateral donors and various international 
NGOs. Without running into details about these partners, it is striking that all 
these donors teamed up behind the District Assembly. While it took the District 
Assembly years to regain control over conflict-ridden Nanun, the local govern-
ment – with the support of the Bretton Woods institutions and NGOs – has in 
recent years been able to claim a central role in the development of Nanun.  
Zooming out a bit, in 2004 and 2005, namely, the Ministry of Local Govern-
ment and Rural Development, with financial support from the Canadian, Danish 
and German International Development Agencies, conducted a nation-wide 
‘District Based Poverty Profiling, Mapping and Pro-Poor Planning’ to pinpoint 
the ‘technical’ root causes of poverty.20 When the project reached the Nanumba 
districts in 2005, it had the additional support of Action Aid.21 Five days of inter-
viewing should provide a ‘spatial and societal distribution of poverty’ to ‘identify 
core and subsidiary variables and indicators for measuring the incidence of 
poverty’.22  
                                                 
19  Nanumba North District Assembly (n.d.) ‘Community Driven Initiative for Food Security (Kumbo 
Area Council). Programme of Action with Indicative Cost from 2006 to 2009’. 
20  ‘District Based Poverty Profiling, Mapping and Pro-Poor Planning As a Tool for Monitoring and 
Evaluation. LGPRSP Report 2007-03’, p. 5, 18, 10. 
21  NNDA (n.d.) ‘Poverty Profiling Report’. 
22  NNDA (n.d.) ‘Poverty Profiling Report’, p. 8. 
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Despite several setbacks – women were ‘shy’, farmers were at work, few 
respondents were literate, there was a lack of translators and many respondents 
misunderstood the exercise and expected money23 – the research team described 
the five ‘key poverty issues’, reminiscent of those described in the national 
Poverty Reduction Strategy report (see below). These were ‘human resource 
development’ (the improvement of education, health and sanitation), ‘vulnerabil-
ity and exclusion’ (the District Assembly standing for the equality of disabled, 
elderly, chronically ill, women, children and poor peasant farmers), ‘district 
micro-economy’ (tax raising, infrastructural developments and a better distribu-
tion of facilities), ‘production and gainful employment’ (subsidies on agricultural 
inputs and the stimulation of cash cropping, such as cashew, mangoes and 
cotton) and ‘governance’. According to the report, governance in Nanun was 
seriously hindered by (unspecified) conflicts, which required the deployment of 
more security personnel, unspecified ‘Alternative Conflict Resolution Mecha-
nisms’, peace and human rights education by the National Commission for Civic 
Education and Civil Society Organisations, and finally decentralization to the 
sub-district level.  
This programme brought new vigour to the state as the engine of moderniza-
tion, particularly to local government. In its 2006-2009 Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Paper, the central government of Ghana explicitly called for an improved 
resumption of the modernization economy of first President Nkrumah.24 Before 
elaborating on this, I make a side-step to sketch an overview of the main devel-
opment policies in Ghana from Nkrumah’s modernization to the pro-poor poli-
cies.   
In the 1960s, Nkrumah had embarked on a socialistic modernization, giving 
the masses access to health care and education but also sacrificing the nation’s 
roaring cocoa and gold economy to import substitution industries and expensive 
welfare building.25 A successful 1966 coup against Nkrumah’s 1964 self-de-
clared single-party regime plunged Ghana in more than 25 years of intermittent 
military rule, broken by the brief Busia (1969-1972) and Limann administrations 
(1979-1981). Dependency theory, which blamed underdevelopment on western 
interests rather than on backwardness (Leys 1996: 11), took root in some of 
                                                 
23  NNDA (n.d.) ‘Poverty Profiling Report’,  p. 11. 
24  ‘Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005. An agenda for growth and prosperity’ (19 February 
2003); National Development Planning Commission (November 2005) ‘Growth and Poverty Re-
duction Strategy (2006-2009)’. 
25  The recently established Bretton Woods institutions (notably the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, IMF) saw that contrary to Europe under the Marshall Plan, the ‘Third World’ and 
Sub Saharan Africa in particular did not catch up, because – as they believed – economic growth 
required ‘modernization’ (Leys 1996: 9). 
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Ghana’s subsequent military dictatorships, which by rejecting Bretton Woods 
recovery programmes, plunged the nation in ever deeper crises.26  
Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, who had taken power by force on the eve of 
1982 in a populist ‘revolution’, had little option but to turn to the IMF in 1983 
after he failed to rally communist support (but he welcomed this ideological 
diffuseness to confuse domestic opposition; Hutchful 2002: 49). Rawlings’ 
acceptance of an IMF (and later also World Bank) loan coupled with a so-called 
Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983 put Ghana on an economic path set 
out by the Bretton Woods institutions which it has continued to date. Between 
1983 and 2000, Ghana concluded six successive Structural Adjustment Pro-
grammes, which focused on price and currency stabilisation and market liberali-
sation (Konadu-Agyemang & Baffour 2001: 21; Konadu-Agyemang 2001: 23-
25).  
The packages led to a dramatic economic recovery of Ghana over the 1980s, 
especially in the urban areas, and Nanun’s rural yam market sky-rocketed due to 
rising urban demands. Already in 1988, the IMF/World Bank had pressurised 
Rawlings to organise local District Assembly elections, but these local elections 
triggered demands for a return to civil rule. Rawlings concurred and he won the 
December 1992 elections amidst international applause but also domestic accu-
sations of fraud. The hopes and fears of political and economic liberalization 
have since given way to a shifting global development discourse, one which has 
worked out in Ghana as a strengthening of the state, particularly its local admini-
stration, in a renewed modernization discourse under the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (cf. Young 2003). The Fourth Republic inherited an economy suf-
fering from the side-effects of structural adjustment. First, as the Structural Ad-
justment Programmes came with loans, Ghana’s foreign debt sky-rocketed, and 
second, cuts in social services led to higher costs of living, a rise of unemploy-
ment and as a result, to more poverty (Konadu-Agyemang & Baffour 2001: 25-
34). Since these effects were not peculiar to Ghana, the Bretton Woods institu-
tions drastically turned to debt relief and poverty reduction, aligned with the 
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals in 2000.  
In 2001, after Rawlings had voluntarily stepped down after serving the maxi-
mum two terms, the new President (opposition leader John A. Kufuor) endorsed 
an IMF/World Bank poverty reduction programme for Highly Indebted Poor 
                                                 
26  When the pro-Western Prime Minister Busia adopted an unpopular ‘Western’ IMF/World Bank 
programme in 1971, which included a drastic devaluation of the national currency (cedi), he was 
overthrown by General Acheampong who revaluated the cedi and plunged the country in a decade or 
even worse economic crisis, exacerbated by the international crisis, and intermittent dictatorships. 
Between 1970 and 1983, Ghana’s per capita income had dropped by thirty percent; in the north, plans 
for large-scale farming collapsed (Oelbaum 2007: 14). When in 1983, Nigeria repatriated a million 
Ghanaian labourers and harvests failed due to serious droughts, the crisis was complete (Boafu-
Arthur 2001: 247; Ninsin 1996). 
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Countries (HIPC). Despite substantial critique (many Ghanaians found HIPC a 
derogatory term), the Kufuor administration presented its Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) in 2003, which were entirely structured towards meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals. In 2005, as the HIPC programme was com-
pleted and Kufuor had been re-elected, his administration wrote a second PRS for 
2006-2009. The targets of this paper were much more ambitious than poverty 
eradication: By 2015, Ghana had to be a middle-income country with an analo-
gous standard of living. This ambition required a resumption of Nkrumah’s 
industrial and agricultural modernization and vigorous human resource develop-
ment (health and education), complemented with private sector growth (Kufuor’s 
fancy) and good governance, especially decentralization.  
Returning to the central argumentation: due to the global good governance and 
subsequent poverty reduction development paradigms, which Ghana has vigor-
ously embraced, the District-level executive powers have been greatly increased. 
While many NGOs were trying to bypass the Ghanaian state in the mid-1990s, 
they teamed up behind a strengthened local government a decade later. This shift 
is apparent in the Action Aid funding of the decentralization policies in Nanun. 
In 2006, the Nanumba North District Assembly even endorsed a compulsory 
registration of NGOs with the local government.  
These developments seem to run on a double depoliticization: The executive 
has to be politically neutral and local development interventions are increasingly 
presented as technocratic. Because both decentralization and poverty reduction 
were in its infancy as I left the field, future research would have to be conducted 
for studying their impact. However, in 2005 I had the chance to observe the 
tensions surrounding the installation of two politically neutral District Chief 
Executives in Nanun, while the 2006/2007 tensions from Chamba illustrated the 
tensions emanating from depoliticized development interventions. I study the 
first below and the latter in chapter six. 
The confirmation of a District Chief Executive 
For a better understanding of the tensions generated by the suppression of politi-
cal competition in decentralization politics, I present two cases: First the 2005 
tensions emanating from the nomination of the first Konkomba District Chief 
Executive in Nanun; and second, the simultaneous politicization of the politically 
neutral ‘confirmation’ ceremony of the second District Chief Executive in 
Nanun. 
Underlying these events was a major decentralization intervention in Nanun a 
year earlier. In August 2004, 28 new districts were created across the nation, 
bringing its total to 138. In this exercise of decentralization, Nanumba district – 
which was congruent with Nanun – was cut in two: Nanumba North (Bimbilla) 
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and Nanumba South (Wulensi). This  followed a 2002 request of the Bimbilla 
regent Vo Naa Abarika Attah II to the Minister of Local Development to carve 
Nanumba South out of the Nanumba district to ‘further enhance Government at 
the doorsteps of the people and quicken development and good Governance’.27 
For the first year of its existence, Nanumba South district continued to be de 
facto administered from Bimbilla but after the December 2004 presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the re-elected President Kufuor nominated Thomas 
Ogajah as the DCE for Nanumba South district.  
Ogajah, a Chamba teacher who had contested the parliamentary elections in 
1996, was to become the first Konkomba DCE in Nanun. This is significant: 
Although DCEs have to be politically neutral, Ogajah was a former politician. 
On a personal level, the distinction between legislative and executive functions is 
very flexible and the general public took notice of that. For most of them, both 
DCEs and MPs are politicians in different roles. We will get to that in more 
detail below.   
However, on 14 June 2005, two weeks before the inauguration ceremony, six 
Nanumba phoned in during a live radio show on the national station Unique FM. 
They objected to Ogajah’s candidacy because he was a Konkomba and advised 
him to run for DCE in Saboba. Although the NAYA president condemned the 
events in a breakfast show on Ghana national television (GTV) the next morning, 
a scandal was born. Konkomba in Chamba were outraged and said: ‘I thought we 
had a deal: One Konkomba DCE and one Nanumba DCE […]. Now we get one 
DCE and hear the noise they are making. In the next four years, we will take all 
posts from them.’ In the following two weeks, Ogajah’s candidacy was hotly 
debated all over Nanun and security personnel could only just prevent that the 
Wulensi chief, who backed Ogajah, was attacked by a Nanumba mob.  
At the 28 June ‘confirmation ceremony’ in the Wulensi District Hall, Regional 
Minister Bonniface Saddique summed up the so-called confirmation percentages 
throughout the Northern Region, none of which was lower than 84 percent. 
Although a DCE candidate is nominated by the President, he or she requires the 
confirmation of at least two-thirds of the District Assembly. The position of DCE 
is strictly non-partisan, but no candidate would be nominated by President 
Kufuor if his loyalties had not been with his NPP party. Rejecting the candidate 
would be interpreted as a rejection of the President. The Minister argued that 
Ogajah was a good candidate, memorising an unwritten deal of ethnic political 
and administrative equation of Konkomba and Nanumba representatives in the 
Nanumba districts. This was significant because such a political deal had been 
                                                 
27  NDA/L/11/v.3/247 Vo-Na Attah Abarika to The Minister of Local Government (19-02-2002) 
‘Request for the Creation of an Additional District Assembly – Nanumba South District Assembly 
Wulensi’. 
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proposed by both NDC and NPP but it was now cast in the non-partisan execu-
tive sphere too. In other words, the best candidate was not just the one with the 
best personal qualifications but also implicitly the one with the right party alle-
giance and the right ethnic background.  
After the Regional Minister’s speech, Ogajah gave a short speech in which he 
emphasised that he was born and bred in Nanumba South district and that he 
would always act in the common interest of the district. So doing, he tried to 
prove both his dedication as a Konkomba to the district and his dedication, as a 
former politician, to all citizens irrespective of political preferences. 
After that, the assembly members voted one by one and the results were made 
public directly after that: 69 percent of the assembly members (17/25) voted in 
his favour, exactly enough to be inaugurated. This result significantly eased the 
situation in Nanun; after lunch, the inauguration team went to Bimbilla, where I 
found both Nanumba and Konkomba in a feasting mood. Assembly members in 
Nanumba North district, many of whom were Konkomba and had closely fol-
lowed the Wulensi voting, rewarded Ogajah’s inauguration with overwhelming 
support (90 percent) for their candidate, the Nanumba Salifu Saeed (see below). 
Many people I spoke to in Nanun, both Konkomba and Nanumba, argued that 
the personal merit of Ogajah was eclipsed by his ethnic identity and his political 
allegiance to NPP. Many citizens of Nanun found the distinction between party 
politics and non-partisan administration a hoax and they called both the MP and 
DCE ‘politicians’. The most important qualification of the candidate seemed to 
have been the presidential recommendation, which although presented to the 
District Assembly members as an advise was a bribe (‘no king, no law’) and an 
act of paternalism (the President knows which DCE is best for you). In sum, 
there was a whole field of politics behind the confirmation ceremony, which 
were masked – as a kind of anti-politics machine (Ferguson 1994) – by a tech-
nological confirmation procedure of individual assemblymen. Although Fergu-
son concluded that the ‘anti-politics machine’ – the political impact of seemingly 
technocratic interventions – was an unintentional side-effect of development 
projects in Lesotho, many interlocutors suggested that the procedural vocabulary 
in the confirmation ceremony deliberately masked these politics, thereby result-
ing in a fertile ground for conspiracy theories. An incident at the confirmation 
ceremony of Saeed as the DCE for Nanumba North clarifies this point.  
Like that in Wulensi, the ceremony was attended by Northern Regional 
Minister Boniface Saddique, members of the Electoral Commission and several 
northern MPs and DCEs. The ceremony was held in the District Assembly Hall 
of Bimbilla to which the general public (myself included) had free access. The 
public then watched how forty assembly members were given a ballot by the 
electoral commissioner, walked to a booth in the corner of the hall, put ink on 
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their thumbs, thumb-printed the ballot, wiped off the ink on their hair, closed the 
ballot, put it in a box and returned to their seats. The phases of this procedure – 
except for wiping off the ink – had been spelt out by the electoral commissioner. 
However, when the electoral commissioner did so, one assembly member stood 
up and shouted that there was no need for voting because everybody supported 
Kufuor and wanted Saeed to become the DCE. The assembly member then asked 
his colleagues to raise their hands if they also did not want to vote, which about 
half of them did.  
The electoral commissioner begged the man to take his seat and explained that 
under no circumstances could the confirmation procedures be skipped. Although 
some assembly members shouted that this was a waste of time, the actual point 
lay elsewhere. Namely, when the protesting assembly member was invited to cast 
his vote, he took his time: He did not put the ballot into the box but he walked 
towards the stage of the hall and put the ballot above his head for Saeed and the 
audience to see. As the audience went crazy with excitement, the electoral 
commissioner beckoned the police to have the assembly member close his ballot 
and put it in the box. After calm had been restored in the hall, the electoral 
commissioner said that this act was an insult to Ghana’s democracy. The par-
ticular assembly member however had no intention to sabotage the election of 
Saeed. Quite to the contrary: This member had also applied for the DCE-position 
and by showing his ballot he demonstrated his full support to Saeed. 
The secret ballot, as Bertrand, Briquet & Pels (2007) argued, has become the 
main technology and performance of such accountable elections. In the case 
described above, the assembly member found his secret and anonymous vote 
insufficient to remove suspicion from him. After the voting was over, the elec-
toral commissioner opened the ballot box and removed the ballots one by one, 
opening them and showing them to the audience, which counted them aloud. As 
mentioned above, 90 percent of the District Assembly had supported the candi-
dacy of Saeed. Dozens of spectators – Konkomba and Nanumba alike – stood up 
and started dancing and yelling; some of them rushed to Saeed and the assembly 
member who had opened his ballot and respectfully dusted them with washing 
powder. Again police had to calm the meeting to allow Saeed, all white from the 
powder, to give his inauguration speech. In this speech, Saeed said that he would 
not attempt to find out who had voted against him. However, in the following 
days, I heard many speculations buzzing about in the District Assembly offices, 
but certainly the assembly member who had shown his ballot to the audience was 
not among the names of those suspected of voting against the new DCE. 
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Conclusion 
The conclusion emanating from the above is quite straightforward. Political 
competition has not been socially disruptive. Elections may be tense, as Assefa 
argued and as recent polls from other parts of Northern Ghana have shown, but, 
judging from the recent parliamentary elections in Nanun, they may not jeopard-
ize the ‘peace’ between Konkomba and Nanumba. ‘Ethnic voting’ has not been 
widely interpreted by Konkomba and Nanumba as using electoral majority to 
seize power, but – both electorates denying each other’s majority – they rather 
explain ethnic voting as being backward and vulnerable to political promises. 
Rather, the promises of good governance and bringing decision-making to the 
doorsteps of the people, and particularly their technocratic vocabularies (contrary 
to politicians saying it ‘as it is’) suppress politics and bear the conditions for 
disappointment, suspicion and conspiracies. This suppression or depoliticization 
can be so intense that people involved may want to unmask it. The case of the 
confirmation ceremony of the Nanumba North DCE, in which a former political 
opponent opened his ballot in public, was the most tangible example of this. 
In Nanun (and not just there), some politicians are dressed as politicians, while 
others are dressed as administrators. The formal distinction between the legisla-
tive and executive powers has hardly any local reality. Most citizens in Nanun 
call both of them ‘politicians’ or ‘honourable’ and indeed, several MPs became 
DCE and vice versa. However, while parliamentary representation comes as it 
happens, local administrative representation has to be ‘good’: Citizens are 
entitled to the government which is best for them, but who defines what is best 
for them? The widespread Konkomba disappointment about the selection of 
Dakpam, rather than Chamba, as the local sub-district capital was a clear exam-
ple of how contested the so-called accountable administrative structures were. I 
further elaborate this theme in the case of the 2006 tensions in Chamba, in which 
it came as a surprise for many residents of Chamba that the District Chief 
Executive had so much power, while he was so unpopular (see chapter six).  
But before turning to this Chamba dispute, the next chapter studies the politics 
of earth shrines. In this chapter, we have looked at the ballot box as the locus for 
Konkomba majority in Nanun; the next chapter analyses the earth shrines as the 
locus for Nanumba autochthony and whether or not earth sacrifices have gener-
ated tensions in post-conflict Nanun. 
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Customary pacification  
of the earth 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
‘Customary pacification in respect of river gods, land gods and 
grooves should only be performed by the recognised land and fetish 
priests or Tindanas of Nanun’ (clause 8). 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I studied the ballot box as the main locus for Konkomba 
majority in Nanun. This chapter looks at the earth shrines as the locus for 
Nanumba autochthony. This chapter is about the non-performance of earth sacri-
fices and it has been the most difficult chapter to write, precisely because I had to 
analyse something which was not done.  
Consequently, this chapter might have a somewhat unstructured appearance, 
due to my meanderings through a cluster of related themes. These are more 
easily wrapped up than introduced: Against all expectations, the performance of 
earth sacrifice, which is the paramount act of proving autochthony, has generated 
no tensions among Konkomba and Nanumba since 1996, because Konkomba 
have not sacrificed at earth shrines which are under Nanumba custodianship. In 
that sense, the peace clause quoted above was successful. However, on closer 
observation, the clause invokes more questions than it gives answers and, as I 
registered, the issue of earth sacrifices suffered from a lot of local misconcep-
tions and irritations.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Due to the complexity of the mate-
rial presented in this chapter, I start with a section linking the introduction to the 
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rest of the chapter, in order to contextualize the clause and discuss my conceptual 
approach to politics and rituals. I then turn to studying the peace clause in the 
context of the general demise of ‘traditional’ duties, obligations and prohibitions 
of Konkomba and Nanumba subjects in Nanun, which Konkomba and Nanumba 
blame on each other. After that, I describe the case of a Konkomba suicide in a 
Nanumba village, a case which contained all ingredients for conflict but instead 
showed how devoid of tensions the issue of earth shrines is in current Nanun and 
how many Konkomba in Nanun are much more worried about witchcraft (which 
allegedly drove the man into suicide).  
From that case, I move towards a detailed analysis of the components of the 
peace clause, in order to understand what Nanumba mean with recognized earth 
priests, earth spirits and especially their customary pacification. This is followed 
by a study of the ways in which Konkomba relate to Nanun earth spirits and 
Nanumba interpretations of these relationships. After that, I put David Tait’s 
hypothesis that Konkomba are at home where they perform their harvesting 
rituals to a test. By describing a harvesting ceremony in Chamba, I will show that 
Konkomba relate to both local and their ‘homeland’ earth spirits in different 
ways and that many Konkomba in Nanun tend to seek the blessings from the 
latter as well as from anti-witchcraft shrines rather than from local Nanun spirits. 
In the subsequent conclusion I discuss the politics of performing and non-per-
forming earth sacrifices.  
Conceptualization of the clause 
Rawlings’ reconciliation ceremony in Bimbilla was probably the last attempt to 
appease the earth spirits in Nanun after the 1994-1995 bloodshed. But as I argued 
in chapter three, the pacification of people is not the same as the pacification of 
earth spirits. Local Konkomba and Nanumba considered the ceremony a political 
rally rather than a genuine attempt to reconcile the population of Nanun in the 
face of its spirit world. For one reason, there are no earth spirits for Nanun except 
many localised spirits, so the effects of the ceremony were restricted to the 
Bimbilla locality; for another reason, as I argued, school parks were not consid-
ered a valid mediating ground with the spirit world. As argued in chapter one, 
administrators from British colonial rule onwards thought that there were tradi-
tional inter-tribal reconciliation rituals in Northern Ghana but there were none, at 
least not in Nanun. Rawlings’ reconciliation was another post-colonial demon-
stration of this hope.  
Throughout the villages of Nanun, however, people performed sacrifices to the 
earth spirits, not to reconcile former enemies but to apologise for the pollution of 
the earth (with blood) and to ask for its fertility. In Jilo, a Nanumba community 
east of Bimbilla, the earth priest organised the sacrifice of several black animals 
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on behalf of the village members. In Chamba, a Konkomba-dominated town 
from where the Nanumba authorities had fled, the son of the first Konkomba 
settler, who was locally called ‘Konkomba earth priest’, sacrificed to his father at 
the doorpost of his entrance hall, which is the prime invocation point for 
Konkomba ancestors, to thank him for his protection. After that, he consulted a 
Konkomba soothsayer to ascertain the sacrificial requirements of the Chamba 
earth spirits because the actual earth priest, a Nanumba of course, had fled to 
Bimbilla.  
As rumours trickled down to Bimbilla, where the bulk of Nanumba had sought 
refuge, that Konkomba were performing such sacrifices, many Nanumba inter-
preted this as the ultimate Konkomba attempt to seize the land of Nanun. In his 
June 1994 petition to the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team, Bimbilla Naa 
Abarika Attah II wrote that Konkomba deliberately ‘perform sacrifices to Na-
numba gods and violate sacred grounds, ponds and hunting territories’ as part of 
a KOYA plan ‘to eject the Nanumba from their legitimate land’.1 The tenor of 
this suspected plot was that Konkomba tried to abuse the spirit world of Nanun to 
position themselves as the autochthonous ritual executives to whom chiefs are 
indebted.  
As we have seen in chapter one, Nanun chieftaincy rests on an intricate myth 
of conquest and submission; the founder of Nanun chieftaincy is believed to have 
subjected the autochthonous population in Bimbilla and a number of adjacent 
communities, while simultaneously subjecting himself to the ritual powers of the 
autochthons. This myth is staged at critical moments in the naam (Nanumba 
chieftaincy), such as the installation, burial and funeral of the Bimbilla Naa 
paramount chief. During such moments, Nanumba ethnic autochthony is replaced 
by the strangeness of the children of the chief (naabihi) and commoners 
(taremba) as opposed to the autochthony of the so-called children of the earth 
(tinbihi).  
As I describe below, this social stratification is duplicated in every Nanumba 
village by a complicated relationship between earth priests and chiefs. As the 
descendents of the founder of the village, earth priests are considered to be 
capable of mediating with local earth spirits at set shrines, and in this capacity 
working for the village’s well-being. Chiefs, whose career leads them from 
village to village, as part of the hierarchical chiefly lineages which alternate to 
the Bimbilla paramount chieftaincy, are ceremonially received by local earth 
priests. In this way, earth priests symbolize Nanumba autochthony and the link 
between the naam and its territory; Konkomba sacrifices at earth shrines in 
Nanun might bring this political constellation down. Many Nanumba feared this 
                                                 
1  ‘Joint Memorandum of the Nanumba Traditional Council and the Nanumba Youth Association to the 
Negotiation Team on the Ethnic Conflict in the Northern Region’ (June 1994). 
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politics more than the modern ritual politics of Rawlings, who organised an 
inauthentic yet harmless ceremony outside the shrines. Analysing these intrica-
cies requires shifting from the native definition of politics (polatisi) to a wider 
anthropological perspective on politics as the actions to make or break social 
order (see chapter one).  
This analytical shift of focus is relevant for studying how debates about earth 
rituals in Nanun oscillate between politicization and depoliticization. The issue of 
sacrifices has been entirely absent from KOYA petitions, and when I interviewed 
(former) executives on the theme, they mostly considered such Nanumba suspi-
cions a diversion from the ‘real issues’. During the peace process, therefore, there 
were mutual suspicions of exploiting the political reservoir of such earth sacri-
fices: Nanumba spokesmen interpreted Konkomba sacrifices to earth shrines as a 
way of ritually grafting themselves onto the land of Nanun and subsequently 
subverting Nanumba autochthony, while Konkomba leaders were suspicious of 
the weight Nanumba Muslims put on such a trivial issue.  
This reality posed a serious analytical challenge. In preparation for fieldwork, 
as I read up on the theme of earth sacrifices, I expected to find public and politi-
cized Nanumba earth sacrifices that manifested their autochthony and a ritual 
resistance of Konkomba. Numerous scholars working in the Volta Basin of 
Burkina Faso and Northern Ghana have recently shown that sacrificing to earth 
shrines can be a strategy for claiming autochthony, and its political or economic 
prerogatives, in a locality (Lentz 2006a: 14, 13, 3; see also Hagberg 2006: 123; 
2006b: 112; Kuba 2006: 57-58, 63; Luning et al. 2005: 129; Mather 2003: 6; 
Schlottner 1995: 254). Such an approach suggests that earth sacrifices can be a 
strategy for making claims of autochthony, an insight which requires a reconsid-
eration of classic Durkheimian theories, such as Tait’s, which stressed the social 
stabilizing function of such rituals.  
In classic anthropological theory, adopted by Tait (see chapter one), rituals 
were taken to be rites of passage, enacting a person’s or community’s transition 
from one social category to another in a sacred realm detached from daily life. 
Such theory subordinated the agency and meaning in rituals to the social struc-
tures they produced. While in the 1960s and 1970s, the French emphasis on 
meaning trickled down to Anglo-Saxon anthropology, mainly in the important 
work of Turner (1969),2 a more radical critique on the study of ritual towards an 
appreciation of agency and improvisation, emerged in the early 1990s. 
In his influential 1992 Prey into Hunter, Bloch copied the three-partite struc-
ture of rites of passage originally from Van Gennep and reworked by Turner, but 
                                                 
2  In 1977, Goody critiqued this position when he argued that rituals hold no key to deeper meanings. A 
few years later, Jackson (1983) challenged the idea that all performances considered to be rituals by 
anthropologists should have an explicit meaning to those performing them.  
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he argued that during rituals, time moved on and the historicity of rituals collided 
with that of the everyday social order. Consequently, Bloch argued, both the 
separation and incorporation rites are marked by social upheaval and violence. 
Bloch especially focused on the ‘rebounding violence’ through which the initi-
ates have to conquer their new position in society. Bloch’s focus on the historic-
ity of rituals was an important contribution to the field, but scholars have justly 
criticised him for not only allowing a formalised sequence of rites but also a 
distinction between transcendent history and everyday history (cf. Mitchell 
2004).  
During the early 1990s, four influential publications changed the study of 
rituals and, probably unintentionally, silenced further debates (Baumann 1992; 
Bell 1992; Comaroff & Comaroff 1993; Kelly & Kaplan 1990). Although each 
took an original approach, they similarly rejected the rigid distinction between 
the profane and sacred realms. Subsequently, they tried to historicise rituals by 
studying the power processes by which actors fenced off specific activities from 
daily life. In a brilliant study, Baumann (1992) showed how in a London neigh-
bourhood a seemingly straightforward ritual like Christmas contained multiple 
messages and actions for the various groups of immigrants living in this plural 
setting.  
The value of this approach for the Nanun situation is quite obvious and the 
plural historicity of rituals emerged from my description of a Konkomba har-
vesting ceremony (see below). However, the Nanun case suggests a distinction 
between the discourses and performances of rituals: The politics of earth sacri-
fices exceeds their inconspicuous performance. A research challenge which 
bubbled up during fieldwork was the question how to study sacrifices which are 
seldom performed, and I increasingly became aware that this chapter’s theme 
was not so much about the performance of rituals but about discourses of their 
non-performance. In this chapter I hope to explain this non-performance. 
Obligations versus prohibitions of subjects 
Konkomba delegates accepted, in clauses one, five and six, that Konkomba in 
Nanun were the subjects of Nanumba chiefs, and that Nanumba were landowners 
via their paramount chieftaincy which is the preserve of ‘eligible’ Nanumba 
families. In return, Nanumba delegates acknowledged that Konkomba were not 
after the destruction of Nanun, but after its blessings, as ‘brothers in develop-
ment’. Most importantly, as Nanumba delegates acknowledged the residence of 
Konkomba in Nanun, they cancelled the main difference between Nanumba 
subjects and Konkomba subjects, namely that the latter could be expelled from 
Nanun if they treated the authorities of Nanun with contempt. As such, Kon-
komba settlement in Nanun was no longer a privilege, as the 1978 Alhassan 
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Committee report had stipulated (see chapter two), but an intractable right as 
subjects of the chiefs just like Nanumba commoners (taremba). 
Clause one of the peace accord stipulated that subjects in Nanun had certain 
‘duties and obligations’ according to customary law. As seen in chapter two, 
these include tribute, arbitration and tenure. But the issue of tribute has proven to 
be very ambiguous. While the Nanumba delegation to the fifth Kumasi peace 
workshop compromised the tribute regulations (such as labour and harvest 
tokens) to the peace accord, the ‘Nanun customary law’ confirmed in clause one 
seems to reify such tribute regulations. The 1978 Alhassan Committee report, 
which described such tribute, is consistently used by the Nanumba Traditional 
Council registrar as the paper version of Nanun customary law.  
In post-1996 Nanun, I found that very few Konkomba paid tribute to chiefs, 
but very few Nanumba subjects did so either! Most chiefs I interrogated on the 
issue complained about lack of respect and said that tribute now depended on 
personal will, while many Nanumba argued that tribute was outdated. In sum, an 
issue which was one of the main causes of the 1981 conflict, Konkomba refusing 
to pay tribute to Nanumba chiefs, has fizzled out because although Konkomba 
started to openly refuse such tribute, it had already highly been contested by 
Nanumba. The same actually goes for the issue of arbitration; chiefs have lost 
their formal judicial functions under Rawlings’ military rule and the subsequent 
Fourth Republic. Currently, Konkomba marital cases put a burden on the Bim-
billa circuit court.  
The issue of land tenure is no less ambiguous. Clause seven of the peace 
accord stipulated that the Nanumba Traditional Council, with Konkomba repre-
sentation and ecological experts, would consider new land tenure regulations. 
Indeed, I heard many Konkomba and Nanumba voices calling for stricter land 
tenure and settlement procedures. There are no land tolls in Nanun because land 
cannot be owned, but village chiefs usually charged a settler some kola nuts (a 
euphemism for money). A recent change in the towns of Nanun, such as Bimbilla 
and Chamba, has however been the formalization of land transactions for build-
ing plots (but not for farms), regulated by the Nanumba Traditional Council. So 
while Constitution article 267 stipulates that traditional councils or chiefs’ offices 
should collect land revenues, also on behalf of the District Assemblies which 
receives around half of these taxes, actual collection is once-only for house-
constructing in the towns only. In Chamba, a settler cannot build a house without 
a certificate from the Nanumba Traditional Council, which costs him around 
twenty euros for an average building plot. The local chief was the local Tradi-
tional Council representative but the procedure has to be endorsed by the Sani-
tary Inspector representing the District Assembly. 
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Contrary to other parts of the Volta Basin (see Lentz 2006a for an overview), 
land scarcity is still quite rare in Nanun and mostly restricted to the environs of 
the main towns. Nevertheless, I came across an increasing number of land 
disputes. For the time being, these are mostly restricted to villages where families 
have monopolised large areas of fallow land, but disputes between individual 
Konkomba/Nanumba farmers, which I came across several times, were swal-
lowed for the sake of peace. It seems as if most farmers, both Konkomba and 
Nanumba, but also representatives of security forces consider loose land regis-
tration a threat to Nanun’s stability.  
While many Konkomba and Nanumba would welcome a more active role of 
the local government in land tenure, District Assembly executives I spoke to 
consistently bounced the issue to the Traditional Council. However, since the 
death of the Nanumba paramount chief in 1999, the Traditional Council has 
suspended most of its activities and the escalation of a succession dispute for the 
paramount chief has brought Nanumba chieftaincy to a standstill (see chapter 
six). 
In sum, while the formal ‘duties and obligations’ of subjects in Nanun have 
been dictated by the 1978 Alhassan Committee report, which was never revised, 
my interlocutors by no means considered them as a traditional resource for peace. 
There is a significant discrepancy between the formal duties of chiefs’ subjects, 
both in terms of tribute and tenure, and their actual compliance with these regu-
lations. While chiefs tended to blame all their subjects, Konkomba or Nanumba, 
for failing to respect them, both Konkomba and Nanumba generally wanted a 
more regulated land tenure system and often blamed chiefs for inertia. In fact, 
Konkomba and Nanumba, both the peace workshop delegates and the popula-
tions they represented at large, seemed to agree on the inadequacy of tribute 
regulations and on the need for stricter land tenure regulations, although future 
land scarcity may well drive them apart on these issues. So while many Nanumba 
I spoke to argued that Konkomba have to abide by their subject position and that 
they are currently ‘doing whatever they want’, to quote a Nanumba farmer, the 
main responsibility for this, according to Nanumba, lies with chiefs.  
But rather than specifying the ‘duties and obligations’ of subjects in Nanun, 
the peace accord erected a set of prohibitions for subjects. Most prominently, of 
course, prohibitions relate to the chiefly title to land, which is vested in the insti-
tution of Nanumba paramount chieftaincy, which is the ‘preserve of eligible 
Nanumba’ (clauses five and six). Rather than being challenged by Konkomba 
and/or Nanumba subjects, families eligible to the paramount ‘skin’ of Bimbilla 
themselves have been at each other’s throats in a succession dispute which has 
been lingering since the early 1990s but which escalated after the death of 
Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II in 1999 (chapter six).  
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There is another and very intriguing prohibition in the peace accord, one 
which will be central to this chapter. Clause eight in the peace accord stipulates 
that ‘Customary pacification in respect of river gods, land gods and groves 
should only be performed by the recognised land and fetish priests or Tindanas of 
Nanun’ (clause 8). This clause was explicitly added to the peace agreement on 
the instigation of the Nanumba delegation and not just because several of the 
delegates came from earth priest families. 
Invoking earth spirits for personal or communal well-being is very uncommon 
among Nanumba, maybe because massive Nanumba conversion to Islam since 
the 1990s, or at least public conversion, has increasingly put prayers in the realm 
of Islam. However, without trying to reify the classic dichotomy between Group 
A and Group B societies studied in chapter one, my research material supports 
the hypothesis that blessing has an intricate relationship to ancestor worship and 
that Konkomba, since their communities in Kikpakpaan were often kinship-
based, have a much stronger patrimonial relationship with earth spirits than 
Nanumba do, in whose society only earth priest families maintain such relation-
ships. However, for most Nanumba, not believing that earth spirits will be able to 
bless you is not the same as believing that earth spirits can do harm. I am yet to 
meet the first Nanumba, Muslims included, who does not think that earth spirits 
have the power, and the sovereignty, to punish a person or community after 
breaking the local moral order of the earth. 
The Bimbilla Naa wrote about the ‘violation’ of ‘sacred grounds’ and when in 
September 1994, halfway between the 1994 and 1995 violence, the Nanumba 
Youth Association (NAYA) reported to the government Permanent Peace Nego-
tiation Team that Konkomba from a village near Damanko had performed a 
sacrifice to the spirits in the Oti river, the Youth executives suspected a Kon-
komba ‘hidden agenda to annihilate the entire district of ours’. Such interpreta-
tions were wide-felt in Bimbilla. In other words, many Nanumba found the sacri-
fices of Konkomba to earth spirits in Nanun the ultimate attempt to make this 
land theirs, but they also believed that this plan would not be successful. On the 
contrary, in the words of NAYA, Nanun would be ‘annihilated’. I heard many 
Nanumba stories that Konkomba who performed such sacrifices ‘went crazy’, 
because they were punished by the spirits.  
This Nanumba attitude of leaving the spirits alone clashed with Konkomba 
expectations of earth sacrifices. In Chamba, and in other Konkomba-dominated 
villages as well, several Konkomba interlocutors passed criticism on Nanumba 
chiefs and earth priests for failing to keep up the ritual bond with the earth. In 
Chamba, one of the contestants in the local chieftaincy dispute between and 
among Konkomba and Nanumba (see chapter six) repeatedly blamed the divi-
sions in town on the reluctance of the local Nanumba chief to organise sacrifices 
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for the appeasement of the earth. The chief considered this criticism a provoca-
tion, in spite of his Islamic inclinations, because, as argued above, chiefs require 
the legitimacy from the local earth spirits, or the ‘real landowners’. His reaction 
was that Konkomba should leave the spirits alone.  
The suicide case 
The lack of tensions in earth sacrifices was clear from a dramatic Konkomba 
suicide which allegedly angered the earth spirits of the Nanumba village of Jilo. 
On a May evening, a Konkomba man from Chamba, let’s call him Donkor, went 
missing in Bimbilla. He was on his way with his second wife to her home village 
in Togo, when their motorbike got a flat tyre in Bimbilla. Donkor told his wife to 
wait in town as he would look for a repairer. He never returned. His wife tried to 
call him on his cell-phone but she could not reach him, had the motorbike fixed 
herself and returned to Chamba. There, Donkor’s older brother continuously tried 
to call him and when he finally picked up his phone, he sounded confused and 
said was he was leaving for Nigeria. He however also said that he would hang 
himself, broke the line and did not answer to subsequent calls.  
That night, rumours of this phone call went through Chamba like wildfire and 
soon started a life of itself; some people speculated that Donkor had been killed 
by Nanumba. Within an hour, this very rumour had reached a community of 
relatives to Donkor twenty kilometres south of Chamba! Members of this 
community came to Chamba fully armed and prepared to attack Bimbilla. Once 
arrived in Chamba, they heard the details of the story and that Donkor had 
mentioned hanging himself. It was close to midnight and relatives of the missing 
man decided to go to Bimbilla and look for him first thing in the morning.  
The next morning, anxiety went through Bimbilla at the sight of these 
Konkomba men armed with mattocks. After a quest of some hours, Donkor was 
found dead, hanging under a tree in the bushes of east Bimbilla. While everybody 
was obviously relieved that he had not been murdered, this case of suicide trig-
gered a fear for the wrath of the local earth spirits. Suicide, as both Konkomba 
and Nanumba accept, is murder which angers the land. If the spirits of the land 
were not appeased, many people in Bimbilla feared, the spirits could withhold 
the rains from Bimbilla. It may be noted that at this moment in time, the rainy 
season had been rather poor and farmers were desperately awaiting the spring 
downpours to enable them to plant their seedlings.  
Gravediggers from Bimbilla cut Donkor’s body from the tree, and on that spot, 
their senior sacrificed a red fowl to appease the local land and a fowl of mixed 
colours for the protection of Donkor’s family. Both fowls were paid for by the 
relatives of the suicide. After that, the suicide’s relatives, in the company of local 
police, voluntarily visited the (Nanumba) earth priest in the village of Jilo, since 
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eastern Bimbilla has spread into the ritual territory of Jilo. The Jilo earth priest 
allegedly appreciated their visit and he called the suicide an accident. He contin-
ued that only soothsaying could clarify the sacrificial requirements to appease the 
earth spirits and proposed that they would return to Jilo at a later point in time for 
this. 
After consulting the earth priest, the relatives of Donkor brought the corpse to 
Chamba on a motorbike and buried it that very afternoon. While burials in Nanun 
always take place as soon as possible, Donkor’s elder brother paced up this 
particular burial, to cover up what he considered to be shameful events. The 
burial was however the talk of the town in Bimbilla and Chamba. Bimbilla 
citizens said that according to Nanumba custom, suicides be buried on the spot 
but the same statements rumoured through Chamba about Konkomba custom. 
The elder brother, as I learnt, was confused about what to do and had decided to 
bring his brother home and to bury him without shaving, bathing and dressing his 
corpse. He buried his brother at the right doorpost of the compound’s entrance 
hall where all men tend to be buried, despite family elders warning him that the 
corpse should have been buried on the spot in Bimbilla or anywhere in the bush 
away from the house.  
Meanwhile, a Bimbilla-based photographer who had taken a picture of the 
corpse hanging on the tree made a good profit selling copies of the picture to 
curious buyers on the markets of Bimbilla and Chamba. A variety of interpreta-
tions for the man’s suicide rumoured through Bimbilla and Chamba. One version 
had it that few days earlier, Donkor’s first wife had given birth to twins, who are 
perceived as a hazardous blessing. The most persistent rumour however con-
cerned witchcraft: Either someone had cursed the deceased or the suicide had 
consulted anti-witchcraft shrines to acquire wealth, the powers of which had 
however turned against him. Therefore, most residents of Chamba, including 
Christians, eagerly awaited the final funeral.  
Konkomba usually perform a final funeral ceremony around three years after 
the burial to end the mourning of the widows or widowers and to invite a sooth-
sayer for going to the bush to mediate with the deceased’s spirit and clarify his or 
her death cause, and the behavioural and sacrificial implications of this cause, for 
the bereaved. In this case, the suicide’s brother wanted to perform the final 
funeral as soon as possible and so he did three weeks later. 
In the meantime however, the family elder prepared a concoction in the jabun 
shrine, a horn with protective qualities from human and animal spirits and let 
pregnant women in the family community drink this concoction for having their 
foetuses protected from the suicide’s spirit. Moreover, two weeks after the burial, 
Donkor’s brother sent money down to Jilo for the pacification of the earth spirit 
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through the sacrifice of a sheep and a fowl. Neither he nor any other relative of 
Donkor participated in this sacrifice. 
Another week later, the funeral was performed in Chamba and it was widely 
attended. The soothsayer ‘revealed’ that enemies had seduced the man into 
suicide. The soothsayer warned that danger had not passed: In the near future, a 
beautiful young woman would settle in Chamba and cause the death of any 
young man who would befriend her.  
This case offers an insight into several crucial topics. On a general note, the 
case shows the dynamics of ‘traditions’, namely that they are not fixed but 
subject to discussion or even improvisation. The relatives of the suicide were not 
sure whether and how to bury the corpse.  
Another intriguing issue is that many Nanumba in Bimbilla rumoured that the 
corpse should have been buried in Bimbilla. While Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 
(2000) saw burials as one of the main issues in discourses of autochthony in 
Cameroon, in this case there was neither a Nanumba attempt to prevent the burial 
of Donkor in Nanun, nor a Konkomba attempt to bury him in Kanjook, the home 
village in Kikpakpaan. Burials and funerals are a very rich and fascinating ethno-
graphic theme and observations of such ceremonies are among my most impres-
sive field experiences. However, much of them go beyond the scope of our 
current interest and I have chosen to shelve them for the meantime and touch on 
some general features important for this discussion only.  
Contrary to parts of (more affluent) southern Ghana, where corpses can be 
kept in mortuaries for months, allowing the bereaved to organise the burial (De 
Witte 2001), Konkomba and Nanumba bury their dead within 24 hours, and 
corpses are usually not transported over long distances. Throughout Nanun, 
graves are in or next to the compound, except Bimbilla town, which has a 
municipal cemetery. Both Konkomba and Nanumba distinguish burial from 
funeral. Since funerals transform the dead into ancestors, no funeral is performed 
for victims of so-called ‘bad death’ (e.g. suicide, drowning or struck by light-
ning) (Jagri 2003: 12, 15; Zimón 2005: 68). This case was clearly a deviation.  
While Konkomba funerals have a very localising character (during funerals, 
soothsayers escort the deceased’s spirit from the bush to the family house), such 
performances were absent in both Konkomba and Nanumba claims of belonging. 
The chief of Chamba regularly told me that ‘No Konkomba my age can claim to 
have been born in Nanun’, hence making allusions to cradles rather than to 
graves. And when this chief died at very high age in an Accra hospital in 
December 2006, a chartered vehicle drove his corpse to Chamba to have him 
buried there, in the palace (see chapter six). This transport of his body was 
exceptional enough, but the point here is that his entourage brought the corpse to 
Chamba rather than to Bimbilla, the chief’s birth place and his self-declared 
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‘hometown’. In other words, he was not buried where he belonged but where his 
career ended.3 
The case also shows that Donkor’s family kept the jabun shrine in Chamba. 
My material suggests that such and other lineage-held shrines, including shrines 
for twins, were brought along or reproduced as they migrated. The invocation of 
ancestors can be done at the elder’s entrance hall’s doorpost and the significance 
of graves is minimal (but increasing under Christianity). Even final funeral 
activities tend to ignore the grave. Consequently, the invocation of ancestors, 
usually as prayers and during live-events, such as birth, name-giving, marriage 
and death, is associated with the house; much the same goes for Nanumba, who 
tend to invoke their ancestors in the elder’s compound yard. As we will see 
below, only earth shrines seem to link Konkomba in Nanun to their home village.  
But while it seems as if Konkomba have brought their ritual system with them 
to Nanun, they have actually grafted their ritual activities onto Nanun. The final 
funeral of the suicide took place on a Nanumba ritual day called kòfie, which is 
celebrated on the 42nd and last day of the Nanun six day market cycle. This 
Nanumba ‘tradition’ comes from Asante, where the last day of the calendar was 
called kòfie (Twi for ‘go home’), and on that day unmarried women would not go 
to farm but perform dances. While the kòfie dances have gradually been disap-
pearing from Nanumba communities since the 1970s, Konkomba in Chamba 
massively embraced kòfie as a suitable day for performing sacrifices and for 
general merry-making. This is in spite of the fact that Chamba market is not even 
part of this cycle. 
The focus of the rest of this chapter lies however on some other aspects of this 
case. First, what struck me in the events was that so many citizens of Bimbilla 
and Chamba agreed on the necessity of an earth sacrifice to be performed in Jilo, 
even if most of them were Muslims and Christians. Second, once the corpse was 
found, all tensions subsided: There was no doubt about the relatives of the 
suicide to recognise the Jilo earth priest as the proper authority to perform such 
sacrifices, while this earth priest emphatically called the events an accident. 
However, although the relatives of the suicide paid for the pacification of the Jilo 
earth spirits, none of them participated in the actual sacrifice, while all and 
sundry participated in the funeral activities. Certainly, Jilo was thirty kilometres 
away but from what I could register, Donkor’s relatives were far more concerned 
with the hazards of the witchcraft than with the possible wrath of the Jilo earth 
spirits. While it is true that the earth spirits of Jilo cannot stop the rains in 
                                                 
3  An additional factor worth investigating in more detail later could be that far fewer Nanumba can 
walk to their father’s grave than Konkomba. During the wars, most Konkomba managed to bring the 
corpses of those who died in battle home and bury them there, but most Nanumba were incapable of 
doing so. Hundreds or thousands of bodies were buried at the spot, in mass graves, by soldiers, sym-
bolising the defeat and displacement of Nanumba in Nanun.  
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Chamba, I doubt whether the earth sacrifices would have received significantly 
more attention if the suicide case had happened in Chamba town. The point I am 
trying to make, one I will explore below, is that for Konkomba in Nanun, the 
threats of the earth spirits are eclipsed by the perils of witchcraft. In the next 
sections, I will focus on earth shrines and witchcraft; first on the ways in which 
Konkomba relate to earth spirits in Nanun and then on the witchcraft accusations 
among Konkomba in Nanun.  
Unravelling the clause 
Studying the ways in which Konkomba relate to earth spirits in Nanun requires a 
contextualisation of the Nanumba notions of earth priests, earth spirits and 
customary pacification, the main components of clause eight. Land or fetish 
priest are just two of many English, French or German names for what Nanumba 
call tindana and Konkomba utindaan, with earth priest the most common term 
(cf. Zwernemann 1968). It is difficult to translate tindana, because both syllables 
defy easy translations. The first, tiŋa, covers earth, soil or land, while dana 
straddles meanings ranging from caretaker to owner.   
Rattray’s idea, which I described in chapter two, that originally, all societies in 
the Northern Territories were led by earth priests, until small bands of conquerors 
disrupted this order and subordinated the earth priests to the chiefs in the 
centralised states, is still popular. Up to date, Rattray’s idea that earth priests are 
apolitical and pure – but misrecognised and pathetic – community leaders, whose 
leadership would be a fine alternative to the corruption of chieftaincy continues 
to inspire scholars (cf. Awedoba 2003; Bogner 2000: 197; Brukum 2000: 145; 
Kasanga 1994, Kasanga & Kotey 2000; Wilks 1989: 18). Many earth priests I 
have spoken to have embraced their image of authenticity amidst the chieftaincy 
crises in Nanun (see chapter six). 
While many Nanumba would believe that the number of earth priests was 
fixed during the foundation of Nanun, this perception requires adjustment be-
cause many villages came into existence much later, hence creating earth priest 
positions. When Nmantambu conquered Nanun, he allegedly encountered only a 
dozen or so communities of ‘children of the earth’ (tinbihi). Except in Nabunsi, 
which was renamed Bimbilla, the newcomers feared the spiritual powers of the 
‘children of the earth’ and settled far away from them. Leaders of the ‘children of 
the earth’ (e.g. the Dalana of Dalaanyili), are not ranked in conventional chief-
taincy (that of Nmantambu), and they perform important duties at critical 
moments of chieftaincy, such as the burial of the Bimbilla Naa. Although 
Nanumba chieftaincy itself is also shot through with spiritual powers, many 
Nanumba fear these autochthons. Skalník (1996: 115) recalled for the 1983 
funeral that 
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‘The autochthonous ritualists virtually reigned over Bimbilla town during the naakuli 
(funeral). The town was in tension and everybody feared them. The people of the 
naam were reminded that the autochthons control them ritually and the naam could 
not continue without them’. 
There are earth priests in such ‘children of the earth’ communities but also in 
‘new’ villages. In the village of Dakpam, for instance, both the chief and the 
earth priest descend from the fat (i.e. strong) man (do kpam) who first settled 
here. But when Natogmah was made the Dakpam Naa in 1995, the earth priest 
(Natogmah’s cousin) stopped him at the school park east of the village and told 
him to ask permission to enter the village because he was a stranger (sana). In 
this role-play, the earth priest did not care that Natogmah was actually born and 
bred in Dakpam, nor that he was a very ‘fat man’ (as former MP). As a chief 
coming from another chieftaincy (Chamba), Natogmah was a stranger, but more 
dramatically, he was the embodiment of Nmantambu, the first chief of Nanun 
and a stranger. After this dramatic reception, there happened a role-play gender 
inversion between Natogmah and his cousin. Chiefs usually addressed ‘children 
of the earth’ leaders as yidana, meaning landlord or husband (cf. Skalník 1987: 
309), while calling earth priests their ‘wives’, sitting at his feet next to the tom-
tom beaters and palace elders and catering for his well-being. 
As seen in the previous chapter, the population of Chamba resettled from ‘old’ 
to ‘new’ Chamba at some point in history, thereby creating a new first-comer and 
a new lineage of earth priests. While the current earth priest is the exclusive 
custodian of three shrines within the confines of the town, he recognised the 
superiority of the earth priest of Dakpam, who is the exclusive custodian of 
Kumbu spirit, which is believed to exalt power over all south-western Nanun, 
including Chamba. This situation suggests processes of earth-related fission and 
hierarchy, which are important for the Konkomba case below.  
The peace clause specified that earth priests have to be ‘recognised’ but there 
is no public installation ceremony or record-keeping of earth priests. No-one 
knew the exact number of earth priests in Nanun, but Nanumba interlocutors 
usually started to count Nanumba villages or chieftaincy skins. Most Nanumba 
considered earth priests (tindanima) as part of a chief’s entourage, like the 1978 
Alhassan Committee had stipulated. However, chiefs do not select earth priests. 
In some first-comer lineages, usually where the earth spirit is of ancestral origin, 
the eldest men automatically becomes the earth priest, while in others, where the 
earth spirit is believed to be a territorial force, the earth spirit is believed to select 
the priest. The latter happened to Fuseini, a Muslim in Wulensi, who after 
breaking his leg found out through a soothsayer that he should become the earth 
priest in Chamba (his mother’s father had been the priest in the past). No-one 
envied him: Mediating with earth spirits, is dangerous, but refusing their call may 
be lethal. 
  
137
Earth priests may interact with the earth spirits of a locality at specific meeting 
places or shrines. While the peace clause captured these as ‘river gods, land gods 
and grooves [sic]’, there is a difference between the gods (or spirits) and the 
shrines (groves or river banks) where they can be invoked. In other words, there 
is a difference between an earth spirit (wuni) and an earth shrine (tiŋbani, or 
buγli). Shrines are usually groves or single trees marked by a stone onto which 
oblations can be made. Most shrines are in or near the village, sometimes 
representing a site farther away in the bush. Although these shrines can usually 
be discerned in the landscape, especially during dry season when surrounding 
grass is cut to protect the shrine from bushfires, they are never fenced off and 
animals roam there. 
While some spirits in Nanun are believed to be connected to inherent spiritual 
power, e.g. a pool with a helpful crocodile, most tend to be ancestral (the founder 
of the village). Most respondents said no more than that they are invisible powers 
that transform into physical appearances (usually a reptile) when they need a 
sacrifice. I found that God (Naawuni, ‘chief spirit’) takes a prominent role in 
earth oblations, which usually started with his invocation. This may be in line 
with the massive influence of Islam. Many converts described Islam as a shortcut 
to God, and non-Muslims increasingly perceive earth spirits as a third mediation 
of God, next to Mohammed and Jesus.  
The third part of the clause is crucial: What is customary pacification? Al-
though this was not made explicit, the term refers to the 1978 Alhassan Com-
mittee report which stipulated that  
‘All chiefs have Tindanas. It is their responsibility to consult sooth-sayers and report 
to their respective chiefs on the requirements of the sacrifice to be made. The chiefs 
then procure the necessary items for them to perform the rites to sustain the fertility 
of the land and prevent its pollution. They also appease the gods against offences 
committed by people.’ 
Pacification has no indigenous translation, but its description comes close to 
what many Nanumba would call sacrifice. Ritualised activities in earth shrines 
centre on two kinds of liquid oblations: Blood (of ritually slaughtered animals) 
and alcohol (typically gin, adapted from Asante whose spirits have come to 
prefer Dutch jenever). The distinction between alcohol and blood represents the 
difference between pouring libation (NAN kom baγibu; LIK kper) and sacrificing 
(NAN maligu; LIK kitork) (Goody 1971; Hubert & Mauss 1964: 9-12), and 
between prayer (libation) and making requests (sacrifice). But while all sacrifices 
are preceded by libation, not all libations are followed by sacrifice. It has to be 
noted that after the sacrifice of the victim – usually poultry but sometimes sheep, 
goats or cows – the feathers or hair and the bones and blood are left at the shrine 
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for the spirit but the meat is roasted and all community members can come to eat, 
which – since meat is scarce – many do, including Muslims or Christians. 
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of requests from earth spirits: For the 
present, when sacrifice immediately follows libation, or for the future, when 
clients make a libation or ‘water promise’ (if I get a good harvest I will return 
with a fowl in December). Requests for the future can be made by entire commu-
nities but usually, clients are individuals or families who ask an earth priest to 
perform a water promise. Immediate sacrifices are rather a communal concern 
because an angry earth spirit is believed to punish everybody inside its locality, 
usually by withdrawing rain from it. Such sacrifices come closest to what the 
peace accord described as ‘pacification’, and what educated Nanumba tend to 
call ‘cleansing’ or ‘purification’ of earth spirits. I found two situations which 
may require pacification: Initial pacification of undomesticated, and thus hostile, 
spirits, and their appeasement after breaking the taboos of such spirits. Only 
those who have performed the first pacification (first-comers) can safely perform 
the second type (earth priests). The main earth taboos concern the spilling of 
body fluids outside the house; sperm (promiscuity, adultery and incest), and 
blood (murder or secret sacrifices), but spirits may have specific taboos as well; 
the Kukuo spirit requires silence and darkness after sunset; consequently, women 
pound their fufu (a staple of mashed yams) before it gets dark and they light 
small candles.  
My survey results from three Nanumba villages east of Bimbilla suggest that 
few to no Nanumba engage in water promises to earth spirits. For most of them, 
earth spirits were more capable of disturbing them than of helping them, so if 
possible they left these spirits alone. The entire agricultural cycle, from sowing to 
harvesting was concluded without the involvement of earth spirits, but usually 
with the ritualized bonds with twins and ancestors. Invocations of twins and 
ancestors have a much more covert character and are performed in the yards or 
even in the huts of family elders. I also found a probably very recent casting of 
Islam as the religious norm in these communities and few respondents wanted to 
be seen in or near the earth shrine as a consequence.  
This is quite different with immediate sacrifices. The anger of earth spirits 
may make the locality barren and hence its ‘pacification’ is a communal affair. 
Earth spirits are believed to warn the earth priest about their sacrificial require-
ments, either in their physical presentation – usually as a snake, or, as in 2006 in 
Chamba, as a crocodile – or in the dreams of an earth priest. Either way, the earth 
priest would go to a soothsayer for the interpretation of such signs. Such com-
munal sacrifices have to be paid by the village chief, who would charge the tom-
tom beaters to announce the performance and to collect money. Although many 
earth priests I interviewed said that they have to weed the shrine to protect it 
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from bush burning at the beginning of dry season and subsequently offer a sacri-
fice to apologise for the burning heat, most such weeding is performed by the 
earth priest and his direct family members who offer a water promise which they 
renew every year until there is a draught. In most research communities it could 
therefore take years for such performances to take place.  
It is important to emphasise that the chief was widely held responsible for 
communal sacrifices, even if the chief was a Muslim. Contrary to many com-
moners I interviewed, who felt the social pressure of being Muslims in public, 
many chiefs were expected to be ‘traditionalists’ in public and keep their Islamic 
faith to themselves. This paradox was most tangible in the 1999-2003 acting 
chief of Bimbilla,  who in spite of being a devout Pentecostal (which was already 
exceptional for Nanumba), had to organize certain earth sacrifices. I found most 
chiefs embarrassed by these expectations but they dealt with this in different 
ways. Some openly ignored the earth priest and invited the local imam for 
prayers, others minimized their soothsaying consults, and yet others chose to 
have sacrifices performed in an inconspicuous way.  
Things have become even more complicated by the effects of a lingering 
conflict about the succession of Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah, who died in 1999. 
The vacancy of the Bimbilla ‘skin’ implies that no other Nanumba chieftaincies 
can be renewed; consequently, as of 2007, more than half of the villages were 
without a chief (see chapter six)! Many Nanumba interlocutors interpreted the 
subsequent non-performance of earth sacrifices as a way of protecting the spirits 
from chieftaincy corruption. In this sense, pacification was not a performance but 
a non-performance, in order to protect the spirits from politicicization, not only 
from Konkomba but also from the Nanumba acting chiefs, whose integrity and 
authority were often openly doubted.  
Konkomba and earth shrines in Nanun 
What was and is the Konkomba encounter with earth spirits in Nanun like? Most 
localities were believed to have several earth spirits, which usually related to 
each other hierarchically. Chamba for example has three main spirits, which are 
all believed to be ‘children’ of the prominent Kumbu spirit of adjacent Dakpam. 
The quasi-autonomy of Chamba from Dakpam suggests a process of earth shrine 
fission in which chieftaincy plays a decisive role. This process is crucial for 
understanding Konkomba relationships with earth spirits in Nanun.  
It is crucial to note that not all earth spirits in Nanun have ritualised engage-
ments. I heard stories of Nanumba whose farms appeared to suffer from local 
spirits to which they, after consulting a soothsayer, offered gifts such as a con-
tainer of milk. But things are more serious when people actually settle in the 
bush. Until the 1930s, large parts of Nanun were uninhabited, especially the 
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western half. It were mostly Konkomba who settled in these areas, either by their 
own choice or upon the instigation of the Nanumba chiefs in Dakpam and 
Chamba. A dramatic change is the increased definition of mutually exclusive 
boundaries between the various chiefly territories, usually – but not always, as in 
Jilo – coalescing with ritual earth localities (cf. Lentz 2003). Consequently, many 
Konkomba communities, who upon their arrival half a century ago were directed 
by chiefs to the bush and de facto outside Nanun, now are increasingly consid-
ered part of Nanun. Contrary to Lentz, who rejected the earlier scholarly state-
ments for North-Western Ghana  that in pre-colonial times, chiefs ruled over 
people and not over territories (Lentz 2006a; cf. Goody 1971: 30ff; Kopytoff 
1987: 33), I found that the process of chiefs claiming territories for political 
status is probably of recent vintage in Nanun. This process entailed the transfor-
mation of ‘the bush’ from areas cut off from Nanun, to peripheries awaiting 
Nanumba law and order.  
Upon their settlement in the bush, Konkomba were confronted with wild earth 
spirits. Bondaan, who founded the village of Bondaando just south of Chamba in 
the 1950s, had been informed by the Chamba earth priests about the presence of 
a spirit and Bondaan settled right next to its invocation place. After just a few 
years, so Bondaan’s son told me, the spirits disturbed Bondaan so much that he 
relocated half a kilometre to the north, but he continued his custodianship. When 
Lifale and Mboon founded the respective Lifaldo and Mboondo villages right 
next to Bondaando in the 1960s, they recognised Bondaan as their earth priest, 
but they also found spirits in their own village to which they sacrificed them-
selves. In brief, all twelve research Konkomba communities around Dakpam and 
Chamba had earth shrines within their locality and earth priests attending to 
them.  
The Nanumba earth priests of Dakpam and Chamba were aware of some of 
them but said that these spirits were of minor importance and that Konkomba 
custodianship was harmless provided they left Kumbu alone. Kumbu is the earth 
spirit which is believed to reside in the Kumbu river between Dakpam and 
Chamba and which is thought to wield power over the entire south-west of 
Nanun. The earth priest of Dakpam is the exclusive custodian to Kumbu at a 
riverside shrine, as accepted by the earth priest of Chamba but also by all 
Konkomba research communities around Dakpam and Chamba. Neither in 
Chamba nor in any of the surrounding communities have I ever seen a grain of 
millet, because the Kumbu spirit is believed to taboo the cultivation of this crop.  
Konkomba earth-related ritualized activities and beliefs in Chamba and sur-
rounding communities resembled those of Nanumba depicted above. A striking 
similarity is not only the similar conceptualizations of earth priests as custodians 
to earth spirits at demarcated earth shrines in a specific locality but also the 
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problematic translation of utindaan with earth priest. Konkomba also distin-
guished between earth shrine (litingbaln) and earth spirit (litingbalwaal) and I 
found that Konkomba also did not believe in a single earth spirit except multiple 
localized spirits.4 Strikingly similar to Nanumba, and contrary to what Zimón 
recently found for Konkomba in Kikpakpaan (2003: 430), every Konkomba earth 
oblation I observed in Nanun started with the invocation of God (Uwumbòr, 
‘chief spirit’). Another important resemblance is the sequence of libations and 
sacrifices, although Konkomba rarely use gin but rather pour sorghum beer (see 
below). 
Konkomba also have three types of mediation with earth spirits: Honorary 
libation, water promises and pacification. In Chamba, while Konkomba regularly 
honoured the local earth spirits during libation, they almost never sacrificed to 
them. A beer libation after an interview may be telling. In the ceremony, a 
Kanjooktiib elder said: ‘Oh God, get up and take this water [he poured on the 
ground]; Chamba earth spirit, get up and take this water [he poured on the 
ground]; Kanjook earth spirit, get up and take this water [he poured on the 
ground]’. After that he said a prayer for our well-being and he finished his prayer 
by invoking all that are left behind to take the remainder of the beer and emptied 
the calabash onto the ground. After that, a boy distributed the beer among the 
participants.  
While such Konkomba libations were quite common during my fieldwork, I 
never observed similar Nanumba libations. It is important to note that the elder 
invoked ‘Chamba earth spirit’ and not Saapuri, Bukuli or Butikpra (as the spirits 
of Chamba are called). Most Konkomba in communities in and around Chamba 
did not know the name of the local earth spirits and they called them simply 
litingbalwaal (earth spirit).5 I often heard Konkomba reflecting on these spirits 
that ‘we don’t know them’. Both Froelich and Tait correctly found that for 
Konkomba, earth spirits have both a territorial and a patrimonial aspect (Froelich 
1954: 179, 191; Tait 1958: 193). While these aspects seemed to overlap in 
Kikpakpaan, they were separated in my research communities in and around 
Chamba, where the inhabitants recognised the presence of local earth spirits 
without identifying with them. Konkomba in communities such as Chamba 
generally recognize the local spirits and those of their home community in 
                                                 
4  According to Zimón, earth spirits for Konkomba manifest the universal power of an earth goddess 
(2003: 430). Accounts of such an earth goddess, and a male rain god, have an attractive symbolic 
value (the earth impregnated by rain) and have been persistent in scholarship on Voltaic societies 
(Froelich 1932; Rattray 1931; Zwernemann 1968) but I have never come across such cosmologies 
among Konkomba or Nanumba. 
5  Monchuani, which is Nanunli for ‘inside Monchua’, is an exception. When Konkomba settled in this 
place, the chief of nearby Dakpam informed them about the local spirit’s name (Monchua). 
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Kikpakpaan. It is striking that any memories of their forefathers’ mobility within 
Kikpakpaan appear to have been forgotten or deemed irrelevant.  
Konkomba in localities not inhabited by Nanumba usually perform sacrifices 
to the local spirits only in order to keep them calm. The impression given to me 
by the inhabitants of such Konkomba villages is that by trial and error, they try to 
appease the local spirits with an annual sacrifice, usually before bush burning or 
at the end of the dry season. In cases of spilling of sperm or blood, they would 
also perform ‘pacification’ or ‘cleansing’ sacrifices. Konkomba do this in com-
munities where no Nanumba live and not in for instance Chamba. As such, they 
know well in which places they were the first-comers and in which they were 
not. Theirs is not a deliberate attempt to become autonomous because for specific 
requests for well-being and thanksgiving after harvesting, they rather sacrifice to 
their home earth spirits, hence confirming their settler status in Nanun (see 
below).  
However, a significant point lies elsewhere, namely in what many Konkomba 
consider as the failure of Nanumba earth priests to perform sacrifices. In Chamba 
town, the first Konkomba settler Fiindi was called ‘Konkomba earth priest’ 
(Bikpakpaan aatindaan) and recognised as ‘Konkomba elder’ (Kpungkpaan 
kpema) by the various Chamba chiefs. His role was to collect money for sacri-
fices and to sacrifice white cocks to the glory of the earth spirits at the building 
plots of Konkomba settlers. Fiindi’s son Nmabini openly doubted whether 
Tindana Fuseini, a Muslim from outside Chamba, was capable of performing 
earth sacrifices in the correct way. There have probably been only two earth 
sacrifices in Chamba since 1996. The latter was in 2006, when a crocodile was 
seen swimming in the small lake west of town allegedly causing the draught in 
town. Tindana Fuseini however was annoyed by this suspicion and argued that 
living in Chamba for a long time does not imply knowledge about its spirits and 
that the earth spirits had picked him as their mediator.  
While many Nanumba thought that Konkomba secretly sacrificed to their 
shrines in order to subvert the authority of Nanumba earth priests, many Kon-
komba argued that they only sacrificed to the shrines when Nanumba failed to do 
so, either because they were absent (during their conflict displacement) or disin-
terested (due to their Muslim inclinations). While Nanumba considered ‘illegal’ 
Konkomba sacrifices dangerous because they allegedly incite the earth spirits, 
Konkomba such as Nmabini found the Nanumba reluctance, of Tindana Fuseini, 
to sacrifice dangerous, because the earth spirits were not appeased. Both claimed 
to protect earth spirits from destruction and accused the other of outraging the 
earth shrines, either as a hidden agenda to seize the lands of Nanun (as Nanumba 
feared), or as a hidden agenda to draw the attention away from the real issues of 
the conflicts (as Konkomba suspected).  
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The leaning toward earth shrine purity has numbed the performance of sacri-
fices in the shrines, because in spite of its formalized and integrative semblance, 
earth sacrifices have an inherent political dimension, from announcement to the 
sharing of sacrificial meat. This explains the reluctance of many Nanumba to 
organize sacrifices: They are heavily divided among themselves – which they do 
not blame on spiritual causes – and fear the corruption of sacrifices. 
Beer and Konkomba homeland 
David Tait expected that Konkomba migrants in Nanun recognised the land title 
of Nanumba and therefore did not start ritual relationships with the local earth 
spirits, for sowing and harvesting, which was the first step to political autonomy 
(Tait 1958: 173; see chapter one). In other words, Tait argued that the locality of 
Konkomba sowing and harvesting rituals symbolised their autochthony and 
political autonomy. I have studied this statement at length in the field and my 
material suggests that the most important harvesting rituals of Konkomba in 
Nanun centre on the harvest of an economically marginal crop (sorghum) and not 
on yams and that these rituals, although performed in Nanun, actually ignore the 
local earth spirits and rather reproduce the linkages between migrants and the 
earth spirits of the Konkomba homeland Kikpakpaan. A second important re-
search finding was that thanksgiving after the yam harvest, which is the dominant 
Nanumba agricultural ceremony, is a recent phenomenon among Konkomba in 
Nanun. Contrary to the sorghum harvesting festival, such ceremonies neither 
produce a linkage between migrants and their home communities, and nor do 
they invoke local earth spirits. Instead, such rituals centre on sacrifices to person-
alised anti-witchcraft shrines and such ceremonies seemed to contribute to intra-
Konkomba tensions emanating from witchcraft accusations. Let’s study these 
findings in more detail in the following sections.  
Harvesting in Nanun is all about yams, from the July ‘first yams’ signalled in 
the farms of southern Nanun to the digging up of millions of tubers, from a dozen 
varieties, between September and December. Since early colonialism, Nanun has 
been at the heart of the national labour-intensive hoe-farming yam producing 
area of Central Ghana and its surplus was traded to Accra. These days, a glimpse 
at Nanun’s markets shows the importance of the yam trade; but when going off 
roads from Chamba, one can follow the tracks of the yam trucks into seemingly 
godforsaken places. Beyond that, inhabitants of waterlogged villages transport 
their yams to Chamba by swimming them across the streams.  
Nanun’s yam economy has attracted tens of thousands of settler farmers from 
Northern Ghana and Togo, especially Konkomba, who have come to dominate 
the yam economy in Ghana to such an extent that many of them told me that they 
‘feed Ghana’. This claim shows on the Konkomba Yam Market in Accra, 
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Ghana’s largest single crop market. At this market, which was established 
directly after the 1981 by the Konkomba Youth Association, each Konkomba 
clan has its own market stall (thereby ignoring the ambiguities over clan demar-
cation). Currently, the market is the logical destination for anyone interested in 
buying or selling yams (also for most Nanumba), but also for Konkomba visiting 
Accra, who usually put up in the market sheds (or in the adjacent slum ‘Sodom 
and Gomorrah’).  
Considering the economic importance of yams for Konkomba, it is surprising 
that the main harvesting festival of Konkomba in Nanun is actually that of guinea 
corn (sorghum). Whereas for Nanumba, sorghum thanksgiving is a marginal 
ceremony for a marginal crop, for Konkomba, sorghum and especially beer 
brewed from it, is central in Konkomba ethnic awareness and their political and 
ritual ties to their ‘homeland’. 
On New Years Day 2007, many Konkomba communities in Chamba per-
formed a ceremony called ndipòòndaan, literally meaning ‘new sorghum beer’. 
Celebrated directly after the sorghum harvest, this festival is rather about beer. 
Sorghum is among the last crops to be harvested and its harvesting marks the end 
of the year, which is directly followed by a season of full purses and substantial 
leisure time. January to April therefore make the favourite season for festivities 
such as funerals and marriages. Such festivities require sorghum beer. In this 
way, the ndipòòndaan (henceforth beer festival) marks the hinge between these 
seasons and it was no coincidence that most people performed it on 1 January. 
The festivities neatly fitted into the Christmas break which was celebrated by all 
and sundry in Chamba. Contrary to Konkomba in Kikpakpaan, who tend to 
distinguish sowing rites from harvesting rites (Tait 1953: 215; cf. Zimón 1989; 
2003: 434-435), a distinction increasingly linked to Christmas and Easter, 
Konkomba in Chamba focalise their ritual activities in New Year. This does not 
mean that sowing is not ritualised at all, but rather that its significance is much 
less than that of New Year; as an interviewee said: ‘During the beer festival, we 
do everything’. The reason for this is that contrary to Kikpakpaan, where yams 
are not much cultivated, Nanun’s agricultural calendar lacks a real break because 
of the ongoing labour needed for yam cultivation.  
A ceremony which I observed in the Bisanguum community in Chamba 
started at 8 a.m. Better put, it started at 8 a.m. for me, because when I arrived at 
the compound of Nyeuma (the Bisanguum elder), people were walking in and 
out, women were cooking breakfast and the elder was walking around. While the 
ceremony did not seem to have started, Nyeuma had already finished sacrificing 
a cock on his father’s grave. Even before that, the beer used for the libations had 
also already been brewed in the past days, sacrificial animals had been caught or 
bought and announcements had also been sent round Chamba on the previous 
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days. So although a messenger had come to my house to tell me that the cere-
mony was about to start, when I arrived at Nyeuma’s place, any temporal demar-
cation of the sacrifices from daily life struck me as artificial.6 
After sacrificing a white cock on his father’s concrete grave outside the en-
trance hall, and leaving blood and feathers there, Nyeuma went inside the 
compound yard for the other sacrifices. In the middle of the compound, eight 
calabashes representing the twins in the community were spread on the floor and 
Nyeuma poured beer to his ancestors for their support. Twin pots are associated 
with fertility and hence tend to be invoked during pregnancy or crop planting (cf. 
Froelich 1954: 217-219). This performance was probably moved from sowing to 
the beer festival. What I observed was how the mothers of two twins helped 
Nyeuma to sacrifice a black guinea fowl to the deceased twins and to empower 
the spirits of the living twins. After the sacrifice, in which blood and feathers 
were put on the calabashes, the calabashes were turned around and filled with 
beer. 
Two sons of Nyeuma then brought a clay pot (tiyar aasaambil) into the yard, 
containing sand dug from the home village earth shrine (linampal aatingbaln). 
Nyeuma directly poured beer to the earth spirit. He complained to the spirit that 
his harvest had been so meagre that he had to buy additional sorghum to brew 
beer and he asked it to give him three huts filled with sorghum next year. He then 
poured libation to three other earth spirits, also begging their help, after which he 
took a guinea fowl, removed some of its feathers and put them in the pot with 
sand. As he cut the fowl’s throat, spectators made all kinds of requests, from a 
yam truck to a flock of children. A nephew of Nyeuma, had a second guinea fowl 
sacrificed, to ask for a good harvest and a posh car, after which Nyeuma invited a 
young woman who had recently married into the family. He poured beer to the 
pot as he recounted that after the woman’s baby had died, soothsaying had 
stipulated that she should plead with the earth spirit. Nyeuma begged for her to 
get pregnant and for the baby to live and promised to reward the earth spirit with 
a guinea fowl and a fowl in the next beer festival if she would give birth this 
year. As Nyeuma emptied the calabash of beer on the pot after this plea, he said: 
‘Show us that you are not just sand’.  
After this, there was a significant change in the ceremony. As Nyeuma went 
into his room to change to a green shirt and pick up a bell, his younger brothers 
put a dozen of anti-witchcraft shrines (tigari), made of wood or clay and black 
from the sacrificial blood, from the room into the yard. While Nyeuma had been 
talking aloud in the previous oblations, he now whispered, so that nobody (not 
                                                 
6  Scholars before me have struggled to study Konkomba sacrifices as tripartite rites of passage, but 
while searching for a formal sacred blueprint of such performances, they failed to do justice to their 
actual observations about joking, discussion and insults as the driving force in these performances 
(Tait 1955a; Zimón 1989: 454).  
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even his closest relatives) could hear whether he was asking for a posh car or 
cursing somebody. After the whispering, he took some beer in his mouth and spit 
three times on the shrines. Then he got a white chick, removed three feathers and 
sacrificed it. He threw the fowl away and it landed on its back, sign of reception. 
He then got a black goat and hit it three times on its head with a stick, cut its 
throat, after which a son of his threw the goat over his shoulder, because ‘that’s 
what we do with witches’. Nyeuma removed the beard and part of the ear of the 
goat and put it on the blood-soaked tigari. His children instantly roasted the meat 
in the yard. After the ceremony he went to other houses to do sacrifices they had 
requested.  
A detailed study of Zimón (1989) of a ndipòòndaan ceremony in a village 
near Saboba displayed a striking similarity when it came to the sacrifices to 
ancestors and twins, but our observations differed in terms of the clay pots and 
anti-witchcraft shrines. Zimón did not observe the latter in Kikpakpaan and 
instead of sacrificing to clay pots with sand from the ‘home’ earth shrine, the 
participants in the Zimón’s version entered the earth shrine itself.  
Note that in the entire description above, there has been no reference to the 
Chamba earth spirits, even though the harvest was drawn from the lands of 
Chamba. Instead, Nyeuma put a pot with sand dug from the earth shrine at 
‘home’ in the yard and, sacrificing to it twice and pouring a water promise once, 
he and his relatives made all sorts of requests which were rarely connected to the 
earth fertility but rather to the patrimonial care. Strikingly, Nyeuma found the 
clay pot a legitimate way of invoking this earth spirit because, as he (and other 
interlocutors) later told me, their sacrifices were requests and promises, while the 
appeasement of the earth spirit (after breaking taboos) has to be done in the 
shrine at ‘home’ in Kikpakpaan. In such cases however, as I was told, Konkomba 
in Chamba may bring their clay pots to the path outside the compound, symbol-
ising the journey home, and sacrifice there until they have the opportunity to go 
‘home’ (which can take years).7  
Whence the ritual importance of an economically marginal crop like sorghum? 
Sorghum beer comes close to symbolising Konkomba. In fact, beer is the most 
prominent produce of sorghum. Many Nanumba like the beer brewed by 
Konkomba women, because the Islamic taboo on alcohol has virtually eradicated 
Nanumba beer-brewing.8 As in most societies of the Volta Basin, brewing beer is 
an exclusively female practice (cf. Luning 2002: 136). Women within a family 
would brew beer for specific ceremonies such as funerals or the beer festival. It is 
                                                 
7  Piot (1999: 109) observed similar roadside offerings of off-married Kabré women in northern Togo. 
8  Sorghum porridge is losing popularity in Nanun, because as sorghum kernels are hard, they require 
days of welding, so giving them a much more pronounced taste than corn. Increasingly, Konkomba 
and Nanumba women in Chamba cook corn porridge and, as seen in chapter four, Konkomba in 
Chamba have a taste for the porridge sold by Nanumba women opposite the mosque. 
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however no exception to see Konkomba in Chamba purchasing beer from bars 
for libation.  
Almost all beer bars in Chamba are run by divorced women (with a striking 
prevalence of women from the Bigbem clan). After running away from their 
husbands, they started a bar to make their own living. Men know that they should 
not ‘joke’ with these robust women. Although some bars make good business, 
especially on market days, opening a beer bar remains a career move for outcasts, 
contrary to bars selling bottled beverages which are usually managed by male 
entrepreneurs. Such bars usually have plastic tables and chairs rather than the 
simple wooden benches positioned in a large square in beer bars. In beer bars, no 
word remains unheard in the communal conversations, usually with rejoinders 
from the bar owners. In bars selling bottled beer, however, conversations are 
confined to the various plastic tables and are usually drowned by the deafening 
music from the loud-speakers.  
According to most Konkomba, few things come closer to symbolising their 
ethnic identity than sitting in a beer bar chatting time away while sipping from 
cheap and voluminous calabashes of sorghum beer. For them, this scenario 
symbolises a ‘simple’ lifestyle, one which colonial administrators both admired 
and feared (blaming Konkomba feuds on the excessive intake of beer). Time and 
again, as I sat in a beer bar enjoying a calabash or two, my companions, be they a 
yam farmer in Chamba or the president of the Konkomba Youth Association in a 
Saboba bar, said ‘Now you see our traditions’. The latter told me in 2005 about 
KOYA intentions to organise an annual sorghum thanksgiving as ethnic home-
coming festival in Saboba.  
Similar ideas came from the Roman Catholic Church. Contrary to the Evan-
gelical Presbyterian and Assemblies of God congregations, which are significant 
in Kikpakpaan but marginal in Nanun, the omnipresent Roman Catholic missions 
both in Kikpakpaan and Nanun encouraged sorghum beer consumption at so-
called ‘pito parties’. Moreover, Roman Catholic priests have been promoting the 
celebration of a Christianised sorghum festival. In August 2005, I participated in 
the inauguration party of a Konkomba priest in Saboba. After an exuberant mass 
full of ‘traditional’ Konkomba round-dances and in the presence of a handful of 
KOYA founders, the priest Cudjoe, in a public meeting in a Catholic school, 
offered the first copy of his graduation thesis on Konkomba ethnicity and 
religion to the KOYA founding father Daniel Ngula. In this thesis, Cudjoe 
argued that Konkomba should be ‘one people’, because ‘then we can force 
ahead’. He therefore proposed the organisation of an annual ethnic homecoming 
festival in Saboba during sorghum thanksgiving. 
The ethnic homecoming dimension of sorghum thanksgiving emerged from 
my interviews with Konkomba in Chamba, such as Nyeuma, too. Although very 
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few Konkomba in Chamba actually went to Kikpakpaan for this celebration, 
many felt that they should go home, at least once every three or four years, to 
introduce their children to the ‘real’ thanksgiving and the Konkomba traditional 
homeland.  
Konkomba in Chamba imagined the Oti swamps as their homeland, which 
they called ‘Chabob’ (Saboba), linampal (home), or Kikpakpaan (‘Konkomba 
land’). In 1985, KOYA wrote that ‘All these Konkombas outside our traditional 
homeland look to Saboba as their Jerusalem’.9 However, not only was this Jeru-
salem chosen rather arbitrarily as Konkomba centre by British administrators but 
with Konkomba ethnicity largely a product of colonial administrators, anthropo-
logists, linguists and missionaries, the idea of an ethnic homeland was not much 
older. 
Konkomba in Kikpakpaan however claim moral authority over their relatives 
in Nanun. The fascinating change here is that the Konkomba Youth Association 
claim this moral authority and not elders, many of whom actually reside in 
Nanun. But do Konkomba look at Saboba as their Jerusalem? Tait expected the 
links between Konkomba migrants and Konkomba in Kikpakpaan to be broken 
within years, but in 1947, assisting district commissioner Anderson noticed a 
remarkable ‘solidarity’ of Diaspora Konkomba with their kinsmen at home. Cur-
rently, almost every Konkomba I spoke in Nanun considered Kikpakpaan as his 
or her home. It is plausible that the links between Konkomba in Nanun and 
Kikpakpaan have even become stronger now, due to infrastructural and commu-
nication technologies developments but especially resulting from increased 
ethnic awareness.  
Trade, funerals and sorghum thanksgiving are the main channels for these 
relationships. On the eve of Saboba market, dozens of buses depart from Chamba 
and other large Konkomba places, overloaded with yams, bringing back fowls 
and goats from Saboba which is a centre for animal husbandry. Konkomba 
musicians travel from place to place to launch their cassettes. Konkomba in 
Nanun generally also consider ‘Saboba’ as their ‘traditional’ homeland, even if 
many rituals I observed in Nanun appear to be much more ‘traditional’ than those 
performed in Kikpakpaan. However, although Konkomba in Nanun considered 
Kikpakpaan their home, many of them feared going there, because of the perils 
of witchcraft accusations. Below, I study these accusations, which are expressed 
in the realm of yam cultivation, in more detail. In order to understand the peculi-
arity of the link between yams and Konkomba witchcraft I however first describe 
the symbolic value of yam harvesting for Nanumba. 
                                                 
9  Wujangi, Kenneth (KOYA) to The Secretary for Local Government (08-05-1985) ‘Projected Sabo-
ba/Chereponi District Council’. 
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Nanumba, yams and hospitality 
Nanumba typically found Konkomba lifestyle immature and (socially and 
ecologically) destructive. While many Nanumba farmers in Chamba also have 
remote farms, none of them would spend the night there. A persistent Nanumba 
stereotype is that Konkomba would sell their yams, even at the risk of starving 
their children, and then waste their profits on beer. The core of this point of view 
is that Konkomba farmers in Nanun have to use their yam money to buy a proper 
meal from Nanumba women. This stereotype gains relevance from the fact that 
in Chamba, most bar owners are Konkomba while most food sellers are Na-
numba. 
Before proceeding with these stereotypes, let’s briefly look at Nanumba self-
identification, in which yams are a crucial symbol. While Nanumba self-identifi-
cation also draws on the production of yams, and most Nanumba depend on 
selling their yams as much as Konkomba do, I never heard Nanumba say that 
they ‘feed Ghana’. Nanumba I interviewed on this issue said that they would eat 
first and sell their surplus yams to those Accra urbanites or Asante cocoa farmers 
who failed to look after their own meals. Many Nanumba in my research took 
great pride in their fufu (a staple of mashed yams), claiming that their wives 
know how to cook and pound the best fufu, without adding plantains (as is done 
in the south of the country). The dominant Nanumba self-image does not only 
structure most narratives of Konkomba settlement in Nanun (‘we gave them food 
to eat and yam seedlings to plant’) but it also symbolises the basis of Nanumba 
social organisation between chiefs and earth priests. Chiefs tend to call the local 
earth priests their wives who ‘cook’ (sacrifice) for them. Several earth priests 
summarised the settlement of chiefs in Nanun as a quest for food: ‘We gave them 
food to eat’. This complex local relationship between chiefs and earth priests is 
not complementary but they are rather entangled in a Gordian knot. This explains 
why settlers such as Konkomba cannot be earth priests, because it would imply 
that chiefs had to humble themselves to strangers.  
A dramatic manifestation of the hospitality theme was the September 2002 
ritualised consumption of first fufu by Jilo earth priest Wumbei who was also the 
supreme Nanumba warrior chief. After a night of communal dancing, Wumbei 
sacrificed six roosters onto the stool which symbolises the warrior class, after 
which elder women from his lineage jointly cooked and pounded the yams to fufu 
in the yard. Like with sorghum beer, ritualization here corresponded with a crop 
transformation, i.e. from yams to fufu. It was only later (the ceremony happened 
during my first weeks in Nanun) that I learnt the exceptional character of this 
ceremony, and that various family elders had performed their own sacrifices the 
previous night, while I was dancing. The ceremony (nuli dibu, yam eating) I 
heard of was celebrated in the yard of the family elder at night and involved the 
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sacrifice of a fowl to ancestors. Sacrifices in the elders’ compound yard may also 
be to twins, represented by pots or occasionally wooden dolls.  
Konkomba, yams and witchcraft 
Konkomba yam harvesting does not seem to produce a communal feeling of 
home in Nanun. Generalizing a bit, Konkomba yam thanksgiving resonates with 
hard work and wealth creation rather than with hospitality and it is rather 
shrouded in jealousy and fear. This is precisely the realm of witchcraft accusa-
tions. In spite of its name, Konkomba do not dominate trade to and in the 
Konkomba Yam Market. Increasingly, educated Konkomba in Nanun stress the 
negative side of Konkomba feeding Ghana, namely the ‘enslavement’ of yam 
farmers by traders (usually Asante middle-women) and southern consumers. This 
market is a stage for Konkomba self-reflection. My interlocutors did not blame 
their ‘enslavement’ in the yam economy on the Accra traders or clientele but on 
their own naïve ‘simple lifestyle’.  
The dominant Konkomba lifestyle in Chamba is that of yam farmers who, 
with their families, work on their farms near the Sofeya forest reserve fifteen 
kilometres from town and sleep in their unequipped farm huts all week except 
Friday when they enjoy the market and lots of alcohol. My material suggests a 
very widespread move away from the ethos of naive hard farm work towards 
education. So, Konkomba self-identification as people who like hard work and 
drinking beer has a shadow reality of being cheated. Many Konkomba I spoke to 
wished for their children a different future. Symbolically, these expectations 
bring along drinking something different from simple sorghum beer.   
Drinking sorghum beer is opposed to drinking gin (cheap but intoxicating), 
sodas (dull and childish) but especially to Guinness, the most expensive beverage 
available in Nanun (per bottle five times the price of a calabash of sorghum 
beer). Drinking Guinness requires a certain level of wealth but it offers the 
prestige of financial success and the appreciation of international quality, even 
though a Guinness brewery in Kumasi serves the Ghanaian market. But many 
Konkomba in Chamba suspected that consumers of Guinness derived their 
wealth from this stout, as if it were a concoction. The brand’s slogan ‘Guinness 
the power’ is known in all corners of the country and its richness in calories is 
eclipsed by allusions to virility. In Chamba, the slogan also alludes to occult 
powers; many consumers of this stout were owners of anti-witchcraft shrines.  
This stout symbolises the aspirations of many Konkomba, wealth creation, but 
it also stands for the jealousy, fear and suspicion which find a way out in witch-
craft accusations and which are tearing many families and communities apart. 
Witchcraft accusations seem to thrive in the ambiguous intimacy of families, 
especially those relatives living elsewhere, beyond observation (Geschiere 1997; 
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Geschiere & Nyamnjoh 1998). Many Konkomba communities were ravaged by 
witchcraft accusations. Just south of Chamba, in the homogeneous village of 
Bondaando, accusations and counteraccusations resulted in two suicides and a 
dozen households fleeing to Chamba (Labré 2004).  
Although few interlocutors overtly spoke about this, many Konkomba in 
Chamba feared going ‘home’ to Kikpakpaan to celebrate the presumably unify-
ing beer festival, because of witchcraft accusations. In the beer festival described 
above, the most expensive sacrifice (a goat) was offered to anti-witchcraft 
shrines. Much as sorghum beer may symbolise Konkomba unity, it also symbol-
ises their divisions. It is widely accepted that most people are poisoned through 
sorghum beer and no one would ever drink from a calabash which has been filled 
without seeing it or which has been offered by someone who keeps his or her 
thumb in the beer. One of my interlocutors (a Roman Catholic) stopped drinking 
beer for months after he heard rumours that someone wanted to poison him. To 
be safe from poison, my interlocutor decided to only drink bottled beer (which 
had to be opened in his presence).  
Witchcraft accusations and protective measures are expressed during sooth-
saying at funerals, as seen in the suicide case. However, protection from witch-
craft appears to be tied up with the yam harvest as well. Many Konkomba in 
Nanun, mostly young men, ritualised the yam harvest, either by offering some 
tubers to the pastor or priest in church service or by sacrificing to tigari or related 
anti-witchcraft cults at the ‘church’ (asòre). Anti-witchcraft shrines, such as 
tigari, grumadi and kupo (henceforth collectively addressed as tigari), are 
usually attributes in clay from Central Ghana or Togo which became popular in 
the North during the economic crises of the 1970s.10 While elders were privi-
leged to ‘medicine’ (NAN tiim; LIK nnyok), tigari were available to the youth. 
Although the district administration certified some tigari-owners as ‘traditional 
healers’ (and taxed their income), it was a public secret that some of them used 
their shrines to ward off witchcraft and avenge their enemies.  
Sacrificing to anti-witchcraft shrines during yam thanksgiving is a typical 
Konkomba phenomenon in Nanun. There were therefore no interethnic witch-
craft accusations in Nanun, even though a series of absences of Nanumba chil-
dren and women around Dakpam in the 1960s led to wild speculations that 
                                                 
10  Tigari and similar cults emerged when economic crises on the cocoa plantations in the Gold Coast 
and Ashanti colonies in the 1930s triggered witchcraft accusations (Field 1940; Gray 2005; Parker 
2006). Northerner labourers seemed not to fear witchcraft, because they were not familiar with the 
phenomenon (Field 1940), but many southern labourers instead turned to northern earth shrines, such 
as those of the Tallensi Tongo Hills. From the 1960s onwards, Northerners visiting the south for trade 
or education, took these transformed cults back to the north (Kirby 1986: 63, f.n.). Witchcraft accu-
sations were far from alien in the northern villages (Cardinall 1918: 61; cf. Tait 1954c: 74), but 
Ghana’s collapsing economy coupled with exorbitant yam benefits for some farmers greatly exacer-
bated such accusations in the 1970s. 
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Konkomba had abducted them to perform sacrifices to their tigari cults. Many 
middle-aged Nanumba in Dakpam remembered that they were not allowed to 
walk to school alone during that time. These speculations exacerbated the wide-
spread Nanumba portrayal of Konkomba as savages and resulted in a public 
Nanumba rejection of tigari (even though many visited them in secret).  
Nanumba considered witchcraft a typical Konkomba problem. However, as 
seen in chapter three, witchcraft accusations destroyed the safety of many refu-
gees in Bimbilla. Nanumba however retain the idea that while witchcraft spreads 
unabated among Konkomba, it can be controlled by the chief Lanjiri Naa at the 
village shrine of Kukuo, east of Bimbilla (cf. Geschiere 1997: 66-68, for a 
similar distinction for Maka and Bamilike). For at least a century, Kukuo has had 
a community of old women accused of witchcraft, popularly known in Ghana as 
one of four ‘witch camps’ in the country’s north-east (cf. Kirby 2006). Its earth 
spirit is renowned for its capacity to neutralise witchcraft (Amherst 1931b: 33). 
When I did research in Kukuo in 2002, there were almost 300 women in the 
camp (but none were Konkomba). After the healing ceremony, the women could 
return home but most of them stay on in Kukuo because they were banished by 
their communities. The suffering of these women is immense and has attracted 
international attention through Berg’s documentary ‘Witches in exile’ (2005), but 
most Nanumba euphemistically called the camp a traditional nursing home.  
This perception is coherent with the Nanumba notion that the intra-Konkomba 
proliferation of witchcraft accusations is a manifestation of their lack of social 
organisation and lack of respect for the Nanumba social order; many Nanumba 
told me that Konkomba ‘witches’ would have to be sent to Kukuo for healing. 
Moreover, for many Nanumba, Konkomba yam cultivation, witchcraft accusa-
tions and Guinness consumption are all manifestations of the greed and exploita-
tion of the stereotypical Konkomba. 
Conclusion 
The suicide case showed that the struggle over earth sacrifices was discursive, 
belonging to the conflict and displacement context of 1994-1995, rather than 
empirical: The actual performance of earth sacrifices was much less tense than 
their non-performance. As described, I found the theme of earth sacrifices in 
Nanun to be shrouded in very persistent mutual stereotypes and prejudices about 
greed; Nanumba thoughts that Konkomba have an excessive and destructive life-
style full of violence, consumption, witchcraft and land depletion versus Kon-
komba ideas that Nanumba are lazy, irresponsible and yet arrogant landowners. 
These ideas were developed in a context of general decline of traditional ‘duties 
and obligations’. 
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The suicide and beer festival cases showed the dynamics and mobility of 
Konkomba shrines; most lineage and ancestral shrines appear to move along with 
migrants so that only earth shrines link them to Kikpakpaan. Earth shrines and 
the sorghum thanksgiving have been increasingly central to Konkomba ethnic 
awareness and the construction of Kikpakpaan as a Konkomba homeland. How-
ever, most Konkomba migrant communities had pots with sand dug from these 
shrines, to which they turned for blessings, while ceremonies for the protection 
from witchcraft appeared to eclipse the earth shrine performances. The Nanun 
earth spirits were strikingly absent in this Konkomba constellation of blessing 
and protection but nevertheless, most Konkomba farmers felt heavily dependent 
on the fertility of the earth they worked on.  
While earth shrines may symbolize Nanumba autochthony, many Nanumba 
considered such shrines the locus of a relationship between Nanun society and 
the local natural forces, mediated by earth priests. As such, earth shrines stand 
for the fragmentation of Nanumba society in localized communities and their 
reliance on the goodwill of the earth spirits, which most Nanumba feared more 
than the presumed Konkomba political agenda of conquering the privilege of 
earth sacrifices.  
Earth sacrifices are not in the realm of rights or entitlements; it is no coinci-
dence that the clause contained a prohibition. As such, this issue slid into the 
realm of stereotypes and prejudices, leaving judgment to the spirits. During my 
fieldwork I found that Nanumba considered a Konkomba political plot to seize 
the autochthony in Nanun impossible. Sovereign earth spirits would not allow 
such attempts and I heard several Nanumba earth priests say that ‘They won’t get 
what they came for’. Schmitt argued in Political Theology that all significant 
political concepts are secularized theological concepts; ‘[t]he exception in juris-
prudence is analogous to the miracle in theology’ (Schmitt 1921: 36). In other 
words, sovereignty is originally a theological construct, which has been appro-
priated and secularized in the political sphere (cf. De Vries et al 2006). The 
Nanun case however clearly shows the strength of the alternative, non-political, 
sovereignty of the earth spirits. Consequently, while Konkomba and Nanumba 
relationships may be imbued with stereotypes, they are devoid of spiritual accu-
sations, and for that matter also of anti-Christianity or anti-Islam rhetoric. This 
would require more research. 
What seemed to unconsciously bind Konkomba and Nanumba was not only  
hot potato. As I showed for Chamba, while Konkomba generally recognized 
Tindana Fuseini as the exclusive custodian to the earth shrines in town, they were 
usually very critical of the way in which he exercised, or rather failed to exercise, 
the duties which came along with his position. The earth priest himself was un-
easy with his position: He had never set foot in Chamba until a soothsayer re-
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vealed his duty in 2000, making him one of the last settlers in town (see chapter 
four). Like many other Nanumba earth priests, he withdrew himself from the 
public sphere as much as possible, leaving decisions about sacrifices to the chief 
and to soothsayers. As described in this chapter, many Konkomba criticized the 
earth priest for forsaking his responsibility. In sum, not the performance but 
discourses of the non-performance of earth sacrifices seem to have the capacity 
to generate suspicions between Konkomba and Nanumba. 
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The power of decision:  
The Chamba dispute 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
‘Konkombas shall be allowed to freely choose their headmen to be 
blessed by the Bimbilla-Naa or his delegated divisional authority 
provided this will not conflict with the interest of the Bimbilla-Naa 
and/or the Princes of Nanun’ (clause 2). 
Introduction 
Who has the final say when a Konkomba free choice of headman conflicts with 
the interest of a Nanumba chief, phrased in clause two?1 This chapter is about the 
Chamba chieftaincy dispute, in the context of Chamba’s intricate demographic 
constitution of an overwhelming Konkomba majority and a Nanumba minority 
centred around the chief. This chapter brings most themes in this book into play 
but it is essentially about the sovereignty or the power of decision of that chief of 
Chamba. The case illustrates that against the spirit of the Kumasi Accord, Kon-
komba and Nanumba did not openly discuss the conflict issues between them but 
rather closed their ranks behind the legalistic speeches and petitions of ethnic 
Youth Associations or Students Unions. Many interlocutors considered the 
Chamba dispute, which was the largest of similar cases around Nanun, to be a 
litmus test for the 1996 Kumasi Accord.  
                                                 
1  This clause was the consequence of clause eleven, which stipulated that Konkomba would consult 
Nanumba for finding a ‘satisfactory’ solution for the Konkomba ‘self-styled chiefs and separatists’. 
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A better understanding of the events requires posing several questions: Why is 
the choice of a Konkomba headman so problematic in Chamba? Why do Kon-
komba headman have to be in the interest of Nanumba chiefs? What is the 
semantic difference between headman and chief in a Ghanaian context and what 
does blessing mean? Why did this town dispute escalate to an ethnic level in 
2002 and in 2006/2007? Why didn’t the local leaders sit together to clear the 
dispute up? But especially, why didn’t the tensions produce violence? 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: After a chronology of the dispute 
from its start in 1996 until its first escalation in 2002, I make two side-steps: 
Contextualizing Konkomba free choice of headmen in the wider controversies of 
Konkomba leadership in Nanun and second, studying the impact of a simultane-
ous intra-Nanumba dispute concerning eligible succession to the paramount 
chieftaincy of Bimbilla. As such, it addresses clause six of the peace accord, 
which stipulated that ‘Paramountcy is the preserve of eligible Nanumbas’. The 
succession dispute showed not only that such eligibility is highly contested 
among Nanumba, but also that the case led to a virtual standstill of chieftaincy in 
Nanun: Because without a paramount chief, no new chiefs can be installed, 
almost half of the Nanumba chieftaincies was vacant by 2007. Although Kon-
komba tried to stand aloof from this case, they increasingly rejected the moral 
authority of Nanumba chiefs and mocked their ‘interests’.  
After analysing these contexts, we return to the chronology of the Chamba 
case, from 2002 until the new escalation and de-escalation in 2006 and 2007. In 
order to draw conclusions on the relationship between threats of violence, silence 
and legalistich discourses, my analysis will focus on the presentation of spokes-
men claiming the authority to write or speech on behalf of Konkomba or Na-
numba and both the content and form of their authoritative presentation; security 
interventions and the exercise of the power of decision in the case.  
Before beginning to study the Chamba events, it is important to recall that by 
emphasizing the stability inherent in Ghanaian chieftaincy as a framework for 
peace in Nanun, Assefa seemed to ignore that Ghana has lived through countless 
chieftaincy disputes from time immemorial and that this nation is haunted by the 
dilemma whether or not the state should intervene in these disputes (see chapter 
one). As the state delegated its sovereignty in chieftaincy affairs to the National 
and Regional Houses of Chiefs in the Second, Third and Fourth Republics (1969-
1971, 1979-1981, 1992-), the country has also been haunted by conspiracy 
theories that ‘traditional rule’ is being politicised. These tensions were most 
tangible in the dramatic events of March 2002, when Dagomba paramount Ya Na 
Andani was assassinated by local opponents in his Yendi palace with forty of his 
entourage. This so-called ‘Dagbon crisis’, which I hope to analyse elsewhere, 
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shook the nation, had been decades in the coming and at completion of this book, 
it was still unresolved.2  
The Chamba dispute (1996-2002) 
Although the number of actors may be dazzling, three persons initially stand out 
in the dispute: Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan (the Nanumba chief) and the two 
Konkomba contestants: Nyilyar (the son of former Konkomba headman Bijiba) 
and Biligban (the former district ‘chief farmer’). Below, I describe the chronol-
ogy of the case up to late 2002, when I left the field for over two years. These 
years coincided with a lull in the case until early 2005, when I was back in the 
field.  
Although the dispute emerged in 1996, the story of Chamba headmen actually 
started in 1979, when the Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) told their local 
activists in Nanun to choose their own leaders. Biyenjin, an industrious farmer – 
the district ‘chief farmer’3 in the mid 1970s – and the local KOYA activist organ-
ised a meeting in Chamba about leadership, but he refused leadership himself 
because he was also a trader and hence often away. He therefore went to Fiindi, 
the first Konkomba settler in town and whom he considered to have the privilege 
of leadership. Fiindi also refused the offer, because of his old age, but he for-
warded the request to his clan-mate Bijiba, who had previously been a commu-
nity leader elsewhere. So it happened and Bijiba became the Konkomba headman 
for Chamba.  
Throughout 1980, concomitant with the tensions in Bimbilla between the 
Bimbilla Naa and the self-declared Konkomba leader Ali (see chapter two), the 
local Nanumba chief in Chamba called Bijiba to step down, until the 1981 
violence broke out. The Nanumba community in Chamba fled to Bimbilla and 
when some of them returned, they brought a new chief, Chamba Naa Yakubu, 
who feared the Konkomba in town and tolerated Bijiba’s position as Kpung-
kpaam kpema (Konkomba elder). Note that Nanumba have consistently called 
the Konkomba leader for Chamba ‘headman’ (kpema, literally elder), while Kon-
komba called them ‘chief’ (ubòr). This semantic difference is important because 
while for Nanumba, only chiefs have spiritual powers which they receive during 
their ‘enskinment’ ceremony (chiefs sit on animal skins instead of thrones).  
                                                 
2  The Dagbon events had profound repercussions for Konkomba and Nanumba. Some Konkomba used 
the crisis to try and get rid of their stereotype as northern aggressors, but many also feared becoming 
a scapegoat for internal Dagomba divisions. Some Konkomba intellectuals saw the crisis as a 
dangerous precedence and argued that Konkomba better stay far away from chieftaincy, but most 
other Konkomba interpreted the Dagbon crisis as a hindrance to the paramount chieftaincy for the 
Konkomba homeland which was promised to them in the Kumasi agreements. In the slipstream of the 
Dagbon crisis, a lingering intra-Nanumba chieftaincy escalated (see below). 
3  A government honour to stimulate agriculture which, although awarded annually, offers a lifelong 
societal status in Nanun. 
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When Bijiba died on 28 April 1996, his eldest son Nyilyar acted on his 
father’s behalf until the funeral was performed; his experience and young age 
made him popular. By then, there were no Nanumba in town, since all were 
displaced by the 1994-1995 violence. But when Nyilyar performed the funeral of 
his father two years later (in May 1998), some Nanumba had returned and there 
was also a new Nanumba chief (Salifu Alhassan). This chief announced to 
Nyilyar that he wanted to formally ‘enskin’ a Konkomba leader as his sub-chief 
(rather than install a headman), as a medium between him and the Konkomba 
communities in town. Nyilyar said that he was not interested in such a title and 
that he wanted to become a farmer after the funeral was over.  
Two men were however very much interested in claiming the title. This was 
significant because in 1981, no-one had volunteered for it and it suggests that 
Konkomba in Nanun took a greater interest in chieftaincy in 1998 than two 
decades earlier. Both contestants claimed to represent the late ‘chief farmer’ 
Biyenjin, who had performed an important advisory role to Bijiba. After the 1994 
death of Biyenjin, Bijiba had invited Biligban, who had been the annual local 
government elected ‘best farmer’ in 1989, from a hamlet west of Chamba, to 
replace Biyenjin. This did not however go well with Biyenjin’s family. Biyen-
jin’s eldest ‘son’ (in fact his nephew Nmayaan) also claimed the title. At the 
funeral, Nyilyar gave ambiguous signals about his loyalties, allowing Nmayaan 
to pay the gravediggers but accepting Biligban’s cow for slaughter. 
Immediately after his father’s funeral, Nyilyar organised a council of elders 
from the main Konkomba communities in town and informed them about his 
father’s last words. Both Nmayaan and Biligban hoped that their names would 
fall, but surprisingly, Bijiba’s last wish was that Konkomba leadership in 
Chamba was granted to the family of the first Konkomba settler in Chamba 
(Fiindi). Fiindi had died, but his eldest son (Nmabini) was present at the meeting 
and he said that although he was grateful for the offer, he was also unprepared. 
He therefore asked Nyilyar to become the leader himself, so that he could learn 
from him. The council of elders supported Nyilyar’s candidacy and Nyilyar, who 
had preferred to be a farmer, agreed. The elders and Nyilyar visited the Chamba 
chief that day and he said that he recognized Nyilyar as the Konkomba elder.  
However, Biligban complained to Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan that a son 
cannot succeed his father as a chief. Chamba Naa agreed on this but he was 
afraid to meddle in these Konkomba affairs and he sent Biligban away to find an 
amicable solution. In reality, the chief had a preference for Biligban because the 
latter, as a successful yam farmer, provided the chief with significant sums of 
honorary and voluntary tribute. While Biligban and Biyenjin’s son accepted the 
mediation from the Konkomba community chief of Accra where the latter 
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stepped back for Biligban’s seniority, the ambivalence between Biligban and 
Nyilyar remained.  
In 1999, tensions rose to such an extent that the District Security Council 
(DISEC) suspended the installation of a Konkomba chief in Chamba.4 This 
shows that although the government of Ghana had delegated its power of deci-
sion in chieftaincy affairs to what it considered the traditional authorities, it held 
on to its sovereignty in maintaining security or the monopoly of violence. So 
although governments in Ghana could not make a decision in the Chamba 
dispute, they did have the legal power to freeze traditional installations for secu-
rity reasons.  
DISEC comprised four main actors: The District Chief Executive and the 
District Superintendent of Police (DSP) were the faces and voices of DISEC, 
while the officer of the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI) and the Com-
mander of the Armed Forces and their chairman were mostly silent in public. The 
BNI officer was covertly gathering his information and the Army Commander 
was also silent in public, for he could not intervene without DCE and DSP invi-
tation and without permission from his regional superiors in Tamale. On numer-
ous occasions I have heard police officers quenching a problem by giving warn-
ings that ‘You don’t want me to call the soldiers’, exemplifying the distinction 
between state law-preserving violence in the police and military law-making 
violence described in chapter one.  
The Nanumba Traditional Council (NTC, the chief’s office), more precisely 
the Nanumba paramount chief Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II, supported 
Biligban (whom he had known as a farmer). After the Bimbilla Naa’s death in 
1999, his acting son continued the support for Biligban. The Chamba Naa was 
under stress: Biligban followed all the procedures for becoming a sub-chief and 
paid him well with yam money, but denying the popular Konkomba support for 
Nyilyar, including that of Fiindi’s family, could be a dangerous decision for him 
personally and the small Nanumba community in Chamba.  
There was a status quo for two years, until on 5 May 2001, DISEC came to 
Chamba to push Nyilyar and Biligban for finding an amicable solution.5 Nyilyar 
thereupon organised a meeting of family elders on 12 May, similar to the council 
of elders he had organised following his father’s funeral in 1998, at which, in the 
absence of Biligban, he was once again elected.6 Nyilyar presented himself to the 
Chamba Naa who, overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of elders, accepted 
                                                 
4  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/10 District Chief Executive to The Police Sector Commander (29-01-2000) ‘Re-
Suspension of Choice of Konkomba Leader at Chamba’. 
5  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/14 Youth Chairman Targal Beyi to Chamba-Naa Salifu Alhassan (06-05-2001) ‘An 
Invitation’. 
6  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/16 Youth Chairman Tagar Biyi (13-05-2001) ‘Information on Konkomba Chieftain-
cy Affairs at Chamba’. 
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Nyilyar’s election. Biligban immediately called the help of a Konkomba lawyer 
based in southern Ghana and three days later, he summoned Nyilyar to the 
Nanumba Traditional Council (popularly called kòtini, court),7 since chieftaincy 
matters cannot be handled by civil courts. Biligban was illiterate but in a state-
ment of claim bearing his thumbprint, he claimed that Nyilyar’s election was 
illegal, untraditional and dangerous because it was done ‘without the approval 
and blessings of the Chamba Naa the lawful representative of the Bimbilla Naa’.  
After Nyilyar, who was also illiterate, gave a written statement of defence to 
the Council, written by his cousin, with thumbprints of most clan elders in 
Chamba,8 the Council installed a Judicial Committee of three chiefs, all but one 
illiterate as well. This intra-Konkomba dispute became eclipsed by Nanumba 
divisions: The Committee never reached a conclusion, because its chairman died 
early 2002 and his death led to an escalation of a serious intra-Nanumba dispute 
in Bimbilla (see below). 
In the meantime however, popular support of Nyilyar in Chamba became ever 
more obvious. The local Konkomba Youth Association Chairman, a middle-aged 
man who had been selected by the youth leaders of the various clan communities 
as their representative, teamed up behind Nyilyar and so did the Chamba delegate 
District Assembly member. Third, the Assembly member and several other 
opinion leaders were devout Roman Catholics and the local priest made it no 
secret that he supported Nyilyar. 
Popular support notwithstanding, however, Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan 
forced a breakthrough in the stalemate, an intervention disadvantageous for 
Nyilyar. In August, heavily pressurised by the Bimbilla regent and the Tradi-
tional Council, he installed Biligban. The chief was also illiterate but later 
explained in a petition to the Regional Minister that ‘[t]he new headman for 
Chamba only needed my blessings as the traditional ruler and custodian of the 
land in the area, and which I needed to do in a very peaceful atmosphere’.9 On 
Saturday morning 31 August 2002, in the presence of Bimbilla elders, Chamba 
Naa performed Biligban’s ritual enskinment. The installation happened while 
two armoured cars patrolled Chamba for the chief’s safety.  
Nevertheless, a troop of young Konkomba with sticks and guns headed from 
Nyilyar’s place to the Chamba Naa palace. Nyilyar anxiously walked through 
town, afraid of what was going to happen. Simultaneously, an opponent group 
                                                 
7  ‘Chieftaincy Act. 1971 (Act 370) Writ to Initiate Chieftaincy Proceedings in the Judicial Committee 
of Nanumba Traditional Council, Bimbilla: Statement of Claim’ (15-05-2001); ‘Chieftaincy Act. 
1971 (Act 370) Writ to Initiate Chieftaincy Proceedings in the Judicial Committee of Nanumba 
Traditional Council, Bimbilla’ (15-05-2001). 
8  Iyaar to NTC (29-05-2001) ‘Statement of Defence’. 
9  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/22 Chamba-Naa Salifu Alhassan to The Regional Minister (15-10-2002) ‘Chamba 
Konkonba Community Situational Report (31st August) – A Rejoinder’. 
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was ready to depart from the Biyenjin family (Kanjooktiib community). The 
small Nanumba community also prepared to defend the Chamba Naa. It was 
mainly because of the authority of the Youth Chairman and the District Assem-
bly member that fighting was averted.  
That very week, Youth Chairman Tagal Beyi, who was illiterate, reported the 
events to the Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA),10 which sent a delegation 
to Chamba to investigate the issue. After that, the KOYA senior Wujangi gave a 
press conference in Saboba, referring to clause two of the Kumasi Accord and 
interpreting it in the framework of citizenship rights: 
‘KOYA is against imposition of leaders of any kind at any level on our members. 
KOYA believes in democratic [tenets], and as such we cherish a situation whereby 
our members freely choose their leaders as Ghanaians’.11  
From here, the local case was rapidly brought to an ethnic level. On 16 
September, KOYA wrote a memo on the Chamba issue, accusing the Nanumba 
Traditional Council of ‘divide and rule tactics’ and of enforcing a chief on the 
Konkomba community by force.12 Three weeks later, the Nanumba Youth 
Association (NAYA) responded to KOYA, firmly rejecting the critique on the 
undemocratic Nanumba enskinment customs, also by adhering clause two, albeit 
through a different lens:13  
‘Against this background it would indeed be very unfortunate for KOYA to interpret 
this to mean that Konkombas can just pick a leader bring him to a Nanumba tradi-
tional ruler and sort of command him to give his blessings without due regard to the 
normal and established channels or procedures Nanumbas equally go through to seek 
titles from our overloads [sic].’ 
The Nanumba petitioners added that they would ‘not compromise with the 
novelty KOYA wants to introduce into the traditions and customs of Nanung’ 
and embedded their legal position in a moral stance that their ‘hospitality is being 
taken for granted’ and they even suspected ‘a secret agenda by Konkombas to 
annex Nanumba land and make it a tributary state to Saboba’.  
                                                 
10  Yaw Waja Peter (General Secretary KOYA) to The Regional Minister (16-09-2002) ‘Simmering 
Tension between Two Konkomba Factions at Chamba in the Nanumba District’. The KOYA dele-
gation was made up of the Saboba District Chief Executive Charles Bintin, the chief of Nnaalòk 
village in Kikpakpaan (Unalorbòr Yamba Yajool) and several KOYA executives. 
11  Wujangi, Kenneth (KOYA) (2002) ‘Speech of the National President of the KOYA at a Meeting of 
Konkomba Chiefs on Sunday 8th September, 2002 in Saboba’. 
12  Beyi, Tagal (Youth Chairman) to The Regional Minister (31-08-2002) ‘Chamba Konkomba Commu-
nity Situational Report’; On 20 September, the Chamba assembly member John Kidisil wrote to the 
DCE for intervention; NDA/P/28/Vol.2/21 Assemblyman John L. Kidisil to The District Chief Exe-
cutive (20-09-2002) ‘Report from Chamba’. 
13  Mohammed Yahaya A. (General Secretary NAYA) to The President KOYA (06-10-2002) ‘Protest 
against KOYA Activities in Nanung’. 
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The tone of both letters was inflammatory and it engendered heated local peti-
tioning, e.g. of the illiterate Chamba chief and youth chairman.14 As in the after-
math of the 1994 violence, legalistic petitioning was the main form of communi-
cation between Konkomba and Nanumba. A dramatic turn for the good came on 
5 November 2002 with a KOYA letter to the Regional Security Council 
(REGSEC), asking for a meeting between KOYA, NAYA and the DISEC repre-
sentatives of Nanumba and Saboba/Chereponi districts, to solve the issue along 
the lines of the Kumasi peace accord.15 NAYA agreed to the meeting,16 which 
took place on 17 December 2002 in Tamale.17 Although no decisions were taken 
that day, both parties were dedicated to finding a peaceful way out of the 
Chamba impasse. However, an intra-Nanumba chieftaincy dispute which became 
very tense in early 2003 (see below) overshadowed the case and no further 
meetings were scheduled. This status quo lasted for over two years, until early 
2005, when a peace-building programme from the Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) gave new impetus to resolving the dispute (see below). 
The context of Konkomba leadership in Nanun 
So far, this case has clearly shown how a local case over the succession of a 
Konkomba leader escalated into a phase of petitioning of youth associations, 
claiming to represent Konkomba and Nanumba ‘ethnic groups’ and phrasing 
suspicions of Nanumba divide and rule tactics or a Konkomba secret agenda to 
annex the land. Contrary to the performance of earth sacrifices and voting, which 
were shrouded in prejudices of reluctant landowners or immature voters (see 
chapters four and five), the case of the recognition of Konkomba headmen in the 
lower ranks of Nanumba chieftaincy ignited widespread mutual feelings of 
victimhood based on the violation of their rights as ‘Ghanaians’ (for Konkomba) 
or ‘custodians of the land’ (for Nanumba). It is striking that by claiming these 
rights, the Youth Associations both referred to the second clause of the Kumasi 
Agreement! 
This situation nearly produced violence, but not quite. Instead, KOYA and 
NAYA authoritatively claimed to represent their ethnic communities in Chamba 
and they petitioned the security agencies about the others’ illegal activities. Their 
role illustrates the forms of legalism pictured in chapter one. Both Youth Asso-
ciations did not ask for a decision from the security agencies DISEC and 
                                                 
14  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/22 Chamba-Naa Salifu Alhassan to The Regional Minister (15-10-2002) ‘Chamba 
Konkonba Community Situational Report (31st August) – A Rejoinder’. 
15  NDA/P/28/Vol.2/23 National President Konkomba Youth Association to The Chairman Northern 
Regional Security Council (REGSEC) (05-11-2002) ‘Proposal for a REGSEC Meeting’. 
16  Taher, Dr. H.A. (NAYA) to KOYA (25-11-2002). 
17  Regional Co-ordinating Director to NAYA, KOYA (09-12-2002) ‘Summons to Meetings with 
REGSEC’. 
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REGSEC but they wanted to formally defend respective the power of decision of 
the chief or of the Konkomba communities. 
Both Associations adhered to clause two of the Kumasi agreements, but rather 
than offering a solution to the controversy in Chamba, the clause allowed for 
competing interpretations. The clause stipulated that Konkomba could ‘freely 
choose’ their candidate, but who are ‘Konkomba’? Nyilyar claimed to be chosen 
by the elders from the majority of the clan communities in town, but Biligban 
also claimed to represent Konkomba as the advisor to the previous Konkomba 
leader. The chief of Chamba said that he had to choose between the two candi-
dates because Konkomba had been incapable, due to their unfamiliarity with 
chieftaincy, of teaming up behind one candidate. Most Konkomba however 
blamed their divisions on the chief, who acted in his own ‘interests’. In the peti-
tions of the Youth Associations, these local ambiguities were presented as a clash 
between the communal Konkomba right of free choice of leadership and the 
chiefly power of decision to recognise the best candidate.  
This controversy however essentially revolved around the concept of head-
men. Put bluntly, there were no headmen in Nanun chieftaincy, except chiefs, 
who are ceremonially enskinned, and elders, who are recognised. While the chief 
of Chamba recognised Nyilyar as an elder twice, which the latter considered 
sufficient, the chief also enskinned Biligban as a sub-chief. Whereas Nanumba 
naam resonates with notions of power, Konkomba spoke of their chieftaincy as 
tibòrtiib aabor, meaning ‘what chiefs do’. For most Konkomba in Chamba, 
Biligban was not a Konkomba leader but a Nanumba chief and they considered 
his installation an imposition. The Chamba chief interpreted the general Kon-
komba rejection of Biligban as a flouting of his generous and voluntary offer to 
enskin a Konkomba chief.   
The Chamba case was not unique; it was the largest of a handful of similar 
Konkomba leadership disputes, which were all tense, in which one contestant had 
the popular Konkomba support and aspired to the recognition of the local 
Nanumba chief and another rallied the Nanumba support for enskinment as a 
sub-chief. As of 2002, the Nanumba Traditional Council had registered Biligban 
among four other Konkomba chiefs, who all had requested for such titles them-
selves and while being popular among Nanumba, they were called ‘Nanumba 
chiefs’ by most Konkomba.18 These divergent appreciations are most tangible in 
Kanjoo Naa Nachipòòn Mmalbe Immanuel.  
This chief was enskinned in 1994 and he is the grandson of Kanjoo Naa 
Tangam, the first Konkomba chief in Nanun. Tangam settled from Kanjook in 
French Togoland in northern Nanun, where, for motives unknown to me, the 
                                                 
18  These chiefs were Achina Gmaninbu Nagbija (1982) in Nakpa, Damba Naa in Dambado near 
Chamba in 1990, and Depa Naa Nayemi Bogbela (2000) in Depa near Nakpa. 
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nearby Nanumba chief of Gambuga recognised him as his sub-chief. In the 
1960s, Bimbilla Naa Dasana upgraded Tangam as the chief for all Konkomba in 
Nanun, similarly to the Ewe and Asante chiefs. While Tangam and his succeed-
ing son continued to live in Kanjoo, Mmalbe moved to the roadside town of 
Makayili to work as a teacher. For many Nanumba, Mmalbe is one of their 
favourite chiefs: He is young and bright but also loyal to tradition. However, 
Konkomba dislike him what Nanumba like for: He is almost a Nanumba and he 
and his father sided with Nanumba during the violent conflicts. Mmalbe told me 
that he even feared Konkomba assassination attempts against him. 
In sum, the peace clause encapsulated a profound dilemma: While most 
Konkomba agree to introducing their chosen leaders to the Nanumba chiefs, they 
do not agree to the decisions of such chiefs about proper Konkomba leadership. 
But while most Nanumba agree with Konkomba local leadership, many of them 
object to such candidacy as a fait accompli and support the local chief’s power of 
decision in terms of local leadership.  
But although many Konkomba in Nanun do not want their leadership to be 
‘Nanumba’, I found that Konkomba leaders were heavily borrowing from 
Nanumba or from the national Asante-inspired chieftaincy format. While 
Biligban was much more explicit in his presentation as a Nanun chief, Nyilyar’s 
palace regulations were implicitly copied from Nanumba as well. This was 
shown in codes of conduct, e.g. the offering of kola nuts to visitors and elders 
clapping hands during greeting, and in their entourage, comprising chief’s elders 
who were usually called bikpanpalb, an adaption from Nanumba kpamba and 
especially the leading elder (or ‘linguist’ in Ghana’s national terminology) who 
was usually known as wunlaan (from Nanumba wulana) or chaamininkpel (from 
Asante òchaame).19 Moreover, I found that in villages where Konkomba and 
Nanumba lived together, Konkomba tended to call their leaders chiefs, in spite of 
local Nanumba calling them elders, while in very few homogenous Konkomba 
settlements, inhabitants called their leaders chiefs (but rather elders or earth 
priests).20 In sum, Konkomba ‘chieftaincy’ in Nanun tends to be (often 
unintentionally) relational to that of Nanumba. 
                                                 
19  Such imitation becomes clear when compared to Kpasa and Damanko, whose ‘chiefs’ positioned 
themselves as southern chiefs, sitting on stools instead of skins and wearing cloth instead of smocks. 
20  In all mixed Konkomba/Nanumba villages between Bimbilla and Chamba, Konkomba communities 
called their leader a ‘chief’ (ubòr), in spite of Nanumba calling them elders. By contrast, Konkomba 
had such ‘chiefs’ in only two out of ten autonomous Konkomba villages in the same area. Both were 
villages where various clan communities coexisted; each community had a family elder (uninkpel) 
but they also recognised the elder of the senior community as earth priest (utindaan) and a young 
member of that family as a ‘chief’, who mediated between these clans. However, three villages with a 
comparable social structure lacked such a ‘chief’ and so did five all homogeneous (in terms of kin-
ship) Konkomba villages in the sample, were the family elder simultaneously performed earth sacri-
fices as earth priest.  
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The interests of the princes of Nanun 
In the previous section, we have seen that many Konkomba in Nanun did not 
want their leaders to be ‘Nanumba’. However, many of them did not just want 
the moral freedom to choose their leadership but they also challenged the integ-
rity of Nanumba chiefs. This assessment was exacerbated by an intra-Nanumba 
chieftaincy dispute. The death of Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II in 1999 trig-
gered a lingering succession dispute revolving around the ‘eligibility’ to para-
mount chieftaincy (peace clause six). Playing a crucial role in the dispute, the 
chief of Chamba lost his credibility and authority among Konkomba in Chamba, 
but also among many Nanumba I spoke to. Sketching the Bimbilla dispute is 
therefore necessary for an understanding of the post-2002 developments in the 
Chamba dispute. 
Entitlement to the Bimbilla skin alternates between two dunoli, gates or royal 
‘houses’: The bangle house (Banyili) and the lion house (Gbugmayili), which 
both trace descent from Nmantambu, the founder of Nanun. Since a certain chief 
of Dakpam (Naa Kponguhu) and the son of the late chief of Nakpa (Naa Asam-
boni), killed the allegedly despotic tenth Bimbilla Naa Sulgu, their offspring have 
alternately occupied the Bimbilla skin. Most Nanumba villages became hierar-
chically divided over either gate. All Nanumba chiefs are naabihi (sg. naabia) – 
literally ‘children of the chief’ and popularly translated as ‘princes’ and ‘prin-
cesses’ – and entitled to skins but not all children of the chief become chief 
themselves. Naabihi become commoners after three generations without incum-
bency. 
Competition to the Bimbilla skin has often been marked with tensions within 
the gates. When Ferguson visited Bimbilla in 1892, he was told about a bloody 
conflict over the Bimbilla skin two years earlier and all subsequent installations 
required state intervention (Skalník 1979: 47). In the slipstream of chieftaincy 
violence in Dagbon in 1969, the Nanumba Traditional Council was pressed by 
the Government to issue a document called Nanumba Customary Regulations 
and Procedures. These regulations confirmed the alternation between the Banyili 
and Gbugmayili gates, specifically between the respective highest positions of 
the Dakpam Naa and Nakpa Naa.  
An unwritten requirement, for many Nanumba, is that a chief cannot surpass 
his father or grandfather. It was this controversy which created the current 
dispute: While Andani is the son of a former Bimbilla Naa but holds no chief-
taincy title himself, Nakpa Naa Salifu holds the highest title within the Gbug-
mayili lineage, but neither his grandfather nor his father were chiefs of Bimbilla. 
How did this controversy come about?  
When the Gbugmayili skin of Bakpaba village became vacant in the late 
1980s, Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II (from Banyili gate) asked one Suha Naa to 
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run, but he refused because if he accepted this skin, he would surpass his father’s 
reach. However, his younger brother Salifu Dawuni accepted the offer. When the 
chief of Nakpa died he was promoted from Bakpaba to Nakpa in 1990.21 This 
was despite objections by Kpatihi Naa Ponadoo (a senior chief in Bimbilla) and 
the chief of Lepusi,22 who summoned the Bimbilla Naa to High Court. When 
they lost their case early 1993, 23 Nakpa Naa Salifu Dawuni was attacked at his 
palace and he fled to the Konkomba community, who protected him from his 
opponent Nanumba! The dispute between Bimbilla Naa Abarika and Kpatihi Naa 
Ponadoo reached such heights that Naa Abarika abolished the Kpatihi Naa’s 
function as kingmaker. The DCE described the summer of 1993 as ‘full of 
tensions’.24  
The 1994 Konkomba/Nanumba conflict temporarily eclipsed the case, to 
resurface when Bimbilla Naa Abarika Attah II died on 22 August 1999.25 One 
group, a Gbugmayili minority but almost all Banyili chiefs, defended Bimbilla 
Naa Abarika’s enskinment of Nakpa Naa Salifu Dawuni and stressed the promo-
tional system of chieftaincy. Another group of mostly Gbugmayili chiefs ob-
jected that Salifu Dawuni should never have become Nakpa Naa in the first 
place, let alone Bimbilla Naa, and they therefore supported the chief of Juanayili, 
the second-highest Gbugmayili chief and son of Bimbilla Naa Dasana. 
Both sides agreed to the power of decision of the nine electors or kingmakers 
(naakpemba) to choose the next Bimbilla Naa, but they quarrelled about the 
hierarchy of these authorities. This issue was complicated by the internal divi-
sions of these kingmakers and by the situation that five of the nine kingmakers 
were dead and represented by regents whose power of decision was contested 
because they were not officially installed as chiefs.  
This was a stalemate: If only proper kingmakers could install a Bimbilla Naa 
but only a proper Bimbilla Naa could install the kingmakers, there was never 
going to be a solution. Realising this, the Bimbilla regent by exception claimed 
the sovereignty to install the Wulensi chief and kingmaker in 2002, a decision 
which was generally received with aversion, because it was untraditional. How-
                                                 
21  NDA/L/11/v.3/22 Registrar Nanumba Traditional Council to The PNDC Dist. Secretary (14-06-
1990) ‘Out-Dooring Ceremony of the Nakpa-Na Salifu Dawuni at Nakpa’. 
22  NDA/L/11/v.3/11 Registrar Nanumba Traditional Area to All Chiefs, Nanumba Trad. Area (05-02-
1990) ‘Emergency Meeting of Chiefs – Nanumba Traditional Area’. 
23  NDA/P/20/vol.4/13 Ag. District Chief Executive (19-04-1993) ‘Quarterly Report for the First 
Quarter, January – March 1993 of the Nanumba District Assembly’. 
24  NDA/P/20/vol.4/n.n. Ag. District Chief Executive ‘Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter – from 
July to September 1993: Nanumba District Assembly’. 
25  NDA/L/11/v.3/260 District Chief Executive to H.E. The President (03-03-2003) ‘Re: Delegation of 
Na-Abarika Family of the Banyili Royal Gate of Nanumba Paramountcy to Call on His Excellency 
the President of Ghana Mr. J.K. Kufuour at the Castle, Osu’. 
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ever, the kingmakers used their authenticity and claims to be subjected to earth 
spirits as a cloak for political allegiances. 
Things got even more complicated when the main opponent to the Nakpa Naa, 
the chief of Juanayili, died in January 2003. His supporters thereupon found the 
dead chief’s young brother prepared to stand on his brother’s behalf. This Andani 
Dasana, an entrepreneur with a Tamale rice company, was no chief, but his 
supporters suggested that he could be granted a minor title for a day before 
promoting him to the Bimbilla skin. Due to the complication, the funeral of 
Bimbilla Naa Abarika was postponed twice and finally performed late March 
2003. At the last day of the funeral, the regent was to step down for a new 
Bimbilla Naa. But during the funeral, the District Security Council (DISEC) 
realised that the kingmakers would not be able to close their ranks and therefore 
suspended the enskinment of a Bimbilla Naa until the kingmakers had reached 
consensus. However, after the funeral, the eldest son of the late chief stepped 
down as a regent and Nanun became headless.  
In the night of 3 April, a group of kingmakers ignored the DISEC ban and 
tried to secretly perform the enskinment rituals on Andani. They were however 
caught in the act by police and detained in a Tamale prison for some days. 
National media started to compare the Bimbilla dispute to the Dagbon crisis.26 
Subsequently, the Nanumba Traditional Council established a Judicial Commit-
tee, chaired by the Chamba chief, in June, to declare which kingmaker had the 
decisive sovereignty.  
After three rounds of hearings with the kingmakers, the committee presented 
its report on 29 July 2003, unanimously backing the Juo Naa as leading king-
maker, who chose Nakpa Naa Salifu as next Bimbilla Naa.27 In a strange twist 
however, Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan, renounced this decision the very same 
day in a letter to the Regional House of Chiefs.28 The chief of Chamba had had a 
personal quarrel with the late Bimbilla Naa, who was a family member, and he 
therefore by principle objected to the Nakpa Naa because he had the backing of 
that chief. With his move, Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan lost his credibility 
among many Nanumba I spoke to and among Konkomba in Chamba, who saw 
this as proof that the chief was an intriguer.  
Despite Chamba Naa’s move, the Nanumba Traditional Council allowed the 
Juo Naa to enskin Nakpa Naa Salifu Dawuni as the Bimbilla Naa in early 
August. But as the leader of the dissenting kingmakers (Kpatihi Naa) cried foul 
                                                 
26  GW (29-05-2003) ‘Another Dagbon in the offering? Two gates clash over Bimbilla skin’. 
27  ‘In the High Court of Justice Tamale. The Republic vrs The Registrar of the Nanumba Traditional 
Council Ex Parte Andani Dasana’ (15-10-2003); ‘In the Judicial Committee of the Nanumba Tradi-
tional Council, Bimbilla’ (08-08-2003). 
28  NDA/L/11/vol.4/21 Chairman of the Judicial Committee, Chamba Naa Alhassan Salifu to The Regis-
trar Northern Regional House of Chiefs (29-07-2003) 
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in a press conference, accusing the Vice-President Alhaji Aliu Mahama, a Da-
gomba, for choosing sides with Nakpa Naa, the regional administration reported 
that Bimbilla was ‘on the brink of chaos’ and the Regional Minister banned all 
chieftaincy activities in Bimbilla.29 That same week, ‘Bimbilla Naa’ Salifu 
Dawuni cleared the Vice-President of the accusations and rather accused Andani 
of buying the support of the Chamba Naa.30 
Andani summoned his opponents to High Court later that month. Although 
High Court has no jurisdiction in chieftaincy affairs, it had the power to judge the 
legitimacy of Traditional Council Judicial Committees. After hearing from most 
key actors, including kingmakers and the Traditional Council registrar, the Court 
quashed the Judicial Committee in January 2004 because it was ‘not properly 
constituted’.31  
After that, Andani petitioned the Asantehene for his mediation,32 who charged 
Nayiri Boahugu Mahami, the Mamprusi paramount chief and the President of the 
Northern Region House of Chiefs, to mediate in the Bimbilla dispute. His dele-
gation met the kingmakers at Bimbilla in March, 2005, after which the Nayiri 
invited the kingmakers to his palace in Nalerigu a week later. There, he chal-
lenged the kingmakers to go home to find an amicable solution, and report back 
in two weeks.33 When the kingmakers did so, they had not found consensus. The 
Mamprusi paramount chief thereupon called the kingmakers to Nalerigu one last 
time and asked them to thumbprint a declaration in which they accepted his 
power of decision.34 All nine kingmakers signed this declaration and on 18 Octo-
                                                 
29  Kpatihi Naa ‘Press Release by the Gbugmayili Clan of the Nanumba Traditional Council at a Press 
Conference Held on the 8th August, 2003’; respectively District Chief Executive to The Juo Regent 
et al (07-08-2003) ‘Halt on All Activities in Connection with the Enskinment of Bimbilla-Na’; 
Regional Co-Ordinating Director to Yunyoo-Rana et al (15-08-2003) ‘Committee of Enquiry into the 
Bimbilla Chieftaincy Crisis’. 
30  ‘Reaction of the Bimbilla-Naa Alhaji Dawuni Salifu II to the Press Release by the Gbugmayili Clan 
of the Nanumba Traditional Council at a Press Conference Held on the 8th August 2003 at Accra’. 
31  ‘In the High Court of Justice, Northern Region Held at Tamale on Monday the 26th Day of January, 
2004. Before His Lordship Jones Dotse, Appeal Court Judge Sitting as an Additional Court Judge’; 
‘In the High Court of Justice Tamale. The Republic vrs The Registrar of the Nanumba Traditional 
Council Exparte Andani Dasana, Bimbilla-Naa’ (28-08-2003; 10-09-2003; 15-10-2003). In April, Juo 
Naa appealed to the Supreme Court, but his subsequent withdrawal cost him a 10 million cedi penalty 
(NDA/L/11/vol.4/18 ‘Quarterly Reports – Nanumba Traditional Council, Bimbilla. 2nd Quarter 
Ended 30th June, 2004’). 
32  NDA/L/11/vol.4/n.n. Bimbilla-Na Andani Dasana Abdulai to The President, National House of 
Chiefs (29-04-2004) ‘Protecting Chieftaincy and Custom in Nanung’. 
33  NDA/L/11/vol.4/38 District Co-Ordinating Director to The District Police Commander e.a. (10-03-
2005) ‘Meeting of Nayiri’s Delegation with the Kingmakers of Nanung’; NDA/L/11/vol.4/40 Juo 
Gbang-Lana to All Kingmakers (March 2005) ‘Meeting of Nanun Kingmakers’; ‘Minutes of DISEC 
Meeting Held in the Office of the District Chief Executive on Wednesday, 30th March, 2005’. 
34  ‘Note on Commitment to the Resolution of the Impasse Regarding the Nomination of a Candidate 
from the Gbugumayili ‘Gate’ of Nanung Traditional Area as Successor to the Vacant ‘Skin’ of 
Bimbilla following the Death of Naa Abakari II’. 
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ber, Nayiri stated that Andani should be the Bimbilla Naa.35 The kingmakers’ 
delegation of their sovereignty to the Mamprusi chief subverted several simulta-
neous NGO initiatives including Catholic Relief Services) to empower the 
alleged authentic kingmakers.  
When Nakpa Naa Salifu Dawuni heard about the arbitration of the Nayiri, he 
was outraged and immediately stepped to the Northern Region House of Chiefs, 
which quashed Nayiri’s verdict the next month. This made Bimbilla so tense that 
after the death of two sub-chiefs, a clean-up exercise at the old Gbugmayili 
palace on 6 January led to fighting. A big clash happened three days later, when a 
power outage during a naming ceremony in the butcher’s neighbourhood was 
interpreted by some guests as a sabotage.36 A dusk to dawn curfew was enforced 
until May and again, the Bimbilla dispute made sensational headlines in national 
media.37  
Ever since, there has been a status quo as both sides awaited the investigations 
of the Northern Region House of Chiefs. Meanwhile, there has been a ban on 
chiefly festivals for almost a decade, and chiefs are not allowed to join in Muslim 
prayers. Nanumba society is utterly divided over the case: While the young and 
literate Andani had the popular support in Bimbilla town, and also the support of 
kambonsi warriors and leading Muslim families, while most Banyili gate villages 
and NAYA seniors from those villages supported Nakpa Naa.  
Many respondents thought that the dispute retarded development in Nanun and 
many feared its negative effect on Konkomba/Nanumba relations. Commenting 
on the situation that more than half of the skins are vacant, a senior Nanumba 
said that ‘we are making ourselves irrelevant’ and he doubted whether Kon-
komba would accept a new Nanumba chief in such villages. Most Konkomba 
tried to stand aloof from the Bimbilla affairs but they believed that the case 
hindered a solution in the Chamba chieftaincy dispute and similar disputes.  
The Bimbilla dispute shows that Assefa’s idea of a stable traditional rule was 
fictional and that eligibility of paramount chieftaincy was far from consensual. 
The case showed how both sides in the dispute resorted to legal interventions in 
order to halt the untraditional, politicized and hence illegal activities of the oppo-
nents. This is the context in which both Konkomba and Nanumba were suspi-
cious of the ‘interests’ of chiefs. In December 2006, the chief of Chamba died, an 
                                                 
35  Naa-Boahugu Mahami Abudulai Sheriga (King of Mamprugu) to The Regional Minister (20-10-
2006) ‘Settlement of Dispute Concerning Succession to the Naam of Bimbilla’. 
36  District Co-Ordinating Director to The Regional Minister ‘Report on Security Situation in Bimbilla 
on Tuesday, 10th January, 2006’. 
37  DG (11-01-2006) ‘Let’s silence the war drums’; DG (11-01-2006) ‘Mayhem looms in Nanumba 
North’; GT (11-01-2006) ‘Curfew at Bimbilla following communal fight’; DG (12-01-2006) ‘Curfew 
imposed on Nanumba North area’ 
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event which brought both the Bimbilla and the Chamba disputes back centre-
stage in a dramatic way.  
From headmen to women groups (2005-2006) 
As seen above, tensions subsided in the Chamba case after leaders of the 
Konkomba and Nanumba Youth Associations met the Regional Security Council 
in late 2002. This meeting did much to debunk ethnic interpretations of the 
dispute. However, the contestation was left to simmer locally, as it was over-
shadowed by the chieftaincy affairs in Bimbilla. However, early 2005 a peace-
building programme from the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) gave new impetus 
to a resolution thereby unfortunately, and unintentionally, contributing to a new 
escalation of the Chamba dispute.  
Although CRS had been a prominent member of the NGO Consortium, its 
peace-building activities got new impetus in 2004 with the establishment of the 
Centre for Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies (CECOTAPS), funded by 
CRS and USAID.38 The Centre was to coordinate local projects of five so-called 
‘satellite peace centres’ attached to the various dioceses in the former conflict 
zone. Both Bimbilla and Chamba parishes are under Yendi diocese and came 
under the responsibility of William Abakisi, secretary of the Yendi bishop and 
the Diocesan Development Office, and especially the Bimbilla-based St. Gildas 
nun Melanie Amikiya.  
In February 2005, the Yendi satellite peace centre organised a meeting in 
Bimbilla for opinion leaders from all parts of society, mostly Nanumba, and 
asked them to list the biggest peace problems in the district.39 Bimbilla and 
Chamba chieftaincy disputes topped this list and were selected for peace-building 
workshops. In May, Amikiya (popularly known as Sister Melanie), Abakisi and 
the director of CRS, Aidan Saabie Naah, none of them Konkomba or Nanumba, 
organised separate meetings with the three main actors – Chamba Naa Salifu 
Alhassan, Biligban and Nyilyar – to rally their cooperation for a peace workshop 
from 22-24 June 2005, at the Chamba mission, with delegations of the three 
parties.  
                                                 
38  Set up as a Roman Catholic Church relief organisation in the post-First World War USA, CRS 
extended its programme to worldwide poverty reduction, including Ghana, after the Second World 
War with USAID support. In the 1970s, CRS shifted its attention from relief aid to development 
(education, health care and food production). In 1996, the national CRS headquarters moved from 
Accra to Tamale, because most CRS activities were in the north. This centre was the continuation of 
the Northern Peace Project, which Bishop Philip Naameh of the newly created Damongo diocese in 
western Gonja had founded because he saw peace-building a necessary prerequisite for evangelisa-
tion. 
39  Coordinator CECOTAPS (08-02-2005) ‘Invitation to Participate in Nanumba District Peacebuilding 
Dialogue’. 
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The CRS director infused these workshops with a paradigmatic approach. 
Aidan, who holds a BA degree in Social Sciences and a Diploma in Education 
and specialises in preventive health issues, received training in peace mediation 
in the United States from John-Paul Lederach. As seen in chapter one, Lederach 
was an influential peace mediator and scholar and a devout Christian, like 
Assefa. Theoretically, similarities between Assefa and Lederach are significant, 
as both focus on reconciliation, forgiveness and healing.  
However, acknowledging that the issues of war are ‘nested’ in a broader 
context, Lederach argued that the challenge for reconciliation would be to trans-
form a society from a ‘war-system’ to a ‘peace-system’ (1997: 59, 84). While 
Assefa found peace enshrined in traditions, Lederach argued that a peace-system 
was something new. He wrote in his 2005 The Moral Imagination that peace-
building required the participants’ ‘moral imagination’, to ‘imagine the canvas of 
social change’ (2005: 74). There is one additional and crucial difference between 
Assefa and Lederach: While the former wanted to base peace on grassroots, the 
latter wanted it to emerge from the ‘middle level’ actors, such as ethnic and 
religious leaders and intellectuals, who stood strategically in between the grass-
roots and top leaders (Lederach 1997: 41). Aidan strongly believed in society’s 
self-organising mechanisms to transform conflicts to a peace culture. His treat-
ment of the Chamba case as a ‘stepping stone’ for Konkomba/Nanumba prob-
lems at large reflected Lederach’s paradigm that conflicts are ‘nested’ in wider 
problematic contexts. 
Let’s look at this approach in more detail. I was able to observe the meeting 
between Aidan’s group (known locally as kimòkpaanyaab or ‘peace people’) and 
Nyilyar with twenty of his entourage, including the Youth Chairman. The work-
shop, which lasted for three hours, took place in the mission garden. An educated 
relative of Nyilyar was asked to translate from English to Likpakpaln. The work-
shops were marked by improvisation, no records were taken and both the organ-
isers and the participants were nervous.  
Between opening and closing prayers, at least four phases passed to empower 
the participants. First, upon Sister Melanie asking, Nyilyar explained that tradi-
tional problem-solving requires that elders ‘sit together’. Melanie thereupon 
replied that the chieftaincy dispute had to be addressed in this way. Second, 
Sister Melanie argued that the root causes of the conflict had to be addressed for; 
she showed a small tree and explained that if the roots are not well it would not 
bear fruits. She asked about the roots of the dispute, and Nyilyar said: ‘they 
[Nanumba] want us to fight among ourselves’.  
Third, after that, Sister Melanie took a spread sheet and asked the participants 
to identify the actors involved in the dispute and the evaluate the relations be-
tween these actors. Worth noting is the relationship with Chamba Naa, which a 
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follower of Nyilyar described as ‘very bad, because he is corrupt’. Aidan asked 
the participants to think about changing the relations which they had just evalu-
ated. A participant wanted to start greeting Biligban and Chamba Naa supporters, 
and Nyilyar said that he was prepared to meet Chamba Naa or Biligban. Aidan 
told the participants to clap for these promises. Finally, Aidan emphasised that 
CECOTAPS could only play a facilitating role but that the solution should come 
from the participants themselves. He announced a joint follow up workshop for 
the three parties and asked the participants to chose a representation of ten people 
including three youth and two women.  
The announced joint workshop of three factions made up of elders, youth and 
women took place between 19-21 December 2005, on neutral grounds, in Sunson 
village near Yendi. I was unable to attend and so was Sister Melanie, who was 
replaced by Father Rasmus (a Konkomba) from Saboba Technical School. Aidan 
had deliberately chosen a location with only one hall but the first night most 
participants refused to sleep together and many took their mattresses to the 
veranda. 
The next morning Aidan organised role plays which, according to him, led to 
the easing of tensions. After lunch, Aidan asked each faction to desist from accu-
sations and rather to phrase their core fear. Nanumba felt threatened as a minority 
while both Konkomba factions feared that Nanumba wanted to divide and rule 
them. Aidan told the whole group not to be afraid. After the general session, Fr. 
Rasmus took the Biligban and Nyilyar groups apart and told them that they both 
reacted the same to the Nanumba group. He told them to stop allowing Nanumba 
to divide them. The outcome of this day was that the groups agreed to maintain 
the current status quo and exercise patience. That night, as several participants 
told me, almost every participant slept inside the hall.  
The next day, the two Konkomba groups agreed that they would ‘sit together’ 
and find a solution, while the Nanumba delegation promised to completely resign 
from it and accept any outcome, provided it was mediated by Nmabini (the son 
of Fiindi, the first Konkomba in town). Aidan put the agreements on paper in a 
declaration, and under the auspices of the bishop of Yendi, the participants put 
their thumbprints under it.40 Having achieved this solution, that the Konkomba 
‘earth priest’ in town would lead the resolution attempts and that the Chamba 
chief would recognise any outcome, the facilitators said that the time had now 
come to talk about development issues. 
Back in Chamba, the chief called Nmabini to his palace and indeed delegated 
his sovereignty to him. A few days later Nmabini organised a meeting between 
Nyilyar and Biligban, but the latter did not accept Nmabini’s authority, probably 
because he feared the outcome of his meditation, and refused to attend to the 
                                                 
40  ‘The Sung-Sung Declaration’ (20-12-2005). 
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meeting. Momentum passed and in spite of repeatedly receiving the blame from 
the Chamba Naa, Nmabini conceded. 
However, this status quo was eclipsed by another outcome of the Sunson 
meeting, namely the CECOTAPS shift towards development issues in order to 
take away the seed-bed for conflict. Empowering women for the development in 
town demonstrated CECOTAPS’ dedication towards poverty reduction, a 
development paradigm which explicitly linked poverty to insecurity (see chapter 
four). This approach reversed Assefa’s insistence that development required 
peace between ‘brothers in development’, and although it was initially success-
ful, this technocratic focus on development eventually boomeranged back to the 
chieftaincy dispute, when the chief exercised his sovereignty in two development 
issues. The subsequent events produced Nanumba rumours that Konkomba 
wanted to sack Nanumba from their land. Let’s trace the genesis of these ten-
sions. 
In May 2006, Sister Melanie invited women from the three disputing parties to 
Sunson to ‘prepare a brighter future for our children’.41 Sister Melanie found the 
women more cooperative than the men. They agreed to abstain from gossiping in 
the presence of their children and founded a Chamba women’s group. Back in 
Chamba, they marked their agreement with a parade and they thereupon set up a 
women’s group led by the local catechist.  
The Chamba women’s group developed beyond expectation, enrolling more 
than one hundred women within the first six months. Their monthly meetings 
were held in Likpakpaln, which most Nanumba women could understand. In the 
meetings, issues of conflict and chieftaincy were shied, but the women did talk 
about the need for e.g. a micro credit programme. It was however in one of those 
meetings that the seeds for a near-escalation of the Chamba dispute were sown. 
In the 21 October 2006 meeting, a Konkomba woman raised the issue of the 
measurement of food stuffs in Chamba market: Traders in Chamba market – 
many of whom were Nanumba women – had a monopoly on the measuring of 
food stuffs, whether for purchasing or for selling and they always took a share for 
themselves. Chamba women, who usually sold their husband’s produce in the 
market, Nanumba included, saw it as a kind of cheating and they called for the 
right to measure their own produce.  
When Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan, the self-declared owner of the market 
heard about this, he was red hot. His anger has to be understood from earlier 
events. On 21 September, namely, the chief had called all Konkomba and 
Nanumba butchers to his palace, informing them about the completion of a 
District Assembly abattoir. The chief however said that he denied access of 
illegal butchers in town, who did not recognise the authority of the chief butcher 
                                                 
41  Sr. Melanie Amikiya (Satellite Peace Centre) (25-04-2006) ‘Invitation to a workshop’. 
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(see chapter four), to the slaughter house. Upon Konkomba butchers asking, 
Chamba Naa specified that the Konkomba butchers did not follow the rules of 
the Chamba chief butcher (nakoha naa) who resided in Wulensi. These rules 
included the offering to the chief butcher of the legs, skin and intestines of each 
slaughtered animal for the upkeep of the butchers’ association. The Konkomba 
butchers objected that they had never met any chief butcher and that the abattoir 
was built by the District Assembly for all butchers to use it. The culminating 
tensions led to a DISEC visit to Chamba on 26 September, and the District Chief 
Executive collected the key of the abattoir until further notice.  
On 26 September, also, local government elections were held in Ghana. In 
Chamba, the incumbent District Assembly member, who was on reasonable 
terms with the chief, lost the elections to Daniel Nakoja, a charismatic Kon-
komba literacy activist in town whom the chief considered a warmonger. In sum, 
his argument with the Konkomba butchers and the election of Nakoja together 
made the Chamba Naa worried about his authority in town.  
Two days after the October women group’s meeting, Chamba Naa Salifu 
Alhassan wrote a letter to the District Chief Executive,42 informing him about a 
Konkomba ‘by-law’, in which he saw the hands of Nakoja. The letter informed 
the DCE about a three-week suspension of Chamba market. The District Security 
Council (DISEC) responded to the letter by visiting Chamba. There, they backed 
the chief and warned Nakoja about his behaviour. Nakoja was however falsely 
put to blame because he had no role in the women’s group. With his exclusion of 
Konkomba butchers and his suspension of the Chamba market, the chief of 
Chamba claimed his sovereignty to counter a ‘by-law’ and he had DISEC sup-
port. Many Konkomba in Chamba felt betrayed by DISEC and the DCE. Only 
two months later, DISEC seemed to realise that the chief did not actually have 
such sovereignty in terms of development and security (see below).  
It was surprising to witness how a case between farmers and traders became 
ethnic; although Nanumba women initially backed the uprising, they fell silent 
when their chief imposed a boycott. This shift is another example of Lonsdale’s 
analytical distinction between internal moral ethnicity and external political 
tribalism. On Friday 27 October, Nanumba and Dagomba traders from Bimbilla 
and Tamale boycotted the market of Chamba and set up roadblocks to prevent 
traders other parts of Ghana from attending to the market. Most Konkomba 
refused the boycott.43 Although the boycott lasted for three weeks, increasing 
numbers of traders from other parts of the country reached Chamba by taking 
                                                 
42  Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan to The DCE (23-10-2006) ‘Halting of commercial activities’. 
43  That the chief positioned himself as the owner of the market in Chamba was surprising because, as 
seen in chapter four, Konkomba women had started this market by selling beer outside the Nanun 
market cycle in the 1970s. 
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bush paths and they kept the market running; one trader bought the entire 
groundnut supply!  
A dramatic event further escalated the market situation in Chamba. On 7 
December, on the eve of the first market day since the three-week boycott, 
Chamba Naa Salifu Alhassan died in an Accra hospital after a short sickbed. The 
next day, as the market was suspended, the corpse was escorted back to Chamba 
where he was buried in the palace the same day with financial contributions from 
both Biligban and Nyilyar. In the subsequent week, a series of funeral ceremo-
nies were organised in the Chamba palace, which I hope to study in more detail 
elsewhere. Two events on the last two days of the funeral were however crucial.  
First, on Thursday, Biligban organised a large Konkomba round-dance which 
is customary in Konkomba funerals. Although most Konkomba families had not 
been informed about the dance, since they did not recognise Biligban as their 
chief, and some visiting Nanumba elders were uneasy with the exuberant Kon-
komba dance, this dancing performance was one of my most impressive field-
work experiences, because of the chaotic but elated temper of the Konkomba 
young men and women and Nanumba women, including the daughters of the late 
chief. Precisely its non-authenticity made it so touching for me, because I seemed 
to be watching an improvised reconciliation ceremony rather than a traditional 
dance. However, some Nanumba visitors from Bimbilla considered the chaotic 
dance a sign of anarchy (see below). 
Second, the next day, on Friday 15 December, the Chamba market was again 
suspended to mark the final funeral ceremony of the chief. Again, hundreds of 
dignitaries from across Nanun attended, including dozens of Muslims from 
Bimbilla and a group of CHAYA members from Accra. Since the chief was a 
devout Muslim, this ceremony consisted mainly of praying. During the prayers, a 
sub-chief from Bimbilla gave some coins to a Muslim prayer to preach for the 
well-being of the Nakpa Naa, one of the contestants of the Bimbilla chieftaincy. 
This prayer sparked off a riot among some Nanumba chiefs after which the secu-
rity forces cancelled the ceremony.  
In sum, the last two days of the ceremony suggested that Chamba appeared to 
eclipse the Konkomba/Nanumba market tensions, because of an exuberant joint 
Konkomba/Nanumba dance and a riot among Nanumba chiefs. However, these 
tensions resurfaced after the funeral to reach a boiling point ten days later. On 
Friday 22 December, as Chamba had its first significant market in almost two 
months, Nanumba traders returning from Chamba market spread the rumour in 
Bimbilla that they had seen weapons in that market. Within a day, rumours were 
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buzzing around that Konkomba were preparing to step in the power vacuum of 
Chamba, just like they had seized control over the Kpasa area in 1981.44  
In this altered form, these rumours spread back from Bimbilla to Chamba. So 
when two days later, on Christmas Eve, a shed burned down incidentally in 
Chamba, most Nanumba in town fled to Bimbilla overnight. The next morning, 
police enforcements were sent to Chamba, where Christmas was celebrated in a 
very sober way. In the Roman Catholic mass, the Christmas round-dance was 
suspended and Daniel Nakoja begged the congregation to remain calm under all 
circumstances.  
Security and peace meetings (2006-2007) 
While that very evening, Nanumba refugees started to return home, news of a 
potential new conflict between Konkomba and Nanumba spread like wildfire, 
making headlines in national media.45 The three weeks after Christmas were 
marked by a lot of meetings and activities, mostly outside of Chamba town.  
Immediately after Christmas, on 27 December, Regional Minister Alhaji 
Mustapha Ali Idris (a Dagomba) and the Regional Security Council of top 
military and police executives came to Bimbilla for an emergency meeting at the 
District Assembly hall. The tensions invoked such an active role of government 
representatives, because the national government did not want the upcoming 
‘Golden Jubilee’ or Ghana’s 50th Independence Day overshadowed by ethnic 
conflict. Although the meeting was held in the District Assembly hall, there were 
very few local government representatives among the more than one hundred 
‘chiefs and opinion leaders’. More than two hundred Nanumba, and some Kon-
komba from Chamba too, followed the meeting through loudspeakers outside the 
hall, and they clamped to the windows when electricity broke down.  
The meeting was opened by the two Nanumba District Chief Executives. 
While Saeed (the Nanumba North DCE and a Nanumba) said that the District 
Security Council was still investigating the rumours, Ogajah (the Nanumba South 
DCE and a Konkomba) stated that, after a ‘fact-finding mission’, he knew that 
the rumours were simply not true. Whereas the latter implicitly found rumouring 
Nanumba in Bimbilla a source of insecurity, Saeed seemed to take the rumours at 
                                                 
44  Although many Nanumba expected a new Bimbilla Naa to stretch his authority to this area again, 
Konkomba leaders in Kpasa and Damanko towns said that they would not accept such Nanumba 
authorities. But when in 1997, Akyodé again tried to gain control over the Kpasa area, the Volta 
Region based Konkomba lawyer Jejeti petitioned the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team, which had 
extended its arbitration to this part of the country, and stated on behalf of the Konkomba leadership in 
Kpasa land that ‘the person who has jurisdiction over the land […] is the Paramount Chief of 
Bimbilla’ (‘Lawyer Jacob Jejeti on behalf of Konkomba Chiefs in Nkwanta District to The Perma-
nent Peace Negotiation Team’ (06-01-1998)). 
45  GW (27-12-2006) ‘Konkombas and Nanumbas brace up for another conflict’. 
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face value, assuming that there is no smoke without fire, and described Chamba 
as the source of danger.  
The Regional Minister then spoke for over half an hour, the first ten minutes 
in English and the rest in Dagbanli (similar to Nanunli). He made no effort to 
speak Likpakpaln and his speech was not translated into that language either. It 
may be noted that most Konkomba understand Nanunli, which is also the most 
common language of communication between them. However, the majority of 
Nanumba also understand basic Likpakpaln. 
In the speech of the Minister, the Dagbanli part of his speech was of similar 
content as the English part, albeit in a much more proverbial form. He hardly 
spoke about Chamba but he made two related points about his indiscriminate 
determination to development and security. First, he said that ‘This government 
is your government’ because ‘you voted for President Kufuor’ and that this 
government had an interest in the development of Nanun, and therefore Kufuor 
had nominated a Konkomba and a Nanumba DCE. However, government 
budgets ‘wasted’ on peace-keeping could be spent on development, so therefore 
the opinion leaders should advise their communities to abstain from violence. He 
prayed that he would never have to use military force on the district but he would 
hesitate to do so if people took the law in their own hands. The Minister did not 
specify this warning.   
In the ensuing open forum, the latent disagreement between both DCEs – the 
Nanumba Saeed found Chamba insecure while the Konkomba Ogajah considered 
rumour mongering Bimbilla unsafe – was continued in former MP George 
Mpanbe (a Konkomba) who asked the chiefs to send all rumourmongers to the 
security agencies, and in two NAYA peers who said that they had witnessed, 
during the funeral of the chief, that Chamba was ‘a very unsafe town’. Outside 
the hall, there were similar thoughts about the origins of insecurity. However, 
Konkomba suspicions that Nanumba rumourmongers wanted to provoke them 
and Nanumba thoughts that Konkomba wanted to seize the land of Chamba were 
eclipsed by a mutual fear for a supernatural force of violence. Those good at 
counting saw that Nanun was bedevilled by a thirteen year cycle of violence, 
after 1981 and 1994.  
To my interlocutors, rumour was the main expression of this evil spell. Al-
though rumour is a very strong public expression in any case (Ellis 1989), in 
conflict situations it is often the only source of information (Robben & Nord-
strom 1995: 15). De Boeck (2008) argued that rumours straddle publicity and 
privacy as the ‘awkward intimacy of a public secrecy’ (cf. Das 2007: 105, 111, 
130), hence triggering the need to validate or falsify them.46 As news spread 
                                                 
46  The uncertain truthfulness in rumours is evident from the Konkomba and Nanumba concepts of 
rumours. Most Konkomba described the rumours as tibòr ŋuulnkaan, implicating issues of which 
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around Bimbilla or Chamba, my interlocutors always first asked the messenger: 
‘Who told you?’ It struck me that during the tensions, few to no Nanumba went 
to Chamba to see if the Konkomba there were indeed preparing for war, and 
those who did mistrusted the town’s normality; few Konkomba went to Bimbilla 
to say that they were not. I elaborate on this insight in the next chapter.  
Students on Christmas break tried to stop the cycle of rumours and mistrust 
and replace it with dialogue. Many people I spoke to were disappointed in the 
Regional Minister who had only tried to empower the heavily divided chiefs and 
elders, without addressing the Chamba issue. There was however one group of 
people who felt responsible for averting further tensions: Students. Because it 
was Christmas break, most Konkomba and Nanumba college students were with 
their families. During college breaks, students usually engage in voluntary clean 
up exercises and health education programmes. While the Konkomba-Bassari 
Students Union (KOBASU) holds its annual congress during Summer break, the 
Nanumba Students Union has its congress (‘the homecoming week’) during 
Christmas break. During this week, students organise sports matches, quizzes, 
movie shows and a durbar for educated opinion leaders.  
Responding to the tensions, NASU leaders contacted KOBASU students from 
Chamba to play a soccer match with them in Chamba to give a message of peace, 
but the Police Superintendent forbade the match from being played, because he 
feared it would exacerbate tensions. Despite this disappointment, NASU and 
KOBASU leaders agreed to meet each other on 29 December in Bimbilla to 
discuss their possible role in reducing the tensions. At a closed door meeting (to 
which I was allowed), the students openly spoke (in English) about their fears of 
another conflict (‘If I hear a gunshot I will shit in my pants’) and their doubts 
about the position they were in. They felt a great responsibility to unite NASU 
and KOBASU in a Nanun Students Union. In fact, these students came under 
serious stress and many of them were to arrive back on campus two weeks late. 
This activism of students was a clear sign of the declining moral authority of the 
Youth Associations, of which students were junior members. NASU stimulated 
the KOBASU leaders to organise a conference in Chamba to convince everyone 
that this town was safe.  
But before this meeting on 3 January, Nanumba students held their annual 
homecoming durbar on 30 December, which had the surprisingly topical theme 
‘Peaceful coexistence: A tool for quality education’. The meeting was more 
informal than the Regional Security Council (REGSEC) meeting and the whole 
programme was in English. Whereas REGSEC had addressed the chiefs, this 
                                                 
they do not know whether they are true; Nanumba usually called the rumours lahibaya, or ‘the 
masses have said’. These words differed from what may be called gossip, information which lack 
authority but of which the truth is not doubted (LIK mbornyun; NAN tiŋmarlim). 
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meeting mainly linked politicians to students. After several Nanumba dancing 
performances, there were speeches of the DCEs, MPs a Minister of State and the 
national coordinator of the Ghana Network for Peace-Building (GHANEP), 
which was founded in 2002 as an umbrella platform organisation for over fifty 
NGOs working on peace-building.  
Thomas Ogajah (Nanumba South DCE) opened the programme by repeating 
that the rumours that Konkomba in Chamba were preparing to take up arms 
against Nanumba were untrue and by saying that peace must be a priority to 
students as future leaders of Nanun. After that, Salifu Saeed (the Nanumba North 
DCE) and Mohammed ibn Abass (Bimbilla MP) both briefly called for restraint 
and for student brokerage in the tensions after which they rallied applause for 
their development achievements. Many participants found the act of the DCE and 
MP, both Nanumba, of scoring off each other’s development successes during 
such tensions in Nanun embarrassing. 
In that sense, the speeches of Konkomba state executives were received much 
better. This was best exemplified in the speech of Charles Bintin, the Saboba MP 
and Minister of State. Like Ogajah, Bintin said that security personnel had to 
work harder to bring rumourmongers in Bimbilla to book. But while he held 
DISEC responsible for peace-keeping, Bintin said that Nanumba, or better put 
NAYA, as landowners should take the lead in organising a forum to peacefully 
resolve the tensions in Nanun. This statement earned him an ovation.  
But the speech which had the largest impact on the audience was that of the 
charismatic national coordinator of the NGO consortium GHANEP. Amidu 
Ibrahim Zakaria, himself a Nanumba, stood on behalf of Emmanuel Bombande, 
the Ghanaian chairman of the umbrella West African Network for Peace-Build-
ing (WANEP) and former assistant of Hizkias Assefa during the Kumasi peace 
workshops. Amidu forwarded a message from Bombande that ‘During the 
Kumasi 5 series we had a pledge and we should keep it’. This pledge was a vow 
of non-violence, which, as seen in chapter one, comprised one half of the Kumasi 
Accord. In his speech of around thirty minutes Amidu continuously coupled the 
pledge of non-violence to the need for dialogue about the contents of the peace 
deal. 
He called security a responsibility of the people themselves. He said that 
although conflict is unavoidable, because no-one is the same, it matters how you 
go about conflict in a non-violent way. He called rumours and ‘songs which 
make you want to vomit’ the worst type of violence because it set up ‘genera-
tions against generations’. He therefore called for tolerance and dialogue. While 
obviously a very different phenomenon from dialogue, Amidu left the theme of 
tolerance more or less unaddressed, the consequences of which I show below. On 
the need for dialogue he however said: 
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‘My brothers and sisters, any time in a society we find needs insecure, than what we 
do is we begin to build walls […] around ourselves, because that is the only way to 
get security. But the real nature of humankind is that my security lies in the society 
and I have a responsibility to ensure the security of the other person. Where have we 
left the beautiful norms and customs of our beloved country? We either have to go 
back for it or we are a lost people.’ 
Assefa’s legacy came through in Amidu’s statement that although silence is a 
technique of security (‘we build walls’), it rather caused an insecure situation in 
which people rather talk about each other than to each other. Rather than tracing 
the roots of insecurity, he challenged the audience, students in particular, to 
engage in a dialogue about the issues at stake.  
Inspired by this speech, the chairman of the durbar, the secondary school 
headman and a NAYA peer, obviously remembered the Kumasi workshops in 
which he participated and he asked all those present to rise and repeat a Kumasi 
workshop ritual. He asked them to take each others hand and sing ‘All we are 
saying is give peace a chance’! The invocation of such a globalised incantation 
(of John Lennon and Yoko Ono) was a striking form to take the sting out of the 
tensions. The song, which many participants sung at the top of their voices, was a 
direct reference to the Kumasi peace process. Immediately after the song, there 
was however another significant event in the spirit of that peace process.  
Salifu Saeed, the Nanumba North DCE, namely, invited the Nanumba student 
leader to him and gave him a cup under the explanation that Nanumba and 
Konkomba students from Bimbilla and Chamba would have to play a soccer 
match every year during Christmas break to celebrate peace in Nanun. So, while 
police had forbidden a soccer match a week earlier, the head of DISEC now 
encouraged such a match. And here we are back at page one of this book, where I 
introduced the case of a soccer match between the Bimbilla and Chamba teams 
as a metaphor for peace in Nanun. The repercussions of this initiative therefore 
exceed this chapter and I will carry them over to the general conclusion in the 
next chapter.  
While NASU had organised this durbar, they did not have a public voice. This 
changed on 3 January, when KOBASU organised a peace meeting in Chamba, 
where both Konkomba and Nanumba students gave speeches. In this meeting, 
chaired by former KOYA president Kenneth Wujangi, most executives who had 
delivered a speech in the Bimbilla durbar were present, except the Bimbilla MP, 
while there was also a KOYA representation from Saboba. But while these actors 
spoke to the people, KOBASU claimed to speak on behalf of these people.  
So far, the speeches had revolved around the message to keep the peace in the 
interest of development. The KOBASU president however delivered a speech in 
which he said that Konkomba had been misrepresented in the REGSEC meeting: 
The depictions of Chamba as an unsafe town eclipsed the profound injustices in 
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this place: Chamba farmers were cheated in their market; Konkomba butchers 
were illegally denied access to the abattoir and Nanumba chiefs had their hands 
in Konkomba leadership. Saying that ‘Konkombas are fighting for their rights in 
accordance with the constitution of Ghana which is the supreme law of our 
Nation’, the spokesman called for an end to all these injustices.  
After this speech, both the NASU president and the KOYA secretary spoke 
briefly to preach dialogue and student cooperation. The significance of this was 
that neither NASU nor KOYA directly reacted to the KOBASU speech; while 
the NASU president seemed to postpone his reaction to the KOBASU speech to a 
press conference half a week later (see below), the KOYA secretary rather 
seemed to have given the lead to the students.  
It was significant that while the Nanumba North DCE Saeed, a Nanumba, was 
very gentle on his largely Konkomba audience, (in vain) promising them 
development projects, both the Nanumba South DCE (Ogajah) and the Minister 
of State (Bintin) spoke with more persuasion to the Konkomba audience than 
they had done to the Nanumba audience in Bimbilla. Charles Bintin first called 
for one minute silence for the memory of the Chamba Naa and then he told the 
audience that he found the Chamba tensions ‘a disgrace’. In other words, only 
Nanumba spokesmen dared to provoke their Nanumba audience; similarly, only 
Konkomba spokesmen were hard on Konkomba audiences. 
But what united both DCEs and Bintin was their reaction to the issues raised 
by KOBASU. All three of them drew a sharp distinction between development 
cases (the abattoir and market controversies), which had to be solved by the 
District Assembly and DISEC, and the Konkomba leadership dispute in town, 
which the people themselves had to solve with reference to the Kumasi Accord. 
With this position, they withdrew their support to the late Chamba chief’s market 
boycott. 
A similar distinction was made in a NASU reaction to the KOBASU paper at a 
7 January press conference in Bimbilla. The president of NASU asked for a 
District Assembly resolution of the market and abattoir issues, but he also lined 
up behind the sovereignty of Nanumba chiefs, whom some Konkomba ‘have 
failed to give […] the due recognition’. So while KOBASU had presented the 
abattoir, market and leadership cases as an interrelated set of injustices, emerging 
from the central role of the Chamba Naa in all these cases, NASU disentangled 
the development issues from the chieftaincy dispute. KOBASU were not present 
at the Bimbilla press conference, but their leaders received the NASU position 
quite well, even though they were reluctant to put their confidence in the district 
administration and particularly in the District Chief Executive, who had openly 
supported the Chamba chief two months earlier. 
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For some days, tensions seemed to subside, until on 9 January, police at a 
Bimbilla roadblock intercepted guns and ammunition in a Konkomba truck. 
When the Nanumba North District Chief Executive told the national press that 
the war had already started, the small Konkomba community in Bimbilla took to 
their heels and fled. But nothing happened and after three days, the refugees 
returned, most with a smile on their faces as a combination of shame (for their 
fear) and relief. As sudden as tensions had started in Nanun, they subsided alto-
gether to give way to a normalcy which I have found so difficult to assess.  
It was in this context that NAYA and KOYA executives finally came down to 
Nanun, to show their faces in a public conference in Lungni town south of 
Wulensi on 14 January. However, as I later learned, in a subsequent closed door 
meeting in a Bimbilla restaurant, the actual reason of the Youth visit to Nanun 
became clear, as they received a budget and vehicle from the two DCEs in order 
to organise the joint peace education tour. This tour took place two weeks later, 
after I had just left the field, and telephone reports suggested that the communi-
ties they visited, including Chamba, endured this mission with resignation. The 
students were surprised how quickly they earned the moral authority from both 
the people on the streets and from government executives, and how quickly 
Youth Association executives, who were described as ‘big men in Accra’, lost 
theirs. The apparent loss of the Youth Associations’ authority was demonstrated 
a few months later.  
The ‘renewed commitments’, 2007 
The following events took place after I left Nanun in mid-January 2007 and I 
have had to follow them at a distance. While this seriously handicapped my 
analysis, I decided to include a description of the events to be able to wrap up the 
Chamba dispute. Not only the Youth Associations but NGOs too, CECOTAPS in 
particular, were absent during the Christmas break tensions. While he already 
considered the Chamba dispute a steppingstone for Nanun peace at large, Aidan 
told me that he found the problems in Chamba even bigger than he anticipated 
and because CECOTAPS had financial constraints, it had stopped mediation until 
further notice.  
GHANEP, the umbrella organisation for NGOs working in the field of peace-
building, had not been silent of course: Their executive’s speech in Bimbilla 
about the dangers of rumouring and the need for dialogue and tolerance reso-
nated in many subsequent speeches. Additionally, Ghana’s Jubilee stimulated the 
West Africa and Ghana Networks for Peace-building (WANEP and GHANEP) 
to facilitate a meeting with the delegates of the seven ethnic communities which 
had achieved the Kumasi Accord eleven years earlier. On 8 February, President 
Kufuor had given his annual State of the Nation Address, in which he indirectly 
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alluded to the Chamba tensions. In his speech, he rallied the participation of 
citizens in his development policies ‘in an atmosphere of peace and security’, and 
he made a special appeal to chiefs to resolve all disputes ‘with recourse to the 
law’.47 So whereas CECOTAPS had parked the chieftaincy dispute with ‘the 
government’, Kufuor bounced it back to the chiefs. 
This limbo was addressed a few months later in the GHANEP/WANEP work-
shop. On 2 and 3 August 2007, the WANEP staff Emmanuel Bombande, the 
GHANEP executive Zakaria and 47 participants signed an update on the Kumasi 
Accord.48 For years, but especially since the Chamba tensions, many educated 
Konkomba and Nanumba had called for such a written down recommitment to 
the peace accord. This shows that texts are higher valued than oral statements in 
Nanun, a tendency I summarised in the ‘book no lie’ adage in chapter one. 
Students and politicians, who had dominated the peace meetings, were not in-
cluded in the workshop. 
Although tolerance was a key word in the speech of the GHANEP executive at 
the Nanumba Students Union durbar in Bimbilla analysed above, the commit-
ments stimulated dialogue for consensus rather than dialogue for tolerance. In the 
preamble, the undersigned confirmed their dedication to the dialogue started in 
1996 but, other than in the Kumasi Accord which had tried to empower the 
ethnic communities to create their own security, they called human security and 
peace ‘the fundamental responsibility of the Government of Ghana’. This change 
has to be understood in the context of a development discourse which gave new 
vigour to the nation-state as the responsible agent for development and security 
(see chapter four).49 After the preamble, three ‘renewed commitments’ followed, 
respectively between Konkomba and Nanumba, Gonja and Nawuri and on 
Dagbon.  
The commitments between Konkomba and Nanumba delegations consisted of 
three clauses in terms of chieftaincy and land: One ascertained that ‘the princes 
and leaders of Nanung […] work assiduously to achieve a compromised solution’ 
in the Bimbilla chieftaincy dispute, while another amended clause five of the 
Kumasi Accord that the Bimbilla Naa allodial title to land is not only accepted by 
Konkomba but ‘by all ethnic groups in the traditional area’, so as to take away 
any suspicion that only Konkomba were excluded from land titles. These agree-
ments were intended to restore the sovereignty of Nanumba chiefs.  
The key clause for Konkomba/Nanumba relationships was however one 
addressing the issue of Konkomba headmen, to achieve consensus by coupling 
                                                 
47  ‘State of the Nation Address. 8th February 2007’; available at http://www.myjoyonline.com. 
48  ‘Engaging in dialogue to sustain peace in the Northern Region in Ghana’s Golden Jubilee Year’, 
available at www.g-rap.org/docs/RAO%20narr%202007/WANEP%20narr%202007-Q3&4.pdf. 
49  Emmanuel H. Bombande (05-02-2008) ‘Narrative Report’, available at www.g- 
rap.org/docs/RAO%20narr%202007/WANEP%20narr%202007-Q3&4.pdf. 
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‘continuous education of both Konkomba and Nanumba youth in Nanung on the 
letter and spirit of the Kumasi peace accord’ to the establishment of ‘a consulta-
tive forum […] to clearly define the process and criteria for selecting and 
enskining [sic] Konkomba leaders/chiefs.’. So while the delegates seemed to 
acknowledge that the eleven-year-old agreement was largely unknown to the 
general public, they also recognised that Konkomba leadership procedures were 
shrouded in confusion and hence required codification. However, the clause 
remained vague about the relation or distinction between ‘selecting’ and ‘enskin-
ing’ and ‘leaders’ and ‘chiefs’, as well as about the form of such a consultative 
forum; the controversy about the power of decision in such cases is likely to 
continue. 
Conclusion 
This book’s main line of thought is that if Konkomba and Nanumba find their 
rights as equal citizens or as autochthons, violated by the other, their intra-ethnic 
divisions, mostly in terms of modernization, tend to be eclipsed by ethnically 
divisive mutual victimhood. The Chamba case showed how a local dispute be-
tween and among Konkomba and Nanumba alternated between what Lonsdale 
called internal moral ethnicity and external political tribalism. 
Moreover, the dispute showed that the main conflict issues between Kon-
komba and Nanumba still had the capacity to render their inter-ethnic relations 
tense and that these tensions hardly generated dialogue, except in the closed door 
meeting of students, but mostly led to a non-dialogue coupled to speeches or 
petitions of spokesmen claiming the authority to represent their ethnic communi-
ties. Such representations had a legalistic character because the spokesmen or 
petitioners wanted to provide evidence, usually to state security agencies, of the 
violated rights of their ethnic communities, as autochthons or as equal citizens. 
This legalistic format, which as Wilson & Mitchell showed (see chapter one), 
produced a communicative strategy of silence and authoritative speech, one 
which Assefa wanted to stop in 1995.  
The abundance, variety and complexity of the events studied in this chapter 
defy simple conclusions, which also conflate with the general conclusions in the 
next chapter. I focus here on the relationship between autochthony and sover-
eignty in the decisions made in the dispute. It may be helpful to recapitulate the 
main decisions in the dispute.  
In 1998, the new chief of Chamba invited the acting Konkomba leader in town 
(Nyilyar) and told him that he should nominate a candidate for him to give his 
blessings to. Nyilyar became the candidate with a mandate from the Konkomba 
‘earth priest’ and the elders of most Konkomba clan communities in town but in 
spite of his own aspirations (he wanted to be a farmer). The Chamba chief gave 
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his blessings to him. However, Biligban, the main advisor to the previous leader, 
did not agree to this decision and between 1998 and 2002, he in vain sought an 
overrule from the Chamba Naa, the Nanumba Traditional Council and High 
Court, while the District Security Council froze the dispute and pressed the chief 
to exercise his sovereignty in the case. In August 2002, the Chamba Naa there-
upon installed Biligban, not just as a headman but as one of his sub-chiefs.  
Consequently, many local Konkomba considered this imposition a Nanumba 
attempt to divide and rule them and they marched to the chief’s palace fully 
armed, only to be stopped by the local Konkomba Youth Association chairman. 
He reported the case to the Youth Association headquarters in Saboba, and 
Konkomba Youth Association executives petitioned the Regional Security 
Council that Konkomba citizenship rights and the peace accord were violated. 
Nanumba Youth Association executives wrote a reply in which they stipulated 
that Konkomba were subjects of Nanumba chiefs according to the Kumasi 
Accord. After one meeting between the Youth Associations, mediated by the 
Regional Administration, the dispute fizzled out and returned to a local silence. 
In this period, the Chamba Naa tolerated Nyilyar as the Konkomba leader, while 
Biligban sat in a mostly empty palace. 
After more than two years of status quo, a peace-building initiative from the 
Catholic Relief Services and USAID organized a series of peace workshops with 
delegates (youth, elders and women) of the chief and both Konkomba contest-
ants, resulting in a declaration that the chief of Chamba would suspend his sover-
eignty and accept any Konkomba resolution in town, provided it was mediated 
by the Konkomba ‘earth priest’. This mediation resulted in a status quo again.  
However, this peace-building initiative parked the (male) chieftaincy case and 
instead focused on women and development to take away the seed-beds of 
conflict in town. But the market controversy, added to the abattoir case, showed 
the entanglement of development issues with the chieftaincy dispute. This 
became clear when the chief’s suspended the market in town. Because the 
District Chief Executive and DISEC, of which he was the chairman, backed the 
chief, many Konkomba felt betrayed by local government and the security agen-
cies and moreover, Konkomba revolts to the boycott were considered to be 
illegal. Simmering Nanumba thoughts that Chamba was an unsafe town were 
ignited when the chief died.  
DISEC played a central role in trying to prevent a violent conflict by increas-
ing security measures and by first empowering Konkomba and Nanumba chiefs 
and elders and second, as chiefs and elders remained passive, by supporting 
student initiatives to dialogue. The Youth Associations were strikingly absent. As 
Konkomba students aired the injustices of Konkomba in Chamba, DCEs drew a 
distinction between development and security issues, which would be handled by 
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the District Administration and DISEC, and chieftaincy issues, which had to be 
handled outside government reach, by reference to the Kumasi Accord. Nanumba 
students agreed to this.  
Finally, the Ghana Network for Peace-building, the heir of the NGO Consor-
tium, commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of Ghana’s Independence with a 
peace workshop in Kumasi where most erstwhile participants committed them-
selves to the Kumasi Accord and dedicated themselves to a consultative forum to 
codify the procedures of choosing Konkomba headmen. But with the Nanumba 
Traditional Council at a standstill due to the Bimbilla chieftaincy dispute and the 
lack of a Nanumba paramount chief, such a consultative forum appears to have 
been postponed.  
A sense of being the victim of the other’s illegal action is the hinge point 
between internal divisions and external ethnic rigidity. A prominent Konkomba 
in Chamba commented on Konkomba chieftaincy in Nanun in the following 
words: ‘It spoils us but we need it’. Many Konkomba I spoke to in Chamba were 
very unhappy with the dispute and with the behaviour of the contestants; how-
ever, this assessment could easily slide into blaming ‘the Nanumba’ for, in the 
words of one interlocutor, ‘banging our heads together’. From the Nanumba 
point of view, few chiefs were as controversial as the Chamba Naa was, espe-
cially due to his role in the Bimbilla succession dispute, and many were very 
critical of his role in the Chamba dispute. However, this assessment could also 
slide into blaming ‘the Konkomba’ for failing to pay the due respect to this very 
chief. Although only the suspected violation of rights seemed to have had the 
capacity to trigger violence, such victimhood was embedded in the wider context 
of moral detestation, i.e. the general Nanumba theory that Konkomba abused 
their hospitality versus the Konkomba notion that Nanumba used their autoch-
thony to denigrate settlers. 
The Chamba case showed how Konkomba leadership in Chamba developed 
into a Konkomba/Nanumba conflict because both sides found the others’ activi-
ties illegal, rather than just morally detestable. In this process, we saw how 
spokesmen claimed the authority of ethnic representation, of authoritative 
speech, notably KOYA and NAYA in 2002, but also how these Youth Associa-
tions lost a significant portion of their authority to students in 2006. In other 
words, a legalistic discourse brings along a social structure in which entire 
communities refer to the petitions or speeches of whom they consider to be their 
representatives in phrasing their injustices. In such a situation, as seen especially 
in 2002 but also in 2006, their authorities do not ‘sit together’ to seek compro-
mise, but rather make their legalistic statements. Whereas Assefa mistrusted such 
elitism, this chapter showed how students were forced into such a position 
against their will (see also the next chapter). 
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While the peace agreements seemed to have successfully taken the legal sting 
out of earth sacrifices and elections, this chapter showed how traditional rule, 
rather than having an intrinsic sovereignty and being a source of peace-building 
(cf. Assefa 1996; Voorhoeve 2007: 20), continued to invoke Konkomba and 
Nanumba theories of injustices, both among and between them. When Assefa 
and his team argued that traditions in northern Ghana were still strong and intact 
and they erroneously equated customary law to tradition, they overlooked the 
hand of the state, both colonial and post-colonial, in bolstering such traditions 
into a bundle of contradictions. While they aspired to restoring an intrinsic sover-
eignty, most people in Nanun awaited external state decisions and lined up 
behind authorities who petitions to that end.  
The Chamba dispute revolved around the power of decision of the chief in 
town. Did he have the right, as the landowner, to install an unpopular Konkomba 
candidate as his sub-chief and did he have the right to suspend the market for 
three weeks? The Konkomba majority did not think he had the right to do so and 
considered his interventions illegal, while the chief and many Nanumba consid-
ered this Konkomba rejection illegal. While representatives of both sides peti-
tioned the district and regional security agencies for countering such illegal 
actions, they reacted by temporarily freezing decisions for security reasons and a 
non-intervention.  
The neutrality of these agencies however implied an explicit categorization of 
the dispute in the realm of traditional rule, in which Nanumba chiefs were sover-
eign as landowners. In 2006, the DCE and DISEC initially backed the develop-
ment and security decisions of the Chamba chief, rather than those of the elected 
Assembly member, thereby exacerbating Konkomba interpretations that their 
citizenship rights were secondary to their subject position to chiefs. While the 
DCEs and Ministers of State renounced the chief’s interventions, it will take a lot 
of effort to remove the widespread disappointment of especially Konkomba in 
the local government. The latest tensions emanating from Chamba suggest that 
procedures of electing and recognizing Konkomba headmen require not so much 
more codification, as proposed in the Renewed Commitments, but rather a con-
sideration of the very place of such Konkomba leadership in Nanumba chief-
taincy and the relationship between the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ forms of 
government in Ghana. 
Nanun has endured two very serious tests to its peace. When in the past 
conflicts, state agencies failed to live up to the local expectations to solve this 
violation, petitions for a state intervention drowned in vigilante violence. Why 
didn’t this happen in 2002 or 2007? Put negatively, perhaps violence did not 
occur because there was no guinea fowl incident to ignite the tensions or put 
more optimistically, most interlocutors told me that they were ‘fed up’ with 
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fighting. Most interlocutors coupled fear for violence to the recognition of a 
pledge of non-violence in Kumasi, even though few of them knew the exact 
contents of this peace deal. A third explanation may be that security agencies 
were much more actively present during the Chamba tensions than during the 
tensions which resulted in the past violent conflicts. The police prohibition of a 
soccer match between the Bimbilla and Chamba teams may symbolise this 
vigour. But however auspicious this non-violence may be, the mechanisms 
triggering previous episodes of violence have not been cleared. In the past, 
feeling victimized by the others’ illegal action, bolstered in conspiracy theories 
and coupled to a sense of betrayal by the state, first rendered Nanun silent and 
then extremely violent. In that sense, the current calm in Chamba may continue 
to be ominous.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
After addressing the themes and questions from the introduction in the previous 
five chapters, we can now draw conclusions about the different forms of autoch-
thony and citizenship equality discourses (rights or stereotypes) and processes of 
depoliticization in relation to violence. Below, I start with some considerations 
about drawings conclusions as such, followed by a brief synopsis of the argu-
mentation in this study, based on the double Konkomba/Nanumba meanings of 
peace as calm and unity, and finish with analytical thoughts about the move from 
consensus to compromise in the pursuit of Konkomba/Nanumba peace. 
Considerations for concluding 
In chapter one, I quoted Eltringham’s argument that because conflict is about 
disagreement, scholars of conflict should give voice to such disagreements and 
show confusion rather than sanitized truths, also because I feared that my future 
analytical representations would become a reference of scholarly evidence in 
Konkomba and Nanumba legalistic petitions, just like the work of Tait and 
Skalník. It was significant that my possible scholarly authority seemed to be tied 
to my future texts rather than my presence in the field; this was most tangible in 
the Christmas tensions described in chapter six, when I felt neutrality actually 
imposed on me. 
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In chapter one I argued that when my interlocutors said that they could not 
wait to read my book, this flatter was eclipsed by my doubts about my expertise 
and nervousness about what local leadership would use my findings for. While 
most people I worked with thought that my research would reveal ‘the facts’, my 
work was about dismantling such ontological aspirations and trying to represent 
the ways in which facts fractured. But I am worried that my message for the 
people in Nanun, that there is no straightforward solution for their conflict, but 
rather an overwhelming contingency of voices, silences, disagreements, suspi-
cions and misrepresentations, will disappoint many interlocutors.  
My consent with Eltringham’s line of thought notwithstanding, I have found 
its application very cumbersome. I had to understand the general patterns and 
threads before dissolving them in my material’s inconsistencies or contradictions. 
Retrospectively, I seem to have come only halfway of this trajectory. My re-
search often went in opposite directions: Trying to understand what was going on 
and seeking consistencies, while simultaneously looking at the pieces that did not 
fit.   
Synopsis 
These considerations made it difficult to draw straightforward conclusions. Let’s 
therefore recapitulate the main findings chapter by chapter. In chapter one, I 
posed the question, through the soccer match case, whether there was peace in 
Nanun. The match confronted me with an eerie calm which resonated with one of 
two Konkomba and Nanumba definitions of peace (nsudoon or sodoo), but not 
with the other definition (unity; kimòkbaan or nangbaŋyini). Whence this calm? 
It was certainly conflict avoidance, in the meaning given to it by Assefa, who 
called such pretences of tranquillity inauthentic. However, anthropologists such 
as Tait and Skalník have rather shown that such calm, as symbolised by the 
soccer match, has been a typical manifestation of inter-ethnic reserve in this part 
of Ghana (see chapter one).  
The deliberate abstinence from provocation, tackles and insults, which are 
characteristic for soccer matches in this part of the world (and probably beyond), 
certainly attested to a certain type of conflict avoidance, but I have tried to show 
that this calm was eclipsed by a silence-generating legalistic discourse between 
Konkomba and Nanumba. The soccer match, from this point of view, was an 
improper site for invoking the issues at stake between them. The core in this 
interpretation is that both Konkomba and Nanumba seemed to acknowledge the 
possibility of a future occasion on which these issues could be addressed and 
clarified to such an extent that they would allow for unity in Nanun. In sum, most 
Konkomba and Nanumba I spoke to evaluated their peace as halfway between 
calm and unity.  
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Aspirations to unity have been explicitly phrased in the Kumasi Accord 
agreements between them. As I showed in chapter one, the twelve clauses in the 
Accord roughly split in two halves between clauses ensuring the prevention of 
violence as a way of addressing conflict issues and clauses consensually solving 
the conflict issues. By its own standards, then, the calm in Nanun, which I found 
symbolically represented in the soccer match, testified to the success of the 
former set of agreements and the failure of the second set. While Kon-
komba/Nanumba relationships have been non-violent since 1996, consensus 
about the key issues and their solutions has been drowned in lack of consensus 
and consequently in a silence-generating legalistic authoritative speech or peti-
tioning.  
Taking this silence into consideration, we should ask how feasible such a 
consensual unity is. While the peace mediators in the Kumasi workshops aspired 
to the restoration of a pre-conflict unity around consensual traditions, I have 
deconstructed such representations in chapter two. In this study I have tried to 
show that rather than producing security, the fiction of consensus and its aspira-
tion to it often triggered disappointment when it appeared to be out of reach. 
Such disappointment has more than once slid into suspicion and even violence. 
Let’s look at a synopsis of the analysis for clarifying this point. 
In order to understand the calm in Nanun, I have analytically linked debates of 
autochthony, violence and sovereignty, peace-building and legalistic discourses. 
To address this question, we have taken a long trajectory through five chapters. 
Chapter two showed that although Konkomba and Nanumba coexistence may 
have always been shaped in terms of moral judgments or clichés about each other 
(feudal Nanumba or Konkomba bush people), it was a legal clash between regis-
ters of rights based on autochthony and rights based on citizenship majority, first 
about Konkomba self-arbitration and after that about the Konkomba rights of free 
settlement in Nanun, which forced their cohabitation in a strenuous legalistic 
straitjacket of seemingly rigid ethnic opposition or political tribalism after 1979.  
In chapter three, we saw how these issues took specific forms, or tropes 
(Geschiere & Jackson, see chapter one), of violence and a silence-generating 
authoritative and legalistic petitions, drawing heavily on moral judgments of 
mutual exploitation – Konkomba abusing Nanumba hospitality and Nanumba 
imposing feudal chiefs on Konkomba – which alone were insufficient to trigger 
violence. Rather, violence burst out as Konkomba and Nanumba took the law 
into their own hands to counter what they considered to be violations of their 
constitutional rights.  
Chapters four to six were critical examinations of the post-Peace Accord 
situation forms of addressing the conflict themes. Chapters four and five showed 
that prior to the Peace Accord, some Nanumba tried to prevent Konkomba from 
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casting their votes while some Konkomba performed sacrifices at Nanumba earth 
shrines. Judging from scholarship, I expected that the marks of autochthony and 
majority – the earth shrine and the polling station – would generate tensions and 
explicit acts to demonstrate either position. But quite on the contrary, since 1996, 
Nanumba have not tried to subvert the marks of Konkomba citizenship majority 
(polling stations), and that Konkomba have not challenged the marks of Na-
numba autochthony (earth shrines), in spite of moral judgments: Many Nanumba 
found Konkomba immature voters but did not contest their right to vote, while 
many Konkomba considered Nanumba lousy landowners but did not contest their 
title.  
The headmen controversy depicted in chapter six showed that not Konkomba 
citizenship or Nanumba autochthony as such generated tensions, but rather a 
(perceived) clash between these two sets of rights and the power of decision, 
drawn from autochthony or citizen majority, to overrule one register of rights. 
While accepting Nanumba chieftaincy and the necessity to have their leadership 
blessed by Nanumba chiefs, many Konkomba did not accept the power of deci-
sion of such chiefs to refuse their candidate. For most Nanumba, on the contrary, 
this Konkomba refusal corrupted the fundamental rule in their chieftaincy, 
namely that each title is an award or privilege. This controversy was not resolved 
by the Kumasi Accord but rather exacerbated by it, because representatives from 
both sides referred to clause two in order to cast their claims.  
In the Chamba dispute, especially in 2002, ethnic spokesmen, both Konkomba 
and Nanumba, referred to clause two of the Kumasi Accord, but they gave differ-
ent readings of the clause. While Konkomba Youth stressed the right of free 
choice of Konkomba as Ghanaian citizens, Nanumba Youth emphasised that 
such choice had to be in the interest of Nanumba chiefs, who embodied Na-
numba tradition. In this situation we saw the limits of consensus: While Kon-
komba and Nanumba agreed on the Nanumba traditional privileges and on the 
equal Konkomba rights as citizens, the issue of headmen – a novelty in Nanumba 
chieftaincy – seemed to straddle both registers. Compromise may be the only 
way ahead. 
Silence and lack of consensus 
The Chamba case illustrated a peace in which people in Nanun neither used 
violence nor sat together to talk their contentions out. While the Kumasi Accord 
helped prevent violence in Nanun, Assefa called such a truce of non-violence a 
‘negative peace’ so long as it failed to achieve consensus about the conflict is-
sues. But how negative is such a peace? Before elaborating on that, let’s first 
look at the reasons why consensus about the conflict issues has failed in Nanun. 
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First, only Nanumba traditions were recognised. On the whole, the peace deal 
is very ethnic, which may come as a surprise considering that both Konkomba 
and Nanumba are citizens and subjects and that Nanumba autochthony has a high 
tendency to fragment in smaller pieces than ethnicity (see chapter five). The 
prominent ethnic character of the Accord already suggests how closely Nanumba 
ethnicity and traditions are entwined. As seen throughout this study, Nanumba 
have constantly been divided internally about their traditions, which are far from 
straightforward and consensual – for example about eligibility to paramount 
chieftaincy – while such moral ethnicity has the potential to slip over to a legal-
istic political tribalism, as we saw in the Chamba dispute. Nanumba traditions are 
unlikely to produce consensus. 
Second, as Assefa explicitly placed the Nanun peace in the realm of tradition, 
which he considered to be strong and intact and away from the disruptions of 
modern political competition. His representation of tradition resonated with what 
Hansen & Stepputat recently called ‘intrinsic sovereignty’ or a Durkheimian 
collective ethos which motivated everyday life. Such a theory, that if you follow 
tradition you will know what to do, clashes with an acceptance that sovereignty 
was externalised, as in the work of Schmitt but also of Skalník. When Assefa 
claimed that traditions in northern Ghana were still strong and intact and he 
equated customary law to tradition, he overlooked the hand of the state, both 
colonial and post-colonial, in bolstering such traditions into a bundle of contra-
dictions. While Assefa argued that a small elite (Youth Associations) had tried to 
politicize and therefore ravaged traditions, but that traditions had survived in the 
communities and among the voices of reason, he overlooked the reality that 
youth had not only claimed but also often received the modernist authority from 
their people to make and break traditions. When Assefa called for infusing tradi-
tions with the positive elements of modernity, he actually repeated the Youth 
Associations agenda. But by excluding the Youth from this infusing and rather 
focusing on the changes bubbling up from the grassroots, it remained unclear 
who had the moral authority to infuse traditions.  
This brings us to a related third point. Assefa thought that talking heals and 
that calm is pathological. While I have certainly appreciated this point, free 
speech between Konkomba and Nanumba on the issues which divided them is a 
fiction. Assefa namely presumed that knowledge was free, hence his selection of 
the ‘voices of reason’, but these ‘voices’ became authorities in their villages. 
Sixty odd years earlier, Amherst, the colonial officer who wrote the Nanumba 
constitution for the purpose of introducing British indirect rule in Nanun, was 
already confronted with the silence, secrecy and ambiguity of his Nanumba 
interlocutors. In sum, the idea that once consensus has been reached, each and 
every Konkomba and Nanumba would be able to freely talk about their previous 
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issues of contention may be attractive for peace-builders but not realistic if epis-
temology and authority are as interwoven as in Nanun. 
However, even if Nanumba traditions may not be so consensual and self-
explanatory as the mediation team thought they were, Konkomba and Nanumba 
delegates agreed that Nanumba owned their traditions and that Konkomba would 
abide by them. The controversy however emerged when it came to demarcating 
the confines of the Nanumba traditions, especially when Konkomba considered 
them to clash with their citizenship rights, as the Chamba dispute illustrated. It is 
in this very lack of consensus about the exact validity of customary law and 
modern law that we have to place the obsession with external sovereign deci-
sions, to suspend one register of rights for the application of another.  
While a future consultative forum about the codification of headmen selection 
procedures may certainly clarify some difficulties, it is likely to ignore the over-
riding controversy: Whether the locus of headmen titles is within or without 
Nanumba chieftaincy. The constitutional set-up of Ghana seems to allow no 
other categories. Although Konkomba leadership chosen by councils of elders do 
not seem to fit in either, they have been placed in the realm of Nanumba tradi-
tion, both by the NGO Consortium and subsequent NGO initiatives and, through 
their non-intervention, by most state agencies including DISEC. However, this 
traditional realm has been demarcated by the state, often drawing on colonial 
constructions. Whether or not they are a viable structure in Ghana’s political 
system is a different question, but certainly, chieftaincy is not original or authen-
tic and in that sense, the consensus to which the renewed commitments aspired 
may be a dead-end. 
But what are the consequences of such a lack of consensus or unity? Accord-
ing to the Kumasi peace workshops, lack of consensus was tantamount to lack of 
trust, and hence insecurity, and lack of cooperation as ‘brothers in development’, 
and hence deprivation. In the paradigm of Assefa, which he implemented in the 
peace process, security and development in Nanun could only bubble up from 
healthy, reconciled relationships (‘full of energy and differences’) based on 
consensus about the root causes of the conflict, and ways to solve them, between 
Konkomba and Nanumba. For Assefa, therefore, peace, security and develop-
ment were intertwined; consider his description of the Kumasi peace workshops 
as ‘consultations on development’. Without unity, security measures would be 
coercive and development programmes divisive. The value of an integrative ap-
proach to peace, development and security has been exemplified by the Chamba 
dispute, namely how quickly alleged technocratic development and security 
interventions were drowned in the headmen controversy.  
In any case, consensus, depoliticization and a legalistic discourse seem to go 
hand in hand. My data suggests that the denial of politics in tradition or in local 
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government has the potential to generate sentiments of victimhood, based on 
theories that one’s rights are violated by illegal actions of the other, while politi-
cal competition seems to take the sting out of the disappointment that there is no 
consensus in Nanun.1 Although Konkomba in Chamba seemed to suffer most 
from such depoliticization – many Nanumba instantly considered Konkomba 
objections to the locus of headmen in Nanumba tradition and the exclusion of 
‘their’ (Konkomba) Assembly member from crucial local government decisions 
to be illegal – the denial of politics affected Nanumba too, when they chiefs and 
kingmakers used tradition as a cloak in the Bimbilla dispute or when the un-
popular DCE said that he was the government. In the shadows of peace agree-
ments, which regularly triggered tensions when politics popped up where it 
allegedly should not and when residents of Nanun had to like each other against 
their will, political competition and moral disapproval may have produced a 
peace which appears to be pretty robust. You don’t have to agree in order to live 
in peace. How does this relate to the soccer match metaphor? 
Disagreements but no violence: Back to the soccer match 
The calls for a decision in the Chamba case have brought back the silence-gener-
ating legalistic forms of communication, especially petitions, which Assefa and 
his team hoped to have solved by the Kumasi Accord, because they hindered the 
peace. Throughout this book however, we have constantly seen how tensions 
about victimhood, which motivated previous outbreaks of violence, blew over 
leaving mutual stereotypes. While this moral realm certainly remains a source of 
conflict, as the latest outbreak of tensions suggest, such stereotypes are equally a 
source of ethnic fragmentation. The best examples of this process were Kon-
komba assessments that Nanumba were more politically skilled which resembled 
Nanumba self-images of political maturity but also that their leadership was 
politicized; and the Nanumba images of Konkomba as immature and primitive 
bush people which came somewhat close to Konkomba self-images as a naive 
people (see chapters four and five).  
This point invites to briefly considering a theme for future research: Toler-
ance. While the concept of tolerance featured in several speeches during the 
Christmas tensions, these were little more than a shorthand for ‘unity in diver-
sity’. Concomitant with the transfer of issues from rights to moral disapproval 
seems to be, as demonstrated in chapter five, a shift from a political to divine 
sovereignty to counter illegal behaviour. We have seen that both Konkomba and 
Nanumba recognised the sovereignty of earth spirits in a locality and tolerated 
                                                 
1  On an important side-note which requires more research, I was struck by the general faith of Kon-
komba and Nanumba in the judiciary, which, contrary to the legislative and executive powers, has a 
profound image of neutrality. 
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poor behaviour of the other, because they considered it to be a matter between 
him and God or the earth spirits.  
In the end, this seems to be the message of the soccer match between the 
Nanumba Nationals from Bimbilla and the Chamba Soccer Heroes; that in spite 
of disagreements and disapprovals, two teams felt secure to voluntarily play a 
match without any threat of violent escalation. The students, who wanted to 
repeat this match during the Christmas break tensions, were very much aware 
that the match symbolised a certain peace between Konkomba and Nanumba, 
which its playing would demonstrate. DISEC first mistrusted the peace in this 
match and banned it for security reasons, while a week later, the Committee used 
it for its own peace-keeping ends. Although the chairman of DISEC, the DCE, 
even presented a cup which the teams would have to compete for, latest tele-
phone reports from Nanun suggested that neither during Christmas 2007 nor 
during Christmas 2008, was such a match played. The reason for this, apparently, 
was that such a staged match lacked the voluntary intentions to play in spite of 
disagreements. Such matches may symbolize an ominous calm in Nanun rather 
than resolve it, but they may also contribute to an auspicious coexistence in 
Nanun. It is therefore to be hoped that such voluntary soccer matches will be 
played again.  
  
Annexes 
 
 
Orthography 
In this study I use the names Konkomba and Nanumba for scholarly consistency. 
Konkomba and Nanumba speaking English use these names, but Nanumba speak 
of themselves as Nanuŋba (sg. Nanuŋa), while Konkomba call them Binanuŋ (sg. 
Unanuŋja). Konkomba call themselves Bikpakpaln (sg. Ukpakpalnja), while Na-
numba call them Kpuŋpaŋba (sg. Kpuŋpaŋa).  
For an overview of language clusters in Nanun and adjacent areas, see Naden 
(1988). The question whether Nanunli (NAN) is a language of its own or a 
dialect of Dagbanli has not been resolved. I found the two tongues to be very 
similar, with some conjugations and plural forms in Nanunli different from 
Dagbanli and a small set of words in use which are alien to Dagbanli. Unless 
specified otherwise, my spelling in this study is congruent with that of Dagbanli 
(Mahama 2003b; Sulley 2000; TICCS 2002) and may differ from the spellings of 
Skalník and colonial officer Amherst. 
The internal differences in Likpakpaln (LIK) are much bigger than that be-
tween Dagbanli and Nanunli and some Konkomba had difficulty understanding 
each other (e.g. my assistant and some of our interlocutors). In this study I use 
the standardised spelling of Likpakpaln (as in Ghana Institute of Language, 
Literacy and Bible Translation (1983) and Langdon & Breeze 1981). This spell-
ing is based on the Lichaborl dialect spoken in and around Saboba and differs 
from that of Tait and the French ethnographer Froelich. I have made use of the 
common Dagbanli and Likpakpaln alphabets; ŋ is pronounced ng as in ‘sing’ and 
γ as a throaty ‘r’ as in the French ‘très’ (cf. Piot 1999).  
  
Acronyms 
 
 
 
 
AA All Africa (online news portal) 
Ag Acting 
AI The Ashanti Independent (newspaper) 
BNI Bureau of National Investigation 
CCNT Chief Commissioner Northern Territories (colonial) 
CECOTAPS Centre for Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies 
CPP Convention People’s Party 
CRS Catholic Relief Services 
CS  Colonial Secretary (colonial) 
CSP  Commissioner Southern Province (colonial) 
DA District Assembly 
DC District Commissioner (colonial) 
DCE District Chief Executive  
DG Daily Graphic (newspaper) 
DISEC District Security Council 
DK Deutsches Kolonialblatt (German Colonial Journal) 
DPO  District Political Officer (colonial) 
DSP District Superintendent of Police 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
GC Ghanaian Chronicle (newspaper) 
GHANEP Ghana Network for Peace-Building 
GILLBT Ghana Institute of Language, Literacy and Bible Translation 
Gongong IV Military Task Force 
GT  Ghanaian Times (newspaper) 
GV The Ghanaian Voice (newspaper) 
GW Ghana Web (online news portal) 
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
IDPs Internally displaced persons 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
KOBASU Konkomba-Bassari Students Union 
KOYA Konkomba Youth Assocation 
MFGS Mitteilungen von Forschungsreisenden und Gelehrten aus den  
 deutschen  Schutzgebieten (Research Proceedings from German  
 Protectorates) 
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MP Member of Parliament 
NASU Nanumba Students Union 
NAYA Nanumba Youth Association 
NDA Nanumba District Assembly 
NDC National Democratic Congress 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NNDA Nanumba North District Assembly 
NPI Nairobi Peace Initiative 
NPP Northern People’s Party; New Patriotic Party 
NRC National Reconciliation Commission 
NT Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (colonial) 
NTC Nanumba Traditional Council 
PDCs People’s Defence Committees 
PNC People’s National Convention 
PPNT Permanent Peace Negotiation Team 
PRAAD Public Records and Archives Administration Department 
PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy 
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
REGSEC Regional Security Council 
SIL Summer Institute of Linguistics 
TRC South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WA West Africa (magazine) 
WANEP West Africa Network for Peace-Building 
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Glossary 
 
 
 
 
Afanima (sg. afa) NAN Muslims 
Amasachina NAN (Hausa) Youth 
Asòre Twi Anti-witchcraft shrine (literally  
  ‘church’) 
Banyili NAN Nanumba chieftaincy gate (literally  
  ‘house of the bangle’) 
Bikpakpaan (sg. Ukpakpalnja) LIK Konkomba 
Bikpakpaan aamòkbaan  LIK Konkomba Youth Association  
  (literally ‘Konkomba unity’)   
Bikpakpaan aatindaan LIK Konkomba earth priest 
Bikpakpaannyon LIK Konkomba Market (in Accra) 
Bimbilla Naa NAN Nanumba paramount chief (literally  
  ‘Bimbilla chief’)  
Bikpanpalb LIK Chiefs’ elders 
Buγli NAN Earth shrine 
Chaamininkpel LIK Chief’s elder (from Twi òchaame) 
Chabob LIK Saboba 
Dan NAN Clan 
Dibu NAN Chop (euphemism for corruption) 
Do LIK Place indicator  
Dogim NAN Lineage 
Dondo NAN War drum 
Fara NAN Poverty 
Fufu  Staple of mashed yams 
Gacaca  Village tribunals in Rwanda 
Gbugmayili NAN Nanumba chieftaincy gate (literally  
  ‘house of the lion’) 
Gongong Twi Announcement bell 
Igiin LIK Poverty 
Jabun LIK Protective ancestral shrine 
Ji LIK Chop (euphemism for corruption) 
Kali NAN Tradition 
Kambonsi NAN Warriors 
Kidabuk LIK Single barrel gun 
  
201
Kijaak LIK Communal violence 
Kikpakpaan LIK Konkomba land 
Kimòkbaan LIK Peace (literally ‘unity’) 
Kimòkpaanyaab LIK Peace-builders (literally ‘peace  
  people’) 
Kininkpòkpòk LIK Quarrel 
Kitork LIK Sacrifice 
Kòfie Twi Market festival 
Kom baγibu NAN Libation of water 
Kòtini Pidgin English Popular name for Nanumba  
  Traditional Council 
Kpema (pl. kpamba)  NAN Elder 
Kper LIK Libation (literally ‘pour’) 
Kpungkpaam kpema NAN Konkomba elder 
Likpakpaaln LIK Konkomba language 
Linampal LIK Homeland (literally ‘home’) 
Linampal aatingbaln LIK Homeland earth shrine 
Liluul LIK Poison 
Litingbaln LIK Earth shrine 
Litingbalwaal LIK Earth shrine spirit 
Lunsi NAN Tom-tom beaters  
Magasia NAN (Hausa) Women leaders 
Maligu NAN Sacrifice 
Naa (pl. Naanima) NAN Chief 
Naabihi (sg. Naabia) NAN Princes (literally ‘chief’s children’) 
Naakpamba NAN Kingmakers (literally ‘chief’s  
  elders’) 
Naakuli NAN Funeral of the chief 
Naam NAN Chieftaincy 
Naawuni NAN God 
Nangbaŋyini NAN Peace (literally ‘unity’) 
Nanun NAN Nanumba land 
Ndipòòndaan LIK Beer festival (literally ‘new sorghum  
  beer’) 
Nkaal LIK Tradition 
Nnyok LIK Medicine 
Nsudoon LIK Peace (literally ‘calm’) 
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Nuli dibu NAN Yam harvesting festival (literally  
  ‘yam eating’) 
Nyiin LIK Protective ancestral shrine 
Pito  Sorghum beer 
Polatisi Pidgin English Politics 
Sabli (pl. saba) NAN Talismans 
Sana (pl. samba) NAN Stranger 
Singal  Pidgin English Single barrel gun 
Sodoo NAN Peace (literally ‘calm’) 
Taremba (sg. tarma) NAN Commoner 
Tibòrtiib aabor LIK Chieftaincy (literally ‘chiefs’  
  matters’) 
Tigari Twi Anti-witchcraft shrine 
Timantotiib LIK Ritually obliged lineages 
Tinbihi (sg. tinbia) NAN Autochthons (literally ‘children of  
  the earth’) 
Tiŋbani NAN Earth shrine 
Tindana NAN Earth priest 
Tiyar aasambil LIK Pot with sand from earth shrine 
Tobu NAN Communal violence 
Ubòr LIK Chief 
Uchabobor LIK Konkomba paramount chief (literally  
  ‘Saboba chief’) 
Ukpiin  LIK Announcement horn 
Uninkpel (pl. bininkpiib) LIK Elder 
Utindaan (pl. bitindaam) LIK Earth priest 
Uwumbòr LIK God 
Wulana NAN Chief’s elder 
Wuni NAN Spirit  
Wunlaan LIK Chief’s elder 
Yidana NAN Landlord or husband 
Zabili NAN Quarrel 
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Summary in Dutch 
 
 
 
Spanningen tussen autochtonen en immigranten zijn een verontrustend fenomeen 
in veel delen van de wereld. In een relatief onbekend geval in noordoost Ghana 
hebben zulke spanningen geleid tot onvoorstelbare etnische zuiveringen tussen 
autochtonen en een groep immigranten. Hoewel de analyse van deze uitbars-
tingen veel bijdraagt aan het verkrijgen van inzicht in etnisch geweld, gaat deze 
studie vooral over de mogelijkheden om vrede te bereiken tussen deze groepen.  
Dit speelt zich af tegen de achtergrond van drie episodes van geweld tussen 
leden van de Konkomba en Nanumba etnische groepen in 1981, 1994 en 1995 in 
de twee Nanumba districten (die overlappen met het Nanumba Traditioneel 
Gebied Nanun). Elk van die geweldsuitbarstingen duurde slechts een aantal 
dagen maar resulteerde in duizenden burgerslachtoffers en ze waren als zodanig 
de meest intense geweldsuitbarstingen in een overigens relatief vreedzaam land. 
Een mengelmoes van noodhulpverstrekkende organisaties bracht in 1996 een 
vredesakkoord tot stand tussen vertegenwoordigers van beide groepen. Deze 
studie gaat vooral over de periode na 1996.  
In hoofdstuk 1 stel ik, door de beschrijving van een voetbalwedstrijd, de vraag 
of er vrede is in Nanun. Deze wedstrijd confronteerde mij namelijk met een 
gespannen kalmte die overeenkwam met één Konkomba en Nanumba definitie 
van vrede (respectievelijk nsudoon en sodoo), maar niet met een tweede definitie 
(eenheid, ofwel kimòkbaan of nangbaŋyini). Vanwaar deze kalmte? Deze kalmte 
was niet zondermeer conflictontwijkend gedrag, zoals Assefa, die het vredes-
akkoord tussen Konkomba en Nanumba sloot, stelde. Lang voor Assefa hebben 
antropologen zoals Tait en Skalník namelijk al laten zien dat een dergelijke 
vrede, waarvoor de voetbalwedstrijd een metafoor bleek te zijn, juist een typische 
manifestatie van interetnische relaties in dit deel van Ghana zijn (hoofdstuk 1).  
Het opzettelijk afzien van provocaties, zoals de tackles en beledigingen die 
karakteristiek zijn voor voetbalwedstrijden in dit deel van de wereld (en niet 
alleen daar), was uiteraard conflictontwijkend gedrag maar ik laat zien dat deze 
kalmte veeleer het resultaat is van een stiltegenererend legalistisch discours 
tussen Konkomba en Nanumba. Zo beschouwd was de voetbalwedstrijd een 
ongeschikte ontmoeting om de onderwerpen van conflict te bespreken. De kern 
van deze interpretatie is dat zowel Konkomba als Nanumba verwachten dat er in 
de toekomst een gelegenheid zal zijn waarin al deze onderwerpen benoemd en 
opgelost zullen worden en dat er dan pas eenheid in Nanun zal zijn. De meeste 
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Konkomba en Nanumba die ik sprak plaatsten de huidige ‘vrede’ halverwege 
tussen kalmte en eenheid.  
Het verlangen naar eenheid is expliciet geformuleerd in het Kumasi vredes-
akkoord dat in 1996 door Konkomba en Nanumba vertegenwoordigers gesloten 
werd. In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik zien hoe de twaalf clausules van dit akkoord grofweg 
in twee categorieën uiteenvallen, namelijk clausules die het gebruik van geweld 
in het conflict tegen gaan en clausules die het conflict door middel van consensus 
proberen te beëindigen. De huidige kalmte in Nanun, zoals die metaforisch in de 
voetbalwedstrijd naar voren kwam, toont het succes van de eerste groep clausules 
aan maar het tekortschieten van de tweede categorie. Hoewel Konkomba/Na-
numba relaties sinds 1996 geweldloos zijn geweest, is consensus over de 
oplossingen voor het conflict overschaduwd door een gebrek aan eenstemmig-
heid en vervolgens gevat in legalistische vormen van communicatie (autoritaire 
speeches en petities) die het conflict in het dagelijks leven het zwijgen lijken op 
te leggen.  
We kunnen daarom de vraag stellen hoe realistisch een vrede gebaseerd op 
consensus of eenheid is. Terwijl externe vredesonderhandelaars zoals Assefa in 
de Kumasi workshops, die de opmaat waren voor het akkoord, de traditionele 
eenheid van vóór het conflict probeerden te herstellen, deconstrueer ik deze visie 
op een traditioneel verleden. Ik toon aan dat deze representatie van consensus en 
vooral alle pogingen om deze te herstellen geen veiligheid brengen maar omdat 
deze een fictie is, veeleer teleurstelling teweegbrengen. Meer dan eens heeft een 
dergelijke teleurstelling geleid tot wantrouwen en zelfs grootschalig etnisch 
geweld.  
Om de kalmte in Nanun te kunnen begrijpen, heb ik in hoofdstuk 1 debatten 
over autochtonie, geweld en soevereiniteit, vredesopbouw en legalistische dis-
coursen met elkaar in verband gebracht. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat hoewel 
Konkomba en Nanumba altijd in stereotyperingen over elkaar hebben gesproken 
(feodale Nanumba of primitieve Konkomba), het juist een modernistische 
legalistische botsing tussen rechten, aan de ene kant gebaseerd op autochtonie 
(Nanumba) en aan andere kant op burgerschap (Konkomba) is geweest die aan 
de grondslag heeft gelegen van de conflicten in 1981 en 1994-1995. De 
Konkomba roep om autonome arbitrage van hun huwelijksgeschillen gevolgd 
door het claimen van hun recht op vrije vestiging in Nanun plaatste Konkomba 
en Nanumba in een dwangbuis van ogenschijnlijk rigide, maar in wezen nieuwe, 
etnische tegenstellingen.  
Hoofdstuk 2 bestudeert het samenleven van Konkomba en Nanumba vanaf het 
eerste schriftelijke bewijs van hun co-existentie in 1931 tot de eerste uitbarsting 
van geweld in 1981. In deze vijftig jaar transformeerde Nanun van een afgelegen 
plek in een Britse mandaatgebied waar nooit iets leek te gebeuren, tot Ghana’s 
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meest gespannen gebied. Dit is een geschiedenis van ontwikkeling, etnische 
emancipatie and processen van modernisering waarin sommige tradities werden 
omarmd en andere afgewezen, vanaf het moment waarop een Brits bestuurder 
klaagde dat Nanumba stil waren en werden gehinderd door taboes tot het 
moment dat Jeugdbewegingen pretendeerden namens hele etnische groeperingen 
te spreken. Dit hoofdstuk gaat, met hulp van debatten over burgerschap en 
autochtonie, over het proces waarin Konkomba en Nanumba zich slachtoffer van 
het wetteloze gedrag van de ander begonnen te voelen.  
In hoofdstuk 3 laat ik zien hoe deze onderwerpen van conflicten specifieke 
vormen of tropes (Geschiere & Jackson 2006) aannamen, namelijk die van 
geweld en een maatschappelijke stilte in de schaduw van speeches en petities van 
zogenaamde etnische woordvoerders. Hoewel deze vormen voortbouwden op 
morele veroordelingen op grond van een wederzijds gevoel van uitbuiting – 
Konkomba zouden Nanumba gastvrijheid uitbuiten en Nanumba zouden feodale 
dorpshoofden aanstellen in Konkomba dorpen – waren deze morele gevoelens 
onvoldoende grond voor geweld. Het grootschalige geweld tussen Konkomba en 
Nanumba was een poging om de wet in eigen hand te nemen om het ver-
onderstelde grondwetondermijnende en criminele gedrag van de ander een halt 
toe te roepen. Dit geweld was als zondanig het claimen van soevereiniteit, zeker 
door de aanvankelijke passiviteit van de overheid. Hoofdstuk 3 zet de chrono-
logie van hoofdstuk 2 voort, van de eerste uitbarsting van geweld in 1981 tot het 
tekenen van een vredesakkoord in 1996, in een afwisseling van escalatie en de-
escalatie. Dit hoofdstuk probeert die afwisseling te duiden, vooral door in te gaan 
op de relatie tussen stilte en geweld en kijkt naar de gevolgen voor de thema’s 
van verzoening en veiligheid uit het vredesakkoord.  
Hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 6 zijn kritische beschouwingen van de vormen die 
het conflict na het vredesakkoord heeft aangenomen. Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 
beschrijven hoe, voor het vredesakkoord werd gesloten, sommige Nanumba 
probeerden de stembusgang van Konkomba te verhinderen omdat ze als im-
migranten geen gelijk stemrecht zouden hebben, en hoe sommige Konkomba 
landrituelen uitvoerden in Nanumba offerplaatsen. Op grond van beschikbare 
informatie uit West Afrika verwachtte ik dat deze symbolen van autochtonen (de 
offerplaats voor het land) en van een burgermeerderheid (het stemkantoor) in 
spanningen gehuld zouden zijn. Mijn materiaal liet echter het tegenovergestelde 
zien: sinds 1996 hebben Nanumba de stemgang van Konkomba niet meer ver-
hinderd en hebben Konkomba de landoffers van Nanumba niet meer geprobeerd 
over te nemen, zelfs ook al werden deze onderwerpen aan een morele veroor-
deling onderworpen. Maar hoewel veel Nanumba Konkomba onvolwassen stem-
gedrag verweten en veel Konkomba Nanumba onverantwoordelijke landeige-
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naren vonden, stelden zij het respectievelijke stemrecht en offerrecht niet ter 
discussie.  
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op de impact van ‘moderne’ politiek (zowel wetgevend 
als uitvoerend) op Konkomba en Nanumba co-existentie. Ik begin daarom met 
een analyse van de demografische situatie van Nanun en in het bijzonder 
Chamba en hoe Konkomba daar een electorale meerderheid werden, gevolgd 
door een studie van de recente electorale en bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen in 
Nanun. Op een bepaald moment tijdens spanningen, vroeg een Konkomba aan 
het Nanumba hoofd van Chamba om het uitvoeren van landoffers om de rust te 
herstellen. Het hoofd weigerde dit verzoek en vond het een provocatie. In 
hoofdstuk 5 laat ik zien waarom het hoofd zo reageerde en hoe landoffers zich 
verhouden tot stereotypes van uitbuiting (economisch en ecologisch) maar niet 
tot het schenden van elkaars rechten. Landrituelen lijken daarom een onderwerp 
van tolerantie in plaats van een onderwerp van escalatie.  
De controverse over het benoemen van een Konkomba leider voor het stadje 
Chamba (hoofdstuk 6), laat nog duidelijker zien dat niet Konkomba burgerschap 
versus Nanumba autochtonie als zondanig spanningen genereert maar veeleer een 
(veronderstelde) botsing tussen twee sets van rechten en vooral de beslissings-
macht – als autochtonen of als demografische meerderheid – om één set van 
rechten te onderschikken aan de andere. Terwijl ze Nanumba dorpshoofden 
erkenden en ook de noodzaak om hun eigen leiders door deze hoofden te laten 
erkennen, accepteerden veel Konkomba niet de beslissingsmacht van deze 
hoofden om een Konkomba kandidaat af te wijzen (zoals in Chamba het geval 
was). Voor veel Nanumba, aan de andere kant, was deze Konkomba weigering 
een ondermijning van de meest fundamentele regel van het Nanumba leider-
schap, namelijk dat een benoeming te allen tijde een privilege is en nooit een 
recht. Deze patstelling werd niet opgelost door het Kumasi vredesakkoord maar 
er juist door versterkt, omdat de tweede clausule van dit akkoord een legalis-
tische verwijzing bleek voor beide perspectieven.  
Hoofdstuk 6 bestudeert het Chamba dispuut in detail, vanaf het begin, twee 
maanden na het ondertekenen van het vredesakkoord in 1996, tot de escalatie in 
2002, de erop volgende de-escalatie en nieuwe escalatie in 2006. Met clausule 
twee als leidraad, stel ik de vraag waarom het kiezen van een Konkomba 
hoofdman zo problematisch is en vooral waarom deze patstelling zo slecht op te 
lossen is. Wie heeft beslissingsmacht in deze zaak? Dit is de centrale vraag, niet 
alleen voor de Chamba zaak, maar voor de vrede in Nanun als zondanig. Zo kom 
ik tot een analyse die de meeste thema’s uit eerdere hoofdstukken aan elkaar 
verbindt, namelijk hoe autochtonie discoursen zich verhouden tot soevereiniteit, 
ofwel beslissingsmacht.  
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In het Chamba dispuut, en dan vooral in 2002, verwezen Konkomba en Na-
numba woordvoerders naar clausule twee van het vredesakkoord maar ze gaven 
beide een andere interpretatie van deze overeenkomst. Terwijl de Konkomba 
Jeugdbeweging de nadruk legde op de vrije keuze van Konkomba om hun leiders 
te kiezen, benadrukte de Nanumba Jeugdbeweging juist het tweede deel van de 
clausule, namelijk dat een dergelijke keuze overeen moet stemmen met de 
belangen van het Nanumba hoofd. In deze situatie zien we de grenzen van de 
consensus: terwijl Konkomba en Nanumba het eens zijn of Nanumba traditionele 
privileges en gelijke Konkomba rechten als burgers, overstijgt een innovatieve 
vorm van leiderschap zoals het Konkomba hoofdmanschap beide legalistische 
registers. De oplossing lijkt dus niet in de juridische sfeer te vinden te zijn en in 
plaats van consensus stel ik een vrede gebaseerd op compromis voor. 
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